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AT: Lowers Threshold

Drones don’t lower the threshold for conflict.


Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, 6/1/2013. NYU School of Law. “Drones and the Dilemma of Modern Warfare,” New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper 404, http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/404/.
In our view, there are four myths about the modern use of drones to target specific, identifiable individuals for lethal force. The first myth is that targeting specific individuals for death is a modern innovation in military practice. But targeted killings have long been a part of military practice; the invention of the long rifle, for example, gave snipers the ability to pick off opposing field officers. The modern practice, however, begins with the discrete act of seeking out military enemies outside normal wartime engagements based on an individualized assessment of the threat they present. The use of lethal force is not incidental to a battlefield objective of capturing a particular piece of territory but becomes a distinct response to the generalized threat posed by a particular individual. Killing is now not secondary to a distinct military objective but becomes the objective itself because of a specific determination about the threat posed by the continued operation of an individual. At a more fundamental level, as Eyal Benvenisti argues, the laws of war had two major premises that fail in modern asymmetric conflict. First, it was possible to distinguish military and civilian objectives, and, second, battle could be directed to military objectives, as with the capturing of territory or overtaking a military installation. Neither premise necessarily characterizes military engagements in asymmetric war—or put another way, the military objective becomes killing itself. 28 The object of the targeted attack changes as well, in a way that seems morally defensible. Drones enable military planners to focus on high-level targets, and there is a further morality in that—we should appreciate a technology that can discriminate between low-level and high-level combatants, and minimize the loss of life to foot soldiers of the other side by concentrating fire on the leaders. Precision targeted killings should be seen as a substantial humanitarian advance in warfare, assuming that use of force is justified in the first place. Whereas the tradition LOAC placed the foot soldier at greatest risk of being killed in combat, the new targeted killing regime initially redirected lethal force to the command structure of the enemy. In our view, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on the level of force being used without also understanding that the targets (if accurately identified) bear a moral culpability for unlawful warfare completely distinct from anything that could be attributed to conventional soldiers in a stateauthorized war, especially in the case of conscript armies. As the technology improved, most notably with drones, the targets could expand from the command structure to operational centers, as with attacks on remote sites at which enemy combatants trained or assembled. A second myth concerning targeted killings as a new form of warfare is that this ability to project force from a distance itself raises new legal issues. But this view is simply an exercise at drawing a technological line that, in our view, has little moral or legal force in and of itself. Drones present the same legal issues as any other weapons system involving the delivery of lethal force. Advances in military technology have always been about the ability to project force from a distance. Drones are a technology, the latest technological development in the history of warfare, but they do not change the legal issues, under either domestic or international law, relevant to deciding whether particular uses of force are justified. In technologically advanced countries, militaries have long been in the business of delivering lethal force at great distances from their targets. The U.S. Navy has engaged enemy personnel by firing cruise missiles from ships in the Mediterranean into Libya, Iraq, and Sudan. Air Force pilots frequently take off from bases far removed from the actual theater of conflict and drop their bombs based on computer-generated targeting information from thousands of feet above the ground; the bombing campaign over Serbia during the Kosovo war, for example, involved pilots taking off from the Midwest in the United States and returning there. Ancient advances, such as catapults and longbows, involved the delivery of force from a distance, instead of hand-to-hand personalized combat. U.S. drone operations reportedly follow the same rules of engagement and use the same procedures as manned aircraft that use weapons to support ground troops. 29 At least the military’s use of drones operates within the same military chain of command, subject to civilian oversight, as all other uses of military force. 