Romanian Foreign Policy Change: From Isolation to Dependence (1989-1994)

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Romanian Foreign Policy Change: From Isolation to Dependence (1989-1994)

Alina-Alexandra Georgescu

After the end of the Cold War, scholars have stressed the urgent need better to understand, explain, anticipate and respond to foreign policy change. Bipolarity has been replaced by a multipolar balance of power, and small states have begun enjoying much more liberty to decide about changing their foreign policies. Indeed, Gustavsson (1999: 91) believes that focussing on the study of foreign policy change may even be a step towards developing a theory of foreign policy.

More specifically, this paper aims to demonstrate that there was a change in Romanian foreign policy between 1989-1994, i.e. a shift from isolation to dependence on the West (the EU and NATO). It also seeks to reveal both the most important factors in provoking the change and how the change happened. Existing studies of foreign policy change have mostly been preoccupied with US, Canadian and Western European states’ foreign policies. In contrast, this paper adds value by focusing on a specific state in Eastern Europe, an area of small rather than dominant or hegemonic states that has moved closer to the centre of scholarly debate in the context of current and anticipated enlargement rounds of the European Union.

This paper concentrates on a certain type of foreign policy change, which is rapid (less than five years), non-incremental, and pushes for a reorientation of the whole foreign policy in opposition to the normal (natural), evolutionary, slow, incremental adjustments to changing conditions in foreign policy. Its denomination is different for different authors: restructuring, adaptation, redirection or simply change. Scholars cannot agree on the definition of foreign policy change, restructuring or redirection either. This paper uses the term ‘foreign policy change’, employing Holsti’s (1982: ix) definition as ‘the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations’. A government’s intentions to redirect its foreign policy are not sufficient for a change to happen. Actual re-patterning is absolutely necessary. Goals and aims become relevant for our research just in the cases where these are accompanied by actions.

To prove that Romania changed its foreign policy between 1989-1994, Holsti’s (1982: 13) recommendation that ‘restructuring occurs when there is change in many geographical and functional sectors simultaneously’ is followed. How much change is necessary simultaneously in different fields to constitute restructuring? It is possible to establish a priori how much change is necessary in every sector, but Holsti also stresses that generalization about these criteria is not useful and that an amount of contextual judgement is required instead. Holsti identified a list of indicators that can signal if a state redirects its foreign policy, but the list is not exhaustive. Different indicators are relevant for different states. The indicators can be weighted, and the weighting should be conducted for each study separately, even if the same country is analysed at different moments in time. Holsti stresses that ‘the importance of various actions depends on the entire web of relations within which a country operates’. No arbitrary limit of time should be set for the study, but usually redirection happens in less than five years (Holsti, 1982: 16-18).

To comment on the changes in Romanian foreign policy, it is useful to deploy Holsti’s ideal types of foreign policy: isolation, self-reliance, dependence, and nonalignment-diversification. To explain how the change occurred and what were the major factors that determined the change, a revised and improved version of Gustavsson’ (1998) model of foreign policy change is used. Gustavsson’s model is intended to contribute to Foreign Policy Analysis, seeking to explain actions taken by ‘states as individual units located in the international system’. Rather than employing a ‘middle-range theory’, this model ‘constructs multicausal explanations based on factors drawn from different levels of analysis’ (Gustavsson, 1999: 77). The dependent variable is foreign policy change. The theoretical argument made here is that foreign policy change occurs when fundamental structural conditions that favour the change are identified by key decision-makers, who then alter their various beliefs and priorities and through their interventions in the decision-making process bring about a reorientation of foreign policy. Thus, explaining foreign policy change requires both a systemic-level analysis and an actor-centred focus. Gustavsson differentiates between political and economic factors but here it is more relevant to split the international factors into global and regional sources of change. By ‘region’, we refer to CEE.


International factors:



Foreign policy change



Domestic factors

Figure 1. A Model of Foreign Policy Change (adapted from Gustavsson)

Gustavsson’s model uses as outcome Hermann’s (1990) typology of foreign policy change identified at four levels: (1) ‘adjustment change’, (2) ‘program change’, (3) ‘problem/goal change’ and (4) ’ international orientation change’. The first three levels of change do not correspond to the definition of Holsti, representing more minor transformations, not the dramatic, extensive alteration of the state’s orientation internationally. This is why only the fourth type of change, international orientation change, is taken into consideration here. Despite the fact Gustavsson applies it just to a single case study (the Swedish reorientation on EC membership), he argues that his model might be valid for an extensive study of foreign policy change. By applying the adapted Gustavsson’s model to Romanian foreign policy, this paper actually tests the durability of the model.

