Schmitt Kritik Table of Contents



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Schmitt Kritik






Table of Contents

Table of Contents


Schmitt Kritik 1

Table of Contents 2

Notes 4

Frontline 7



K 8

Block Goodies 13

Links 14

Impacts 34

Alternative 46

Absolute Enmity Stuff 50

Liberalism Kills Politics (turns Cede the Political) 52

Solves K aff 53

Framing (if not read in 1NC) 54

2NC 55


2NR 58

Overview(s) 59

2NC 60

Framing 2NC (if read in the 1NC) 61



2NR 62

Framing 2NR (if read in the 1NC) 63

A/Ts 64

Enmity Inevitable 65



A/T Cede the Political 68

A/T Nationalism Bad 70

A/T Perm 72

A/T Perm Doublebind 75

A/T Perm – Reject in all other instances 76

A/T Realism 78

A/T Schmitt=Nazi 79

A/T Schmitt=Neocon 82

A/T Schmitt=Realist 84

A/T Truth Claims 87

A/T You Cause Violence and Genocide 88

A/T “You’re Racist” 93

A/T Various War/Bad Stuff 94

A/T Zizek 95

Theory 96

Framework 97

Condo 101

Misc Cards 103

Schmitt and Radical Democracy 104

A/T Hobbesian Critique of Schmitt 105

Democracy and the State of Nature 106

Aff Answers 108

Alt = Genocide and stuffz 109

Alt =/= Solve 110

A/T Gitmo 111

Cede the Political 113

Framework Cards 115

Free Trade Good 117

Heg Turn 118

Impact Answer 121

Lank Turns 122

Liberalism Good 127

Liberalism solves 128

Peace is inevitable 129

Perm 131

Schmitt=Nazi 132

The K Isn’t Special 134

Theorizing Trades off with action 135




Notes

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was a German legal philosopher, and so called “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich”. He advocated, among other things that this kritik does not cover, a clear definition of friend from enemy. He said that “the political”, that is to say the space in which the citizenry interact, is made up by friend/enemy distinctions, much like aesthetics is made up of beautiful/ugly, moral by good/evil, and so on *cue Zizek…*. He thinks (and his contemporaries write more extensively about this) that defining friend from enemy is key to preventing wars and conflicts from escalating to the point of genocide or a war for morals.


This argument is best read against aff’s that advocate some type of Levinasian ethics (that is to say, the inclusion of the other, we’re all equal, stuff like that) because it is a direct response to Levinas/. Then again, this argument can really be read against any aff that advocates some form of liberalism and even free trade (as you shall see in the links section).
Also, a lot of times, I refer to the “friend/enemy” dichotomy as “the fundamental distinction/dichotomy”, they are one in the same.
-peter
Types of Enmity

Thorup ‘6 [Mikkel Thorup - Ph.D.-dissertation, Institute of Philosophy and the History of Ideas, Department of the History of Ideas, University of Aarhus, Denmark, “In Defence of Enmity

- Critiques of Liberal Globalism”, published January 2006, accessed 7/7/13, ] //pheft