30 One can view the technological advances that make drone warfare possible with horror or with fascination, but the idea of projected force beyond hand-to-hand warfare does not of itself present radically new legal issues. As the philosopher David Luban rightly concludes, targeted killings “are no different in principle from other wartime killings, and they have to be judged by the same standards of necessity and proportionality applied to warfare in general: sometimes they are justified, sometimes not.” 31 A third prevalent misconception, in our view, is that drones and targeted killing pose a major threat to the humanitarian purposes and aims of the laws of war. The key principles of the laws of war are the principles of necessity, distinction and proportionality—the principles that force should intentionally be used only against military targets and that the damage to individual citizens should be minimized and proportionate. Drones, as against other uses of military force, better realize these principles than any other technology currently available. Indeed, they allow for the most discriminating uses of force in the history of military technology and warfare, in contexts in which the use of force is otherwise justified. If the alternative is sending US ground forces into Yemen or the frontier regions of Pakistan, the result will be far greater loss of civilian life, and far greater loss of combatant lives, than with drone technology. A more subtle concern that perhaps underlies the humanitarian critique of targeted killings is that drone warfare might make the use of force “too easy.” Since powerful states do not have to put their own pilots or soldiers directly at risk, will they resort to force and violence more easily? This is a serious issue, but some historical perspective might help put this concern in a broader frame. Throughout the modern history of warfare, there has been concern that humanitarian developments in the way war is conducted will, perversely, make it more likely that states will go to war. The argument is essentially that there is a Faustian tradeoff between the laws of war and the initial decision to go to war. This is an enduring, moral complex issue that has attended virtually every effort in the paradoxical-sounding project of making warfare more humane; pacifists in the 19th century objected to the formation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and its efforts to mitigate the horrors of war. 32 Moreover, the same paradox surrounds even purely humanitarian aid during wartime; in some contexts, access to such aid has become a strong economic incentive to continue the war, for the very purpose of extracting more of this financial assistance. 33 A more complicated picture emerges if we shift from the perspective of the civilian leaders who authorize the use of force to those who actually deliver that force. One of the consequences created by individuating the responsibility of specific enemies, combined with drone technology, is the possibility of a much greater sense of personal responsibility and accountability on the part of drone operators for lethal uses of force than that exhibited by prior generations of fighters. At least some drone operators report exactly this kind of experience of personal responsibility for their actions, including their mistakes, that was much less likely in earlier generations when “the enemy” was faceless and undifferentiated in most circumstances. 34 Of course, if such a perverse tradeoff does end up driving state practice, the same concern could be applied to the use of force for humanitarian purposes, as in Libya. Did the use of drones in the Libya operation make humanitarian interventions “too easy?” The right question, it seems to us, should focus on whether the use of force is justified in the first place. Moreover, one should be careful not to romanticize traditional combat and the pressures toward excessive violence it nearly always unleashes. To the extent the humanitarian critique of the use of drones is that sending in ground troops acts as a restraint on the use of force, compared to the use of force from remote locations, such as with drones technology, this idea might have matters backwards, at least once the decision to use force at all has been made (and made, hopefully, for appropriate and lawful reasons). Dramatic overuse of force is most likely when scared kids come under attack on an active battlefield and respond with massive uses of force directed at only vaguely identified targets. Remoteness from the immediate battlefield—with operators able to see much more of what is going on—almost surely enables much more deliberative responses. One Air Force combat officer who became a drone operator supports this conclusion; he comments that compared to conventional combat, both in the air and on the ground, the distance involved with drones enable operations to be “deliberate instead of reactionary;” 35 compared to manned combat flights, he experienced drones as affording “the ability to think clearly at zero knots and one G”; 36 and he observed that other “methods of warfare could be, and often were, much more destructive” 37 —indeed, he goes so far as to comment that when marines were sent into operations, they “broke things and killed people” while drones enabled U.S. military force to be “less brutal.” 38 Whether one accepts or not this particular self-reported drone operator experience, a realistic appraisal of all the costs and benefits of the use of drones must confront the “compared to what” question. Perhaps in some contexts, if drones were not available, no force would be used; but in many cases, it seems likely that much greater force would be used instead. Put another way, powerful nation-states are unlikely to remain passive in the face of significant risks to the physical security of their citizens and property that emanate from other nations that are unwilling or unable to control these threats. Nor is it clear why states should be understood to have a moral obligation to permit their citizens and territory to be attacked. If states have the capacity to do so, they will neutralize these threats through killing or capture; and at times, the humanitarian costs of capture, in terms of harm to and loss of innocent life will be great, and at other times, capture might not be practicable for any number of reasons (a complex issue to which we return below). As a result, it seems to us that any general humanitarian critique of the targeted killing has a moral obligation to offer a credible, practical alternative that a state can realistically employ to protect the lives of its citizens and that better serves the humanitarian aims of the laws of war.




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