Gustvasson does not go into detail about the international and domestic factors that should be paid attention to. The reality is extremely complex and in order to help researchers look for the sources of change and not to omit some very important ones, this paper introduces in Table 1 (p. 6-10) a list of factors to which one should pay attention. The list of international and domestic factors is not exhaustive. Factors are interrelated. It is important that factors are not overlapping because of the necessity of stating clearly after the analysis is done, which the most important sources of change are. Some of the factors would be vital to consider during bipolarity but lose importance when considering a foreign policy change happening during multipolarity. Usually, factors such as: organization of the international system, degree of tension/conflict between the world hegemons, international institutionalisation, prevailing global norms of the international system, the existence of a dominant hegemon in the region, the degree of regional tension, economic situation, type of regime, etc can impede or promote foreign policy change.

Some of the factors were already considered and discussed before by Goldmann (1982, 1988). The rest are the fruit of our own work. It is argued here that these factors are relevant because many of them had been already used in studies of foreign policy change (Goldmann, 1982 and 1988; Holsti, 1982) for other states very different from Romania. Although Gustavsson’s analysis did not refer to those factors, they are presented in Table 1 because we believe them to be relevant when studying Romanian foreign policy changes and beyond.

1989-1994: Romanian foreign policy change?

Firstly, an answer is given to the questions: was there a change in Romanian foreign policy between 1989-1994? In case there was a change, what type of change was it? It is argued here that there was a change from isolation to dependence. Using Holsti’s (1982: 4) ideal types, Romanian foreign policy of the 1980s was one of isolation. Its international involvement was at a low level. It blocked multilateral cooperation, especially when concerned with human rights issues, it stopped being an international mediator, and blamed both the USSR and the US, ignoring their rapprochement. Moreover, because of Ceausescu’s ‘mad’ domestic policies, Romania became an unreliable and inefficient client. As an isolationist, it put into place ‘comprehensive exclusionist policies’ such as that of quickly paying back its foreign debt. It avoided military commitments inside the Warsaw Pact by decisions to cut its number of troops and to reduce its military expenditure.

After 1989 and a couple of years of searching and uncertainty, Romania opened itself up to the West. A dependent foreign policy means, according to Holsti (1982: 4), a fairly high level of ‘externally directed actions and transactions’, ‘characterized by high concentration towards another state or group of states’. Besides this, ‘essential economic, technical, communications and military requirements come from abroad, usually from a single country’. In addition, the dependent state is penetrated by foreign agents, such as government advisors, foreign investment, possibly military personnel and its security is provided by a ‘mentor power’. Did Romania become dependent? Indeed, after 1994 most of its actions and transactions have been concentrated towards the EU and the US. Further, essential political, economic, juridical requirements come from the EU, in the form of Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire. Military requirements come from NATO and its hegemon: the US. America provides security for Romania, as its ‘mentor power’. Romania has been penetrated by EU nationals as government advisors and educators. It has been very dependent on EU funds. Its successful economic transformation has depended essentially on Western financial aid and EU integration might constitute the engine of economic growth.

Further, it is argued that Romania changed its foreign policy between 1989-1994 and evidence is brought about seriatim or simultaneous changes in many different fields: political, security, economic, social and cultural1. Concerning political transformations, Romania arguably changed overnight into a multiparty democracy, attached to Western values. Its relations to the world underwent a huge transformation. It stopped being uncooperative, critical and isolationist. Romania’s first foreign minister after 1989, Celac (1996: 137), underlines Romania’s clear European option and promotion of common values: parliamentary democracy, market economy and respect for human rights. After only a few years, since it was harshly criticized for its human rights records, it was granted full membership of the Council of Europe in 1993. While in the late 1980s, Ceausescu had been critical of both the US and NATO for a deterioration in international relations, in the 1990s Romania became very open to cooperation with Western institutions and, in 1993, it signed the Europe Agreement with the EU and its free trade agreement with EFTA came into effect. In 1994, it signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) with NATO and then, no later than 1995, it formally applied for EU membership, continuing its dependent foreign policy.

