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Strategy PAge


For the NEG:
Thesis to this
The DA is best against affs that claim leadership advantages ---- this is essentially the link claim that you’re going for

The CP tries to remedy all of the advantages that are not intrinsic to leadership. So any “exploration/development” based advantage, the CP should resolve. If you think there’s a “US key” advantage, the DA should turn it because China will always play the spoiler (Rajput card)


For the AFF:
The CP fiats an international government – don’t let them do that! International fiat is bad, and you should argue that the neg can’t fiat an actor that is not part of the USFG because the judge does not have jurisdiction over such claims, making it an illogical option
The permutation arguable resolves the link to the DA because it can boost cooperation
The DA relies on the argument that the ocean is always a zero-sum geopolitical hotspot, but decades of ocean cooperation disproves this. LOST even disproves this claim – so you should point out that your leadership advantage resolves the cooperative mechanism to the link

CHINA DA




china da – 1nc



china’s eyeing political and economic leadership in ocean exploration and development now --- perception of safe leadership guarantees stability over its access to resources



MARLOW 12/30/2013 - Geological and Planetary Sciences at the California Institute of Technology (Marlow, Jeffrey, “China’s Deep Sea Ambitions”, 12.30.13, http://www.wired.com/2013/12/chinas-deep-sea-ambitions/)
Recently, China’s Jiaolong manned submersible became the world’s deepest-diving state-sponsored research vessel, with four trips to 7,000 meters depth. Around the same time, news broke of plans for a National Deep Sea Center, a $78 million facility that will operate the sea-going fleet and serve as a central base for oceanographic research and technology development. Months later, the center’s director, Liu Baohua, announced a nationwide search for oceanauts, men and women who will pilot Jiaolong and its planned sister sub around the ocean’s depths. It’s all part of China’s rhetorical, financial, and strategic return to the sea, a realm that it dominated several centuries ago. Chinese maritime strength reached its apex in the early 15th century, as admiral Zheng He crisscrossed the Indian Ocean with enormous fleets, returning with gifts (most famously a giraffe) for the Emperor. But a few years later, as political winds shifted, the Ming Dynasty ended the epic voyages, choosing instead to focus on other, more local, priorities. This abrupt 180 is frequently cited as a cautionary tale highlighting the dangers of isolationism, a poor strategic move that doomed the discoverers to become the discovered. So why the resurgence in sea-based activity? Dean Cheng is a Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation and an expert on China’s technological ambitions. He points to the innocuously named “863 Program” as an underappreciated game changer that reconfigured the country’s relationship with technology across a number of disciplines. In March of 1986 (hence the “863” title), four prominent engineers wrote to then-Chairman Deng Xiaoping, warning of impending doom for civil society’s scientific institutions. A long-standing focus on military might had neglected other aims of technological development, and if China didn’t redistribute its resources soon, it would be fated to watch the “new technological revolution” from the outside. Xiaoping took the argument to heart, initiating research and exploration programs focused on seven key fields: biotechnology, space, information technology, lasers, automation, energy, and materials science. Marine Technology was added to the roster in 1996, well coordinated with the country’s broadening regional influence and growing appetite for sea-based resources. “China has become much more dependent on the oceans and ocean-based trade for food and commerce,” notes Cheng. “They’d also like to know what’s off the coast; there are vast unexplored swaths of their seabed as well as deeper ocean reaches that could prove useful.” And while Plan 863 indicates a formal commitment to oceanographic exploration, China’s movement has been measured and deliberate, similar to its spacefaring progress. With all the fanfare surrounding the country’s entry into manned spaceflight, it’s important to maintain historical perspective. In the decade since it became the third country to put a man in space, China has completed four flights; the bulk of the Space Race, from Gagarin to Armstrong, happened in less time. It seems likely, then, that the oceanaut program will be a slow burning initiative, the leading edge of a larger oceanic strategy. Going forward, China will continue to consolidate its strategic interests and look to secure access to resources, whether in the form of deep ocean minerals or coastal fish. As Cheng explains, “there are relatively few sudden interests in Chinese politics. The broader set of research areas tend to be methodical in the development process – it’s been true for outer space and it’s true for inner space too.”




volatility of the plan guarantees economic and geopolitical competition --- encroaching in China’s sphere risks global conflict



