# Version 1: Release Note 28 November 2014

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Decimal Representation
 Vended by supplier Originator Counter (64 bits) 1001001010001111110001110010110000000000000000000000000000000000 10,560,878,642,999,590,912 UTRN Counter (32 bits) 10010010100011111100011100101100 2,458,896,172 PTUT Truncated UTRN Counter (10 bits) 1100101100 812 Recorded on Device Highest entry in UTRN Counter Cache (32 bits) = V 10010010100011111100011100100111 2,458,896,167

 Step Description Example Binary Representation Decimal Representation 1 The method requires 4 signed 32 bit integers, p, q, r and s 2 Set p = the numeric value of the least significant 10 bits of the highest UTRN Counter value in the UTRN Counter cache (V) 1100100111 807 3 Set q = V – p q = 2,458,896,167 – 807 10010010100011111100010000000000 2,458,895,360 4 Set r = PTUT Truncated Originator Counter 1100101100 812 5 Calculate p – 29 (Call this variable, x) (See footnote 39) x = 812 - 512 100101100 300 6 Calculate p + 29 (Call this variable, y) y = 812 + 512 10100101100 1324 7 Test r against x and y and set s accordingly If r < x then s = r + 210 If r > y then s = r – 210 Else s = r 300 < 812 < 1324, therefore s = r 1100101100 812 8 Set deduced Originator Counter = (q + s) *232 1001001010001111110001110010110000000000000000000000000000000000 10,560,878,642,999,590,912 9 Set deduced UTRN Counter as most significant 32 bits of Deduced Originator Counter 10010010100011111100011100101100 2,458,896,172

Table 27: Derivation of the UTRN Counter from the PTUT Truncated UTRN Counter – a worked example

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1 This document also includes the HAN Connected Auxiliary Load Control Switches (HCALCS) Technical Specification, the Prepayment Interface Device (PPMID) Technical Specification (PPMIDTS), and the In Home Display (IHD) Technical Specification (IHDTS)

2 http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680-X.693-200811-I/en

3 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5912

4 HAN Only Messages are ZigBee commands or response commands. This includes HAN Only Messages passed between Devices using the ZSE TransferData, for example a Command from a PPMID to a GSME.

5 IEC 61334-6

6 http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf

7 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf

8 Supplier and Network Operator credentials on the Communications Hub (Gas Proxy) relate to the supply of gas only. These Trust Anchor Cells on a Communications Hub are still required and valid where there is no GSME connected to the SMHAN, but the stores should be populated with Access Control Broker certificates (so ensuring the Gas Proxy functionality, apart from Update Security Credentials, is inoperable)

9 http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5280/

10 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-4/fips-180-4.pdf

11 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf

12 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf

13 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf

14 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf

15 See Mapping Table for identification of Variant Messages

16 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1700

17 See Green Book.

18 Terms defined within this section are only used within this section, and therefore not included in the Glossary (Section 21).

19 See Section 6.10.3 of ZigBee Document 09-5264-23

20 As defined in Section 6.10 of ZigBee Document 09-5264-23

21 As defined in Sections 6.10.10 and 6.8.4 of ZigBee Document 09-5264-23

22 ZigBee Document 095264

23 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5759

24 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5480

25 The Contingency Key is a second public key held in the Root Certificate (and protected with an encryption key). Its sole purpose is to allow the validation of a specific command that allows direct replacement of the Root Trust Anchor. The command (an Apex Trust Anchor Update message) is signed with a private key (used once only, and only to sign this message) that only the second public key (known as the Contingency Key) can verify and therefore authorise action of.

26 Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, ‘Trust Anchor Management Protocol (TAMP)’, RFC 5934, August 2010. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5934

27 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4108

28 https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/en

29 https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680/en

30 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2986

31 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5967

32 This is unrelated to the ZSE meaning of ‘joining’

33 The shared secret between the Communications Hub and the Type 2 Device / GSME established when the Device joined the HAN shall be used by the GPF to authenticate with the Device.

34 To avoid duplication of specification, the Use Cases here are grouped together, and the standard Use Case cross reference table is not used.

36 This derivation places a practical limit on the maximum increment between issued sequentially UTRN Counters. An increment of greater than (29 -1) between a UTRN Counter and the next one issued will cause this derivation to be inaccurate

37 See: (1) Verhoeff, J. (1969). Error Detecting Decimal Codes (Tract 29). The Mathematical Centre, Amsterdam. doi:10.1002/zamm.19710510323., (2) Kirtland, Joseph (2001). Identification Numbers and Check Digit Schemes. Mathematical Association of America. p. 153. ISBN 0-88385-720-0. Retrieved August 26, 2011. (3) Salomon, David (2005). Coding for Data and Computer Communications. Springer. p. 56. ISBN 0-387-21245-0. Retrieved August 26, 2011

38 Available from http://www.triple-3.co.uk/sswg/.

39 In some cases where p < 512, this result may be negative. How negative binary numbers are represented in the calculation is an implementation decision, and not a matter for the GBCS since there is no impact on interoperability.

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