The authority of the President of the United States to use or deploy armed forces in circumstances likely to lead to an armed attack without a prior declaration of war from the United States Congress should be substantially restricted

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The authority of the President of the United States to use or deploy armed forces in circumstances likely to lead to an armed attack without a prior declaration of war from the United States Congress should be substantially restricted.

Armed attack” should be defined as: The use of force of a magnitude that is likely to produce serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or considerable destruction of property.

Contention 1: Wars of Choice

They’re inevitable in the status quo:

First - Commitment trap --- lack of congressional war power causes presidential utterances to become de facto strategy --- this locks us into unnecessary conflicts

Brookings Institution 6-20-2013, The Road to War: Presidential Commitments and Congressional Responsibility,, jj
Ever since WWII, Kalb said that “history has led us into conflicts that we don’t understand” because presidents do not seek approval from Congress for declarations of war. The country has reached a point now where “presidential power is so great, words out of his mouth become policy for the United States.” Kalb used the Syrian civil war and President Obama’s “red line” policy as an example of how a president’s words become strategy for the United States. Kalb argued that this presidential “flexibility” in foreign policy decision-making has repeatedly led the country into one misguided war to the next such as the Vietnam and Iraq wars. To nullify these poor decisions, Kalb believes that formal congressional declarations of war will help “trigger the appreciation for the gravity of war” and assist in “unifying the nation” behind a strategic military intervention, resulting in more positive outcomes for the United States. ¶ He concluded his remarks by noting that declarations of war by Congress are “stark commitments,” and statements by the president of the United States must be thoroughly discussed to make well-informed decisions that will be in the best interest of the American people. Conflicts must be understood before the decision is made to send American troops to war, and presidents of the United States should converse with Congress before taking any military action.
Second - Groupthink – Comprehensive analysis proves absent sustained congressional involvement in war-making – unnecessary interventions are inevitable

Martin ’11, Craig Martin, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law, Winter, 2011¶ Brooklyn Law Review¶ 76 Brooklyn L. Rev. 611, ARTICLE: Taking War Seriously: A Model for Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force in Compliance with In-ternational Law, Lexis, jj
II. The Causes of War

In beginning to think about how to improve the legal constraints on the resort to war, it is essential to consider the causes of international armed conflict. n10 The question of what causes war is the subject of a massive amount of re-search and debate, stretching back literally thousands of years. n11 The focus of the various theories on the causes of war range from the individual decision makers, through small-group dynamics, the structure of the state itself, all the way to the structure and operation of the international system of states. n12 Thucydides, whose analysis of the Peloponnesian War is one of the earliest studies of the subject known to us, set the stage with a complex explanation for the causes of that war that included the individual attributes of decision makers, the nature and structure of the leading city-states, and the nature of the interstate system itself. n13 Kenneth Waltz continues this classification by defining the three levels as "Images": the individual or human level ("Image I"), the level of the state structure or organization ("Image II"), and the level of the international system ("Image III"). n14 And despite the differing theories, disagreements, and areas of emphasis, there is a widely shared acceptance that all three Images play a role in explaining the causes of war, albeit to varying degrees [*617] depending on one's theoretical perspective. n15 While it is not necessary for us to examine the various theories in detail, it will be helpful to get a flavor for some of the more important ideas as they relate to each of the three Images, as I will refer back to these ideas to support the argument for the proposed Model.

A. Image I--The Level of the Individual

There are a wide variety of theories, and indeed a number of different sublevels within the Image I--the individual level--perspective on the causes of war. Some of these focus on aspects such as human nature itself and the inherent aggression of man. n16 But the theories that relate to both the psychology of decision makers, and a number of systemic problems in small-group decision making are of greatest significance for the argument being advanced here. Beginning with individual psychology, one set of theories focus on the personality traits that are common among those who tend to reach the highest offices of government as factors that contribute to unsound judgments regarding the use of armed force. Empirical studies suggest that a number of traits that tend to be overrepresented in national leaders--such as au-thoritarian and domineering tendencies, introversion (which is perhaps counter-intuitive, but Hitler and Nixon are both prime examples of this trait), narcissism, and high-risk tolerance--also tend to correlate with much higher levels of con-frontation and the use of force to resolve conflicts. n17

