Resolve D/a gds 2010 Buntin Pre-institute



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Resolve D/A GDS 2010

Buntin Pre-institute



Resolve DA

Resolve DA

Resolve DA---1NC 3

Resolve DA---1NC---Short(er) Kagan 5

Resolve DA---1NC---Long Kagan 6

Resolve DA---1NC---Long Kagan 7

Uniqueness---Global Military Engagement 8

Uniqueness---NSS---Focus on Sustainability 9

Uniqueness---Troop Deployments Sustainable 10

Uniqueness---AT: Iraq Withdrawal Triggers the Link 11

Link---Bases Key to Primacy---Conventional Deterrence 12

Link---Bases Key to Primacy/Resolve---General 13

Link---Bases Key to Primacy/Resolve---Containment 14

Link---Bases/Forward Deployment Key to Resolve 15

Link---Bases Key to Resolve---Trip-Wire 16

Link---Withdrawal/Appeasement---General 17

Link---Afghanistan Withdrawal 18

Link---Afghanistan Withdrawal 20

Link---Afghanistan Withdrawal---Power Vacuum 22

Link---Afghanistan---2NC Counterinsurgency DA 23

Link---Afghanistan---2NC Counterinsurgency DA 25

Link---Afghanistan---AT: Withdrawal Now/Inevitable 26

Link---Iraq Withdrawal 27

Link---Iraq Withdrawal 29

Link---Iraq Withdrawal---AT: Withdrawal Now 30

Link---Iraq Withdrawal---AT: Their Defense 31

Link---Iraq Withdrawal---AT: Their Defense 32

Link---Japan Withdrawal---1NC 33

Link---Japan Withdrawal 34

Link---Japan Withdrawal---Okinawa 36

Link---Japan Withdrawal---2NC China Impact 37

Link---Japan Withdrawal---2NC China Impact---Extn 38

Link---Japan Withdrawal---2NC Asian Trade DA 39

Link---Japan Withdrawal---AT: Their Defense 40

Link---Kuwait/Middle East Withdrawal 41

Link---South Korea Withdrawal 42

Link---South Korea Withdrawal 44

Link---South Korea Withdrawal---Spills Over 45

Link---South Korea Withdrawal---AT: Withdrawal Now 46

Link---South Korea Withdrawal---AT: Only Partial 47

Link---Turkey---Incirlik Key to Power Projection 48

Link---Turkey---Iran 49

Link---Turkey---Tactical Nuclear Weapons 50

Link---Turkey---Tactical Nuclear Weapons 52

Link---Turkey---Tactical Nuclear Weapons 53

Link---Turkey---Tactical Nuclear Weapons---2NC Prolif DA 54

Link---Turkey/Europe Withdrawal 55

Internal Link---Resolve Key to Heg 56

Internal Link---Resolve Key to Heg/Unipolarity 57

Internal Link---Single Withdrawals Spill Over---Rogues 58

Internal Link---Single Withdrawals Spill Over---China 60

Internal Link---Global Diplomatic Influence 61

Impact---Resolve---Laundry List 62

Impact---Resolve---Laundry List 63

Impact---Resolve---Global Stability 64

Impact---Resolve---Global Stability 66

Impact---Resolve---Terrorism 68

Impact---Resolve---Terrorism 70

Impact---Resolve---Terrorism---AT: Their Defense 72

Impact---Resolve---China 73

Impact---Hegemony---The Classics 74

Impact---Hegemony---Unipolarity Solves War 75

Impact---Hegemony/Withdrawal---Asia 76

Impact---Hegemony/Withdrawal---Middle East 77

Impact---Hegemony---Prolif 78

Impact Magnifier---Loss of Resolve Escalates Conflicts 79

Impact Magnifier---AT: Overall Heg/Military Power Checks 80

AT: Resolve Not Key To Heg/Impossible to Demonstrate 81

AT: Hegemony Too Durable/No Challengers 82

AT: Withdrawal Key to Heg/Solving Overstretch 83

Aff---Uniqueness---Hegemony Unsustainable 84

Aff---Uniqueness---Hegemony Declining 85

Aff---Uniqueness---Terrorists’ Perception 87

Aff---Uniqueness---Terrorists’ Perception (Iraq/Afghanistan) 88

Aff---Afghanistan Withdrawal---No Link 89

Aff---Iraq Withdrawal---No Link 91

Aff---Troop Withdrawal Key to Sustainable Primacy 93

Aff---Single Country Withdrawal Doesn’t Link 94

Aff---Single Instances of Resolve Don’t Spill Over 95

Aff---Maintaining Troop Presence Sends Worse Signal 96

Aff---Troop Presence Doesn’t Signal Resolve 97

Aff---Withdrawal Increases Expectations of Future Resolve 98

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---General 99

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---General 101

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---Prefer Our Evidence 102

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---Tangible Power Outweighs 103

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---Realism Proves 104

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---Cuban Missile Crisis Proves 105

Aff---Resolve Not Key to Heg---Only Applies to Bipolarity 106

Aff---Resolve Doesn’t Solve Terrorism 107

Aff---Resolve Focus Causes War 108

Aff---Resolve Focus Counterproductive 109

Aff---No Balancing/No Challengers 110

Aff---Hegemony Durable---Nothing Can Undermine 111

Aff---Hegemony Durable---Military Power Gap 113

Aff---Hegemony Doesn’t Solve War 114

Aff---Hegemony Decline Doesn’t Cause War---General 115

Aff---Hegemony Decline Doesn’t Cause War---AT: Apolarity 117

Aff---Hegemony Decline Doesn’t Cause War---Middle East 118

Aff---Hegemony Decline Doesn’t Cause War---Asia 119




Resolve DA---1NC
The Obama NSS will maintain current military engagement---but further withdrawals would undermine military power

Pletka 10 – Dianne Pletka, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, May 27, 2010, “Obama Must Match Rhetoric, Reality,” online: http://www.aei.org/article/102106

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will roll out the Obama administration's National Security Strategy on Thursday.

