Ways forward in global counterterrorism Anna Cornelia Beyer Abstract:
This article argues that the US-led policies of countering terrorism have created a new area of global governance. While this is a positive development per se, problems persist with the military and intelligence focus of global counterterrorism policies. Rather, for addressing the underlying conditions which contribute to the emergence of terrorism long-term, economic and social development policies are needed. For this purpose, global counterterrorism policies need to be better integrated with other areas of global governance. This would aid both the effectiveness of counterterrorism and other foreign policies.
About the author:
Cornelia Beyer is lecturer in security studies at the University of Hull, UK. Her main research interests are International Relations, Counterterrorism and Terrorism, and Global Governance. She is the author of ‘Violent Globalisms – Conflict in Response to Empire’ (2008 Ashgate) and ‘Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance’ (2010 IB Tauris).
Wordcount (without footnotes): 5462
The last decade has been marked by a political obsession with creating and implementing measures to counter terrorism. Particularly the United States created a large set of policies aimed at countering political violence directed against them – from outside or inside their own country -, established institutions – nationally or internationally – to enable international cooperation in and global management of these policies, and promoted the pursuit of counterterrorism as a priority on the international level. By now, nearly globally states have been integrated into regimes promoting counterterrorism measures of wide range. This article will look at the most important positive and negative outcomes of these policies and argue that we need to utilize the positive gains from the former Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) to spread cooperation, stability and welfare.
This article is divided into three main parts. First, it is going to describe in which ways global counterterrorism efforts have created global governance in a new policy field. It will argue that herein lies the main advantage and the most important positive outcome of the GWOT. Second, the article will criticize the strong focus in counterterrorism on military approaches and intelligence, which, while useful in pursueing terrorists, don't add much to the resolution of the underlying problems contributing to the emergence of terrorism. In a third step, it will be argued that we have to utilize the positive achievements from the GWOT for increasing stability, peace and prosperity on a global level. The mechanisms, networks and procedures which have been created with the purpose to counter terrorism need to be utilized to spread global governance in further areas and strengthen it in existing ones. Here, this article will conclude by arguing that we need to refocus our collective efforts away from the 'state of security' towards the 'conditions of security'. We need to focus on soft policy matters to reduce the conditions which allow for the emergence of political violence in order to pursue an effective longterm strategy. Of particular interest for countering terrorism are policies of foreign aid, rightly used. These can address the underlying grievances and thereby reduce motives for joining terrorist groups and in the long term reduce terrorist activity.
The emerging Global Governance of Counterterrorism
Global governance is the creation of globally cooperative networks spanning many levels and including a diverse array of actors with the goal to collectively address global problems. It is supported by the creation of international regimes, and institutionalized in international organizations and international law. Global governance is understood as the most powerful tool to address in particular the externalities of globalization. These problems need transnational, integrated responses to be effectively an efficiently addressed. National policies are virtually helpless against them.
