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- The aim of
- How does one "act" on something
- We define or invent a process of rationalization each time we establish human relations in some material form, in some group, in some multiplicity.
- There is nothing like "freedom" within us that does not also appear as its opposite: as something that "imprisons" us
- If human beings are constantly in a process of mutual demolition, we might as well destroy ourselves, under pleasant, even fanciful conditions. "Of course all life is a process of breaking down,"
- It is not a question of dying, or of a desire to die, but of investing the temptation to die in a sublime element like music.
- What the Greeks taught us
- When we posit a single, universal reason de jure, we are falling precisely into what Châtelet calls
- Châtelet
1nc kritikThe 1AC is a one-dimensional epistemology of oppression -- an insistence on the self-evident perspectivism of oppressed peoples by focusing attention on the uniqueness and irrefutability of their personal experience participates in a mythos of implicit solidarity where all oppressed peoples are thought to assume the same interests -- this orientation romanticizes complicity with totalitarian violenceGur-ze-ev, 98 - Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education at Haifa, (Ilan, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy,” Educational Theory, Fall 48, http://haifa.academia.edu/IlanGurZeev/Papers/117665/Toward_a_Nonreperssive_Critical_Pedagogy) The postmodern and the multicultural discourses that influenced Giroux took a one-dimensional attitude towards power. They denoted the importance of deconstructing cultural reproduction and the centrality of relations of dominance to the “voices” of groups whose collective memory ,knowledge, and identity were threatened or manipulated by power relations and knowledge conceptions that reflect and serve the hegemonic groups. Freire is not aware that this manipulationhas two sides, negative and a positive. The negative side allows the realization of violence by guaranteeing possibilities for the successful functioning of a normalized human being and creating possibilities for men and women to become more productive in “their” realm of self-evidence.Their normality reflects and serves this self-evidence by partly constituting the human subject aswell as the thinking self. Giroux easily extracted from Freire’s Critical Pedagogy the elements denoting the importance of acknowledging and respecting the knowledge and identity of marginalized groups and individuals. In fact, this orientation and its telos are in contrast to the central concepts of postmodern educators on the one hand and Critical Theories of Adorno,Horkheimer, and even Habermas on the other. But many similar conceptions and attitudes are present as well. The aim of Freire’s Critical Pedagogy is to restore to marginalized groups their stolen “voice”,to enable them to recognize identify, and give their name the things in the world. The similarity to postmodern critiques is already evident in his acknowledgment that to correctly coin a word isnothing less than to change the world. 10 However, to identify this conception with the postmodernstand is a over-hasty because the centrality of language in Freire‘s thought relates to his concept of “truth” and a class struggle that will allow the marginalized and repressed an authentic “voice”, 11 asif their self-evident knowledge is less false than that which their oppressors hold as valid. Implicitly, Freire contends that the interests of all oppressed people are the same, and that one general theory exists for deciphering repressive reality and for developing the potentials absorbed in their collective memory. An alternative critique of language which does not claim to empower the marginalized and the controlled to conceive and articulate their knowledge and needs on the onehand, and is not devoted to their emancipation on the other, is mere “verbalism”, according toFreire. 12 The purpose or common cause of the educator and the educated, the leader and the followers, in a dialogue between equal partners is called here “praxis”. Praxis in education aims to bridge the gap between theory and transformational action that effectively transforms human existence. This concept of transformation contrasts with educational concept of Critical Theory. Here learning andeducation are basically the individual’s responsibility and possibility, and are always an ontological issue while epistemologically concretized in the given historical social context. They are conditioned by an individual’s competence to transcend the “father image”, prejudices, habits, and external power relations that constitute the collective in order to attain full personal and humangrowth. 13 According to Freire, this personal development is conditioned by critical acknowledgment and should occur as part of the entire community’s revolutionary practice. Only there can successful educational praxis realize its dialogical essence. The dialogue is an authentic encounter between one person and another, an educator and her/his fellow who wants to be dialogically educated, and the encounter should be erotic or not realized at all. “Love” is presented as the center and the essence of dialogue. 