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1 Even the conventional way of ideological confrontations between the United States and enemies in the region, China and North Korea, has not changed too much during this period, except some fluctuations due to the nuclear issue of North Korea and the consequent Six-Party Talks for its resolution.
2 Foreign aid of the United States has expanded since the 9/11 incident, which was intended to match not only humanitarian demands but also security concerns. The Bush Administration has emphasized the significance of the strategic approach in implementing foreign aid programs, and added the mission of foreign development as one element of the triple axis for national security (Lugar 2008, 3).
3 Remarks at the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) Launch (April 22, 2014). The Secretary of State John Kerry proposed that the QDDR 2.0, which would be published in autumn 2014, will present a new blueprint for American foreign policy on the basis of the previous one.
4 Britain was the only European member of the NATO has kept the guideline that any member country should spend more than two-percent of GDP (Economist, May 3, 2014).
5 For these missions, Hillary Clinton suggested the following three objectives: political agreements over core goals of alliance, supports for allies’ rapid adaptation to new challenges, and capacity-building for allies in deterring various states and non-state actors (Clinton 2011, 58).
6 For a detailed discussion on the institutions of regional cooperation in Asia, see Wesley (2009).
7 Scholars have proposed that American decision-makers should consider the “minilateral” approach which intends to narrow down the range of cooperation only among friendly allies. This is to overcome the problem of “free-riding” so that the United States may have to find out a small “magic” number for cooperation in resolving the problem of global commons (Naim 2009, 134-135; Brummer 2014, 2-3).
8 The foreign policy doctrine of the Obama Administration has been heavily criticized partly because it was ambiguous in its contents, and partly because it was just following the Bush Administration’s approach. Despite some disputable points, the Obama Doctrine may be defined as holding the following elements: American political and economic, rather than military, supremacy; Retrenchment and realignment of American military responsibility rather than their expansion; Rebalancing Asia rather than the Euro-centric strategy; Containment and offshore-balancing rather than global American primacy (Stepak and Whitlark 2012, 52).
9 Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth are representing the first group of the strategy of engagement, while Christopher Layne, Barry R. Posen, and Robert A. Pape for the second group favoring for retrenchment.
10 This policy was “misguided,” according to Mearsheimer, because a wealthy China would not become a “status quo” power but an aggressive one who is determined to aim regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001, 402).
11 Scholars have focused on the “strategic quadrangle” among the four-power relationship in East Asia, while some of them see it as the “greatest threat” to regional stability and economic interdependence (Shirk 1997, 246).
12 Stephen Walt proposed the theory of balance of threat in order to revise the conventional theory of balance of power. According to him, states respond not so much to powers as threats of other counties, so the intention of a country is more important than power in estimating the dynamics of international politics (Walt 1987).
13 A “cooperative hegemony” implies a soft rule within cooperative arrangements so that concept is based upon a hybrid approach between idealism and realism (Pedersen 2002, 683). As such, the concept of cooperative hegemony was intended to revise and narrow down the traditional notion of hegemony.
14 Scholars compared the position of Mexico, South Korea and South Africa with that of swing states. The difference between these two groups can be found in the role of pivotal partners played in the first group. Many European states, Japan and Australia are classified as included in this group as far as they have stayed with the American hegemony well over decades (Fontaine and Kliman 2013, 98).
15 According to scholars, the balance of power system was broken by World War I. The self-operating law of balancing had failed to operate in world politics for peace and stability. So the law of balance of power was discredited both by socialists such as Vladimir Lenin and idealists such as Woodrow Wilson as the guideline for a new world system in the early 20th century (Taylor 1954, xx-xxi).
16 To explain this phenomenon of underbalancing, Randall Schweller suggests a new approach of international politics focusing of domestic politics. He assumes that there are so many domestic constraints for balance of power at the international level (Schweller 2006, 6-9).
17 For example, the Iraq war can be understood less as a product of systemic imperatives than a war of choice. We may introduce so many factors such as domestic interests, transnational networks, and emotional fear that had made the United States initiate the war (Hinnebusch 2006, 461).
18 Among many options against outside threats, the most frequent one selected by weak states has been nonalignment, and the next one “balancing with great powers” for a free-rise or fight. As long as the patrons of great powers are available, the option of “balancing with great powers” has been the first priority for many weak states (Labs 1992, 393-394).
19 According to historians, Japan and China in World War I, and small countries in Southeastern Europe in World War II chose their strategies in a mixed way between balancing and bandwagoning (Schroeder 1994, 119-120).
20 The Concert model was originated from the collective security system in the early 19th century called the “Concert of Europe” joined by Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and France after the victory over the Napoleonic War in 1815. The Concert system was regarded as a global regulatory mechanism among great powers. It mitigated security dilemmas among great powers by generating behavioral codes of cooperation and collaboration in a conservative way. In this sense, the Concert of Europe was an informal institution for cooperation that increased flexibility and effectiveness in management of global affairs (Shirk 1997, 266).
21 The Concert model works under the condition that is a fairly well-established rules for state behavior. In this context, the Concert assumes a practicable and realistic system to comply with, collective responsibilities shared among great powers, and great powers’ consensus regardless of their ideologies (Elrod 1976, 170-172)
22 As such, some scholars have developed a new framework for the “complex deterrence” to be applied to ambiguous deterrence relationship, which is caused by fluid structural elements of the international system (Paul 2009, 8).
23 The “Century of National Humiliation” has been the official symbol of modern Chinese history education and the standard perspective of Chinese historiography during the communist regime. It emphasizes, as a part of Chinese nationalism, specific narratives that would build modern states out of long troubles and external threats. What Chinese people wanted in this nationalistic framework as not just the “others” like Japan and the West, but also the reflexive itself upon self-criticism (Callahan 2004, 206-207).