Space Force Starter

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SCFI 2011 Space Force Aff

Scholars Lab – DRIP ___ of ___

Space Force Starter

Space Force Starter 1

***AFF*** 2

1AC – Plan Text 3

1AC – Inherency 1/2 4

1AC Advantage 1 – China 1/6 6

1AC Advantage 2 – Hegemony 1/4 11

Inherency – No Space Supremacy Now 15

Link – Space Force Solves Weaponization 1/2 16

China Adv – China is a Threat 18

China Adv – Plan Solves Weaponization 19

Hegemony Adv – Plan Solves Hegemony 20

Solvency – Quick Timeframe 21

Solvency – Arms Race 22

2AC Space Treaty Counterplan 1/2 23

2AC Spending Disadvantage 25

***NEG*** 26

1NC China Advantage 1/2 27

2NC China Adv – Plan Causes Weaponization 29

2NC China Adv – Not a Threat 30

1NC Hegemony Advantage 1/2 31

2NC Hegemony Adv – Plan Causes Arms Race 33

2NC Hegemony Adv – No Weaponization Now 34

1NC Space Treaty Counterplan 35

2NC Solvency 1/2 36

2NC Permutation 38


1AC – Plan Text

The United States Department of Defense should establish a Space Force under the United States Armed Forces as per Title 10 of National Security Space. The United States Department of Defense should delegate that the Space Force has a distinct and legitimate area of responsibility in the Unified Plan Command over Space Control, Space Support, and Force Application missions, including Rapid Decisive Operations.

1AC – Inherency 1/2

U.S. is beginning to lose its competitive edge in space – satellites are vulnerable

Gates & Clapper ’11 (Robert M: Secretary of Defense; James R.: Director of National Intelligence, “National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary,” January 2011. <> LV)

Space is increasingly competitive. Although the United States still maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have lowered (see Figure 3). The U.S. technological lead is eroding in several areas as expertise among other nations increases. International advances in space technology and the associated increase in foreign availability of components have put increased importance on the U.S. export control review process to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while also addressing national security needs. U.S. suppliers, especially those in the second and third tiers, are at risk due to inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, consolidation of suppliers under first-tier prime contractors, and a more competitive foreign market. A decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce.

1AC – Inherency 2/2

The creation of a Space Force solves – allows for effective weaponization of space through a new branch of the military

Dinerman, author and journalist for The Space Review, ’06 (Taylor, February 27, “United States Space Force: sooner rather than later”

The most important reason the US Department of Defense needs a Space Force is that space has different properties from land, sea, and air environments found on Earth. The “terrain” of the Earth-Moon system combines orbital dynamics and gravitational forces in constant and sometimes subtle interaction. Senior officers, no matter how sincere, whose formative experiences consist of flying machines that are supported by the relationship between propulsion and air pressure cannot be expected to instinctively understand the nature of space warfare. The small space cadre that is slowly coming into existence will, without doubt, never produce an Air Force Chief of Staff. A new space service, with its own promotion ladder and its own training and doctrine development system, will insure that when the Joint Chiefs and their civilian superiors meet to plan an operation, someone with four stars will be there to make sure that the capabilities and limitations of US and enemy space forces are taken into account. Military space expertise is becoming more widespread than ever and even the least sophisticated future foe will know enough to try and avoid being detected or targeted by US or allied satellites. With its own budget, the space service will be able to concentrate on making sure that all the other services have access to the best space-based support possible. The Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and others who use America’s military space assets will not have to worry about institutional favoritism, although it should be pointed out that, since 2001, there has not been any evidence that the USAF has abused its authority to the detriment of the other services. Instead, the problem is that, within the Air Force, there has not been enough top-level attention paid to the needs of space operations. A new USSF should not get control of everything that now comes under the heading of “Air Force Space.” For example, the ICBM force should continue to be controlled by the USAF. In contrast, the new organization should take control of the space-based elements of all missile defense systems, including tactical ones. Missile warning and tracking is a global requirement that can best be done from space. SBIRS and its successors will need to be controlled by space warfare experts controlling networks that can instantly pass information on to those who can shoot the enemy target down. The Space Force will, eventually, control space-based anti-ballistic missile weapons, anti-satellite weapons, satellite defense weapons and space-to-Earth weapons when US policy makers decide that these systems are needed. The new force will also get control of the GPS and military communications networks and of the space access infrastructure. This will give them control of the Delta 4, Atlas 5, and other rockets. It will be up to the new force to continue the recent record of safe and successful military space launch operations. The Space Force will have the responsibility for developing new launch systems, including laying the basis for a future reusable launch vehicle (RLV). With its own budget, the space service will be able to concentrate on making sure that all the other services have access to the best space-based support possible. Every major, and many smaller, joint headquarters will have a representative of the USSF present and with a legitimate seat at the table. In order to show their commitment to support the troops who carry the greatest burden, the USSF should, on a day-to-day basis, wear fatigues rather than flight suits. This will also make it plain to members of the Army, Navy, and Marines who will be joining the new organization that it is not just another version of the Air Force. It will be able to make its acquisition decisions based on the need to keep a healthy American space industry in existence, rather than catering to the needs of the aerospace industry. This should allow for a new set of corporate players to get involved alongside the older large contractors. As the Space Force proves itself, Congress may be expected to show a greater level of confidence and allow needed systems, such as Space Radar and the TSAT communications satellite program, to be fully funded. Leaders inside the Pentagon keep saying that space is the critical backbone of network-centric warfare. The evidence shows that, without space, American global military superiority would not be anywhere near what it is today. Our enemies know this and are working hard to find new ways to damage and degrade US space superiority. To counter this, and to give America a new set of grand strategic options, a new space force is needed: not immediately, but within the next five or ten years. Future presidential candidates, if they want to show they are serious about national security, should consider making this reform part of their platform.

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