Conventional enmity (or just enmity). This is the ideal according to which the other enmities are measured. This is the great achievement of the nation state era. It is also what we here describe as¶ political enmity. It describes a relation of enmity between states who recognize, fight and negotiate with each other. The conventional just enemy is recognized as an equal and the war is thus contained through international law and a codex of honour among combatants. This concept of¶ enmity arises through the de-theologization and de-moralization of international relations. Silete¶ theologi!, as Schmitt is fond of saying. The new nation state order was conditioned upon a¶ ‘dethronement of the theologists’ (1985: 65). Julien Freund (1996: 65) reminds us of Oldendorp, a¶ sixteenth century Lutheran jurist who “used to say that a just war was ultimately no war, but the¶ work of justice, whereas the unjust war was no war either, but a rebellion against the just order.¶ Thus verbal dialectic finally does away with the act of war”. But only on a verbal plane. In the world of flesh and bone, warfare was endemic; and it was the banishment of just war in favour of the just enemy who ultimately stopped the ferocious religious wars and created the interstate order.It marks a transition from a discriminatory concept of war and enmity, where the enemy is a moral or religious enemy to be destroyed, to a non-discriminatory concept, where no one can claim moral superiority and where the political enemy is (only) to be defeated, not destroyed (2003c). In a¶ Schmitt-inspired text, Paul Hirst (2001a: 59) elaborates: “Reason of state limits the enmity of interstate relations in that it makes them a matter of pure power technique: one’s enemy is not an implacable foe but an honourable opponent in a conflict of interests”. The enemy is not a criminal. The clear demarcations between war and peace, internal and external, combatant and civilian/neutral help contain the enmity and its implications. It is a limited and regulated enmity, a¶ ‘duel’ between equal sovereigns. The aim is to impose our will on the other, not to annihilate him.¶ In a footnote to the 1963-edition of Begriff des Politischen, Schmitt explicates the meaning of the¶ conventional concept of enmity as consisting not in the elimination of the enemy but in “the¶ prevention, in the clash of forces and in the creation of a common border” (1996a: 119).¶ This is why he insists on the autonomy of the political decision. It is not informed by or dependent¶ upon other criteria: “The political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he does not have to be an economic competitor” (1996a: 27). In actual politics, this is of course not true: “In¶ psychological reality the enemy is often treated as evil or ugly because every demarcation – not¶ least the political which is the strongest and most intensive distinction and grouping – uses all¶ available differentiations as support. But this changes nothing of the autonomy of such oppositions”¶ (1996a: 28). To Schmitt, this concept of enmity is tied to the nation state and his concern for the decline of the nation state is intimately connected to the re-emergence of other kinds of enmities. As¶ Andreas Behnke (2004: 285) says: “In order to channel violence into structured conflict, the State is¶ based on the territorialization and spatialization of the decision between Friend and Enemy”. Once the connection between state, territory and decision is loosened the conventional enmity is dissolved in favour of other more sinister and less containable forms. The paradigmatic war of conventional enmity is the interstate war. Real enmity is an enmity, which cannot be contained within or by international law. The prime example is the partisan, a non-state contractor of violence, where the rules of law do not and cannot apply as they are characterized by the opposite of the regular army: they hide their status as combatants, they merge with the civilian population; they evade the battle; they have no clear hierarchical chain of command: “The partisan leads the regular army away from the traditional¶ theatre of war and into a secret clandestine underground war, without traditional fronts, without¶ emblems or uniforms” (Slomp 2005: 510). Real enmity, according to Schmitt, emerges where a war is being fought by the population or segments of it to expel an intruder. Its first appearance was,¶ according to Schmitt, in the opposition to Napoleon’s war on Spain and Prussia. Napoleon’s army¶ can be considered the first modern army with mass mobilization, national conscription, national¶ propaganda etc. And at the same moment its counter-force emerges. This shows the precarious nature of the conventional enmity, which produces its own challengers and the fight against the partisan takes on an irregular form, where the fight against the partisan entails copying his tactics. The partisan explodes the distinction between enemy and criminal. The partisan knows that his¶ opponents consider him a criminal acting outside both juridical and moral law. The partisan on his¶ part tries to gain political status as a military and political opponent, that is, to turn the real enmity¶ into a conventional one, although his tactics consistently hinders this transformation.¶ What distinguishes real enmity from the absolute enmity (to be discussed next) is its connection to territory. The struggle may be fierce, fought with unconventional means and between combatants¶ who do not recognize each other as legitimate others, but it is geographically as well as temporally¶ limited. The goal is to expel the invader, not to exterminate him. We could add that during the decolonialization struggles, once the colonizing force was expelled, the disrecognized partisan force often transformed itself into a recognized, legitimate and sovereign state. The partisan blurs the¶ distinction of nation state modernity, peace/war, inside/outside, domestic/foreign, which add to the¶ transformation of enmity, but it still has strong elements of the political, as understood by Schmitt,¶ within it. It is highly significant that Schmitt says that partisan warfare started when, for the first¶ time, a people “pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial, pre-conventional” clashed with the army of the French¶ Revolution (2002: 11). A people tied to the native earth versus a universalizing force. Both the¶ conventional and the real enmity have its limiting factor in the relationship to the earth. It is a true¶ relation between man and earth, which also helps explain Schmitt’s positive attitude towards the tellurian partisan (we’ll return to the two partisan types in chapter 8).31 Hence, real enmity is relative and defensive rather than absolute and aggressive. The paradigmatic war of real enmity is war of liberation and its present manifestation could be interethnic civil wars where, as Mary Kaldor (1999: 98) says, “the main method of territorial control is not popular support … but population displacement – getting rid of all possible opponents”. One should not mistake real¶ enmity for a benign or bloodless enmity, should such a form exist.¶ Absolute enmity (or total enmity) is the radicalization of real enmity. The goal is no longer concrete and limited but total and universal. Whereas real enmity is carried by ‘freedom fighters’ liberating an occupied nation, absolute enmity is carried by world-aggressive actors fighting for an abstract notion of justice. The goal is liberation of mankind. Schmitt sees this figure as a degeneration of the¶ telluric partisan. The world-aggressive partisan has cut his connection to the ‘real’, concrete fight;¶ the local fight is only one front in a global struggle. The telluric partisan locates his enemy in a¶ concrete geographical and historical setting, whereas the world-aggressive partisan views his enemy¶ as a universal enemy: A class, a race, a religion. In chapter 8 we’ll discuss how a real conflict may easily slide into an absolute one. The enemy is de-humanized; he stands in the way of the final liberation and his total destruction is hence both necessary and justified. This is a war without limitations. All containments are dissolved; all demarcations other than that between friend and¶ enemy are meaningless.
Distinction between “enemy” and “foe”

