The australian naval institute

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MAY 1977



1. The Australian Naval Institute has been formed and incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory.
The main objects of the Institute are:

a. to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge related to the Navy and the
Maritime profession.

b. to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning subjects related to the Navy and
the Maritime profession.

c. to publish a journal.

  1. The Institute is self supporting and nonprofit making. The aim is to encourage freedom of dis­cussion, dissemination of information, comment and opinion and the advancement of professional knowledge concerning naval and maritime matters.

  2. Membership of the Institute is open to:

a. Regular Members-Members of the Permanent Naval Forces of Australia.

b. Associate Members-(1) Members of the Reserve Naval Forces of Australia.

(2) Members of the Australian Military Forces and the Royal
Australian Air Force both permanent and reserve.

(3) Ex-members of the Australian Defence Forces, both permanent
and reserve components, provided that they have been honourably
discharged from that force.

(4) Other persons having and professing a special interest in naval
and maritime affairs.

c. Honorary Members—A person who has made a distinguished contribution to the Naval or

maritime profession or who has rendered distinguished service to the Institute may be elected by the Council to Honorary Membership.

  1. Joining fee for Regular and Associate Member is $5. Annual Subscription for both is $10.

  2. Inquiries and application for membership should be directed to:

The Secretary,
Australian Naval Institute,
P.O. Box 18,
DEAKIN. ACT. 2600.


As the Australian Naval Institute exists for the promotion and advancement of knowledge relating to the Naval and maritime profession, all members are strongly encouraged to submit articles for publication. Only in this way will our aims be achieved.


In writing for the Institute it must be borne in mind that the views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Institute.





Chapter News 2

Correspondence 2

From the Editor 3

The Needs of the RAN 1985 to 2000 4

I Was There When 13

International Economic Relations The Peoples Republic of China - by 'Gig'. ... 14

The Role of the Submarine in Future Limited Conflicts

- By LCDR K. W. Grierson, RAN 17

H.M.A.S. Penguin - A Short History by LCDR W. N. Swan, RAN (Rtd) 28

Shiphandling Corner 29

The Impact of Technology Upon the Royal Navy 1860-1974 Part 1:

The Battleship by 'Master Ned' 33

Book Review 36

Articles or condensations of articles are not to be reprinted or reproduced without the permission of the Institute. Extracts may be quoted for the purposes of research, review or comment provided the source is acknowledged.

OUR COVER Our cover now features the crest of the Australian Naval Institute.

Jaurnal of the Australian Naval Institute- Page I


Captain PG.N. Kennedy, RAN and Commander O.R. Cooper. RAN co-operated in smooth fashion to provide very stimulating address on "Automated Com­mand and Control Systems Current and Future" on Tuesday. Sth April, 1977

About 40 members and guests attended the meeting at RSL National Headquarters and, needless to say this large gathering, together with some of the concepts advanced by the speakers, provided the necessary ele­ments for a protracted and lively question period

The next meeting will be held at the RSL National Headquarters, Constitution Avenue. Canberra on lues day, 5th July, 1977 A paper titled "One Man's View of Naval Aviation - Past, Present and Future" will be delivered by Commander II.G Julian, DSC. CI' ng. M.I. Mech. ARA1S RANEM


24 Vista Street Greenwich, NSW 2065

17lh May. 1977 Dear Sir.

1 read the article "Ship Based VTOL Aircraft" by Lieutenant Commander Jones in the February 1977 Journal with some interest.

1 am a little surprised I he author refers through­out his article to VTOL especially when discussing vari­ous versions of the Hawker Siddelcy Harrier. Harrier is certainly capable of performing VTOL operations but due to the significant increases in payload/radius para­meters accruing when short take-off runs are used. I believe the more correct acronym is V/STOL. Further, as Harrier is normally landed in the "V" mode a more precise description could be V/STOVL.

In the interest of accuracy I would like to make

the foUowineobservations:

Page 28 - The USMC did not participate in the Tri-Service assessments in UK or the U.S.

Page 28 & 29 - The author appears confused regarding AV-8B and AV-16 The AV-8B will be powered by the Pegasus II engine (21,500 lb. thrust), whereas the AV-16 was planned to use the Pegasus 15 (25,000 lb)

Page 29 The RN Sea Harrier will be fitted with Side­winder on outboard wing stations only.

