Space race da outline

Download 0.78 Mb.
Size0.78 Mb.
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   33

Georgetown 2011-12

[Space Race DA] [ASP – DKPX]




1) Escalation/actual race is easy to win – lot of cards indicate that countries would compete by either developing space capabilities or competing asymmetrically on the ground

2) Soft/hard impacts – Hitchens indicates that perceptions that US is being aggressive in space will compel “both political and military” – can access both relations impacts and conflict impacts

3) Debris functions as almost an mini disad within a disad – weaponization increases chances of debris/collision

4) Uniqueness is good – new space policy is cooperative, but there is no legal limit in place

Must win a couple of components of inevitability OR draw a good distinction between perception of status quo weapons/space policy and perceptions of plan (which is not necessarily supported by any specific card yet)

1) US won’t militarize (easiest) – new space policy promotes cooperation and peaceful use of space, however no formal agreement gives us wiggle room to develop

2) Countries don’t perceive it or don’t have an incentive to respond aggressively

3) Countries aren’t weaponizing now (or not seriously)
Also, Iran scenario has a lot of potential because of recency, but missing a “Iran will only ramp up its space development if the US does something to provoke” – lit mostly divided into “Iran’s a joke” and “Iran will weaponize inevitably just to increase prestige”

Last resort – add-on to China and/or Russia because of tech-sharing I/L


PLA as answer cooperation/peace turn -

a) Even if they started to weaponize, there is a disconnect between the diplomatic and military sectors of China’s government, which means they would never diplomatically concede that they were aggressively expanding

b) Link magnifier – any China space development would be militaristic/aggressive

c) Most of the ev indicates that China opposes weaps because diplomats control media – not indicative of real policy
Even if they win space war is inevitable
Iran module

Diversified uniqueness

More I/L to turning advantages (other than debris and asymmetric response)


1NC Space Race DA – Space war

Despite new space policy, weaponization is not inhibited in the status quo – norms do no translate into space stability and arms control

Buxbaum 6-27 (Peter, a Washington, DC-based independent journalist, has been writing about defense, security, business and technology for 15 years. His work has appeared in publications such as Fortune, Forbes, Chief Executive, Information Week, Defense Technology International, Homeland Security and Computerworld. He holds a Juris doctorate from Temple University and a Bachelor's in political science and economics from Columbia University, 6-27-11, “Taming the heavens: the new space diplomacy,”,0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233)

The unclassified NSSS summary released to the public and the draft Code both seek to preserve the freedom of navigation in outer space for peaceful purposes, but are short on details. Speaking to the National Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Colorado in April, Gregory Shulte, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy remarked that the NSSS was developed because "space is increasingly congested, competitive, and contested." Congestion in space - there are 1,100 active systems in orbit and 21,000 pieces of debris - threatens US national security, according to Shulte, because of the possibility of collisions between space objects or interference with their transmissions. Shulte also noted that competition among nations in the realm of space technology means that "the US competitive advantage in space has decreased": eleven countries now operate 22 launch sites and 60 nations currently operate satellites. Furthermore, US adversaries such as China and Iran have developed capabilities to "disrupt and disable satellites." Perhaps most important from the US perspective, space is no longer its own private preserve: The US share of the worldwide space market dropped from two-thirds in 1997 to one-third in 2008, according to Shulte. The NSSS seeks to address congestion "by establishing norms, enhancing space situational awareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing"; competition, "by enhancing our own capabilities"; and the contested environment by "establishing international norms and transparency and confidence-building measures in space..." The draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities articulates seemingly non-controversial general principles such as "freedom of access to space for peaceful purposes" and "preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit." The document calls on subscribing states to reaffirm their commitment to the existing legal framework relating to outer space activities--some eleven international accords and declarations of principles--and to refrain from actions which would damage or destroy outer space objects and generate excessive space debris. The Code also establishes a consultation mechanism to resolve disputes among nations over space activities. Nonetheless, US consideration of the European document has drawn expressions of concern from Republicans in Washington. In February, a group of 37 Republican senators wrote a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton detailing their unease about how norms articulated in the EU code might impact US space activities. High on their list of concerns was what impact signing the Code may have on a US decision to deploy missile defense interceptors in space. These concerns were apparently triggered by Section 4.5 of the Code, which calls for "the prevention of an arms race in outer space." Laura Grego, a scientist in the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program told ISN Insights that the "Code does not mention space weapons of any kind, nor would it meaningfully limit their development." The senators' attempt at "inhibiting these initial efforts to establish norms is shortsighted and counterproductive," she said. "Norms are a modest step in the right direction," Grego added, "but leave many of the serious problems of space security unaddressed. Without robust constraints on anti-satellite weapons, threats to satellites will continue to proliferate and mature, requiring the United States to expend more effort securing satellites and leading to less predictability and stability in crises." US diplomacy and engagement The NSSS does not go far enough, in Grego's opinion. She criticized the document for failing to emphasize arms control agreements "as part of a larger scheme for keeping space secure" and for failing to recommend that the United States take the lead on space diplomacy. Well-crafted arms control proposals could lower the risk of arms races or conflicts in space or on the ground, Grego said, and protect the space environment from the harmful debris caused when countries deliberately destroy satellites. "A more robust diplomatic initiative that includes the major space-faring countries would have the potential to increase cooperation with countries that are not traditional US military allies," she added, "and spur other countries to develop realistic proposals that could ensure a safe and sustainable future in space. Diplomatic engagement could help relieve suspicions among countries, reduce incentives for building anti-satellite systems and other space weapons by establishing negotiated limits, and avert space disputes." The UCS released a report last year which called for the US government to "declare that the United States will not intentionally damage or disable satellites" and "press other space powers to make the same pledge." The report recommended that the US make satellites "more resistant to interference and develop ways to quickly replace them or compensate with other measures if they are disabled." The report also called for the US to assemble an expert negotiating team and to "engage in international discussions on space." "The United States should play an active and leading role in engaging the international community to further develop space laws and norms and to keep space free of weapons," said Grego. "A Code of Conduct provides a useful but preliminary standard for responsible space conduct. It should be a first step, but not the last."