Prozorov ‘6 [Sergei Prozorov - University of Helsinki, Department of Political and Economic Studies, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism”, published in Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2006 35: 75, accessed 7/15/13, mil.sagepub] //pheft
Schmitt makes a distinction between hostis and inimicus to stress the specificity of the relationship of a properly political enmity. The concept of inimicus belongs to the realm of the private and concerns¶ various forms of moral, aesthetic or economic resentment, revulsion or¶ hate that are connoted by the archaic English word ‘foe’, whose return¶ into everyday circulation was taken by Schmitt as an example of the¶ collapse of the political into the moral.31 In contrast, the concept of hostis is limited to the public realm and concerns the existential threat posed to the form of life of the community either from the inside or from the¶ outside. In simple terms, the enemy (hostis) is what we confront, fight¶ and seek to defeat in the public realm, to which it also belongs, while the foe (inimicus) is what we despise and seek either to transform into a more acceptable life-form or to annihilate. Contrary to Zizek’s attribution of the¶ ‘ultra-politics of the foe’ to Schmitt, he persistently emphasised that the¶ enemy conceptually need not and normatively should not be reduced to¶ the foe: ‘The enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally.’32¶ In Schmitt’s argument, during the twentieth century such a reduction¶ entailed the destruction of the symbolic framework of managing enmity¶ on the basis of equality and the consequent absolutisation of enmity, i.e.¶ the actualisation of the ‘most extreme possibility’:¶ [Presently] the war is considered to constitute the absolute last war of¶ humanity. Such a war is necessarily unusually intense and inhuman¶ because, by transcending the limits of the political framework, it¶ simultaneously degrades the enemy into moral and other categories¶ and is forced to make of him a monster that must not only be defeated¶ but also utterly destroyed. In other words, he is an enemy who no¶ longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only.33



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