Many authors have argued that, for example, globalisation – while bringing about a vast array of positive changes – also produces negative externalities which – similarly to the processes of globalisation itself – are of transnational nature. Many of these externalities, or ‘unintended side-effects’ of globalisation are presenting political problems which call for solutions. The solutions, however, can only be found on the supranational level, in global cooperation, due to their transnational nature and their connectedness to other global processes. Examples of such externalities would be: climate change, global migration, mass-unemployment due to shifts in the economy of production on the global level, and so forth. Also, transnational terrorism can be understood as an externality of globalisation, if one accepts the explanation that globalisation and related processes contributed to the emergence of this specific form of political violence. Al Quaeda in its declarations of war particularly referred to Western foreign policies as an essential element of globalisation for explaining their motives of struggle. As this new threat is presenting itself as a clandestine, transnational network, with potentially global reach and connections and cells in many countries around the globe, the policies to counter this threat need to be globally integrated. As Cordesman writes:
We cannot deal with international terrorism unless we do cooperate. Terrorist groups have shown that they can easily move across national lines. They have shown that they can find sanctuaries in the nation that is the weakest link, and exploit the differences between nations and cultures as weapons. No country can seal its own borders or rely on self-defense, and participate in today’s global economy. No nation can fight terrorism throughout the world on its own. National defense and response capabilities are critical to counterterrorism but they cannot be enough.i The need to counter terrorism emerged in the present intensity only a decade ago, with the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the realisation that groups such as Al Quaeda targeted Western countries, abroad as well as their homelands. To that date, there had not been many policies in existence in most places, not nationally and particularly not internationally. While some countries, such as the UK and Germany, profited from experiences in the 1980s, and others, such as Spain and France, had some current internal terrorism to counter even before that date, many states realised that their policies to counter an emerging transnational threat of large-scale terrorist attacks were insufficient. Of course, the main driving force behind the creation of new counterterrorism policy and cooperation was the United States, the main target of Al Quaeda. They started to lobby strongly for the creation of not only international collaboration, but also the strengthening of measures in counterterrorism on national levels.
In fact, the United States created a dominant discourse, similar to the previous discourse on globalisation, to promote global cooperation in the field of counterterrorism. One of the elements of this discourse was the assertion that political violence in the form of substate terrorism presented the major security threat for societies in current times, and that countering this threat should therefore be given priority. In many places, this discourse was adopted and internalised.ii But this discourse only served as the background for much wider-ranging policies of counterterrorism promotion. They, in addition, helped create international bodies which were supposed to focus on the monitoring of counterterrorism cooperation (for example the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force of the United Nations); they supplied many countries with aid in military matters with the goal to strengthen their capacity to counter terrorism nationally; they organised a global strategy and common policies to counter the financing of terrorist organisations, for which they established the Financial Action Task Force; and they collaborated intensely on a bilateral level with many states to promote their increased engagement in and cooperation in counterterrorism matters. This list could be continued.
Therefore, the formerly so-called 'Global War on Terrorism' has brought about political arrangements of cooperation which can be described as global governance. They have done so in an area where little cooperation on a global level, and in many cases even few policies on the national level, existed before. In particular the United States helped to create networks of cooperation in this new policy field on a nearly global level. The majority of states internationally in the past ten years have started to create and implement their own counterterrorism policies. Even Cuba now has legal measures against terrorism in place. Also, many states participated – even if to varying degrees – in global counterterrorism cooperation.
Cordesman rejects the interpretation that true cooperation in the field of counterterrorism has developed.iii In his view, this assumption is based on a number of ‘myths’. For example, for full cooperation to happen on a global level, resources in all countries would need to be sufficient to engage in counterterrorism policies; all countries would need to share the interpretation that violent political dissent needs to be countered, and would need to act based on this interpretation towards state sponsors of terrorism as well as non-state actors; all countries would need to be willing to freely share intelligence, and to keep it secure at the same time; and finally, all countries would need to share a common definition of terrorism and common values with regards to what constitutes terrorism.iv While according to this perspective, cooperation in the field of counterterrorism still leaves much to desire, the same can be said of all other areas of global governance and according to Cordesman’s definition no area of global governance would be marked by true international cooperation. I will therefore here not apply the strict definition of Cordesman, but rely on an argument made in Beyer: ‘Global counterterrorism cooperation encompasses more than certain rules of behaviour over a particular issue. For one, counterterrorism cooperation is reflected in a large number of areas … such as financial control, border control, immigration regulation, intelligence cooperation, traditional security policies and so forth. … Furthermore, it encompasses more than ‘rules and regulations’, ‘plans’ and ‘energies’ affecting cooperation.v’ This distinguishes cooperation in counterterrorism from regimes, being wider and broader in nature, and makes the mechanisms, structures and policies of counterterrorism cooperation rather ressemble an emerging form of global governance.
