Student: Leslie Sexton Achievement: Application Total: Marks Section 1



Download 37.26 Kb.
Date25.04.2016
Size37.26 Kb.
#17894
Markville History Department
STEP 4: ESSAY OUTLINE (exemplar)

Student: Leslie Sexton Achievement: Application Total: ___ Marks

Section 1 (Introductory Paragraph)
A. Background Information

August 14th, 1945, marked the end of a long struggle for freedom, democracy, and peace. At the same time, it marked a change in the nature of war, and the dawn of a new era. Truman’s controversial decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan ended the Second World War and began the nuclear age. Since the end of the war, Truman’s decision has been the subject of much controversy, largely due to the high civilian death toll that resulted from the bombardments.


B. Controversial Question

Was the use of the atomic bomb against Japan justified?


C. Thesis Statement

Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan was justified by the historical context of the Second World War, Japan’s refusal to surrender, and the high death toll expected from an invasion of mainland Japan.


D. 3 Sub-Topics / Arguments

1) The use of the atomic bomb was justified in the context of the Second World War.

2) Japan’s refusal to surrender made the use of the atomic bomb necessary in order to end the war.

3) The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki allowed America to avoid an invasion of mainland Japan.



Section 2 (Sub-Topic 1)
A. Introductory Sentence / Major Idea

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justified in the historical context of the Second World War.


B. Evidence & Analysis

1) “With the well-developed understanding that the productivity of a nation was directly connected with its ability to resist, and with the knowledge that particularly in Japan the pattern of productivity was spread widely among small private producers in urban communities, the rationale for mass bombing had been developed. The distinction between civilian and military targets had approached a vanishing point as war became total.”1


The bomb was dropped on an industrial city in order in order to destroy Japan’s war industries. As the Second World War progressed, the world adopted a new morality, and civilian bombings became routine, and even an accepted practice.
2) “The previously accepted and frequently used mass conventional bombings over Japan and Germany had caused a similar result. They had merely been less efficient.”2

3) During the battle of Britain over 146,777 civilians were killed or seriously injured.3 The air-raids in Germany cost approximately 300,000 civilian lives, and injured almost 780,000 more.4

4) “The most widely cited figures [casualties from the strategic air campaign on Japan] from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey are 333,000 dead and 472,000 wounded, including 120,000 from the atomic bombs.”5
The destruction wrought by conventional bombings, a common practice during the Second World War, caused similar destruction and high death tolls. During the war, every country used new technology to gain the upper hand. Therefore, the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represented a culmination in the destructiveness of aerial bombings, not a significant deviation from previous aerial bombing practices.
5) “Aerial bombardment inflicted civilian deaths in Japan measured in hundreds of thousands, but the direct and indirect effects of the blockade in China killed noncombatants by the millions, and the blockade against Japan aimed for the same ghastly results.” 6
The devastating effects of the blockade and conventional bombardments would have produced high civilian casualties. These options would have unnecessarily prolonged the war and the suffering of the Japanese people. The use of the atomic bomb was no less moral than these horrific wartime practices.
6) “Nuclear weapons were to be used to save the Japanese nation and the Allied soldiers from the horrors that had been planned for them from conventional bombardment and invasion.”7
The use of the atomic bomb made an invasion and continued conventional bombardment unnecessary, saving the lives of Japanese soldiers and civilians.
C. Concluding Sentence

The use of the atomic bomb was not morally unjustified in the context of the Second World War.




Section 3 (Sub-Topic 2)
A. Introductory Sentence / Major Idea

The use of the atomic bomb was necessary to compel the surrender of Japan.


