1nc Occular We advocate the 1AC minus their visual presentation of the video.
The 1AC is structured around vision – by playing this video they make the 1AC an experience that is necessarily visual – people who cannot see are structurally incapable of fully experiencing the full force of the 1AC because they are incapable of participating in the act of the 1AC. This turns the case – vision based politics is a distinctly western way of understanding language
Sampson 1996 (Edward, CSUN, “Establishing Embodiment in Psychology” Theory & Psychology 1996 Vol. 6 (4): 601-624. Special issue: The body and psychology
It is apparent from my preceding remarks that I distinguish between the object-body, which has been of some interest to both the dominant and successor traditions, and embodiment, which has generally been ignored by both. I shortly examine what I mean by embodiment. But first, it is necessary to develop further the idea of the object-body.¶ It should come as no surprise that the object-body, that is, the body that a third-person observer encounters much as any other object of knowledge, would have become of general interest to the western scientific community. In great measure this focus on the object-body can be understood to be an aspect of what has come to be known as the ocularcentric bias (i.e. vision-dominated) of the western tradition in which vision and visual metaphors dominate our understanding.¶ Both Jay's (1993) and Levin's (1985, 1993) rather thorough analyses suggest that the privileging of vision and of visual metaphors has been so central to our language and our practices (including our scientific practices) since at least the Greek era that it operates as a kind of seen but unnoticed background (as even my own words attest) to all that we think. Others have similarly commented on the West's privileging of vision and its parallel denigration of the other senses, a conclusion that emerges from both historical (e.g. see Lowe, 1982; Romanyshyn, 1992, 1993; Synnott, 1993) and cross-cultural analyses (e.g. see Bremmer & Rodenburg, 1991; Featherstone, Hepworth, & Turner, 1991; Howes, 1991).¶ Both Jay (1993) and Levin, 1985, 1993) among others (e.g. Synnott, 1993) argue that some of the most notable philosophers whose works serve as the foundation of the western paradigm, Plato and Aristotle, for example, extolled the nobility of vision, while the keynoter of modernism, Descartes, employed a visual metaphor as central to his ideas. For example, Jay (1993) describes Descartes as 'a quintessentially visual philosopher' (p. 69) who, while sharing Plato's distrust of the senses, including the illusions of sight, nevertheless built his entire framework upon the inner or mind's eye, whose clear and distinct vision would establish a secure basis for human knowledge and truth itself. The very term Enlightenment describes both the era within which scientific understanding began its hegemonic rise and the use of a visual metaphor to inform the scientific task. In each of these cases, foundational to the western understanding, a visual metaphor that stressed a disembodied, angelic eye (e.g. see Jay, 1993, p. 81) became central. [p. 603]¶ This ocularcentric understanding is nowhere more evident today than in our scientific conceptions. Not only do we demand observation of phenomena in order to understand their workings, but we also insist that these observations be carried out as a spectator, a third-person observer who remains at a distance from what is being observed, so as not to affect or be affected by what is seen (i.e. the angelic eye). It is no wonder then that whenever the body has emerged within this ocularcentric tradition, it has been the object-body: to be seen, observed and manipulated from the outside.
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