102 Just the elephants were good for an average of 10 reports every week in the key dispersal areas of the Tsavo Conservation Area between 1990 and 2006 (Cheptei 2007). However, between 1995 and 1997 the PAC in Taita-Taveta only had access to one truck and two motorbikes to cover an area of 11.000 km², which was clearly inadequate. In addition, the costs of running these vehicles already consumed about 9% of the Tsavo National Park's annual budget (Smith & Kasiki 2000: 23).
103 I want to thank the Community Wildlife Office in Voi for generously making available their reports. Calculations have been made using the official Human Wildlife Conflict reports of Taita-Taveta district, which are produced by the community office every month and used to report and evaluate its performances. The report of June 2007 was unfortunately not to be found, and this month is therefore missing in the calculations.
104 A third offence leading to prosecution was illegal burning of wood to produce charcoal.
105These numbers are based on the official Arrests and Prosecution Reports for the months January, March, April and June 2006 of the Community Wildlife Office in Voi, which generously made these available.
106 Also observed by Otuoma (2004) in a case study of the Meru Conservation Area in Kenya and independent research by the Five Person Review Group (KWS 1994)
107 For those that are aware of it (Interview KWS Senior Community Warden Ole Perrio, Tsavo East, June 2007 and interview Duncan Kirokor, Maasai local, in Ntakuru Kureiti, August 2007) it is especially stinging that visiting tourists obtain compensations by the state that are many times higher than the ones given to Kenyans. An example was in the news last year when the British Wendy Susan Martin was awarded with Ksh 105 million (US$ 1.6 million) after being attacked by an elephant in 2000. Community based Il Ngwesi Lodge in Lewa Wildlife Conservancy in Laikipia East District where she spent her holidays, was declared to be 100% liable for her injuries (Mbatia 2007, Ndirangu 2007).
108 In the Five Person Review Group survey '[a]ll people who commented on the issue of compensation agree that the current payment for loss of human life, Ksh 30,000, is unfair and abuses human dignity since this amount is not sufficient to pay funeral expenses, let alone hospital bills or school costs for surviving children' (KWS 1994: 7).
109 Also in other areas compensation sometimes took more than five years to come through, if it ever did at all (KWS 1994: 7).
110 Referred to as Chitango in KWS records.
111 Also observed by Otuoma (2004) in a case study of the Meru Conservation Area in Kenya, as well as the Five Person Review Group (KWS 1994).
112 The problems locals have with the KWS' 'reactive approach to conflict management' (Otuoma 2004: 23) is also observed in Meru by Otuoma, and earlier more widespread by the Five Person Review Group on human wildlife conflict (KWS 1994).
113 For the description of a similar situation in Tanzania see Neumann (2001: 316-317, 321) and Zimbabwe see Dzingirai (2003)
114 Interview Mwarigha Moka Nyange, Buguta-East, June 2007.
115 It has to be noted that the Masai Mara, being a National Reserve, is owned and managed by the county council. Therefore the rangers of the Narok County Council are reinforcing the wildlife laws and responsible for the prevention of poaching and trespassing inside the reserve. Outside the reserve these responsibilities fall under the KWS.
116 Focusgroup interview in Oltorotwa, August 2007.
117 Focusgroup interview in Buguta East, May 2007.
118 Interview Mwaghede, May 2007.
119 Interview Olkoinaasi Ole Kuya, Endoinyio-Erinka, August 2007.
120Baraza on human-wildlife conflict, Sasenyi Primary School, Mwagwede, June 2007.
121 Interview with an elder in Buguta-East, June 2007.
122 Interviews Olkoinaasi Ole Kuya, Endoinyio-Erinka, August 2007, and Danson Marampei Ole Pesi, Endoinyio-Erinka, August 2007. The same practice in wildlife conservation is known in Zambia (Marks 2001: 132).