A huge political shift was represented by Romania’s foreign minister Nastase’s discussion with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner on Romania’s association with NATO in 1991. In terms of security, Romania, formerly a Warsaw Pact member, shifted its interest towards NATO, for so long the Warsaw Pact’s opponent. The US presence in Europe and in the Balkans was perceived by Romanian diplomacy as vital. Moreover, Romania’s integration in Euro-Atlantic structures became the major objective of Romanian diplomacy. Since 1993-1994, Romania has been eager to cooperate with NATO and was the first state to sign the PfP with NATO. In order to get into NATO, the Romanian army has been through a thorough process of reform in order to be compatible with NATO structures.

Regarding economic transformation, Romania’s autarchic economy changed after 1989 and the ‘no foreign debt’ policy was reversed by massive imports immediately after December 1989. The transformation in the Romanian economy was as dramatic as its political transformations. The same reforms in other CEE states during the 1980s, condemned by Ceausescu as a ‘betrayal of socialism’, were put in place in Romania after 1989. Most-favoured nation status from the US government constituted an important goal of Romania after 1989, after Ceausescu refused it as recently as 1988. Romania, which had been not cooperating with the IMF since 1984, put pressure on its own economy to accomplish IMF conditions and benefit from its funds. It joined PHARE in 1991, and availed of European funding as well. The integration into the EC(EU) has constituted a tremendously important target for the troubled Romanian economy. In addition, Romanian trade structures changed completely after 1989. The Romanian economy, dependent on the USSR in terms of both imports and exports, reoriented itself towards EC markets.

Romanian society and culture suffered tremendous transformations after the revolution. After December 1989, no party interfered in the lives of individuals as the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) had done before. Romania’s human rights record improved significantly during the 1990s. Respect for the rights of national minorities also increased. Romania stopped destroying churches, synagogues and mosques and ‘freedom of thought, opinion, and religious beliefs are not restricted in any form whatsoever’ (Constitution, Art. 29(1), 1991). Romania signed many cultural agreements, especially with its Western partners. France’s good cultural links with Romania were resumed. Romanian artists enjoyed the freedom of cooperating with their Western fellows; and many Romanian students went to specialize in the West, especially at American and EU universities.

All these transformations that happened simultaneously during 1989-1994 in so many functional sectors bring us to the conclusion that a Romanian foreign policy change took place indeed in the time interval concerned. The second part of this chapter looks at how the change presented above took place and which factors were the most important for its development. We make use of a revised version of Gustavsson’s model of change.

Empirical application of the model
As emphasized before (p. 2), we first need to identify the sources of change, which, perceived by key decision-makers, alter their belief systems. Next, we look for the sources of change, using the list of international and domestic factors, which are presented below in table form (Table 1) due to space constraints, and for clarity of presentation. Then we analyze the impact of the sources of change on the individual decision-makers and how the decision of foreign policy change was produced.

Table 1. International and Domestic Factors of Foreign Policy Change

Key factor


Implications for foreign policy change

International Global Factors

Organization of the international system (bipolarity and multipolarity)

Post-war bipolarity came to an end; the US triumphed as the only super-power in a multipolar international system.

Romania stopped being a Soviet satellite; it gained much more freedom and flexibility in taking internal and international decisions.

Due to the geopolitical transformations after 1989, Romania no longer bordered on any world power and this minimized ‘the risks and constraints associated with such a neighbour’ (Melescanu, 1995: 10).

Systemic changes rendered obsolete a neutral or isolationist foreign policy.

It has been argued that after 1989, it was the moral duty of all European leaders and peoples to erase the consequences of the fifty year-division.

Shift in the international balance of power

The USSR lost its status as a world power; the US remained as the only super-power.

Russia became a state in transition as all other states in CEE, faced political, social and economic instability and deeply needed Western financial support.

The EU had proven to be an oasis of peace, stability and prosperity for half a century. It began to be a viable alternative for many European states outside it.

International Institutionalization

By mid-1991, the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon were dissolved.

Ex- Comecon members lost their markets and faced huge problems in exporting their goods-Romania needed to join other economic international organizations to find more accessible business partners and clients.

