The Jean Monnet Program



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The Jean Monnet Program
Professor J.H.H. Weiler

European Union Jean Monnet Chair

Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/01


Xénophon A. Yataganas
DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The relevance of the American model of independent agencies


All rights reserved.

No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form

without permission of the author.

The Jean Monnet Working Papers are published under the auspices of the

Jean Monnet Program

hosted at Harvard Law School from 1995 to 2001

and now based at New York University School of Law

ISSN 1087-2221

 Xénophon A. Yataganas




DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

The relevance of the American model of independent agencies*

Dr. Xénophon A. Yataganas**

* A draft of this paper was presented at a hearing organized by the “European Governance” task force in Brussels, on 12 March 2001. I want to thank the participants for their useful comments and criticisms.


** Legal Adviser in the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Union; Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and Fellow at the Center for European Studies of Harvard University. The views expressed in this article are strictly personal. I am indebted to the European Commission, particularly to her Forward Studies Unit and to the WCFIA for giving me financial, material and intellectual support. Special thanks to my research assistant Leonid Peiskhin for his massive effort on bibliography and to Donald Halstead for his decisive editing work.
CONTENTS

Introduction


  1. Two different but convergent federal systems

1. Delegation in the US

2. Delegation in the EU

3. The origins and growth of regulatory agencies in the US

4. The origins and growth of executive agencies in the EU


  1. Regulation and institutional balance

The Meroni doctrine

1. The nature of Community regulatory power

2. The limitations of the parliamentary/majority logic

3. The question of the democratic deficit

4. The shortcomings of comitology

5. The nature of the institutional balance

6. Agencies in the Community architecture




  1. Accountability: autonomy and control

1. Autonomy

  1. The founding statutes

  2. Relationship with the legislative and executive powers

  3. Appointment procedures

2. Control

a) Executive oversight

b) Budgetary evaluation

c) Procedural control

d) Judicial review

e) Network coordination


CONCLUSIONS

AFTERWORD
ABBREVIATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
REFERENCES
LEGAL CASES





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