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While the HOT protocol provides a useful starting point, it is not prescriptive. It is ultimately up to staff to use their judgement to decide whether an unattended item is suspicious or not.

Staff should seek immediate advice from their supervisor if they are unsure about whether an item is suspicious or not. If your supervisor deems the item suspicious, they should contact the police. At this stage, people should be moved away from the immediate vicinity.

If the police officer cannot clear the item as safe, then the situation will be elevated, through the deployment of specialised resources who are trained to deal with suspect packages.

Note: If the item is believed from the outset to pose an immediate threat to life, police advice will be to move people at least 100m away and to stay behind hard cover (brick or concrete).A larger area may have to be evacuated if the item is particularly large or associated with a vehicle.

Annex D - Quick reference security checklist





1.1 Do you have copies of the Passenger Rail Security DVD available?

1.2 Do you use wider sources of security advice? E.g. Crime reduction / prevention officers, CTSAs.


2.1 Does your organisation encourage staff to respect common values and standards towards security?

2.2 Does your organisation have ongoing effective personnel security measures in place?

2.3 Are staff undertaking security related duties/tasks appropriately briefed/trained?

2.4 Does your organisation have contingency plans to deal with major incidents? Are these tested and practised?


3.1 Do you have a process in place for handling, reporting and recording bomb threats, and are you/your staff familiar with it?

3.2 Do you have a formal process of assessment for establishing whether an item is unattended or suspicious? (e.g. the 'HOT' protocol)

3.3 Are your staff aware of the BTP “Marauding Active Shooter” guidance?


4.1 Is the vehicle checked at end of route/turnaround?

4.2 Do you have a process for evaluating and dealing with suspicious items/behaviour?

4.3 Are the doors/windows secured when the vehicle is left out of service?

4.4 Are passengers being prevented from boarding when vehicle not in service or driver not present?

4.6 Is there a process in place for dealing with luggage that appears suspicious or is handled suspiciously?

4.7 Are there on-board passenger security announcements/information displayed?

4.8 Have you considered guidance in the surveillance camera code of practice where any CCTV has been fitted on board?

4.9 Is the retention period for CCTV data proportionate to the stated purpose of the system?

4.10 Are there processes, procedures and training of system users that enable the CCTV to deliver images and information that is of evidential value to the police and the criminal justice system?

4.11Is there as much transparency as possible over the use of CCTV?

4.12 What arrangements are in place for the regular review of the CCTV system?


Areas of concealment

5.1 Are all possible small concealed/hidden from view areas removed or reduced?

5.2 Are they checked frequently?

5.3 Are security features designed into station/termini/stops?

Access control

5.4 Are all doors to non-public areas locked or subject to access control?

5.5 Are keys/access codes kept in a secure place?

5.6 Are access codes changed regularly?

5.7 Is the movement of vehicles (other than your rolling stock) controlled?

5.8 Is there a process in place for dealing with illegally parked or suspicious vehicles?

5.9 Are visitors/contractors required to report to the station manager or other responsible person to sign in and provided with an ID pass?

5.10 Are visitors given a security briefing?

5.11 Are there procedures in place for reporting suspicious behaviour?

Patrolling public areas

5.12 Is there a plan in place for regular patrols of public areas?

5.13 Are patrols/search regimes changed regularly so that they cannot be monitored/learnt by those undertaking hostile reconnaissance?

5.14 Is there a record of patrols?

5.15 Are seals on locked doors checked?

5.16 Is there a process in place for evaluating and dealing with suspicious items?

Waste Management

5.17 Are litter bins of an IED resistant or clear plastic sack design?

5.18 Are litter bins emptied frequently?

5.19 Is CCTV monitoring of litter bins necessary?

5.20 Are large bulk waste containers stored in secure non-public areas?

5.21 If not stored away from public areas, are large bulk waste containers kept locked, emptied regularly and CCTV monitored?


5.22 Are bicycle racks/lockers positioned away from crowded areas? Is CCTV monitoring necessary?

5.23 Are keys to lockers controlled and can staff access spare keys?

Equipment boxes

5.24 Are equipment boxes kept shut and secured?

Public toilet facilities

5.25 Are public toilets included in searches?

Post boxes

5.26 Are post boxes kept closed when not being emptied?

Tenants and Cleaners

5.27 Do you have regular security meetings with tenants and cleaners?

5.28 Are your tenants/cleaners security briefed?

Passenger Security Awareness measures

5.29 Are there passenger security announcements, or information displayed?


5.30 Is CCTV fitted and monitored where necessary, and have you considered guidance in the surveillance camera code of practice where any CCTV has been fitted on board?