The mistaken focus on military means in global counterterrorism
The ‘Global War on Terrorism’, since its beginning, has focused more on military and intelligence measures to counter the threat than applying softer means towards this goal. With March 2011, Congress had approved a total of $1.283 trillion ‘for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).’vi Of this, $1,414.8 billion were assigned to the two military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2007 the spending for the military efforts amounted to $170.9 billion, in 2008 to $185.7 billion and in 2009 to $155.1 billion. Other estimates even figured the costs for the Iraq war alone at above $3 trillion.vii
Compared to that, overall the United States in 2007 spent $18,901 million on foreign aid to developing countries; in 2008 the sum amounted to $23,860 million. In 2009, the United States spent $25,174 million on foreign aid. In 2009, the Near East and South Asia together received $11,778 million in grants and credits; Africa received $6,022 million. In 2008, the total foreign assistance from the United States towards North Africa and the Middle East amounted to $13,956 million, of which $8,382 million comprised military assistance.viii Therefore, the military aspects have received more attention in the foreign policies generally, and in counterterrorism policy specifically.
It has been argued that the military-centred approach against terrorism has had several problematic effects. The most prominent among them obviously is the legitimacy-crisis which the United States created with it's highly disputed intervention in Iraq. According to international law – so the widespread concern – being an illegal act of aggression, this intervention has set precedents of unilateral attack which could – and with the case of Russia potentially already has – erode the general will to comply with the international standard of non-aggression lest it be authorized by the United Nations Security Council. The implications of this for future international relations should not be underestimated. If international law is not upheld by the strongest power in the world, who will protect it and comply with it? Secondly, particularly the Iraq intervention has brought the hegemon, the United States, into miscredit with the international community as well as the peoples of the world. While the approval rates for the US have shot up to previous levels under Obama, foreign policies such as these mentioned could serve to decrease the legitimacy and consensus which the US hegemony is based on. This could affect global stability as well as the international capacity to cooperate and to create trust among nations.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, military strategies to counter terrorism serve short-term goals, but aid little to guarantee long-term success in the struggle against political violence. The argument, that military interventions increase the motivational basis – as a precondition – to engage in terrorism against the perceived occupational power has been theoretically and empirically substantiatedix. But not only do interventions increase hatred against the West, also – per se – they help little to address other underlying conditions which contribute to the emergence of terrorism.
Issues, such as rampant unemployment, substandard education, poor social services and healthcare, and a general lack of development with at least the chance to future prosperity need to be addressed to tackle what has been described as lying at the root of the problem of political violence. The recent uprisings in the Middle East are just one outcome of a serious development crisis in the region. While apparently yet there is no connection to be drawn between the revolts and groups such as Al Quaeda, the situation could change if the West does not help ensure improvements in this area.
Poverty, inequality, etc., are all regarded as preconditions for terrorism to occur, and while the leading figures of terrorist groups such as Al Quaeda might be affluent, the footsoldiers often are from the impoverished, unemployed strata. Young people, particularly male, without reasonable expectations for their lifes are more vulnerable to be recruited by terrorist groups.
Political oppression and lack of democracy, freedom and participation are also important aspects contributing to the emergence of terrorism. However, while rhetorically important in the past, the spread of these goods is not necessarily aided by military interventions – at least not on their own. Political change, while desirable, is not necessarily achieved by interventions. Democracy has to be build from below, engaging peoples power. As the recent events in the Middle East illustrate, peoples are ready for change in many places. Supporting their struggles is a reasonable strategy. Libya hopefully will turn out as a more successful example of democratization, than, for example, Afghanistan. However, supporting these developments with military power alone will not be enough to secure stabilization and democracy in the long-term in these cases. Additional supporting policies are necessary to engage these new democracies and aid them on their way to stabilization. Otherwise, the short-term euphoria of victory and change might be overshadowed soon by following years with increased occurrence of violence. For stabilization, though, integration of these states an for enabling widespread support, we need the mechanisms of global governance.