B. Evidence & Analysis

1) “Tokyo’s aim was to inflict such severe damage and casualties on the attackers that the Allies would be convinced of the futility of further fighting and of the wisdom of negotiated peace.”8


Japanese military continued to fight, convinced they had to achieve victory through extreme sacrifice. The Japanese military were mounting a desperate last defense of mainland Japan in hopes of inflicting as severe damage on Allied forces as possible.
2) “the Joint Chiefs ‘saw no prospect of surrender until the army leaders acknowledged defeat’ either through actual defeat or the realization that the military’s survival was at stake.”9
The Japanese military could only be compelled to surrender through absolute defeat through an invasion, or by the significant shock that resulted from the use of the atomic bombs.
3) Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson: “To extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, than it would cost.”10
Dropping the bomb produced sufficient shock to successfully demonstrate the power of the United States, forcing Japan to surrender.
4) “It was thought that the effects of the bomb on such a target would make the maximum impression on the military and civilian rulers of Japan. Any more sparing course was deemed by Stimson and his associates on the Interim Committee to involve a ‘…serious danger to the major objective of obtaining a prompt surrender from the Japanese.’ ”11
Defeat in the Pacific, the Allied blockade, and devastating conventional bombings could not persuade Japan to end its war. Therefore, the destructive power of the atomic bomb was necessary to compel the surrender of Japan through shock.
5) One of the Emperor’s closest aids, Koichi Kido said: “We of the peace party were assisted by the atomic bomb in our endeavour to end the war.”12
The atomic bomb attacks broke the political stalemate between the Emperor and the military, and offered Japan an opportunity to end the war. The Emperor was able to justify surrender by the vast number of civilian casualties that resulted from the use atomic bombs.
6) Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Emperor Hirohito’s closest advisor stated: “If military leaders could convince themselves that they were defeated by the power of science but not by lack of spiritual power or strategic errors, they could save face to some extent.”13
The atomic bomb offered the Japanese military a way out of the war, allowing the Japanese military to be convinced of defeat.
C. Concluding Sentence

Despite its seemingly futile position, the Japanese military refused to surrender, planning to fight desperately until they were entirely destroyed. Thus, it was necessary to use the atomic to shock the Japanese military in order to compel a Japanese surrender.




Section 4 (Sub-Topic 3)
A. Introductory Sentence / Major Idea

The use of the atomic bomb was a military necessity in order to prevent a costly invasion of Japan.


B. Evidence & Analysis

1) “On June 18 [Marshall] had estimated 350,000 Japanese on Kyushu. ULTRA now reported 600,000, ready to fight to the death. (This estimate in turn was much too low; after the war it was discovered there were 900,000.)”14


The estimates of 40,000 deaths in an invasion of mainland Japan were based on flawed intelligence. By late July, the number of Japanese troops prepared to desperately defend their homeland by inflicting severe damage on American troops was almost three times the original estimate.
2) “During the final week of July, Marshall told the president at Potsdam, Germany, that OLYMPIC and CORONET would cost a minimum of a quarter-million and possibly a million American casualties. It seems likely that the wave of reinforcements that ULTRA spotlighted played heavily on Marshall’s mind and caused him to revise his earlier casualty projection dramatically upwards.”15
Based on Japanese decrypts, General Marshall realized that the number of American casualties would rise as a result of the Japanese buildup to defend Japan. The invasion of Japan would result in a high loss of life.
3) “In the three months since Truman took office, American battle casualties in the Pacific were nearly half the total from three years of war in the Pacific. The nearer victory came, the heavier the price in blood.”16
Casualties from previous battles in the Pacific had been high, forecasting a bloody and costly invasion of mainland Japan.
4) General Marshall stated: “The Japanese had demonstrated in each case they would not surrender and fight to the death…It was to be expected that resistance in Japan, with their home ties, could be even more severe…So it seemed quite necessary, if we could, to shock them into action…We had to end the war; we had to save American lives.”17
As American forces approached Japan, Japanese forces resisted further, inflicting a large number of casualties on Allied forces, and sustaining high numbers of casualties themselves. An invasion of mainland Japan was expected to be met with fanatical resistance, causing a high number of American casualties. The cost of an invasion of Japan justified the use of the atomic bomb as saving American lives.
5) “About ten times more Imperial that U.S. soldiers died on Saipan and Okinawa; twenty-five more died to Tinian and in the Philippines. Civilian deaths rose into the several hundred thousands, especially on Saipan and Okinawa.”18
The prevention of an invasion of Japan not only saved American lives, but Japanese lives as well. Throughout the war in the Pacific, the Japanese sustained more casualties than the America forces. An invasion of mainland Japan would have resulted in a high casualty rate among both Japanese soldiers and civilians.
6) “The people who would have suffered most, had the war gone on much longer and their country been invaded, were the Japanese.” 19
The atomic bombs ended the war before an invasion was necessary, thus saving both American and Japanese lives.
C. Concluding Sentence

High American and Japanese casualties expected from an invasion of mainland Japan justified the use of the atomic bomb as a military necessity.