President Barack Obama's own curtain raiser at West Point on Saturday previewed the document, and everyone and their maiden aunt has parsed it silly. Some like it--partly because it isn't about "pre-emption," partly because it doesn't justify the war in Iraq and partly because it emphasizes multilateralism.

But mostly, I suspect, they like it because Obama delivered it.

Without access to the full NSS, it isn't fair to pass judgment. The speech was a fine one, as speeches go. Most of President George W. Bush's speeches were fine, too. But it's the policy that matters.

My beef with Bush was that his speeches and his policies bore little relationship to one another. Turns out, Obama's not so different.

Obama defines success in Iraq as "an Iraq that provides no haven to terrorists, a democratic Iraq that is sovereign and stable and self-reliant."

He has made clear in other statements, however, that he is not so interested in a "sovereign and stable" Iraq that he is prepared to breach his summer deadline for ending U.S. combat operations. Nor is the president so keen to amortize the sacrifices of our troops that he would contemplate a long-term partnership with Baghdad.

But even such limited, if worthy, goals are more than Obama's Afghanistan strategy offers up. The president said, "We will adapt, we will persist and I have no doubt that together with our Afghan and international partners, we will succeed in Afghanistan"-- but not if adapting, persisting and succeeding require substantial troops on the ground beyond July 2011.

For those of us afraid of U.S. retreat--particularly retreat rationalized by the failure of other countries to rally behind us (swimming with what Obama calls the "currents of cooperation")--the president counters himself with a rousing hurrah for strength at home and abroad.

Obama is right that a nation that is weak domestically cannot loom large on the world stage. But he is also the president who has slashed defense programs, opposed military pay increases and set in motion a national borrowing spree so overwhelming that debt service will top defense outlays in two years.

"At no time in human history," Obama said, "has a nation of diminished economic vitality maintained its military and political primacy." Bingo.

The soothing music of international harmony will clearly be a broad theme behind the new NSS. But the president confuses allies with international organizations and leadership with cooperation. Neither is a substitute for the other--and our allies are increasingly at odds with this administration.

Relations are strained with traditional friends in London, Paris and Berlin; and things aren't too hot with New Delhi, Tokyo or Seoul. Meanwhile, the pillars of the "international order" Obama seeks to build--the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Atomic Energy Commission, among others--have failed in epic fashion to address nuclear weapons in Iran and North Korea, genocide in Darfur, economic collapse in Europe and so on.

At West Point, the president said, "We've always had the foresight to avoid acting alone"--as if choosiness kept us from fighting the wars of the 20th century without allies.

But good taste doesn't forge alliances; leadership does. Sometimes leadership requires Washington to lead alone. One need not go as far as Bush to understand that we need a gear other than reverse when it comes to military engagement.
Military withdrawal destroys U.S. foreign policy credibility---that undermines the foundation of hegemony

Tunç 8 – Hakan Tunç, Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Fall 2008, “Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” Orbis, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 657-669

Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actor’s past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior. In international politics, a major component of building or maintaining a country’s reputation involves resolve.5 Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in one military confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness.6 According to Shiping Tang, this concern frequently amounts to ‘‘a cult of reputation’’ among foreign policy makers, which he defines as ‘‘a belief system holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead one’s adversaries or allies to underestimate one’s resolve in the next crisis.’’7 Of particular importance to the cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of the cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a theater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a country’s reputation and thus ‘‘embolden’’ the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment to their cause.8

Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength and resolve.9 According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversaries and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely, being perceived as weak and irresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being less supportive.

This logic has had two general consequences for America’s use of force abroad: First, exhibiting resolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the mere perception of power generates tangible power, thereby reducing the need to use actual physical force against every adversary.10 In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in several places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States appeared questionable to some.11

Second, reputational concerns made it difficult for the United States to withdraw from a theater of war. The Vietnam War is the most prominent case, although the logic was also evident during the Korean conflict in the early 1950s.12 As is well-documented by historians, both the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations took reputation seriously and argued that leaving Vietnam without an ‘‘honorable’’ exit would seriously hurt U.S. credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. For both Johnson and Nixon, an ‘‘honorable’’ exit meant creating an autonomous South Vietnam (much like independent, anti-communist South Korea after the Korean war) that was recognized by all parties involved in the conflict, particularly by the North Vietnamese government. Such an outcome would vindicate U.S. sacrifices.13



Resolve DA---1NC---Short(er) Kagan
Decline in U.S. hegemony sparks nuclear wars in every key region---no viable replacement

Kagan 7 – Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

Resolve DA---1NC---Long Kagan


Decline in U.S. hegemony sparks nuclear wars in every key region---no viable replacement

Kagan 7 – Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html

Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.



In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.



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