Global governance as a tool to counter terrorism
As argued above, global governance has been established on a far-ranging scale in the area of counterterrorism in the recent decade. While the precise scope of cooperation is hard to estimate, it surely spans all continents, most countries and a wide array of measures. Cooperation mechanisms have been established, positive relations formed, with many countries on a global scale. Institutions – nationally, regionally, and again globally – have been erected. International hard and soft law has been created.
All this serves as a perfect basis for utilizing these new governance structures to insert new policies, more positively directed at creating stability, democracy and prosperity. The existing structures can be used to spread cooperation in the sphere of the economy, environmental protection, social issues. In parts, this has already happened as a natural effect of counterterrorism – for example in the area of immigration – , a strategic element of it – for example with intensive aid to Iraq and Afghanistan for development in the social sphere - or as a spillover from these efforts. While therefore the mentioned positive aspects are already present to some degree, much more could be achieved if the global governance structures of counterterrorism cooperation would be integrated with cooperation in other fields of mutual concern. And again, in many areas this is happening. Southeastasia, for example, is engaged in positive relations both in the security realm as well as economically with the United States. These serve as the background and basis for successful counterterrorism cooperation. For Afghanistan and Iraq, development aid is already a central second pillar in the fight against terrorism and does strongly accompany the military efforts in these states.
The global governance of counterterrorism must continue to get better integrated into general global governance approaches and must be well balanced with other, non-military forms of cooperation. Global cooperation from the United States should refocus on global development matters. Development cooperation then could well be made dependent on successful cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism.
It is of utmost interest to the policy community, to find more effective and efficient ways of countering terrorism. However, as argued above, these new methods need to focus less on military and intelligence approaches and instead increasingly include soft measures which serve rather long-term goals and aim at preventing future terrorism by tackling what has been described as the ‘root causes’ of political violence.
Economic Causes of Terrorism
For making the argument, that a revised counterterrorism policy is needed, we need to investigate the motivations for terrorism again. An effective counterterrorism policy should, arguably, address these motivations, or ‘root causes’ of terrorism and thereby reduce its renewed occurrence.
While the connection between underdevelopment and civil war is clearly established, a similar connection between terrorism and underdevelopment is harder to make. Part of the problem results from the mere structure of particularly transnational terrorist groups, who, by their very nature are spanning potentially the whole globe and acting across borders. On the other hand, some successful attempts at showing a positive relation between poverty in countries of origin and the emergence of terrorism from these countries have been made.
Mesquitax has presented the recent findings with regards to selected causes of terrorism. One of the most discussed potential reasons for terrorism to occur is poverty or underdevelopment. As Mesquita finds, the results with regard to the relation between poverty and terrorism are mixed, but indicative. On the one hand, Krueger and Laitin found that ‘wealthy countries are more likely to suffer terrorist attacks and that economic performance is not a statistically significant predictor of which countries terrorists emerge from’.xi Abadiexii finds no statistically significant relationship between per capita GDP and terrorism risk. On the other hand, several authors have found a ‘statistically significant negative correlation between measures of economic performance an the level of terrorist violence’xiii. Also, Li and Schaubxiv found that economic development in a country reduces terrorism in that country.