XIAOYU 2014 - China Institute of international Studies (CIIS) since 2012. She is a research assistant specialized in global macroeconomic situation as well as European economy (Xiaoyu, Li, “China-US Cooperation: Key to the Global Future”, January 13, 2014, http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-01/13/content_6606656.htm)

The world has achieved unprecedented peace, prosperity, and inter-dependence, but past achievements — and further progress — are threatened by a host of looming challenges. Global institutions that served us well and transformed the world are becoming victims of their own success and must be reformed or replaced to deal with new challenges and take advantage of new opportunities. Governments everywhere face rising expectations and increasing demands but find themselves less able to manage the challenges they face. The next round of challenges can only be managed successfully if nations, especially major powers, cooperate. Moreover, the most difficult and most consequential challenges cannot be managed effectively without sustained cooperation between the largest developing country, China, and the largest developed country, the United States. Stated another way, the ability of China and the United States to work together on critical global challenges will determine whether the world is able to sustain and enhance mutually beneficial developments or fails to cope with the issues critical to the global future and to the security and prosperity of the United States and China. This shared conviction persuades us that we must do more than just hope that our countries will find ways to cooperate. This report represents a joint effort to develop both the rationale and concrete mechanisms for sustained, proactive collaboration to address challenges resulting from long-term global trends and consequential uncertainties. It builds on the findings of independent efforts to identify megatrends and potential game-changers with the goal of developing a framework for the US-China relationship that will better enable us to meet the challenges facing the global community and the strategic needs of both countries. The Joint Working Group recognizes that China and the United States hold different views on many bilateral and international issues, and that our relationship is constrained by mutual suspicion and strategic mistrust. Nevertheless, our common strategic interests and responsibility as major powers are more important than the specific issues that divide us; we must not make cooperation on critical global issues contingent on prior resolution of bilateral disputes. Our disagreements on bilateral issues are important, but they are not as important to our long-term security and prosperity as is our ability to cooperate on key challenges to global security and our increasingly intertwined futures. We must cooperate on global challenges not as a favor to one another or because other nations expect us to exercise leadership in the international system. We must do it because failure to cooperate on key global challenges will have profoundly negative consequences for the citizens of our own countries. The Joint Working Group has no illusions about how difficult the task ahead will be. Leaders in both countries face relentless domestic pressures to focus on near-term issues, often to the detriment of long-term interests, as well as on looming US-China bilateral differences and mutual suspicions. This report seeks to illustrate why it is imperative and how it is possible to pursue long- and short-term interests at the same time. How We Reached Key Assessments and Recommendations Generous support from the China-United States Exchange Foundation enabled the Atlantic Council and the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) to establish a Joint Working Group of experts from both countries. The members of the group met in Beijing and Washington in the spring and summer of 2012 to compare and integrate the findings of separate Chinese and US draft reports on global trends. The Chinese projection of trends, entitled Global Trends to 2030 and the Prospects for China-US Relations, was prepared by CIIS with contributions from the School of International Studies at Peking University. The US report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, was prepared by the US National Intelligence Council (NIC).[1] The Atlantic Council contributed to the NIC report and members of the NIC team attended (as observers) the joint assessment meetings. This review confirmed that the independently developed reports were generally consistent in their assessments of global trends and provided a solid basis for development of scenarios to illustrate what might happen under different assumptions about cooperation between China and the United States. The scenarios in both analyses depict markedly different outcomes for China, the United States, and the world. When China and the United States cooperate to meet looming challenges, both countries benefit. When they fail to cooperate and pursue narrow interests or win-lose or zero-sum outcomes, both countries lose. Continuing down the path of drift and episodic cooperation that we are on now also leads to lose-lose outcomes. The obvious advantages of win-win outcomes and dangerous implications of behaviors that eschew or minimize cooperation create strong incentives to focus on megatrends, critical challenges, and enhancing the likelihood of success and mutual benefit through close and continuous collaboration. This report outlines the case for collaboration and makes several specific recommendations to make cooperation both possible and fruitful. It was drafted and circulated among group members for revisions and to ensure consensus. China and the United States have different interests, objectives, and perspectives on many matters, and the number of issues in dispute may well grow as we broaden our bilateral relationship and at times disagree with one another on the world stage. Resolving some of these issues will be difficult and require much time and effort. The resolution of these contentious issues in the US-China