14 Freire’s Critical Pedagogy is foundationalist and positivist, in contrast to his explicit negation of this orientation. It is a synthesis between dogmatic idealism and vulgar collectivism meant to soundthe authentic voice of the collective, within which the dialogue is supposed to become aware of itself and of the world. The educational links of this synthesis contain a tension between its mystic-terroristic and its reflective-emancipatory dimensions. In Freire’s attitude towards Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the terroristic potential contained in the mystic conception of the emancipated“group”, “people”, or “class” knowledge is revealed within the concept of a dialogue. Freire introduces Che Guevara as an ideal model for anti-violent dialogue between partners in the desirable praxis. Che Guevara used a structurally similar rhetoric to that of Ernst Juenger and National Socialist ideologues on the creative power of war, blood, and sweat in the constitution of a new man, the real “proletar” in South America. Freire gives this as an example of the liberation of the oppressed within the framework of new “love” relations which allow to speak the silenced“voice”. The prioritization of indigenous epistemology provides a colonialism as an excuse for every local injustice, weirdly interpreting any indigenous practice -- including violent and exclusionary traditions -- as "emancipatory" resistance to colonial encroachment -- this reliance on indigenous identity for the production of self-evident visions of reality culminates in Fascist authoritarianismSarkar ’93 Tanika, feminist activist and Professor of Modern History at the Centre for Historical Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India “Rhetoric against Age of Consent Resisting Colonial Reason and Death of a Child-Wife” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 36 (Sep. 4, 1993), pp. 1869-1878 A few words are necessary to explain why, in the present juncture of cultural studies on colonial India, it is important to retrieve this specific history of revivalist-nationalism, and to work with a concept of nationalism that incorporates this history. Edward Said's Orientalism has fathered a received wisdom on colonial studies that has proved to be as narrow and frozen in its scope as it has been powerful in its impact. It proceeds from a conviction in the totalising nature of a western power knowledge that gives to the entire Orient a single image with absolute efficacy. Writings of the Sub-altern Studies pundits and of a group of feminists, largely located in the first world academia, have come to identify the struc-tures of colonial knowledge as the originary moment for all possible kinds of power and disciplinary formations, since, going by Said, Orientalism alone reserves for itself the whole range of hegemonistic capabili-ties. This unproblematic and entirely non-historicised 'transfer of power' to struc-tures of colonial knowledge has three major consequences; it constructs a necessarily monolithic, non-stratified colonised sub-ject who is, moreover, entirely powerless and entirely without an effective and opera-tive history of his/her own. The only history that s/he is capable of generating is neces-sarily a derivative one. As a result, the colonised subject is absolved of all com-plicity and culpability in the makings of the structures of exploitation in the last two hundred years of our history. The only culpability lies in the surrender to colonial knowledge. As a result, the lone political agenda for a historiography of this period shrinks to the contestation of colonial knowl-edge since all power supposedly flows from this single source. Each and every kind of contestation, by the same token, is taken to be equally valid. Today, with a triumphalist growth of aggressively communal and/or fundamentalistic identity-politics in our country, such a position comes close to indigenism and acquires a near Fascistic potential in its authoritarian insistence on the purity of indigenous epistemological and autological conditions. It has weird implications for the feminist agenda as well. The assumption that colo-nialism had wiped out all past histories of patriarchal domination, replacing them neatly and exclusively with western forms of gender relations, has naturally led on to an identification of patriarchy in modern India with the project of liberal reform alone. While liberalism is made to stand in for the only vehicle of patriarchal ideology since it is complicit with western knowl-edge, its opponents-the revivalists, the orthodoxy-are vested with a rebellious, even emancipatory agenda, since they re-fused colonisation of the domestic ideol-ogy. And since colonised knowledge is re-garded as the exclusive source of all power, anything that contests it is supposed to have an emancipatory possibility for the women. By easy degrees, then, we reach the position that while opposition to widow immolation was complicit with colonial silencing of non-colonised voices and, consequently, was an exercise of power, the practice of widow immolation itself was a contestatory act outside the realm of power relations since it was not sanctioned by colonisation. In a country, where people will still gather in lakhs to watch and celebrate the buming of a teen-aged girl assati, such cultural studies are heavy with grim political implications. We will try to contend that colonial structures of power compromised with, indeed learnt much from indigenous patriarchy and upper caste norms and practices which, in certain areas of life, retained consider-able hegemony. This opens up a new con-text against which we may revaluate liberal reform. Above all, we need to remember that other sources of hegemony, far from becoming extinct, were reactivated under colonialism and opposed the liberal ratio-nalist agenda with considerable vigour and success. The historian cannot afford to view the colonial past as an unproblematic retro-spect where all power was on one side and all protest on the other. Partisanship has to take into account a multi-faceted nationalism (and not simply its liberal variant), all aspects of which were complicit with power and domination even when they critiqued western knowledge and challenged colonial power. Ours is not a critique of their goal but rather of their methodological framing of Western systems of knowledge as a root cause for indigenous violence. Our challenge to their description is our alternative. Before establishing the desirability of their speech act, we must first understand how they act upon the edifices of Power which they claim to change. Our politicization of THOUGHT ITSELF is necessary to a truly liberatory politics of conceptual mobilityDeleuze ’87 Gilles, famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, (two translations used) The Opera Quarterly 21.4 (2005) 716-724 AND Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62 How does one "act" on something, and what is the act or actuality of this potential? The act is reason. Notice that reason is not a faculty but a process, which consists precisely in actualizing a potential or giving form to matter. Reason is itself a pluralism, because nothing indicates that we should think of matter or the act as unique. We define or invent a process of rationalization each time we establish human relations in some material form, in some group, in some multiplicity.4 The act itself, qua relation, is always political. Reason, as a process, is political. This may well be the case within a city, but it goes for other, smaller groups as well, or even for myself—and nowhere but in myself. Psychology, or rather the only bearable psychology, is politics, because I am forever creating human relationships with myself. There is no psychology, but rather a politics of the self. There is no metaphysics, but rather a politics of being. No science, but rather a politics of matter, since man is entrusted with matter itself. The same even applies to sickness: we have to "manage" it when we cannot conquer it, and thereby impose on it the form of human relationships. Consider the case of sonorous matter. The musical scale, or rather a musical scale, is a process of rationalization that consists in establishing human relationships via this matter in a manner that actualizes its potentiality and it itself becomes human. Marx analyzed the sense organs in this way in order to demonstrate through them the immanence of man and Nature: the ear becomes a human ear when the resonant object becomes musical. The very diverse group of processes of rationalization is what constitutes human becoming or activity, Praxis, or practices. We do not know in this regard if there is such a thing as a human unity, whether from the historical or the generic point of view. Is there a properly human matter, pure potential, distinct from actuality, that has the ability to fascinate us? There is nothing like "freedom" within us that does not also appear as its opposite: as something that "imprisons" us, as Châtelet is always saying. It would be quite obtuse of potentiality to oppose the act capable of realizing it—an inversion of reason, more than its opposite, a privation or alienation. It is as if there were a nonhuman relationship that nevertheless was internal or immanent to human relations, an inhumanity specific to humans: freedom that becomes the capacity of man to vanquish man, or to be vanquished. Potentiality is pathos, which is to say passivity or receptivity, but receptivity is first and foremost the power to receive blows and to give them: a strange kind of endurance. To be sure, one can draw up the history of systems of domination, in which the activity of the powerful is at work; but this activity is nothing without the appetite of those who aspire to give blows in the name of the blows they have received. They fight for their servitude as if it were their freedom, as Spinoza put it. Thus, whether exercised or endured, power is not merely the activity of man's social existence; it is also the passivity of man's natural existence. There is a unity of war [End Page 717] and land, the traces of which Châtelet detected in the work of Claude Simon—or in Marxism, which never separated the active existence of man as a historical being from its "double," the passive existence of man as a natural being: Reason and its irrationality: this was Marx's own theme, [and] it is also ours. . . . He wants to produce a critical science of the actual, fundamental passivity of humanity. Man does not die because he is mortal (any more than he lies because he is a "liar," or loves because he is a "lover"): he dies because he does not eat enough, because he is reduced to the state of bestiality, because he is killed. Historical materialism is there to remind us of these facts, and Marx, in Capital, lays the foundations for what might be a method enabling us to analyze, for a given period—quite a revealing period, in fact—the mechanisms at work in the fact of passivity. . . .5 Aren't there values specific to pathos? Maybe in the form of a despair about the world, something which is quite present in Châtelet, underneath his extreme politeness. If human beings are constantly in a process of mutual demolition, we might as well destroy ourselves, under pleasant, even fanciful conditions. "Of course all life is a process of breaking down," as Fitzgerald said.6 This "of course" has the ring of a verdict of immanence: the inhuman element in one's relationship to oneself. Châtelet's only novel, Les années de démolition (The Demolition Years), has a profoundly Fitzgeraldian motif, an elegance in the midst of disaster. It is not a question of dying, or of a desire to die, but of investing the temptation to die in a sublime element like music. Once again, this has less to do with psychoanalysis than with politics. We must take account of this vector of destruction, which can traverse a community or a man, Athens or Pericles. Périclès was Châtelet's first book.7 Pericles was always the very image of the great man, or great hero, for Châtelet—even in Pericles's "passivity," even in his failure (which was also the failure of democracy), even in spite of his disturbing trajectory [vecteur ]. Another value proper to pathos is politeness—a Greek politeness, in fact, which already contains an outline of human relationships, the beginnings of an act of reason. Human relationships begin with a reasoned system, an organization of space that undergirds a city. An art of establishing the right distances between humans, not hierarchically but geometrically, neither too far nor too close, to ensure that blows will not be given or received. To make human encounters into a rite, a kind of ritual of immanence, even