Psychological theories also focus on problems of misperception. There is powerful evidence that people are prone to systematic patterns of misperception, and that such misperception in government leaders contributes significantly to irrational decisions. n18 In particular, decision makers frequently form strong hypotheses regarding the intentions [*618] and capabilities of potential adversaries, and there is a strong tendency to then dismiss or discount information that is inconsistent with the hypothesis, and to interpret ambiguous information in a manner that is consistent with and reinforces the hypothesis. n19 Such misperception often constitutes a significant factor in the path to war. n20

Another set of theories that relate to the Image I causes of war focus not on the individual alone, but on how deci-sions are made within groups and organizations. Contrary to the expectation that government agencies generally operate in accordance with rational choice theory, studies suggest that group decision making is often characterized by dynamics that can lead to irrational and suboptimal decisions. One such characteristic is excessive "incrementalism" and "satisfycing"--the tendency to make small incremental policy shifts, coupled with the sequential analysis of options and adoption of the first acceptable alternative, a process captured in the aphorism "the good is the enemy of the best." n21 A second theory suggests that the dynamic of competing bureaucratic and departmental interests--interests which are often inconsistent with the larger national interest, but which nonetheless command greater loyalty and mobilize greater effort among department or division members--subvert the decision-making process. n22 Moreover, each department will itself approach the decision making within the constraints of its own perspectives and mindsets, standard operating procedures, and capabilities. This is the famous "where you stand is where you sit" explanation of internal government politics, n23 often referred to as the [*619] "bureaucratic politics model." n24 For example, the senior representatives of the U.S. Air Force, with obviously vested interests, strongly argued in favor of the continued strategic bombing of North Vietnam in 1967, even though the Secretary of Defense and others in the Nixon administration had determined that it was at best pointless and at worst counterproductive. n25

Finally, there is the phenomenon known as "groupthink." n26 This theory suggests that some decision-making groups--particularly those characterized by a strong leader, considerable internal cohesion, internal loyalty, overconfi-dence, and a shared world view or value system--suffer from a deterioration in their capacity to engage in critical analysis during the decision-making process. n27 Decision-making groups that suffer from groupthink are particularly vulnerable to the kind of systemic misperception discussed above, but they suffer from other weaknesses as well, all stemming from a failure to challenge received wisdom, consider alternate perspectives, or bring to bear exogenous criteria or modalities in assessing policy options. n28

These theories do not, of course, explain all of the problems in decision making in all situations. Groupthink and the bureaucratic politics model generally do not operate at the same time in the same groups. But the studies of each of these phenomena suggest that these systemic patterns can be a significant factor in the less-than-rational and suboptimal decision making about the use of armed force. And these theories together show the importance of introducing exogenous criteria for assessing the merit of competing policy options, and the kinds of checks and balances that might lessen the probability that these tendencies could affect the decision to go to war. [*620]

B. Image II--The Level of the State

The causes of war also operate at the level of the state itself. Again, there is an extensive range of theoretical ex-planations for the causes of war that focus on factors at the state level, but those that are central to Image II relate to the actual structure or form of the government of the state. n29 The essential idea is that some forms of government are inherently less prone to wage war than others. This idea has been central to liberal theories of the state and international relations since the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the argument that liberal democratic states are less inclined to initiate wars than autocratic or other nondemocratic states. These arguments were founded upon a number of strands of liberal political theory, including the nature of individual rights within democracies and the manner in which respect for such rights would influence how the state would behave within the international society. n30 They also drew upon liberal ideas about the influence of capitalist economies, arguing that laissez-faire capitalist systems would operate to reduce the incentives for war in liberal democratic states. n31 But perhaps the most important argument among these liberal claims, is that the very structure of government, both in terms of its leaders being representative of and directly accountable to an electorate, and the separation of political power between the executive and a more broadly representative legislature, would operate to reduce the likelihood that such governments would embark on military adventures. n32

Rousseau and Madison both wrote about the ramifications of the democratic structure of the state on the propensity for war. n33 But it was Immanuel Kant who developed the argument most fully in the eighteenth century with his [*621] short work Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. n34 Writing at a time when there were less than a handful of fledgling democratic "republics" in the world, n35 Kant argued that a perpetual peace would result from the spread of the republican form of government among the nations of the world and the development of a form of pacific federation among these free states. n36 His argument thus straddled the second and third images, and I will return to discuss his overall theory more fully below when we turn to consider Image III. But one of his arguments for why republics would be inherently less likely to wage war is still very much at the heart of current liberal theories relating to Image II. His point was that, in the kind of republic he envisioned, the consent of citizens would be required for decisions to go to war. Those who would "call[] down on themselves all the miseries of war," not only fighting and dying in the conflict but also paying for it and suffering the resulting debt, would be much less likely to agree to such an adventure than the heads of state in other kinds of political systems such as monarchies, who can "decide on war, without any significant reason." n37