relationship, however, must not be made a prerequisite for cooperation on a limited but arguably more important set of issues with the clear potential to harm both of our interests. Continued drift toward strategic competition and failure to find a balance of interests on core issues will undermine support in both countries for cooperation on major global issues of mutual interest and benefit. Cooperation on shared global challenges may build trust and make it easier to resolve nettlesome bilateral issues. But that would be an ancillary benefit and should not be the primary reason for collaboration on the global challenges identified in the independently prepared studies and summarized elsewhere in this report. The primary reasons we need to work together on the global challenges are that they cannot be addressed successfully unless we do, and that failure to deal effectively with consequential megatrends will have deleterious consequences for China, the United States, and the world. It is difficult to envision a stable, prosperous global system absent a US-China relationship that is largely a cooperative one. Forces and megatrends that are visible but not well understood today will shape the futures of people everywhere. The list include(s) consequences of globalization that increase prosperity but also increase demand for water, food, and energy. It also includes demographic change and effects of climate change that will intensify the consequences of other megatrends and make them more difficult to manage. Some of the megatrends and the way they interact will threaten social and political stability unless managed effectively. All have profound implications for governance and global stability. How effectively governments meet and manage these challenges in the next ten to twenty years will determine how beneficial or detrimental they will be for our countries and our children. Successfully navigating the turbulent waters ahead will require understanding the challenges we face and foresight about the implications of alternative paths. Our common goal must be to avert or ameliorate negative outcomes, and to maximize the chances of achieving desirable outcomes. To accomplish this goal, China and the United States must establish and draw on a continuing dialogue on the evolution, implications, and possible policy responses to the most consequential megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive change. The framework and policy recommendations of this report seek to jumpstart that process by suggesting mechanisms for collaboration that begin bilaterally but eventually include other nations critical to finding paths to a better future for all. I. Critical Importance of China-US Cooperation The global future is likely to be increasingly volatile and uncertain. The rate of change is increasing, driven by the accelerating pace of technological development, unprecedented urbanization and growth of the global middle class, and a wide range of challenges beyond the control of any one country but potentially affecting the prosperity and security of all countries. Disruptive change in one geographic or functional area will spread quickly.. No country, and certainly not those with the largest populations and largest economies, will be immune. Global challenges like climate change, food and water shortages, and resource scarcities will shape the strategic context for all nations and require reconsideration of traditional national concerns such as sovereignty and maximizing the ability of national leaders to control their country’s destiny. What China and the United States do, individually and together, will have a major impact on the future of the global system. As importantly, our individual fates will be inextricably linked to how that future plays out. The three illustrative scenarios sketched out below underscore how critical the future of the US-China relationship is to each country and to the world. • Global Drift and Erosion (the present world trajectory): In a world in which nations fail to resolve global problems and strengthen mechanisms of global cooperation, governments gradually turn inward. Each nation seeks to protect and advance its own narrow national interests or to preserve an unsustainable status quo that is rapidly changing in ways that erode the international order. The international community’s lack of ability to cooperate to meet global challenges leads to international crises and instability. • Zero-Sum World: Unsustainable drift leads to a world of predominantly zero-sum competition and conflict in the face of severe resource constraints. The result is economic crises and internal instability as well as interstate confrontation. There is risk of military conflict between major powers, which increases global mistrust and uncertainty and fosters an “each nation for itself” mentality that further undermines the ability of states to cooperate in the face of growing common challenges. • Global Revitalization and Cooperation: To escape the perils of drift or zero-sum competition, leaders in countries with the most to lose work together to manage and take advantage of global challenges and megatrends. Cooperation makes it possible to achieve win-win outcomes that avoid or mitigate negative consequences of increased demand for resources and the impact of climate change as well as to harness new technologies to improve living conditions through sustainable development. Cooperation creates and utilizes new transnational institutions to prevent conflict and enhance security for all. China and the United States become more prosperous as we work together. The possible futures sketched out above (and developed at greater length below) are intended to stimulate thinking about how current trends and uncertainties could lead to very different global and national outcomes. For many reasons, the United States and China will have greater ability and incentives than other countries to cooperate in determining and shaping developments over the next two decades. Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a pathway to “global revitalization and cooperation” in which China and the United States do not cooperate and provide critical international leadership. Many factors will shape the future, some of which are beyond the control of any nation state, but China and the United States — and the character of the US-China relationship — will be critical. The mutual dependence on each other’s economic performance and the success of the global economy as a whole was demonstrated during the 2008 financial crisis that began in the United States but quickly spread around the world. US and Chinese leaders recognized that they were in the “same boat” strategically and engaged in a closely coordinated response to the crisis, which played a key—if not decisive—role in preventing the situation from becoming much worse. The need for joint and coordinated responses to economic crises and to mounting economic challenges and threats is certain to increase as globalization continues and interdependence deepens. II. Critical Megatrends There are many global trends that are positive, including greater prosperity; global economic reconvergence after two centuries of Western economic preponderance; profound social changes driven by rapid scientific and technological changes; a growing global middle class; widespread improvement in global health and life expectancy; and overall reduction in war and violent deaths. The great advances in human prosperity over the last several decades and the potential for greater gains in the future are to be celebrated, but they also create new challenges shaped by megatrends in the “global operating environment”. These megatrends include: • Individual empowerment is an increasingly important factor both within states and internationally. The empowerment of individuals is fueled by education, rising prosperity, and a host of technologies. Empowered individuals, the growing middle class, and domestic NGOs are more willing to engage in political activities as well as to make more demands on government. The sense of national identity is becoming stronger in many places but so too are social identities based on ethnicity, religion, culture, political concerns, and shared causes such as the environment and public health. This trend sometimes also fuels extremism and separatism. • Power will be increasingly diffused as the number of players with actual or nascent capacity to influence international deve-lopments is increasing. The international system evinces increasing signs of fragmentation and stratification. In addition to the rise of China, India, and Brazil, middle powers such as Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa, and Mexico are playing an ever more important role in the international arena. Further, the growing numbers and types of non-state actors such as international NGOs, multinational enterprises, and regional organizations mean states themselves no longer control the system. • Aging and urbanizing populations, accompanied by waves of domestic and international migration, will transform societies and strain capabilities. More than one billion people will be added to the global population by 2030 and an equal or greater number will move to cities. Rising incomes will enable as many as two billion more people to join the global middle class. Nearly all of the growth in the global population, urban dwellers, and the middle class will occur in developing countries. Critical demographic shifts will age populations and shrink the percentage of working-age cohorts in most of the developed and, increasingly, in parts of the developing world as well. China will be one of the developing countries with an aging population. Waves of immigration will create or exacerbate significant social problems, but there also will be a huge international marketplace for skilled and talented workers. • There will be increasing stresses and strains on the global commons. Many challenges to the environment and human security will be intensified by rapidly increased food, water, and natural resource consumption due to growing population, urbanization, and rapid expansion of the middle class. If not managed well, these challenges could have a significant and long-term adverse impact on all nations and the global system. • There is increasing concern that global climate change poses an existential threat to humanity. Climate change exacerbates water shortages and food production challenges; sparks greater migration and social conflict; acidifies the oceans; and leads to more extreme weather events, including sea-level rises magnifying the impact of storm surges threatening coastal cities and infrastructure. There is likely to be more focus by the international community on climate change consequence management, adaptation, and mitigation. III. Key Uncertainties The megatrends summarized above constitute a relatively predictable set of challenges facing individuals and nations, especially China and the United States. But they are not the only factors that will influence developments in the next two decades. The relatively predictable megatrends will interact with a number of critical uncertainties. Examples include: • The future of the global economy is volatile. The developed countries, especially in the Eurozone, may face a prolonged period of recovery. The developing countries, including China and India, face a “middle income trap”. The world could experience growing economic nationalism and trade protectionism as well as an accelerating adjustment of international industrial division of labor as China refocuses on domestic consumption-led growth, other nations increasingly displace China as the low-cost provider, and new manufacturing technologies and lower energy costs encourage the return of manufacturing to the United States and other developed countries. In addition, major economic crises could result from the increasing pressure on resource availability discussed previously. • The accelerating pace of technological development is likely to change the global operating environment for foreign policy and national security over the next two decades with uncertain consequences. A wide range of emerging technologies will affect the political, social, economic