123 Meeting between Mrombo groupranch representatvies and KWS, KWS Community Service Office Mrombo, June 2007. The amount of money involved in such an undertaking is considerable. According to Njogu even driving elephants away from community areas with helicopters as KWS sometimes does, has 'been criticized, because of the contrast between KWS spending financial resources on such a expensive undertaking for elephants, while it has no money for the compensation of damage caused by wildlife' (Njogu 2003: 210).
124 Intimidation by the forceful law-enforcement practices and dissatisfaction with the non-consensus approach of KWS rangers dealing with the community are also mentioned in other areas of Kenya (KWS 1994). Otuoma describes that 'when these communities killed an animal as a response to wildlife menace, KWS would come in full military gear to deal with the culprits' (Otuoma 2004: 23).
125 In neighbouring Tanzania complaints of beatings and other abuse of villagers by Tanzania National Park wardens are widespread, and other human rights violations as well killings of villagers are still being reported (Neumann 2001: 313-314, 318-321). In 1997, just across the border from the Mara National Reserve a group of villagers suffering from famine and armed with bows and arrows in search for small game entered the Mara Region of Serengeti National Park in Tanzania. They are reported to have been lined up and executed by the Tanzanian game rangers after being disarmed, their bodies being disposed of in the Mara river. Although I have not come over reports of indictments the Legal Human Rights Center in Dar es Salaam had already said it had gathered enough evidence for prosecution in May 2000 (Neumann 2001: 305).
126 Interview William Nkesese Ole Naurori in Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust, August 2007.
127 Interview Mr. Cheptei, KWS Senior Warden Tsavo National Parks, KWS Headquarters Tsavo East, May 2007.
128 As will be explained further in chapter four, even the money brought in by tourism is by large not enough to compensate the local level for the associated costs and loss of resources they experience when wildlife is solely used as a tourist attraction, as is the case in Kenya (Bonner 1994: 68, Sinclair 1998: 38-40, Western 1998: 1509).
129Interview Tsavo East, May 2007.
130 Purchasing Power Parity
131While there is a David Sheldrick animal clinic near Voi (Interview Donald Mombo and Taiko Lemaiyan, Kecobat Nairobi, June 2007, see also Njogu 2003).
132Interview Tsavo East, June 2007. Examples of recent reports reinforcing the view that community members poach because of lack of food, for instance as a result of lack of rain, including pictures of arrested poachers are the field reports of the Bura Desnaring Team of February and March 2008, which can be downloaded from www.sheldrickwildlifetrust.org, accessed April 24, 2008.
134Interview Juma Ole Sampuerrap, local Maasai and medical practitioner, in Talek, July 2007.
135During recent research in the Taita area Njogu (2003) also found that 91% of his respondents felt the government was the most important stakeholder in wildlife issues, followed by local government structures with 81%. In contrast, only 63% felt local communities were important stakeholders at all. The idea of Kenyan locals that wildlife belongs to the governments is also confirmed by Otuoma's study in the Meru Conservation Area (2004: 23). The Maasai in Kimana even refer to wildlife as 'KWS animals' (Rutten 2004: 18).
136Focus-group interview, Buguta-East, May 2007. These realities are also present in other African countries such as Zimbabwe (Dzingirai 2003) and Zambia (Marks 2001: 132).
137The Five Person Review group writing the 1994 human-wildlife conflict report for KWS notes that the idea that the government loves animals more than people can even be supported by empirical data (KWS 1994: iii).
138For a description of many of the same phenomena in Zimbabwe, see Dzingirai (2003), and in Zambia see Marks (2001).
139Interview Donald Arthur Mulira Sakwa (originally from Kakamega, Western Kenya) working at Narok Community Wildlife Office in Wasongiro, July 2007.
140Interview in Talek, July 2007.
141Interview in Buguta-East, June 2007
142Focus-group interview at Masai Mara Talek gate, July 2007.