Another approach focuses on the economic situation of terrorists themselves. Krueger and Maleckovaxv and Berrebixvi find that terrorist operatives from Hezbollah and Hamas are ‘neither poor nor poorly educated’xvii. Usually, they are well educated and come from relatively well-off backgrounds. Therefore, so the argument, improving the economic conditions in a country would not have any impact on reducing the emergence of terrorism. This argument has been refuted repeatedly. For one, terrorist groups are complex entities, with their own internal hierarchies and structures. And it has been established that the lower ranks among these groups, such as the suicide bombers themselves, are rather found to be coming from the unemployed poor than the middle ranks of researchers and technicians, or the upper echelons of leadership figures. Also, it has been argued that terrorist groups apply strategies of recruitment similar to any business organisation: they try to primarily select those individuals from the pool of interessees which are best qualified, best educated. And these are of course not to be found among the poorest. Finally, terrorist groups need not be comprised of the poorest people themselves in order to make a connection between underdevelopment and this form of violence. It would suffice if these groups adopt the plight of their fellow countrymen, for example, as a motivation to engage in political struggle.xviii Foreign Aid as a Tool against Terrorism
While early on the main focus in the Global War on Terrorism was on the military and intelligence, foreign aid as a tool has also been used to counter terrorism. Even under Bush, in fact, foreign aid to developing countries increased. Recipients have been particularly Afghanistan and Iraq, where schools and hospitals have been built, infrastructure established, and so forth.
Foreign aid as a tool to counter terrorism is, however, contended. The main argument utilized against the use of foreign aid for this purpose is the claim that most members of terrorist organisations, such as Al Quaeda, do not belong to the poorer strata of their respective socities. As there is indication, however, that poverty does contribute to the emergence of terrorism, even if probably not alone, foreign aid as a tool to counter this threat should be taken more seriously.
Several studies have researched the potential contribution of foreign aid for the reduction of terrorism. Interestingly, two studies confirm strongly the positive important role of foreign aid for the reduction of terrorism. However, they also caution: Foreign aid, if it is used by illiberal regimes in order to suppress political violence by restricting political freedoms and by generally repressing the population does in fact not help to decrease the emergence of terrorism. Foreign aid is thought to have the most positive effect against terrorism in the country of origin. The following conclusion is worth full mentioning:
The results confirm the effectiveness of foreign aid to reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating from the recipient country. In the host country, the impact of foreign aid may be different as counter-terrorism measures also influence the number of imported attacks. This finding suggests that there are incentive problems regarding the role of foreign aid, which must be not too intrusive in the policy of the recipient government. Foreign military interventions are also counter-productive and they seem to be a strong attraction factor for terrorists. A strong presence of foreign actors in the recipient country or foreign influence might in fact be counter-productive.xix This not only confirms the positive impact of foreign aid on terrorism, but also provides evidence against the utility of military means in the struggle against substate violence. Particularly the rejection of military means as an effective counterterrorism tools has been well established.xx Military interventions are thought to rather inspire more hatred against the West; they provide more grounds and motivation to join in the struggle against the perceived ‘imperialist’ or occupation power.
Furthermore, oppressive approaches in the pursuit of counterterrorism have been found to be counterproductive:
The evidence suggests that repressive counterterrorism measures may not be the optimal way to fight terrorism. Government crackdowns and harsh repressive measures funded by foreign aid can create a societal backlash and lead to more support for terrorist groups and thereby increase the supply of terrorist attacks.xxi
A New Global Governance of Counterterrorism
Have the policies of global counterterrorism pursued in the last decade brought more harm than good? The obsession with integrating the world into a global struggle against political violence from below the state has brought very mixed results for the peace and stability ten years after the attacks of 9/11.
On the one hand, the states of the world have been integrated into a global regime of counterterrorism. On a global level, nearly all states participate in some form or other in counterterrorism activities. This has been described as a new form of global governance, hegemonially led, which integrates the world with the purpose of much needed cooperation in a new policy field. Beyerxxii has shown the mechanisms of this new form of global governance which rests on the common belief that terrorism is a major threat to our societies, but also on very rational considerations of external gains from cooperation in this field. A very positive result of this cooperation is the possibility to use the existing networks and cooperation mechanisms in this field to enable spill over of global governance processes into other areas. As the widening of globally collective ordering activities is desired and very much needed for the solution of manifold global issues, this is certainly a very positive outcome. The collective efforts to create cooperation in the field of counterterrorism now need to be deepened and broadened, to create collaboration in the wider security dimension. The United States should utilize existing channels to help bring about cooperation even in higher security spheres. With potential conflicts expected to arise from a rising China and the growing strength of its potential allies, such as India and Russia, deepened networks of global governance in the security sphere – in whatever form surpassing the existing mechanisms of the United Nations – could bring immense benefits for future peace.