Page 29 I presume "unlimited" is a typographical error in the reference to CAP time on station. I roni a "V'take-off sortie duration would be com­paratively limited

Page 30 - Aircraft fitted with "deflected thrust" engines, (I would prefer "vectored thrust"), can be designed for supersonic speeds. Plenum chamber burning has been successfully demonstrated in the Pegasus en­gine and can be equated to afterburning.

One can argue that supersonic speeds arc not always essential for an air defence capability. Sea Harrier, because of its high thrust weight ratio can reach medium altitudes in much the same time as M 2 aircraft. Given good ground control interception and fitted with a modem air-to-air missile system (c.g Sky Mash) Sea Harrier would provide a genuine air defence capability especially against the air threat likely to be encountered at sea.

Page 2 Journal of the Australian Saval Institute

Page 30 - The old bogey of high deck temperatures apparently remains. Even with VTO's the deck area directly beneath the nozzles can be touched with the bare hand very shortly after take-off. During trials from the wooden deck of the Spanish Navy's Dcdalo the only effect was some melting of the inter-plank pitch during VTO's.

In concluding I would recommend that any reader wishing to further his understanding of VSTOL in the naval scene should study John Fozard's "Sea Harrier -The First Of The New Wave". This was the title of a lecture given to the Royal Aeronautical Society on 10th November, 1976 by the Chief Designer of Harrier

Any reader desiring a copy of the lecture could write to me at the above address.

Yours sincerely.

A.J (Nat) Gould Commander R AN. (Ret'd.)

Dear Sir.

5 April. 1977

I was interested to read 'Joseph Porter's' remarks
on sea training in his letter in your February 1977 issue-
but 1 cannot agree with his enthusiasm for Junior Entry.
I feel that the 'catch 'cm young' theory is no longer
valid in this country The very isolation of Jervis Bay
and the inevitable limitations of the educational process
there tend to place 'blinkers' on those officers who join
by Junior Entry It is too easy for Junior Entry officers
to possess a dangerously limited knowledge of the out­
side world that will Limit their effectiveness as officers at
all stages of their careers to the Navy's detriment as
well as their own

II is also ton easy for an officer who enters at this
early stage to become disillusioned with the training sys­
tem and the Navy. The retention rates over the past ten
years speak for themselves, fot example, the 1973 Juniot
Entry has already lost two-thirds of its members and the
1974 Entry has lost nearly a third A Junior Entry who
undertakes the Creswell Course has to spend nearly four
and a hall years at the Naval College and it is two years
mote before he is a qualified officer loo often in re­
cruiting the 'get in early' aspect is over-stated and the
studies that need to be undertaken are largely passed
over. The feeling often exists that Junior Entry is some­
thing of a con job to make the numbers up

This brings me to my next point. 'Sir Joseph' stresses the beauty of being able to get in before other outside influences are able to take the cream but is this attitude fair to either the Navy or the recruit'' It seems to me that this argument somehow indicates an inferior­ity on the Navy's part, an inability to face other organi­zations in open competition for fear of defeat. It is my feeling that if the Royal Australian Navy cannot attract the best men in the face of ail opposition, then the RAN is not worth serving I suggest that we luok to our recruiting if we are not getting what we want, the Air Force seems able to do well enough. But whatever one says about the R.A.N, it is not fair for the prospective recruit to refuse him the opportunity to select his career from the widest range, we must always remember thai we are a volunteer force and that the commitment of those who serve the R.A.N, must be complete and mature. If we consider the 1 5 year old entry to be desir­able, then why not at 13. or even the Jesuit ideal of from birth?

I would remind those who say that Junior Entry provides an excellent opportunity for those who would otherwise have been forced to leave school to attain a secondary education and their matriculation that the excellent !' scheme exists within the Junior Recruit organization and that this system shows no signs of faltering or failing

Yours faithfully.

'Master Ned'


For some time the United States Naval Institute has included in its journal a successful feature under the heading NOBODY ASKED ME. BUT .... In response to a request from the Australian Naval Institute, the USN has graciously given its permission to our using the idea for our own Journal. Unfortunately we cannot also follow their example by offering $50 for a contribution, but the articles will be eligible for one of the annual prizes.