Section 5 (Conclusion)
A. Summary of Sub-Topics

Despite moral objections to the use of the atomic bombs, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were justifiable in the context of the Second World War. The bombings produced a sufficient shock to compel the surrender of a Japanese military struggling to fight until they were destroyed entirely, and prevented a costly invasion of mainland Japan.


B. Restate the Thesis

The historical context of the Second World War, Japan’s refusal to surrender, and the high death toll expected from an invasion of mainland Japan justified the use of the atomic bombs against Japan.


C. Positive, moral, lesson learned sentence

Though today it is easy to judge the use of the atomic bombs as wrong because of their destructiveness, the primary factor in Truman’s decision to use these weapons was a desire to end the destruction of war.



Bibliography
Baldwin, Hanson W. “The Strategic Need for the Bomb Questioned.” The Atomic Bomb: The Great Decision. Ed. Paul R. Baker. Hinsdale: The Dryden Press Inc., 1976.

“Battle of Okinawa.” Global Security. 21 October 2001. 28 March 2005.

Bragdon, Henry W., Samuel P. McCutchen, and Donald A. Ritchie. History of a Free Nation. Columbus: Glenroe/McGraw-Hill, 1998.

Bundy, McGeorge, and Henry Stimson. On Active Service in Peace and War. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.

Drea, Edward J. MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan 1942-1945. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992.

Elting, John R. “Costs, Casualties and Other Data.” Grolier Online. 20 March 2005. <http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_16.html>

Feis, Herbert. The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Ferrell, Robert H. Harry S. Truman: A Life. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994.

Frank, Richard B. Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. New York: Random House, 1999.

Jenkins, Roy. Truman. New York: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1986

Kristof, Nicholas. “Why the nuclear attack on Japan was right.” The Age. 6 August 2003.

Maddox, Robert James. Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1995.

McCullough, David. Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

McNulty, Brian. “The Great Atomic Bomb Debate.” Ohio University. 25 November 2003.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. “The Bomb and Concurrent Negotiations with Japan.” The Atomic Bomb: The Great Decision. Ed. Paul R. Baker. Hinsdale: The Dryden Press Inc., 1976.

Leahy, William D. I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on his Notes and Diaries Made at the Time. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950.

Schoenberger, Walter Smith. Decision of Destiny. Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1969.

Sherwin, Martin J. A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the Grand Alliance. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.

Takaki, Ronald. Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Bomb. New York: Little, Brown & Company Limited, 1995.

The Truman Administration: A Documentary History. Ed. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966.

“The United States Strategic Bombing Survey.” The Truman Administration: A Documentary History. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966.

Truman, Harry S. Year of Decisions. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955.

Walker, Samuel J. Prompt & Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997.



Zeiler, Thomas W. Unconditional Defeat: Japan, America, and the End of World War II. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2004.

1 Walter Smith Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1969) 303.

2 Walter Smith Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1969) 303.

3 John R. Elting, “Costs, Casualties and Other Data”, Grolier Online, <http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_16.html>

4 John R. Elting, “Costs, Casualties and Other Data”, Grolier Online, <http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_16.html>

5 Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999)

6 Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999) 334.

7 Walter Smith Schoenberger, Decision of Destiny (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1969) 293.

8 Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan 1942-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992) 213.

9 Thomas W. Zeiler, Unconditional Defeat: Japan, America, and the End of World War II (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2004) 179.

10 Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) 635-36.

11 Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) 48.

12 Nicholas Kristof, “Why the nuclear attack on Japan was right” The Age 6 August 2003, 6 April 2005

13 Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 1999) 347.

14 Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1994) 213.

15 Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan 1942-1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992) 222.

16 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992) 437.

17 David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992) 395.

18 Thomas W. Zeiler, Unconditional Defeat: Japan, America, and the End of World War II (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2004) 194.

19 Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) 193.


Download 37.26 Kb.

Share with your friends:




The database is protected by copyright ©essaydocs.org 2022
send message

    Main page