As we will see, Kant himself did not argue that the development of democratic structures within any given state would be sufficient to prevent it from going to war, and his theory of perpetual peace also rested on the requirement that the republican form of government be also spread throughout the international system. Indeed, one of the problems with liberal theories that rely upon governmental structure as an explanation for the cause of war is that the extensive empirical research and analysis on the subject suggest that liberal democracies are almost as prone to engaging in war as nondemocratic states, at least as against nondemocratic countries. n38 Some have tried to argue that liberal democracies nonetheless do not initiate wars to the same degree, and thus [*622] are inherently less aggressive than other forms of government, but even that claim is very difficult to sustain from the perspective of traditional international law conceptions of aggression and self-defense. n39

What has emerged from this line of research, however, is the widely accepted proposition that liberal democracies do not commence wars against other liberal democracies. The so-called "democratic peace" encompasses both this empirical fact and the principle said to explain it. n40 While there remains some residual debate over the validity of the principle, n41 persuasive evidence suggests that, with the possible exception of two instances of armed conflict between what might be considered democratic states, there have been no wars between liberal democracies during the period between 1816 and 1965. n42 The assertion has been made, and often cited, that the democratic peace is close to being an empirical law in international relations. n43

There is less agreement over the best explanation for the democratic peace. There are two main theoretical posi-tions: (1) normative and cultural explanations, and (2) institutional and structural constraints. n44 The normative-cultural explanations argue that the shared norms of democracies, and particularly the shared adherence to the rule of law and commitment to peaceful dispute resolution internally, inform and influence the approach of democratic governments to [*623] resolving disputes that may arise as between democracies. Moreover, there is a shared respect for the rights of other people who live in a similar system of self-government. These shared beliefs, norms and expectations tip the cost-benefit analysis toward peaceful resolution of disputes when they arise as among democracies. n45

The structural-institutional advocates argue that the elements of the liberal democratic legal and political system operate to constrain the government from commencing armed conflicts. This is entirely in line with the insights of earli-er writers such as Madison, Kant, and Cobden, regarding the lower likelihood of war when representatives of those who will pay and die for the war are deciding, since it is more politically risky for democratic leaders to gamble the blood and treasure of the nation in war unless it is clearly viewed by the public as being necessary. n46 The arguments are also based in part on the broader idea that structural checks and balances typical of democratic systems, and the operation of certain other institutional features of deliberative democracy, will reduce the incidence of war. n47 We will return to some of these arguments in more detail below.

Third - Lack of public awareness about war power issues allows uninhibited intervention

Druck ’12, Judah A. Druck, B.A., Brandeis University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013; Notes Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 98, November, 2012¶ Cornell Law Review¶ 98 Cornell L. Rev. 209, NOTE: DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLO-GY-DRIVEN WARFARE, Lexis, jj¶
The War Powers Resolution in the Era of Technology-Driven Warfare

A. Why an Unconstrained Executive Matters Today

If public scrutiny acts as a check on presidential action by pressuring Congress into enforcing domestic law (namely, the WPR), then that check has weakened given the increased use of technology-driven warfare abroad. n135 As a result, fewer checks on presidential military actions exist, implying that we will see more instances of unilateral presidential initiatives. But if the new era of warfare removes the very issues associated with traditional warfare, should we be con-cerned about the American public's increasing numbness to it all? The answer is undoubtedly yes.

First, from a practical standpoint, the psychology surrounding mechanized warfare makes it easier for the United States to enter hostilities initially. n136 Without having to worry about any of the traditional costs of war (such as a draft, rationing, casualties, etc.), the triggers that have historically made the public wary of war are now gone. When ma-chines, rather than human beings, are on the front lines, the public (and, as a result, politicians and courts) will not act to stop the continued use of drones. In other words, people will simply stop caring about our increased actions abroad, regardless of their validity, constitutionality, or foreign harm.

