When I sat down to write this paper I actually believed momentarily that I could demonstrate its thesis in a mere 20 pages. As I sat writing furiously it quickly grew beyond the bounds that could be encompassed by a brief reading at the haw

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Afghanistan remains as divided, impoverished and undemocratic as ever, opium production has surpassed the pre-9-11volume, and U.S Special Forces have signally failed to apprehend Osama bin Laden, who remains a continual inspiration to his followers and increasingly throughout the Muslim world.

The Bush administration is under heavy criticism for mounting American casualties and is making noises about the need to speed up the transfer of power to Iraqis via the national elections scheduled for January, though the U.S faces the daunting problem of persuading any of the leading factions that Iyad Alawi, with his longtime CIA connections, will serve Iraqi interests primarily. As Iraqi casualties mount every day either from car bombs detonated by Iraqi insurgents, or from U.S. air attacks on densely populated urban areas, increasing numbers of Iraqis are joining or abetting various factions fighting what they see as a U.S. occupation. According to a CIA operative who trained the Afghan “freedom fighters” to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, for every mujahideen killed by Soviet troops at least a half-dozen of his family members immediately took up arms in revenge. “Sadly this same rule probably applies in Iraq.” He added:

There were two stark lessons in the history of the 20th century. No nation that launched a war against another sovereign nation ever won. And every nationalist-based insurgency against a foreign occupation ultimately succeeded. 68

Troop morale among U.S. forces is declining, enlistments and re-enlistments among all troops but especially Reserves and National Guard units are rapidly dropping, and Bush is quietly filling draft board positions across the country, going so far as to inform them that 20 years olds will be drafted first should conscription be implemented. If the most influential voices within the administration are to be taken seriously, the president’s re-election and four more years of power are likely to result in the expansion of what they like to call the “war on terror” but which is, in fact, a great deal more than that, the political, military and economic consequences of which cannot yet be predicted but are certain to be tragic and wide-ranging.

1. Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street, (New York, MacMillan, 1948) 13.

2. Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian Hating and Empire Building, (New York, Schocken, 1990) 46-61.

3. Eric B. Schultz and Michael J. Tougias, King Philip’s War: The History and Legacy of America’s Forgotten Conflict, (Woodstock, Vermont, Countryman Press, 1999) 1-7.

1 David s. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust 1941-1945 (New York, Pantheon, 1984) 42-58; 243-251.

2 Patrick J. Heardon, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler: America’s Entry Into World War II (DeKalb, Illinois, Northern Illinois University Press, 1987) 184-185

3 Stephen R. Shalom, “VJ Day: Remembering the Pacific War,” Critical Asian Studies 35, no.3 (September 2003).

4 Ibid. 72.

5 Ibid. 69

6 Ibid. 155-188.

7 Ibid. 183-184.

8 Ibid. 158

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid. 185

11 Bruce M. Russett, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry Into World War II (New York, Harper and Row, 1972) 78-79.

12 Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities (New Haven, Yale University press, 1946) 784-787.

13 Fortune, May 1941.

14 Life, February 7, 1941

15 Russett, 44-62

16 Historians have long debated whether the 10-point message delivered by Secretary Hull to the Japanese on November 26, 1941 was an ultimatum or roadmap for a peaceful outcome of the U.S.-Japanese dispute. Hull himself said “You cannot give an ultimatum to a proud people and not expect them to react violently.” See, United States Congress, Report of the Joint committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, 1946, Part 5 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government printing Office, 1946) 2175.

17 James O. Richardson, On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson, USN (Washington, D.C., Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1973) 427.

18 Henry Lewis Stimson, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, Harper and Row, 1948)

19 David M. Kennedy, Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1999) 526; John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (New York, Berkeley Books, 1982) 264.

20 Edward s. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan 1897-1945 (Washington, D. C., Naval Institute Press, 1991)

21 Richardson,

22 Toland, 262

23 Ibid. 261-262

24 MAGIC was the generic code-name for the overall process of decoding Japanese transcripts. See, Robert B. Stinnettt, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (New York, The Free press, 2000).

25 Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1991) 109

26 Henry L. Stimson, Diary, November 25, 1941. Quoted in Hearden, 218.

27 Stinnett, 171-172; Toland, 6-7.

28 Stinnett, 189-198; Toland, 284-317.

29 Stinnett, 98-118; Toland, 314-315.

30 Toland, 316

31 From, Adolf Berle’s diary, June 3, 1941. Quoted in Stinnett, 97.

32 Stinnett, 149-156.

33 Stinnett, 175-176.

34 Kennedy, 535-544.

35 Many sources deal with these issues. See, John Jacob Beck, MacArthur and Wainwright: Sacrifice of the Philippines (Albuquerque, Univesity of New Mexico Press, 1974); Lewis Brereton, The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, October 1941-8 May 1945 (New York, Morrow, 1946); William Manchester, American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Boston, Little Brown, 1978); Louis Morton, United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines (Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953).

36 John Keegan,

37 Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott, 1972) 236-237. See also, Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974); Noam Chomsky, “The Savage Extreme of a Narrow Policy Spectrum,” Interview in Counterpunch, July 31, 2004.

38 Life, November 19, 1945; Collier’s, October 27, 1951

39 Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half-Century:United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987) 72-98.

40 Ibid. 77

41 Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil (New York, Three Rivers press, 2003) 79.

42 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, VIII, 54.

43 Carl Soberg, Oil Power: The Rise and Imminent Fall of an American Empire (New York, New American Library, 1976) 187.

44 Larry Everst, Oil, Power and empire: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda (Monroe, Me., common courage Press, 2004) 57.

45 McCormick, 77.

46 Ibid.

47 BarbaraTuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York, Grove press, 2001)

48 “National Security Paper Number 68,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, 1: 234-292.

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