Warsaw Pact’s end brought freedom to its ex-members to decide on their military strategies together with the fear to face alone a military attack.

Prevailing global norms of the international system

The liberal ideas of human rights of the Helsinki Agreement (promoted during the 1980s) continued in the 1990s. In CEE, the Western political and economic norms triumphed, such as the multiparty democracy, democratic institutions, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market economies.

Ethnic tensions and conflicts in the Balkans made the EC(EU) concerned with democratic transformations in CEE; the EU became responsible to maintain stability in the region. In April 1993, the French prime minister Balladur initiated a conference on the prevention of territorial and ethnic conflicts in CEE; the CEE states were encouraged to sign bilateral treaties with their neighbours to guarantee post-war frontiers and to protect national minorities. These treaties became a necessary condition for joining the EU and NATO.

International Regional Factors

The existence of a dominant hegemon in the region

The dramatic shifts at the international level between 1989-1991 transformed the region radically and made it relatively free of hegemonic influence.

Russia became more preoccupied with its own problems and threats. However, after 1990, the American presence was increasingly being felt. The US did not transform itself into a CEE hegemon. The EU was geographically more proximate and was rising as a potential hegemon in CEE. The prosperous and successful EC(EU) acted as a ‘magnet’ for the states in the region.

The intensity of regional tensions/conflicts

From the fall of communism, the CEE security environment became increasingly uncertain and unstable. Four developments in particular have contributed to this: the disintegration of the former USSR, the crisis in Yugoslavia, the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and the conflict in Trans-Dnestr. These developments have raised many new ethnic and territorial issues that could seriously destabilise CEE and undermine efforts to create a stable, new secure order in Europe.

The growing instability has intensified CEE attempts to join Western security organisations such as NATO and WEU. Romania was the only CEE state caught between two conflict zones: the ex-Yugoslavia and the Trans-Dnestr.

Theodor Melescanu, the Romanian Foreign Minister, in 1993 asserted that: ‘Romanian integration into West European structures is the only way to enhance the country’s national security’, because at that time Romania was ‘more vulnerable than ever’ (RFE/RL Research Report, January 1993: 125).

The degree of regional integration

The PHARE programme had been directed to assist ten CEE states to restructure their economies and democratize.

Romania joined the PHARE programme, which became a pre-accession instrument of the European Communities, to help financially the CEE countries to prepare to join the EU.

Go with the flow’ approach

In CEE, the Visegrad states made known their will to join NATO and the EC very early in their transition process to democracy and market economy.

Willing to escape the isolation it had experienced since the beginning of the 1980s, Romania had to hurry with its decision. Was Romania’s decision to join the EU and NATO taken consciously by balancing different alternatives? Or did it do so pushed by the trend in the region to join Western organizations? Phinnemore (2001a: 98) argues that Romania’s official application for EU membership in 1995 ‘was more a reaction to the emerging dynamics of eastern enlargement and a desire not to be omitted from any accession process under development that the expression of a clear wish to accede to the EU in advance of other CEE states’.

Domestic factors

Economic situation

In 1989 it was possible to see the bankrupt character of the centralized, command economies of CEE. The situation in Romania was worse because it inherited the most rigid and inefficient system among all states in the region. Romanian competitiveness has been terribly affected by Romania’s external isolation during the 1980s and its autarchic orientation. The rapid decline amplified after 1990.

Romania inherited important economic links with states affected by war after 1990 (Iraq, Kuwait, ex-Yugoslavia) or some themselves passing through transition (Russia, Ukraine, ex-Comecon states).

It has been believed in Romania that the best cure for Romania’s economic situation is its integration inside the (EU).

Change in the social composition of the elite nucleus

In 1990, the liberal branch of the ex-communist party stood in power until 1996 and put in place leftist, social-democratic governments. The Communist Party in Romania was a mass party2 and promotions were linked with membership in the party. Few intellectuals succeeded in evading membership.

After 1989, the few who had radically different views, got out of the National Salvation Front (NSF) quite early in 1990, complaining about NSF leaders’ insincerity, lack of moral authority to lead the country, and their resemblance to the RCP.

Despite its violent revolution, the change in leadership in Romania was rather marginal compared with others in Central Europe.

Despite their communist past, the new leaders sooner or later understood the necessity of economic and political change. Compared with the transition process in Central Europe led by centre-right governments, Romanian leaders favoured no such radical change.