5.31 Is the retention period for CCTV data proportionate to the stated purpose of the system?

5.32 Are all sensitive areas covered by CCTV cameras?

5.33 Is there a robust maintenance system in place with arrangements for the regular review of the CCTV system?

5.34 Is there as much transparency as possible over the use of CCTV?

5.35 What arrangements are in place for the regular review of the CCTV system?

Left luggage

5.36 Are bags searched/screened before being stored?

5.37 Do you have a process in place for reporting suspicious persons/bags?

Car Parks

5.38 Are public car parks monitored and is there a procedure for dealing with suspicious vehicles?


6.1 Is the site perimeter secured with fencing/walls to keep intruders out?

6.2 Are access control measures in place at all site entrances to prevent unauthorised access?

6.3 Are CCTV cameras in place and monitoring/recording sensitive areas of the site?

6.4 Are vehicles on site secured when not in use/undergoing maintenance work?

6.5 Are vehicles searched before leaving the depot to enter service and again on returning, and is there a search recording system in place?

Annex E - General online resources

CPNI: Protecting against terrorism: 3rd edition (2010)

CPNI: Guidance on personnel security

CPNI: Further guidance on CCTV

CPNI: Integrated Security: A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation

Department for Transport, British Transport Police & Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (2012) Security in Design of Stations (SIDOS)

Home Office, Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure & National Counter Terrorism Security Office (2012) Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues

MI5: Terrorist Threat Level to the United Kingdom

National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) Guidance on crowded places, with links to several publications
Secured by Design (with link to the Safer Tram Award)

Annex F - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) specific publications

The Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology publish a number of documents covering CCTV.

We would recommend that all of them are followed.

These are the most relevant:

Cohen, Gattuso & MacLennan-Brown (2009) CCTV Operational Requirements Manual, version 5, (publication number 28-09)

Cohen & MacLennan-Brown (2007) Digital Imaging Procedure, version 2.1, (publication number 58-07)

Walker (2005) UK Police Requirements for Digital CCTV Systems, (publication number 09-05)

Home Office Centre for Applied Science and Technology publications can also be accessed at:

The Home Office have also published a Surveillance Camera Code of Practice, (June 2013):

Annex G - Vehicle search routine for entry to depots

For those vehicles selected for search this should consist of a selection of at least one of the following five areas of the vehicle:

Area 1 - front door pockets, sun visors and glove box;

Area 2 - rear of front seats (map pockets), under seats and foot wells;

Area 3 - boot/luggage/cargo area;

Area 4 - wheel arches; and

Area 5 - under the bonnet.

These areas should be checked visually to a standard sufficient to reasonably ensure that no prohibited articles are contained in the area or areas searched.

A record should be kept of the vehicles searched and those areas searched. It should also record details of any prohibited articles found.

Annex H - Glossary of terms

Active Shooter Scenario/Marauding Active Shooter

An attack using firearms, involving either a group or a lone shooter. (While the emphasis is on firearms it should not be assumed that attackers will not have access to knives and/or IEDs).

Bicycle/Cycle Locker

An enclosed structure provided for the storage of bicycles (whether singly or in bulk).

Bicycle/Cycle Rack

Device for the storage of bicycles that is of open construction and any bicycle placed in the rack is clearly visible.

Bomb Threat

A communication, anonymous or otherwise, which threatens people or property. This could involve an explosive hazard, or chemical, biological or radiological substances.


British Transport Police

Bulk Rubbish Container

A large, rigid container (including wheelie bins and skips) for storing and disposing of bagged and bulky waste items.


Closed Circuit Television


The Construction (Design & Management) Regulations 2007


The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure is the Government authority that provides security advice to businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure.


Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisor. CTSAs offer provide advice and guidance on all aspects of counter terrorism protective security to operators, with BTP CTSAs able to offer you advice specifically tailored to the railway environment.


This relates to threat items of improvised or military origin. It covers explosive (high-explosive and incendiary), chemical, biological and radiological, threats.


Department for Transport


Police Designing Out Crime Officer


A benign item, material or received threat placed maliciously in such a way as to cause concern on the part of the finder / recipient. The term ‘hoax’ covers a range of scenarios, from overtly benign items placed in such a way as to attract staff / police interest (e.g., an empty cardboard box), to elaborate mechanisms designed to represent viable hazardous devices or materials.

HOT protocol

Procedure devised by BTP and promoted by NaCTSO to assist in determining whether an unattended item is lost property or something more suspicious


Hostile Vehicle Mitigation


Improvised Explosive Device

Left Luggage

Any item deposited by a member of the public at a storage facility provided at a station (whether or not it is provided by the owner or operator).

Lost property

Items misplaced during travel


Marauding Active Shooter

Directory: government -> uploads -> system -> uploads -> attachment data -> file
file -> 8 Section 1 : Sport
file -> Notice of exercise of additional powers of seizure under Sections 50 or 51 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001
file -> Home office circular 004/2014 Powers to search for and seize invalid travel documents in Schedule 8 to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014
file -> Consultation on the Royal Parks and Other Open Spaces (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2012
file -> Crown copyright 2012
file -> This is the Report to Government by the Film Policy Review Panel The brief
file -> Impact Assessment (IA)
file -> Dcms/Wolfson Museums and Galleries Improvement Fund a public-Private Partnership (2002-2010)
file -> Hms victory 1744: options for the management of the wreck site

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