However, special care has to be given to concerns about human rights and civil liberties. In many states even in the West, concerns have been uttered about human rights abuses and infringements on civil liberties. We compromise our democratic standards and achievements of the past if we allow this to happen. The UN, as a central institution promoting counterterrorism, as well as the US, need to develop clear guidelines how security measures can be married to human rights protection and democratic principles.
Not only do we need to defend our values and principles, though, as otherwise we lose against the main threat which is posed by terrorism. Also, we need to refocus our efforts away from being centred around the military and intelligence towards an even stronger inclusion of ofter and more cooperative means.
Several studiesxxiii have argued that political violence against the West is at least partially inspired by a history of interventions in the Middle East. If we continue to use 'the sword' against peoples, states and regions, we will create more terrorism in the long term. The application of hard policies against terrorism is effective in the short term – by binding the resources of terrorist groups and by decimating their numbers – it does not allow for an effective long term strategy with the aim to reduce the motives for people to join such groups.
Therefore, the policie pursued by Western countries include measures of support for developing countries in the critical regions and beyond. We need to help bring about increases in employment rates, improved education, better social services and health care. Only by spreading wealth to the Middle East and other suffering areas we will be able to drain the potential support basis for current or future terrorism long term.
The recent uprisings in the Middle East are one result of the increasing difficulties the peoples of this region face. While the revolts and demonstrations speak all but for support for Al Quaeda, these hardships – if not addressed with the help of the West – might serve as a breeding ground for political violence in the future.
The positive achievements from the former 'Global War on Terrorism' therefore should be utilized to bring states globally together to work towards the goals not only of security, but also of stability and prosperity. Mechanisms, networks and procedures have been widely established. They should be used to deepen cooperation also in other political spheres, such as development, employment, and so forth. Only then we can count on future long term success against terrorism.
It has been argued that the collective efforts in global counterterrorism are resembling a still emerging area of global governance, a new policy field in which collaborative global ordering activities are pursued. Not only are states pursueing policies of counterterrorism on a national level, they also collaborate to spread cooperation and effective approaches, to promote further efforts in other states and regions, and to support each others activities with technical support, legal advise and knowledge transfer. The development of this hegemonially led new form of global governance is certainly the most important an most positive outcome of the formerly so-called Global War on Terrorism. Not only has it created cooperation where little cooperation existed before 2001, also it created the basis for potentially increased future cooperation on a widened and deepened basis. Hence, the newly created global governance in the area of counterterrorism could serve as a springboard to allow for spillover of collaboration and integration into other policy fields. While the potential, for example, to increase cooperation in higher levels of security on a global level is desirable, in this area it is the least certain as still strong considerations of sovereign autonomy in this field persist, even in Europe, and trust among states in many regions of the world is still a scarce commodity. However, according to the logic of spillover, it even here is possible and already happening that cooperation on the lower level of security, which is counterterrorism, accustoms states to increased collaboration and trust in the realm of security generally. In addition, cooperation in counterterrorism could be used to either incite or strengthen cooperation in other fields of global concern where it is either no-existent or weak. The policies pursued in the last decade in th name of global counterterrorism have been largely focused on military and intelligence measures. Not only were these policies extremely expensive, also they don't necessarily contribute much to longterm success against political violence. Short term, amazing achievements have been made, the most prominent among them obviously the killing of Osama bin Laden. It is widely predicted that Al Quaeda is weakened or even 'finished'. But how much guarantees this that the West does not need to fear further attacks in the future, as long as the underlying conditions for terrorism do persist?