Most of us are pretty good a giving voice, in the mess, at home or anywhere for that matter, to some profound statement. This may be a bright idea, a trenchant criticism, a long needed innovation or some simple truth which should be perfectly obvious to anybody with a brain in his head. Yet. in the cold light of day, it is difficult to put into words for the Captain, or one's spouse is too busy. 01 "they" don't have time to listen. Nobody listens any more. But a few do read. If nobody seems to care what you think about anything, then perhaps you should contribute to NOBODY ASKED Ml , BUT

Perhaps what you want to say isn't worth listening to, but at least you'll feel better for getting it off your chest. If it is worth printing then you'll have your audience, your idea may stimulate further discussion in the Journal and could even lead to somebody doing something about it.

Contributions should be short, say one or two pages in the Journal. Your anonymity will be protected if you wish to write under a nom de plume.


With the introduction of NOBODY ASKED ME. BUT ... we now have five feature columns, (he others being TECHNICAL TOPICS, I WAS THERE WHEN . ..CLASSIC SIGNALS and SHIP HANDLING CORNER. These columns arc for your contributions and. as can be seen, a wide variety of subjects can be slotted under their titles. Unfortunately we are not receiving a steady supply of copy for these columns as you can see by their irregular appearance in the Journal.

Contributions do not have to be long therefore those of you who do not wish to, or do not have the lime to write a major article have your chance here. I feel sure these are many of you with humor­ous stories, personal anecdotes and experiences or knowledge of incidents which would be of interest to our readers. Therefore let us hear from you.

Journal of the A uslrallan Na vat Institute Page J

THE NEEDS OF THE RAN. 1985 to 2000

At the Annual Naval Symposium held a( HMAS Watson in November 1976 the following paper was presented by a syndicate of officers consisting of:

Captain E.E. JOHNSTON, AM,OBE Commanding Officer HMAS Perth

Captain M.B. RAYMENT Fleet Operations Officer

Commander N.J. STOKER Officer-in-Charge. Tactical School

Commander ID MACDOUGAE Officer-in-Charge, Submarine Command Team Trainer

Lieutenant Commander C.J. SKINNER Combat Systems Engineer Officer, HMAS Perth

1tit1t it It it ilititlilt it it 1t1t it it it it it it it it it it it

The views expressed in the paper are those of the syndicate who presented it and are not to be construed as being the views of the Australian Government, the Department of Defence, the Chief of Naval Staff or the Australian Naval Institute.

Pane 4 Journal of the A ustralian Naval Institute

The Needs of the R.A.N. 1985 to 2000

In June of 1976 a group of officers was in­vited to present to the Naval Symposium their ideas of the needs of the RAN for the period 1985 to 2000. The 'Young Turks' as they were dubbed (with considerable adjectival licence), decided that in the time available for their present­ation it would be impracticable to address such topics as types and numbers of ships, weaponry, size of the Service and like subjects. Therefore certain broad topics were selected and it is our deliberations on these which wc will lay before you.


Our syndicate addresses the needs of the Royal Australian Navy in and for the period 1985 to 2000 that is from nine years to twenty years hence. This timescale provides time for formulation and implementation of policies to fulfil the needs. You will note we have omitted all reference to the Seaborne Air Platform a subject already receiving much attention.

Before describing the likely roles of the RAN in the period under study, the major in­fluences on the functions of the RAN will be discussed.

Firstly, geopolitical influences The likelihood oi direct invasion is generally accepted as low, and indeed may well be the lowest possibility of all. Nevertheless, shifts in the power balances anywhere in the area of Australia's interest have effects that are felt throughout and can include expansion affecting Australia even though not caused bv Australia.

On the other hand major nations, especially Japan, are becoming more and more resource hungry. As the unexplored areas dwindle the competition will become more fierce. The arbi­trary interference by governments or trade unions in the trading of raw materials will only amplify this ferocity We have assumed that the 200 km resource zone will be adopted by all countries even if unilaterally - these influences will result in a much greater requirement for off­shore surveillance than at present.