Link between policies

Romania’s EU integration ‘is a process able to assure the continuation of the democratic transformation, the implementation of the rule of law, the modernization of the Romanian economy and the improvement of the population’s living standard as well as the assurance of its stability and security’. Integration in the EU has supported the consolidation of the democratic transformations and economic recovery in Romania (Prisacaru, 1995: 70-72).

This factor promotes the necessity for change.

Type of regime

Political life after 1989 was transformed radically towards multi-plural party democracy. There was overtly political opposition to the party or coalition in power and the latter was vulnerable to losing power because of losing elections. The political system was competitive, but not perfectly accountable.

After the 1990 elections, the NSF was relatively cohesive. Opposition to the NSF was led by the historic parties (the National Liberal and the Christian Democrat National Peasants’) favouring a rapid reform vs. gradual change and in foreign policy. They supported Romania’s clear orientation towards the EC and the West. A clear polarization over the foreign policy issues existed in 1991, when Iliescu believed that Romania’s membership in NATO had negatively impacted on Romania’s security because of Russian susceptibility and his signing of Soviet-Romanian treaty with Gorbachev3. In contrast to the NSF’s view, the democratic opposition harshly condemned the treaty and the Romanian leadership’s gesture. Aside from this period, the foreign policy polarization was not high.

All these factors (a vulnerable, less than cohesive regime after the 1992 elections with a competitive, relatively accountable political system) inhibit a change in foreign policy. The lack of polarization over the issue enhances the shift in foreign policy.

Individual Decision-Makers

Ion Iliescu4 became the most influential leader in Romanian politics after 1989. Leading the National Council for Water Resources between 1979 and 1984, his views were in stark contrast to Ceausescu’s megalomanic policies. Because of this, and accused of ‘intellectual deviation’, he was gradually excluded from political life5.

During the 1989 revolution, he became the President of the NSF Council. In May 1990, he was elected president of Romania by a landslide vote (86%). Leading Romania through the turbulent years of the beginnings of democracy, he was probably the most contested person in power. In many eyes, he was the symbol of Communism contrasting strongly with the other CEE younger and more liberal leaders. After the 1990 elections, he was accused of ‘stealing’ the revolution and winning elections by deceit and intimidation. Since he had been in power, he supported gradual as opposed to rapid change.

Concerning Romania’s foreign policy, Iliescu (1994: 56) emphasized the needed openness to the West but in 1989-1990 or even 1991, he did not get so far as advancing Romania’s integration in NATO and the EU. He advanced the ideas of internal national reconciliation, social pact and was very concerned with Romania’s stability. He adopted the ‘gradual reform’ approach even in the foreign policy field. Favouring the policy of openness to the West and probably to the East concomitantly, he adopted the ‘wait and see’ attitude, oscillating between different alternatives Romania had in the beginning of the 1990s: ‘go East’, ‘go West’, become neutral, or stay isolated. After the dissolution of the USSR, he probably discovered that Romania’s ‘going East’ was not a valuable alternatives. In 1992, with Romania surrounded by problems and conflict zones, he should have realized that the only possible solution remained Romania’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Using a model of cognitive learning, we argue that between 1989-1994, Iliescu experienced a gradual change in his beliefs regarding the international political transformations, the EC(EU)-Romania relations and Romania’s new place in the world. More generally, [Iliescu’s] ‘political convictions have changed with the time, from a staunch proponent of socialism to that of a social democrat’6.

In contrast to Iliescu, Petre Roman represented ‘the young’ and ‘the liberal’ leader during the time he was prime-minister. During his relatively short term in office compared with Iliescu’s, he was very active and achieved important points for Romania’s foreign policy, trying to bring it out of isolation. It is believed today that if Roman’s government had survived and continued the reforms at the same pace as in 1990-1991, Romania would have joined the EU in May 2004 together with the other ten states7. Roman’s Western efforts were counteracted by Iliescu’s ‘Russian connection’. Roman’s leadership came too early (1989-1991) for Roman to have an impact on Iliescu’s beliefs system. Roman’s merit in foreign policy was to open up Romania diplomatically to the West.