143Shambi Manuel, treasurer Mbulia groupranch during KWS baraza in Voi, June 2007. The milk of the elephant refers to the revenue it generates through tourism.
144At the Ranch Office of the Predator Compensation Fund in Mbirikani it is stated people receive Ksh 13.500 (US$ 202) for a cow, Ksh 6.000 (US$ 90) for a donkey and Ksh 2.000 (US$ 30) for a goat or sheep hat is lost in the homestead due to a lion, cheetah, leopard or elephant attack. If the animals was lost in the bush due to these attacks, half the amount is given. In case of a hyena, buffalo, or jackal attack in the homestead, compensation is Ksh 6750 (US$ 101) for a cow, Ksh 3.000 (US$ 45) for a donkey or Ksh 2.000 (US$ 30) for a sheep or goat, again being half when the animal was lost in the bush. The full amounts for loss of animals in the homestead were only given after an inspection of the boma. If it was decided that the livestock area had not been fenced properly, only Ksh 4050 (US$ 60) per cow, Ksh 1800 (US$ 27) per donkey and Ksh 600 (US$ 9) per goat or sheep are paid in case of a big cat or elephant attack, and half that money in case of a hyena, buffalo or jackal attack (visit Mbirikani Ranch Office, June 26, 2007). In three Maasai groupranches adjoining Amboseli other AWF compensation schemes have been reported (Ritsma & Ongaro 2002: 129)
145Interview Mwarigha Moka Nyange, Buguta-East, June 2007.
146 Scott might say the locals are resisting the state, because their actions are focused on the authorities, instead of being like 'dog-eat-dog' competition among themselves (Scott 1985: 35). Even though the locals are clearly resisting some efforts of the state, their ultimate focus on the goal of obtaining daily needs and important public facilities, and the lack of widespread practices focused on directly harming the authorities, for instance through slander, arson or sabotage (Scott 1985: xvi), make their actions primarily defenses of livelihoods which hinder the state in the process.
147After problems with leopards the KWS provided the community with traps. Two hyenas and one leopard were caught. The hyenas were killed when they were found by young men. For the leopard the KWS was called, which relocated it. Interview Danson Marampei Ole Pesi, Endoinyio-Erinka, August 2007.
148The Maasai are the only civilians that are allowed in practice to carry these weapons in the city of Nairobi.
149People from other tribes have migrated into the Mara area as a result of land sales and in search of work in the tourism industry, but they generally live either at the tourist facilities where they work or at the three towns that have grown next to the gates of the Reserve, and not in the widespread Maasai villages. This stands in contrast to the Taita area, where Taita, Duruma, Kamba and some other tribes live in a much more mixed setting.
150Interview Mr. Mwanyumba a local Taita from Wundanji working at the Taita-Taveta Wildlife Forum, May 4, 2007.
151 For instance, a large group of Maasai has been living on the side of the Mombasa highway in the Taita area for many months. According to the villagers living nearby, it is impossible for their large herds to live of the small strip of grass on the edge of the road which is considered public land, and they must be grazing on a large scale in Tsavo East National Park, which directly borders it. The authorities confirm this, but have still not undertaken action.
152 Juma Ole Sampuerrap, local Maasai and medical practitioner, while he is standing on the doorstep the poorly equipped Talek community health centre on the edge of the Mara Reserve and points at the tourist air planes flying over, July 2007.
153In 1976 the Masai Mara Game Reserve was re-designated the Masai Mara National Reserve under the Wildlife Act (Lamprey & Reid 2004)
154Being aware of the problem some large newspapers have stopped accepting articles from writers who accepted subsidized trips or discounts, require writers to turn in receipts or let them travel incognito (Honey 1999: 45).
155For a highly critical analysis of the extremely popular community wildlife project CAMPFIRE of Zimbabwe, which is often put forward as a model project (Sinclair 1998: 32, Murphree 1997), see Dzingirai (2003). For a critical analysis of the ADMADE project in Zambia, see Marks (2001).
