DELEGATION OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The relevance of the American model of independent agencies*
Dr. Xénophon A. Yataganas**
* A draft of this paper was presented at a hearing organized by the “European Governance” task force in Brussels, on 12 March 2001. I want to thank the participants for their useful comments and criticisms.
** Legal Adviser in the Legal Service of the Commission of the European Union; Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, and Fellow at the Center for European Studies of Harvard University. The views expressed in this article are strictly personal. I am indebted to the European Commission, particularly to her Forward Studies Unit and to the WCFIA for giving me financial, material and intellectual support. Special thanks to my research assistant Leonid Peiskhin for his massive effort on bibliography and to Donald Halstead for his decisive editing work.