The plan reverses cooperation and causes space race – forces Russia and China to respond aggressively, risking global instability

Zhang and Podvig ‘08

[Podvig, Pavel and Hui Zhang. Senior Research Associate; Project on Managing the Atom. Report for American Academy of Arts & Sciences, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space,” March 2008,]
In recent years, Russia and China have urged the negotiation of an international treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space. The United States has responded by insisting that existing treaties and rules governing the use of space are sufficient. The standoff has produced a six-year deadlock in Geneva at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, but the parties have not been inactive. Russia and China have much to lose if the United States were to pursue the space weapons programs laid out in its military planning documents. This makes probable the eventual formulation of responses that are adverse to a broad range of U.S. interests in space. The Chinese anti-satellite test in January 2007 was prelude to an unfolding drama in which the main act is still subject to revision. If the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, how will China and Russia respond, and what will the broader implications for international security be? The American Academy called upon Pavel Podvig (Stanford University) and Hui Zhang (Harvard University) to elucidate answers to these questions and to discuss the consequences of U.S. military plans for space. Each scholar suggests that introducing weapons into space will have negative consequences for nuclear proliferation and international security. As Podvig points out, Russia's main concern is likely to be maintaining strategic parity with the United States. This parity will be destroyed by the deployment of weapons in space, making a response from Russia likely. Podvig suggests that Russia does not have many options for the development of its own weapon systems in space but is likely to react to U.S. development of space weapons through other countermeasures, such as extending the life of its ballistic missiles. Podvig describes such measures as "the most significant and dangerous global effects of new military developments, whether missile defense or space-based weapons." Zhang arrives at similar conclusions. He describes how U.S. military plans for space will negatively affect peaceful uses of outer space, disrupting civilian and commercial initiatives, but he focuses his discussion on a much greater concern among Chinese officials — that actions by the United States in space will result in a loss of strategic nuclear parity. China's options for response, as detailed by Zhang, include building more ICBMs, adopting countermeasures against missile defense, developing ASAT weapons, and reconsidering China's commitments on arms control. Thus, a U.S. decision to introduce weapons into space would destabilize the already vulnerable international nonproliferation regime. Zhang concludes, "U.S. space weaponization plans would have potentially disastrous effects on international security and the peaceful use of outer space. This would not benefit any country's security interests."

Space war paralyzes US ground forces, collapses global economy, pollutes space, and increases chances of nuclear miscalc

Myers ‘8 (Steven Lee, DC reporter for The New York Times, 3-9-08, “Look Out Below. The Arms Race in Space May Be On,”

IT doesn’t take much imagination to realize how badly war in space could unfold. An enemy — say, China in a confrontation over Taiwan, or Iran staring down America over the Iranian nuclear program — could knock out the American satellite system in a barrage of antisatellite weapons, instantly paralyzing American troops, planes and ships around the world. Space itself could be polluted for decades to come, rendered unusable. The global economic system would probably collapse, along with air travel and communications. Your cellphone wouldn’t work. Nor would your A.T.M. and that dashboard navigational gizmo you got for Christmas. And preventing an accidental nuclear exchange could become much more difficult. The fallout, if you will, could be tremendous,” said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington. The consequences of war in space are in fact so cataclysmic that arms control advocates like Mr. Kimball would like simply to prohibit the use of weapons beyond the earth’s atmosphere. But it may already be too late for that. In the weeks since an American rocket slammed into an out-of-control satellite over the Pacific Ocean, officials and experts have made it clear that the United States, for better or worse, is already committed to having the capacity to wage war in space. And that, it seems likely, will prompt others to keep pace. What makes people want to ban war in space is exactly what keeps the Pentagon’s war planners busy preparing for it: The United States has become so dependent on space that it has become the country’s Achilles’ heel. Our adversaries understand our dependence upon space-based capabilities,” Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, commander of the United States Strategic Command, wrote in Congressional testimony on Feb. 27, “and we must be ready to detect, track, characterize, attribute, predict and respond to any threat to our space infrastructure.” Whatever Pentagon assurances there have been to the contrary, the destruction of a satellite more than 130 miles above the Pacific Ocean a week earlier, on Feb. 20, was an extraordinary display of what General Chilton had in mind — a capacity that the Pentagon under President Bush has tenaciously sought to protect and enlarge.

Download 0.78 Mb.

Share with your friends:
  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   ...   33

The database is protected by copyright © 2022
send message

    Main page