This article analyzed the global policies in the formerly so-called ‘Global War on Terrorism’ and described them as a new, emerging area of global governance. Furthermore, it argued that in the past these policies had wrongly focused in an unbalanced way on military and intelligence measures, underutilizing the preventive power of softer policies as a counterterrorism tool. This set the background to argue that foreign policy, as an economic tool in the struggle against terrorism, should become on of the primary approaches in countering political violence, and that the structures of ‘counterterrorism global governance’ should be utilized to spread these new policies. Foreign aid as a policy against terrorism would particularly address the underlying, so-called ‘root causes’ of terrorism and thereby reduce its future reccurrence. Also, integration of policies would serve the efficiency of counterterrorism and other foreign policies alike, and would lastly render the international reputation of the United States more benign.
i Anthony Cordesman, ‘The Lessons of International Cooperation in Counterterrorism’, Address to the RUSI Conference on Transnational Terrorism, A Global Approach, January 18, 2006, pp. 2.
ii Anna Cornelia Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations: The EU, ASEAN and Hegemonic Global Governance (London: IB Tauris, 2010).
iii Anthony Cordesman, ‘International Cooperation in Counterterrorism: Redefining the Threat and the Requirement’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Working Draft, 2010, online: http://csis.org/files/publication/100315_IntCoopinfightterror.pdf (accessed 28.09.2011).
iv Cordesman, ‘International Cooperation in Counterterrorism’, p. 6.
v Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations, p. 136f.
vi Amy Belasco, ‘The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11’, CRS Report for Congress, 2011, online: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf (accessed 27.09.2011), summary.
vii Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (Victoria: Allen Lane, 2008).
viii U.S. Census Bureau, ‘Foreign Commerce & Aid: Foreign Aid’, 2011, online: http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/foreign_commerce_aid/foreign_aid.html (accessed 27.09.2011).
ix Cornelia Beyer, Violent Globalisms – Conflict in Response to Empire (London: Ashgate, 2008); and Robert Pape, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
x Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, ‘The Political Economy of Terrorism: A Selective Overview of Recent Work’, 2011, online: http://home.uchicago.edu/~bdm/PDF/pe-terror.pdf (accessed 27.09.2011), p. 2.
xi Alan B. Krueger and David Laitin, ‘Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism’, in Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza, eds., Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 148-173.
xii Alberto Abadie, ‘Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism’, American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 96:2, 2006, pp. 50-56.
xiii S. Brock Blomberg et al., ‘Economic Conditions and Terrorism’, European Journal of Political Economy 20:2, 2004, pp. 463-478; and Kostas Drakos and Andreas Gofas, ‘In Search of the Average Transnational Terrorist Attack Venue’, Defence and Peace Economics 17:2, 2006, pp. 73-93.
xiv Quan Li and Drew Schaub, ‘Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist Incidents: A Pooled Time Series Cross Sectional Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:2, 2004, pp. 230-258.
xv Alan B Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, ‘Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:4, 2003, pp. 119-144.
xvi Claude Berrebi, ‘Evidence About the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism Among Palestinians’, Princeton University Industrial Relations Section Working Paper #477, 2003.
xvii Mesquita, ‘The Political Economy of Terrorism’, p. 2.
xviii Beyer, Violent Globalisms.
xix Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, ‘Where to Spend Foreign Aid to Counter Terrorism’, 2010, online: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/IMG/pdf/y10_m12_SER_Thelen.pdf (accessed 27.09.2011), p. 35.
xx Cornelia Beyer and Michael Bauer, eds., Effectively Countering Terrorism: The Challenges of Prevention, Preparedness and Response (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2009).
xxi Burcu Savun and Jude C. Hays, ‘Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: Aid Delivery Channels, State Capacity, and NGOs’, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper, 2011, online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1900690 (accessed 27.09.2011), p. 25.
xxii Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations.
xxiii Beyer, Violent Globalisms; Pape, Cutting the Fuse.