But again one must wonder: should we care? After all, even if we increase the number of military conflicts abroad, the repercussions hardly seem worth worrying about. For example, worrying that WPR violations will cause significant harm to the United States seems somewhat misplaced given the limited nature of technology-driven warfare. Granted, this style of warfare might make it easier to enter hostilities, but the risk of subsequent harm (at least to the United States) is low enough to mitigate any real danger. Furthermore, even if the effects of warfare might become increasingly dulled, any use of force that would eventually require traditional, Vietnam-esque types of harms as the result of technology-driven warfare would in a sense "wake up the populace" in order to check potentially unconstitutional action. n137 [*232] Thus, if our level of involvement requires machines and only machines, why worry about a restrained level of public scrutiny?

The answer is that a very real risk of harm exists nonetheless. War by its very nature is unpredictable. n138 Indeed, one of the major grievances concerning the war in Vietnam was that we ended up in a war we did not sign up for in the first place. n139 The problem is not the initial action itself but the escalation. Therefore, while drone strikes might not facially involve any large commitment, the true threat is the looming possibility of escalation. n140 That threat exists in the context of drones, whether because of the risk of enemy retaliation or because of a general fear that an initial strike would snowball into a situation that would require troops on the ground. n141 In both cases, an apparently harmless initial action could eventually unravel into a situation involving harms associated with traditional warfare. n142 Worse yet, even if that blowback was sufficient to incentivize the populace and Congress to mobilize, the resulting involvement would only occur after the fact. n143 If we want restraints on presidential action, they should be in place before the United States is thrown into a war, and this would require public awareness about the use of drones. n144 As such, whether it is unforeseen issues arising out of the drones themselves n145 or unforeseen consequences stemming from what was ostensibly a minor military undertaking, there is reason to worry about a [*233] populace who is unable to exert any influence on military actions, even as we shift toward a more limited form of warfare. n146

Another issue associated with a toothless WPR in the era of technology-drive warfare involves humanitarian con-cerns. If one takes the more abstract position that the public should not allow actions that will kill human beings to go unchecked, regardless of their legality or underlying rationale, then that position faces serious pressure in the era of technology-driven warfare. As the human aspect of warfare becomes more attenuated, the potential humanitarian costs associated with war will fade out of the collective consciousness, making it easier for the United States to act in potentially problematic ways without any substantial backlash. Rather than take note of whom we target abroad, for example, the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare forces the public to place "enormous trust in our leaders" despite the fact that good faith reliance on intelligence reports does not necessarily guarantee their accuracy. n147 Accordingly, as the level of public scrutiny decreases, so too will our ability to limit unwarranted humanitarian damage abroad. n148 At the very least, some dialogue should occur before any fatal action is taken; yet, in the technology-driven warfare regime, that conversation never occurs. n149

The impact is imperialism, militarism and aggressive foreign policy – the aff is key

Fisher ’05, LOUIS FISHER, Specialist with the Law Library, The Library of Congress. Ph.D., New School for Social Research, 1967; B.S., College of William and Mary, 1956, Indiana Law Journal¶ Fall, 2005¶ 81 Ind. L.J. 1199, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, LEXIS, jj
The initiation of U.S. military operations in Iraq flowed from a long list of miscalculations, false claims, and misjudgments, both legal and political. Errors of that magnitude were not necessary or inevitable. Military conflict could have been delayed, perhaps permanently, had the responsible political leaders performed their constitutional duties with greater care, reflection, integrity, and commitment to constitutional principles. Adding to the failures of elected officials were decades of irresponsible and misinformed statements by federal judges, academics, law reviews, and the media.¶ Although the Iraq War that began in 2003 was orchestrated by the Republican Party and the Bush administration, their miscalculations built upon a half century of violations of constitutional principles over the war power. Democratic Presidents led the country to war against North Korea (President Harry Truman), North Vietnam (President Lyndon Johnson), and Serbia (President Bill Clinton). Republican neoconservatives beat the drums for war against Iraq, but Democratic academics did the same for Korea. The dominant theme in American foreign policy since World War II has been a bellicose spirit that champions the use of military force, boasts the virtues of "American exceptionalism," stands ready to fight "evil" anywhere (whether Soviet Communism or Islamic fundamentalism), and regularly attacks opponents of war as unpatriotic and unmanly. That these forces led to torture by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib or CIA "black sites" should come as no surprise. They are the natural results of concentrated power, political arrogance, and ideological fervor.

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