if this requires a bit of schizophrenia. What the Greeks taught us, and [Louis] Gernet or [Jean-Pierre] Vernant reminded us, is to not let ourselves be nailed down to a fixed center, but to acquire the capacity to transport a center along with oneself, in order to organize sets of symmetrical, reversible relations established by free men. This may not be enough to defeat the despair of the world, for there are fewer and fewer polite men, and there must be at least two for the quality itself to exist. But François Châtelet's [End Page 718] extreme politeness was also a mask concealing a third value of pathos: what one might term goodness, a warm benevolence. The term is not quite right, even though this quality, this value, was deeply present in Châtelet. More than a quality or a value, it is a disposition of thought, an act of thinking. It consists in this: not knowing in advance how someone might yet be able to establish a process of rationalization, both within and outside himself. Of course there are all the lost causes, the despair. But if there is a chance [at establishing a process of rationalization], what does that someone need, how does he escape his own destruction? All of us, perhaps, are born on terrain favorable to demolition, but we will not miss a chance. There is no pure reason or rationality par excellence. There are processes of rationalization—heterogeneous and varied, depending on conditions, eras, groups, and individuals. These are constantly being aborted, receding, and reaching dead ends, and yet resuming elsewhere, with new measures, new rhythms, new allures. The inherent plurality of processes of rationalization is already the object of classic epistemological analyses (Koyré, Bachelard, Canguilhem), and sociopolitical analyses (Max Weber). In his late works, Foucault too pushed this pluralism toward an analysis of human relationships, which would constitute the first steps toward a new ethics from the standpoint of what he called "processes of subjectification": Foucault's analysis emphasized bifurcations and derivations, the broken historicity of reason, which is always in a state of liberation or alienation as it equates to man's relationship to himself. Foucault had to go back as far as the Greeks, not in order to find the miracle of reason par excellence, but merely in order to diagnose what was perhaps the first gesture toward a process of rationalization, and one that would be followed by many others, in different conditions, under different guises. Foucault no longer characterized the Greek polis in terms of the organization of a new space, but as a human relation that could take the form of a rivalry between free men or citizens (in politics, but also in love, gymnastics, or justice . . . ). Within this sort of process of rationalization and subjectification, a free man could not govern other free men, in principle, unless he were capable of governing himself. This is the specifically Greek act or process, which cannot be treated as a foundational act but rather as a singular event in a broken chain. It is undoubtedly here that Châtelet, having taken the Greek polis as his point of departure, meets Foucault. Châtelet defines the Greek polis with reference to the magistrate—not only in terms of how he differs from other functionaries, such as the priest or the imperial civil servant, but also with respect to his correlative duties, which belong to a corresponding process of rationalization (for instance, the drawing of lots). No one has analyzed how the process of drawing lots captures the gist of reason better than Châtelet. For Châtelet, rationalization is also a historical and political [End Page 719] process, in which Athens is its key event yet is also its failure and its erasure—namely, Pericles, from which other events spin off and are absorbed into other processes. Athens was not the advent of an eternal reason, but the singular event of a provisional rationalization, and is as such all the more striking. When we posit a single, universal reason de jure, we are falling precisely into what Châtelet calls presumption—a kind of metaphysical rudeness. He diagnoses this ailment in Plato: even when we recognize that reason is a human, solely human, faculty, a faculty tailored to human ends, we nevertheless continue to grant it theological transcendence. We draw up a dualism of processes instead of a pluralism of processes; this dualism opposes discourse to violence, as if violence were not already concealed within discourse itself, providing it with its various impetuses and ins and outs. For a long time, under the influence of Eric Weil8 and according to a Platonic and Hegelian model, Châtelet believed in the opposition between violence and discourse. But what he discovers, on the contrary, is the ability of discourse to give voice to man's distinct inhumanity. Indeed, it is the purview of discourse to engage the process of its own rationalization, but only in a certain becoming, and due to the pressure of certain motivations and events. This is of extreme importance in Châtelet's La naissance de l'histoire (The Birth of History)9 , because the image of discourse or Logos that he presents there is closer to Thucydides than to Plato or Hegel. Indeed, he never ceases challenging the two corollaries of a doctrine of universal reason: first, the utopian need to invoke an ideal city or a universal State of right, which would prevent against a democratic future; second, the apocalyptic impetus to locate the moment, the fundamental alienation of reason that occurred once and for all, comprising in one stroke all violence and inhumanity. It is one and the same presumption that grants transcendence to both reason and to reason's corruption, and, since Plato, renders the one the twin of the other. 2nccardsNo link to rules or predictability bad—our argument isn't rules-based in the sense they identify, it’s a set of contestable guidelines for evaluating competitions. 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