Changes in political attitudes in neighbouring countries allied with increasing activism in minor-

ity groups within Australia will lead to increasing import of subversive material and ideas. As fish­ing grounds become depleted the fishing fleets from other nations will range further afield and will take even more liberties with national boundaries.

Greatest of all the influences however will be the ever increasing world trade carried on or over the seas There is every sign that the already inter­locking world economy will become more inter­dependent Even now the closure of the major straits through the archipelagic countries would have serious consequences for countries like Japan and Australia.

The high level of seaborne trade is itself worthy of closer study-the trends in levels on the various routes and the content of the trade goods carried thereon are just as important as knowledge of military capability.

Secondly, technological factors. Of these we must first address the submarine. We do so be­cause of its overriding influence on seapower. Notwithstanding any other technological innova­tion, the foreseeable strength of Russian seapowei will rest heavily on the vast radius of action and on the invulnerability of submarines. This is one technological area we do not expect to change greatly. No amount of opposing technology, whether increased capability of sonars, vast passive acoustic arrays, laser underwater sensors, nuclear depth bombs or anything else is going to remove the high vulnerability of merchant ship­ping to attack by submarine. Probably the best defence is to multiply the numbers of hulls {that is less eggs in each basket) - a suggestion quite contrary to present trends for bigger and bigger ships, or to make merchant ships less sinkable. We argue that whatever else may change, the offensive capability of the submarine will continue largely unchanged. However the concentration. until recently, of many of our resources into anti-submarine forces may well be misguided.

The other technological influence on roles is the increasing number of smart weapons. These arms are now increasingly being sold to countries with little or no industrial or technological basis of their own Of more significance however is the

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Page S

decreasing cost, and the increasing reliability, simplicity of operations and comparative invul­nerability to countermeasures of these weapons. These are the greatest levellers ot all-the tiniest nation can fit them to fishing busts and produce a credible threat at low cost, a threat whose greatest asset is our difficulty of identifying which are the enemy That these forces are vul­nerable to air attack is not the point - the cost of the boats and missiles is vastly less than the loss of just one bulk carrier and its cargo.


We believe the common functions for the Australian armed forces are satisfactory and we consider the single Service functions are adequate with the exception that the RAN single Service function should be re-stated as follows:

'The conduct of operations at AND OVbR

the sea for the defence of Australia and

Australian interests' This would not in our opinion degrade the func­tion of the RAAF but would be a realistic state­ment of the requirement for the RAN to conduct air operations as an integral part of Naval opera­tions. We do not believe that maritime operations can be divided into distinct air and surface seg­ments with both RAN and RAAF holding separate responsibilities. The present functions inadequately recognise the requirements of Naval aviation and tend to re-inforce the general in­efficiency and difficulties that have occurred in maritime operations for many years. We believe that the present system whereby sea surveillance is largely the prerogative of 'he RAAF is wrong and that the RAN is the appropriate Service to be the prime mover in this activity.


First let us consider the single Service function ol the conduct of operations at and over the sea for defence of Australia and Australian interests.

We speculate that the maritime situations that could occur may be one or more of the fol­lowing:

a. as a minor ally of a number of non-com­
munist nations, probably including USA, in
a struggle for survival with the USSR and
Warsaw Pact countries, our commitment
probably forced upon us by membership of

b. involvement in a regional war as a result of
deliberate actions taken against Australian
nationals by a foreign government. A situa­
tion where the government is forced to inter­
vene, because public opinion demands inter­
vention to stop the killing of Australians and
the less important but nevertheless signifi­
cant destruction or confiscation of Austral­
ian owned assets.

Page 6 - Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

We believe that the prospects for involve­ment in this type of maritime action is fairly remote but could occur with devastating suddenness;

c. defence of Australian trade carried on the
high seas against military sanctions imposed
by a nation determined to influence our
government policies. Interference with Aus­
tralian maritime trade could occur at great
distances from Australia and could occur
separately or as an adjunct to the two mari­
time situations already mentioned;

d. action to prevent the plundering of national
resources by industrial resource-hungry

e. actions to suppress political blackmail or
acts ot political terrorism. The type and
rationale for this activity is limitless and
could occur without warning;

f. a fish war or similar, resulting from the
necessity to enforce the national claim to
an economic zone as established by Inter­
national law but not recognised by a country
which does not ratify the Law of the Sea


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