What Defeated a Negative Income Tax?: Constructing a Causal Explanation of a Politically Controversial Historical Event


Appendix Two: Documentation for the Tables



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Appendix Two: Documentation for the Tables

For Tables 1, 2, and 5 a vote for FAP is 1 if the member voted for FAP and 0 if she or he did not. LIBERAL is the ADA liberal quotient - the proportion of votes that a member cast for the position favored by the Americans for Democratic Action on select measures important to that group. SOUTH indicates whether a member represented a district in a state defined as "South" by the U. S. Bureau of the Census. The states of the "South" so defined are: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. The source for SOUTH is U. S. Bureau of the Census 1982, 1. REPUBLICAN indicates whether a member is a Republican. EGALITARIAN indicates sponsorship of a bill more generous to the poor than FAP, and its source is Congressional Record - Senate (1970, 3111 and 13618) and Burke and Burke (1974, 177).

For Table 1 the source for a vote for FAP is Congressional Record - House (1970, 12105-6). LIBERAL is for 1970. ANTIWAR indicates whether a member voted the anti-administration antiwar position on a 1970 measure to increase military and economic aid to Cambodia. The source for LIBERAL, ANTIWAR, and REPUBLICAN is ADA World 1971, 6-8.

For Table 2 the source for a vote for FAP is Washington Post, November 21, 1970. LIBERAL is for 1970. ANTIWAR is the proportion of votes, on the two Vietnam war measures that ADA recorded during 1970, that a member cast for the antiwar anti-dministration position. The source for LIBERAL, ANTIWAR, and REPUBLICAN is ADA World 1971, 9. WORK indicates concern for a strong work requirement identified on the indicated pages of Mead (1986): Bennett (223, 228), Curtis (229, 231), Fannin (232-3), Hansen (229), Long (197, 228), and Talmadge (122, 202).

The sources for Tables 3 and 4 are Washington Post, November 21, 1970 and ADA World 1971, 9 respectively.

For Table 5 the source for the two House votes for FAP is Congressional Record - House (1971, 21462-3), and for the two Senate votes the sources are Congressional Record - Senate (1972, 33419) and (1972, 33657). LIBERAL is for 1971 in the House and 1972 in the Senate. ANTIWAR is the proportion of votes that a member cast for the antiwar anti-administration position of the Vietnam war measures - five each in the House and Senate - that ADA recorded during 1971. The source for LIBERAL, ANTIWAR, and REPUBLICAN is ADA World 1972,12-19.

The sources for Table 6 are ADA World 1971, 6-8 and 1972, 13-19, and the source for Table 7 is ADA World January 1972, 12-13. Bowler (1974, 118 and 145) is the source of Table 8, and Table 9 follows from the text of Appendix One.

Notes

1. Both Levine and Williams worked on NIT planning at OEO under Johnson but did not stay on under Nixon. The key holdover figures were Worth Bateman and Gordon Lyday. On the jockeying for position see Chapter 3 of Burke and Burke 1974.

2. After his contrast of "long range development in social policy" and "short term strategy to bring down the level of internal violence", Moynihan adds:

To avoid misunderstanding, two points about this short-term strategy should be made. First, it was my judgment that urban rioting would tend not to reoccur barring exceptional events or singularly clumsy government. Second, although FAP designed to help the poor, and especially the black poor, I assumed that it would have no short-term impact on the behavior or attitudes of this group. (1973, 12)

So he tries to distance his own reason for supporting FAP - i.e., to help the poor - and an Administration reason - i.e., to quell internal violence. Whether or not this locution succeeds in its goal of making him a noble character among cynics, it appears, in a curious way, to strengthen the credulity of his account of the reasons for Administration action.

3. Patterson stresses the causal not just reactive role of the federal agencies in the expansion of welfare rolls in a critique of Piven and Cloward 1971:

The focus on conflict as a cause of the welfare explosion is also one-sided in that it leaves the impression that the only impetus for change came from the poor themselves. Great though that force was, especially in contrast to what had been, it was accompanied by pressure from the federal welfare bureaucracy. Federal officials not only responded to agitation from below, they also encouraged and abetted it, in a dynamic relationship that maximized the thrust from the grass roots. (1986, 181)

So for Patterson the federal welfare bureaucracy's "eagerness to aid the poor was ... a force in itself' (1986, 181).

However, the Piven and Cloward and Patterson views are not completely at odds. About their 1971 work, Piven and Cloward point out:

We were saying that the poor can create crises but cannot control the response to them. They can only hope that the balance of political forces provoked in reponse to a disruption will favor concessions rather than repression. (1979, 282)

So from 1965 to 1969 a federal welfare bureaucracy, often inclined to aid the poor, dominated the response to the disruption of the urban black poor and helped to drive the welfare rolls explosion forward. Similarly the NIT planners who wished to help the poor came to dominate the Administration welfare reform discussion and so FAP rather than repression emerged.