When presenting his electoral campaign programme of 1992, Iliescu (1994: 175) says he pleaded ‘for a new, open foreign policy, with the aim of our integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures’. If this is true, this means that by November 1992, the idea of Romania’s western integration was accepted Romania’s oscillation between different priority objectives had come to an end. However, it is believed that 1992 was too early for Iliescu to have made a clear decision in favour of NATO and the EC. It is rather argued here that his definite change of belief system came in 1993-1994.

The Decision-Making Process
The third step of the case study concerns the decision-making process through which Romania shifted its foreign policy from one of isolation to one of dependence.

According to Art. 101 (1) of the Constitution, the strategic directions of foreign policy are issued by the government, then accepted by the parliament and implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Usually, the government programme has as its starting point the election manifesto of the main party in government.

It seems there was no definitive decision taken regarding Romania’s foreign policy re-orientation. This reorientation began being referred to in declarations and speeches more frequently as the time passed. More and more decision-makers made declarations about the idea of Romania’s membership in NATO and the EU and it ended up becoming fashionable and it got more and more support. In addition, the electorate began to link the idea of Romania’s being part of the West with social welfare and prosperity, so the political parties took up this theme.


Between 1989-1994 Romania experienced so many simultaneous changes in many functional sectors, and we can therefore conclude that it restructured its foreign policy from isolation to dependence on the West in the time interval concerned. Gustvasson’s model is suitable for this case study. Unlike the Swedish case study by Gustavsson, this Romanian case highlights many more international and national sources of change, which need to be taken into consideration, and the whole picture becomes more complicated.

Looking to explain why the change happened and what the decisive factors were, it should be stressed here that Romania’s government would not have restructured its foreign policy without the major transformations in the organization of the international system and shift in the international balance of power. In order for Romania and other CEE states to cease being satellites of the Soviet Union and decide to join the USSR’s opposite barricade, the West, some sources of change were absolutely necessary. This would not have happened without the fall of communism, the implosion of the USSR, the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon. In addition, and linked with these, isolation and neutrality were not considered viable alternatives any longer. These are necessary factors but it is argued here that they would not have been sufficient to make Romanian government apply for NATO and EU membership. The shift in the international balance of power was necessary so that the prosperous EU appear as a viable alternative for so many European states outside it. Moreover, the EC(EU) became itself interested in the CEE region and launched programmes to support these states financially. In addition, Romania was determined to reorient towards enlargement under the fearful pressure not to be isolated again, since Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia had already decided in favour of the West. Probably the decisive factor to make Romanian leaders decide to orient themselves towards the West was the high intensity of conflicts in the region. The crises of Yugoslavia and Trans-Dnestr probably made Romania’s leaders believe that integration in the Western structures might be the only solution to enhance Romania’s security and maintain its stability. Romania’s troubled economic situation and the perceived link between its democratic reforms, modernization and development and integration in the Western structures acted as impetus for this foreign policy change. The relatively marginal change in the composition of the elite nucleus at the beginning of the 1990s and especially Iliescu’s preference for gradual vs. rapid changes, his communist past and links with Moscow generally determined when the change happened. In other words, these factors delayed Romania’s decision. Would another person occupying the position of president also have opted for Romania’s Western integration? If this person had come from the opposition, this would almost certainly have occurred. This would probably have been the case even if another person from the party in power had been president.

Concerning structural conditions, Iliescu as an individual was not vital for Romania’s foreign policy change. However, he was crucial for the timing of the event. The rather slow and delayed change in his belief system, together with some events such as the University Square protests in 1990 and the miners’ coming to Bucharest, postponed Romania’s decision.

To summarize, the argument here is that the fundamental structural conditions referring to the end of the Cold War served as a necessary but not sufficient cause for change. Other sources of change were needed. The fundamental structural conditions were perceived by the individual leaders and determined a change in their beliefs. Iliescu was not vital for Romania’s change in foreign policy but more or less determined the timing of the change, delaying the event longer than might otherwise have been the case.

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1 Due to the constraints on the length of this paper, we will briefly emphasize only the most substantial changes in these fields.

2 The RCP had 4 million members out of a population of 23 million.

3 Romania became the first and only CEE country to sign a political treaty with the USSR after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

4 For a more detailed autobiography of Iliescu see Iliescu (1994: 27-45)

5 as of 30 March 2004

6 as of 7 May 2004

7 Interviews with a Romanian diplomat in Bucharest in February 2002.

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