156 Sinclair concludes that even 'countries with significant information and bargaining abilities are not immune to problems, owing to the high and increasing level of market power exercised by large, vertically-integrated tour operators' (1992: 39-40) which makes that local businessmen or even associations have difficulty negotiating favorable rates there too. Rutten (2002, 2004) provides detailed analysis of the misleading practices as well as the amounts of money involved in revenue sharing arrangements between tour operators and Maasai communities.
157For instance in Taita-Taveta Taita Hills Wildlife Sanctuary with Salt Lick lodge and Safari Hilton Camp is owned by Hilton, Taita-Rukinga Wildlife Sanctuary with the projects of Wildlife Works and Taita Discovery Centre are owned by American investor Mike Korchinsky (Njogu 2003: 109-112), and Lion Rock Lodge, the moneymaker of Lumo Community Wildlife Sanctuary is largely owned by a private investor partner (Lemaiyan & Mombo 2007) who is said to be German (Interview Moi Kennedy, who worked for East-African Cross Border Biodiversity Project and set up Kasigau Community Environment Committee, in Nairobi, June 2007).
158Dennis Ole Mako, Maasai and secretary of Koiyaki Landowners Conservation Association and secretary of the Narok Wildlife Forum tells that 70% of the people in Koiyaki-Lemek (the biggest groupranch neighbouring the Mara) are not benefiting directly from game viewing fees, because they don’t have land inside the conservancy. But sometimes they do have a lot of problems as a result of the wildlife on their land. Interview in Olkimitare, August 2007.
159Many interviews, most prominently Jackson Mpario, Chairman Kecobat, in Talek, August 2007.
160Escobar (1996: 53) even argues that ‘[a]lthough ecologists and ecodevelopmentalists recognize environmental limits to production, a large number do not perceive the cultural character of the commercialization of nature and life integral to the Western economy…. It is not surprising that their policies are restricted to promoting the ‘rational’ management of resources. Environmentalists who accept this proposition also accept imperatives for capital accumulation, material growth, and the disciplining of labor and nature.’
161Interview Sammy Kisemei, Oloosokon, clerc Koiyaki Lemek Wildlife Trust. Interview management Basecamp Masai Mara, in Talek July 2007 (see also KWS 1994: 18).
162Something which communities are often accused of by conservationists.
166For a combined analysis of this burden for different Eastern and Southern African countries see Emerton (n.d.).
167Kees Broere (correspondent Volkskrant in Nairobi), A democracy in distress – The Kenyan Post-Election Crisis, lecture during the Afrikadag 2008, Den Haag, 19 April 2008.
168The authors do feel that '[t]he global benefits from Kenya's conservation efforts are certainly worth the cost' (Norton-Griffiths & Southey 1995: 136-137). However, as the chief benefits are largely indirect and external to Kenya (i.e. visits to parks, biodiversity values and carbon sequestration) the amount of costs born by the developing country are inappropriate (ibid.)
169 See Dzingirai (2003) for descriptions of the same constellation in other places in Africa, such as Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, and more elaborately, Zimbabwe.
170While high income OECD countries harbor 14.3% of the world population, they emit 12.137 MtCO2, which is 44.3% of the world total of CO2 emissions. Sub-Saharan Africa harbors 11% of the world population and emits 663 MtCO2, which is 2.3% of the world total. With 0.5% of the world's population, Kenya emits 10.6 MtCO2, which is below the per person Sub-Saharan African average and contributes to global emissions for 0.0% (UNDP 2007/2008 Human Development Reporthttp://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics accessed February 13, 2008).
171In the end the international institutions are responsive to the citizens of developed countries for legitimizing their work, because their money comes from their donations and investments, directly or through their democratically chosen governments (Wijngaarden 2006).