4. This brief description of the original Administration FAP draws on Chapter 3 of Bowler (1974) and on the bill that the House passed (Congressional Record - House 1970, 12093-105), which Bowler 1974, Burke and Burke 1974, and Moynihan 1973 maintain differed little from the Administration proposal. 5. In contrast, defending FAP in the April 15, 1970 floor vote Representative Anderson (R, Illinois) argued:

The family assistance plan contains a requirement to register for work and strong incentives to accept training and employment. If a person fails to register for work, he will not receive the benefits; and if he refuses a suitable job or training, his benefits will be canceled. Only carefully defined groups would be exempted from the registration requirement. I know that some critics of FAP claim that the work incentive approach will not work and they cite the WIN program as an example. I think it is important at this point to say why certain WIN programs were less than successful, and to show how the FAP approach will avoid these pitfalls. Under the WIN program, a great deal of discretionary power was put in the hands of State social workers to define who was appropriate for referral to manpower training programs and employment....

Because of the wide latitude in discretionary powers left to State welfare agencies, we find great disparities in the percentage of AFDC adults deemed appropriate for referral from State to State....

The family assistance plan would strengthen the work requirement now in effect under WIN by completely eliminating these wide discretionary powers of referral. Instead, a new Federal agency would determine who is to register, and the guidelines on exemption would be explicit rather than discretionary and would be strictly enforced. Once a person has registered with the Employment Service, an individual employability plan would be worked out specifying what steps are necessary to insure permanent attachment to the labor force. And a team of specialists would be responsible for the follow-through on that plan. Job placement would be followed by the necessary coaching designed to prevent a high rate of job dropouts. (Congressional Record - House 1970, 11871)

So the case that FAP’s "work requirement" would be more stringent than WIN’s rested primarily on the assumption that the staff of the "new Federal agency" would be less lax in enforcing it - something no one could know for certain.

6. For fuller and accurate accounts of this attack see Moynihan 1973, 453-83 and Burke and Burke 1974, 151-8.

7. On the role of framing in welfare policy discourse see Rein and Schon 1991.

8. NWRO officials had testified on the Social Security Amendments under consideration by the Senate Finance Committee on September 19, 1967. During the hearing recess the organization staged the first sit-in ever in the chambers of a congressional committee. On this occasion Long referred to AFDC mothers as "brood mares". Thus did he and NWRO become bitter political enemies, and remained so throughout the period of the conflict over FAR (Moynihan 1973, 336 and Piven and Cloward 1979, 324­5 both refer to Long's "brood mare" remark.) The principle secondary sources on NWRO are Bailis 1974, Kotz and Kotz 1977 (including a 1966-1972 chronology on pp. 307-328), and Piven and Cloward 1979.

9. Ginsberg was the chief administrator of the New York City welfare department. "During the long battle for FAP, Ginsberg became the nearest thing to a full-time lobbyist for the reform. On near-weekly trips to Washington he planned strategy with Leonard Lesser, Center for Community Change, and often, with Clint Fair, AFL-CIO" (Burke and Burke 1974, 176). Moynihan confirms that "he gradually spent more time in Washington, ending the 91st Congress as the nearest thing to a full-time lobbyist the legislation had" and that his career contained "a moderating experience" (1973, 322) in contrast to those of other welfare professionals. Thus the three key secondary sources regard Ginsberg as in a position, and of a sufficiently thoughtful temperament, to reliably judge the possibility of breaking a filibuster.

10. For more details see Congressional Record - House 1971, 21,103-6 and 21,452-4 and Burke and Burke 1974, 165-77 on the House FAP; U. S. Congress 1972 on GJOP; and Congressional Record - Senate 1972, 33,075-94 for the Ribicoff FAP.

11. Bowler worked for Ribicoff in 1970 and 1971 as an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow so that his account of Ribicoff’s thinking on a compromise with Long is closer to that of a primary than secondary source.

12. Bowler gets his Conservative Coalition Opposition Scores from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1972, 78-80.

13. Could Nixon lobbying have gotten the June 22, 1971 House-passed FAP through the Senate? Not a single Senator had volunteered to sponsor that FAP version. That FAP also fell under Long's category of "these guaranteed income for not working schemes," and Nixon's HEW, Labor Department, and OMB people had estimated only 20 Senate votes for it. It is therefore implausible that Nixon lobbying could have gotten the June 22, 1971 House-passed FAP through the Senate.

14. Quadagno(1990) misreads into Moynihan an exaggeration of 91st Congress southern House Ways and Means Committee opposition to FAR

The Southern power elite was unwilling to relinquish existing political and economic arrangements. The most determined opponents of the FAP were Southern Democrats. In the Ways and Means Committee, five of the six Southern Congressmen opposed the FAP (Moynihan 1973, p. 257).

What Moynihan (1973, 256) actually wrote was: "Southern congressmen were later to vote 5 to 1 against FAP". He referred to the 79 to 17 (roughly 5 to 1) 91st Congress floor not Ways and Means) vote. Of the 9 Ways and Means southerners, at most 3 could have voted against FAP in committee because the vote for FAP there was 21 to 3 (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 1970, 736). On the floor, 3 of the 9 voted against FAP, 4 for, and 2 abstained (U. S. Congress 1970a, 2 and Congressional Record House 1970,12105-6). So, contrary to Quadagno's misreading of Moynihan, 91st Congress Ways and Means southerners did not vote overwhelmingly against FAP in committee or on the floor.




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