and security trajectories of states, international relations, and the international system, as have the Internet, mobile communications technology, and social media. These technologies range from new energy systems and manufacturing technologies such as 3D printing to bio- and nanotechnology breakthroughs affecting agricultural productivity, human enhancement, robotics, and information availability. On the negative side of the ledger, cyber hacking, cyber warfare, and genomics-enabled bioterrorism have the potential to be highly disruptive. • Nationalistic responses to increasing mutual vulnerability are likely as growing global interconnectedness and interdependence ensure that developments anywhere in the world, from slowly-developing threats like climate change to short-term crises like the 2008 financial crisis, can affect most nations and citizens yet be largely, if not completely, outside the control of individual states. National responses to common challenges and threats could be “each nation for itself” actions to achieve narrow national interests at the expense of other states and the common good. • Unpredictable events such as natural disasters, extreme weather events, pandemics, or nuclear weapon use by terrorists could be game-changers. An H5N1 or similar pandemic could shut down global transportation and kill tens of millions or more with a huge impact on the global economy, politics, and security. A series of extreme weather events, foreshadowed by Hurricane Sandy’s impact on the United States, could change the trajectories of global political efforts to deal with the consequences of climate change. • The future of both China and the United States is uncertain. China has many internal challenges that could limit its willingness to be a “joint responsible stakeholder” with the United States to meet global challenges and resolve regional conflicts. Similarly, the United States faces major economic challenges that could lead to long-term slow growth, a more inward focus, and a less active and influential role in catalyzing cooperation on global challenges. Conversely, one or both countries could achieve considerable success in its/their domestic arena(s) and feel emboldened to lead the transformation of the global system. • Conflicts could become more common and more intense as a result of social unrest, religious extremism, reduced provision of public goods, power shifts, and individual empowerment. The world’s security and stability may become increasingly fragile as a result of state failure, nuclear proliferation, or dramatic acts of terrorism, especially in unstable regions like the Middle East and South Asia. • Regional instability may have global impact. A major conflict in the Middle East, including over Iran’s nuclear weapons, could draw in outside powers, disrupt oil supplies, and send the global economy into recession. Failure to resolve or indefinitely shelve territorial disputes in East and Southeast Asia could limit the ability of regional states to cooperate in global as well as regional efforts to cope with global challenges. Military conflict over these disputes also could destabilize the Asia-Pacific region with grave consequences for the global economy and international stability. An existential crisis of the European Union could disrupt the cohesiveness of what is now the world’s largest economy. IV. Governance and Cooperation Challenges of Megatrends and Uncertainties Although no one can predict with confidence exactly how events will play out in the years ahead, we can be confident that the challenges and choices facing decision-makers at all levels and in all countries will be shaped by the interplay of megatrends, known uncertainties, unexpected “black swan” events, and the decisions of governments and nongovernmental actors. Waiting to see how events unfold is a possible but undesirable choice because waiting is, in effect, a decision to do nothing and hope for the best. We can and must do better than that by working to shape events in ways that reduce uncertainty, avoid or ameliorate undesirable trajectories, and increase the likelihood of win-win outcomes. Some of the challenges posed include: • Volatile global economy: Slower economic growth and potential crises such as a Eurozone meltdown, another global financial crisis, or a sustained spike in food prices could slow or reverse progress toward greater prosperity and better lives for more people. Growing inequality (worsening GINI coefficients[2]) could further compound the challenges. Although the rich and the poor alike may become richer, the absolute gaps between them likely will widen, both within and among countries and regions. Moreover, the middle class may continue to be squeezed not only in developed countries but also in developing countries despite more rapid economic growth, especially as the gap widens between the middle class and the super rich. • Increasing internal pressures on governments: Demands on governments at all levels likely will increase faster than the availability of resources required to satisfy them. More people with rising expectations and greater awareness of conditions at home and elsewhere will have more tools, especially social media, to organize and put pressure on governments to provide more services and opportunities. The rising middle class in the emerging economies likely will expect and demand more and better quality food and water, more reliable supplies of cleaner energy, improved infrastructure, and healthier environments. Governments could find it difficult to meet rising expectations, however, especially growing demand for increasingly limited resources, which will push prices upward and exacerbate economic and social instability. At the same time, some of the poorest countries with ineffective governments may be pushed into internal conflict and state failure by tribal, ethnic, and religious strife as well as economic and environmental stresses. These internal conflicts could lead to regional instability as environmental and economic migrants spill into neighboring states. Global cooperation gap widening: Increasing globalization and