172It is probably true a racial element was involved in the policies, where 'the only legitimate hunters were the white Europeans and the tribal hunters were “poachers”' (Njogu 2003: 139, see also Steinhart 2006), but it has to be said that Europeans who settled in Kenya had a different relationship with the wildlife than the sport hunters, the settlers hunting for subsistence and often classifying wildlife as vermin (Njogu 2003: 141, Steinhart 2006).
173According to Smith & Kasiki '[t]he Tsavo NP [National Park] boundaries were chosen without regard to the migration and dispersal of wild animals, especially the elephants across PA [Protected Area] boundaries' (2000: 21).
174For instance Sam Walton (Walmart) and Paul Fentener van Vlissingen (Makro) are investing their private wealth into game parks in Africa (Rutten 2004: 6). See also the dutch television series Droom van een Tycoon (Dream of a Tycoon), available from
175Of this debt, 43% was bilateral, 52% multilateral and the rest private. The outstanding debt made up 26.9% of the GDP, and the debt service was 7.1% of all exports in goods and services in 2006 (OECD 2007: 596). In recent years it has undergone a considerable improvement, as in 2000 outstanding debt still made up 43% of the GDP and debt service over 27% of the total export of goods and services (OECD 2007: 307). Despite being counted as one of the 81 poorest countries in the world, Kenya was not indebted enough to profit from debt cancellation through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, as its debt is considered to be sustainable (OECD 2007: 307). However, paying off the debts is not foreseeable in the near future, and servicing them is a burden on government funds.
176At the World Bank, Kenya is only eligible to International Development Association (IDA) funds, which are exclusively reserved for the world’s 81 poorest countries. The IDA was established in 1960 to provide soft loans to heavily indebted poor countries so they would continue to be able to service their already existing debts (MacBean & Snowden 1981: 220, Bello 2002: 37). The IDA provides loans which must be repaid, but they are virtually interest free - except for a very small administrative charge - and take so long to mature that they are generally conceived as ‘grant aid’ (Payer 1982: 33, see also Ascher 1990: 118). As a result of these attractive terms, these grants are more wanted by developing countries than harder loans. However, to be eligible to these credits there are certain conditions: The Gross National Product (GNP) of a country must be below a certain level and it must be not creditworthy enough for loans under the World Bank's normal International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) terms. Good economic performance as defined by the World Bank is also of importance, which means that the Bank can request certain behaviour or policies of the countries in return for the loans (Payer 1982: 34).
177The only provision for hunting in the Kenyan law is the KWS Director's Special Authorization to Hunt, which can only be applied in special and limited circumstances such as research. An otherwise successful KWS pilot that gave local communities consumptive use-rights over wildlife on their land in Machakos, Laikipia and Samburu, has not remained or become extended due to the large problems with its essentially illegal nature on the basis of the bans on hunting and trade in wildlife products (KWS 1994: iv, 3, 11-12, Njogu 2003: 206-207)
178According to the literature, 'the lobby that led to a total ban on sale of ivory and other elephant products was orchestrated by a handful of Western environmentalists and animals rights groups, which portrayed elephants as near extinction throughout Africa when in reality poaching was rampant only in East Africa, not Southern Africa (Honey 1999: 299-300). Even conservation organizations like WWF, who's actual standpoint was that sustainable use would most likely lead to the conservation of the elephant, decided to support the listing as a result of huge public and media pressure, which influenced the points of view of their donors (Bonner 1994).
The Tsavo Area harbors the largest single elephant population in Kenya, in 1999 an estimated 8068 individuals. After an initial decrease in numbers due to exploitation as a result of the ivory trade between 1840 and 1890, game laws were introduced at the turn of the century and the population increased so dramatically during the 1950s and 1960s that it was referred to as the 'Tsavo elephant problem'. Only when the population had reached a peak of over 25.000 individuals, it was reduced by 85% due to drought and poaching in the 1970s and 1980s, leaving 5600 elephants in 1988 (Smith & Kasiki 2000: vi, 17-18).