interdependence could make it more difficult for national govern-ments to manage new challenges on their own, but transnational institutions will be increasingly ill-suited or even incapable of meeting twenty-first century challenges. To meet the growing challenges, existing global mechanisms, most of which are legacy institutions from the post-World War II era designed to solve problems from the inter-war period, must be reformed or replaced. That will not be easy. There are 140 more countries today than there were when the global system was last reformed in the 1940s and all feel entitled to a seat at the table when decisions are made that will affect their own destinies. This widely shared ethos of democratic participation of all nations makes it difficult to strike a balance between equity of representation and efficacy of decision-making. • Domestic pressures and weak national governments: Gov-ernments may become less willing or able to cooperate with other nations as a result of domestic pressures on leaders to pursue narrow national interests. This will increase the likelihood of nations engaging in zero-sum behavior that will make it even more difficult to deal with the most challenging megatrends. • Extremism and fracturing of the nation-state: Extremism and separatism are likely to be fueled by individual empowerment and tribal, ethnic, religious, and other identities, strengthened by ubiquitous social media. The power and authority of the nation-state is likely to be increasingly circumscribed by the rising power of non-state actors and the growing importance of transnational challenges beyond the state’s control. The state is being challenged in many cases by separatist and extremist forces, including religious fundamentalists in Waziristan and Dagestan and regional nationalists in Catalonia and Scotland. • “Black swans” and lack of robust international institutions: Failure to establish robust international institutions and habits of cooperation could reduce the international community’s ability to respond to major crises, including black swan events. The latter are high impact but either improbable or simply unpredictable calamities such as pandemics, nuclear weapon or biological warfare attacks, or cyber meltdowns. If China and the United States act as rivals and give priority to parochial interests, it may be impossible for the international community to successfully confront the major challenges of the next twenty years. Owing to their size and importance in the global system, what China and the US do together as well as individually will profoundly affect the international community’s ability to engage in robust international cooperation in science and technology to find solutions to the world’s most pressing problems. V. Scenarios Illustrate Interconnections and Alternative Outcomes As the megatrends and uncertainties evolve over the coming two decades and beyond, China and the United States, along with the rest of the world, will face unprecedented challenges and unpredictable, disruptive change. We offer three global scenarios to illustrate how the complex megatrends, key uncertainties, and disruptive changes could play out, depending in large part on whether the relationship between China and the United States is primarily cooperative or conflictual. • Global Drift and Erosion: This scenario is characterized by the inability of China and the United States to work together effectively, if at all, to address key global challenges and to resolve regional conflicts. Problems created or exacerbated by the megatrends, key uncertainties, and their interactions worsen, creating a world that is less peaceful, less stable, and less prosperous. The debacle of the 2009 Copenhagen UN climate change conference demonstrated the global impact of the failure of the United States and China to agree on far-reaching steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In this future, the US and China again fail to respond adequately to continuing problems such as economic imbalances associated with the efforts of many countries to break into and then move from middle income status to that of high income. There is disruptive socio-political change related in part to both economic and demographic transitions, and environmental problems involving inadequate energy, water, and food resources. Washington and Beijing could be too preoccupied with political and military competition and territorial disputes in the Western Pacific, as well as by bilateral differences over intellectual property and other trade issues, to tackle these pressing problems. Among possible developments, US-China tensions could adversely affect global responses to energy challenges. These range from threats to security of supplies resulting from conflict in the Middle East and Persian Gulf to the need for a global energy transition away from fossil fuels to minimize carbon emissions and the impact of energy price volatility on global economic growth. Further, China and the United States also could fail to cooperate in efforts to mitigate the potentially disruptive impact of greatly increased demand for food, water, and other resources created by the addition of more than one billion people to the global population by 2030 as well as possibly two billion or more people to the developing world middle class. Without adequate international cooperation and global governmental mechanisms, this could lead to deeper economic crises, unresolved political conflicts, and worsening environmental conditions. • Zero-Sum World: A second possible trajectory could lead to the emergence of an even more competitive and dangerous zero-sum world, in which nations pursue narrow national interests. For example, the world could experience intense monetary and trade protectionism, with countries seeking geopolitical advantage at the expense of international cooperation for the common good. It could see intensifying rivalries, creating hostilities and rendering cooperation on global challenges nearly impossible as global governmental mechanisms break down or are marginalized.





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