Remove this if sending to pagerunnerr Page Title Light Rail Security Recommended Best Practice
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Do not remove this if sending to pagerunnerr Page Title Light Rail Security Recommended Best Practice  
 
The Department for Transport has actively considered the needs of blind and partially sighted people in accessing this document. The text will be made available in full on the Department’s website. The text may be freely downloaded and translated by individuals or organisations for conversion into other accessible formats. If you have other needs in this regard please contact the Department. Department for Transport
General email enquiries FAX9643@dft.gsi.gov.uk © Crown copyright 2014 Copyright in the typographical arrangement rests with the Crown. You may re-use this information (not including logos or third-party material) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence. To view this licence, visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/2 Where we have identified any third-party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. Cover photo acknowledgementsClockwise from left: Manchester Metro © Transport for Greater Manchester / TfGM Safer Travel Team with Centro tram © Centro Sheffield Supertram © South Yorkshire PTE/SYPTE Newcastle Metro CCTV monitoring © Nexus Images reproduced with kind permission of Transport for Greater Manchester / TfGM, South Yorkshire PTE/SYPTE, and Nexus. Contents
Foreword 4 Executive summary 5 a.Introduction 6 Background 6 How to use this guidance 7 Sources of advice and further guidance 7 DfT contact details 9 DfT Light Rail Security Network 9 b.Organisational security culture 10 Building and embedding a security culture 10 Personnel security 11 Security training 11 Administrative staff 12 Training records 12 Contingency (emergency) plans 13 Security exercises 14 c.Handling threats and incidents 16 Received threats 16 Firearm incidents 17 Response to unattended and suspicious items 17 Response to suspicious behaviour 18 Discovery of 'white powders' 18 Responding to a cyber incident 19 d.Security of light rail carriages and vehicles 22 Rolling stock design 22 Searches and checks 22 Securing vehicles and carriages not in service 23 Control of passengers boarding and leaving 23 Baggage reconciliation 23 Security awareness measures for passengers 23 High visibility clothing 24 On board Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 24 Security enhancements at times of increased threat 26 e.Security of light rail stations, termini and interchanges 27 Security in Design of Stations (SIDOS) and Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) 27 The Safer Tram Stop Award 28 Searches and checks 28 Construction work at a station 29 Links to other public transport systems 30 Control of access to public / non-public areas 31 Visitors and contractors 32 High visibility clothing 32 Areas of concealment 33 Waste management 34 Bicycles 35 Equipment boxes 35 Public toilet facilities 36 Post boxes 36 Tenants and cleaners 36 Security awareness measures for passengers 36 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 37 Left luggage facilities 37 Car parks / park and ride facilities / car rental facilities 38 Commercial developments at stations 38 Security enhancements at times of increased threat 39 f. Security of depots and maintenance facilities 40 Physical protection 40 Control room security 40 Rolling stock on site 41 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 41 Staffing / patrolling 41 Passes: recording and issuing 42 Motor vehicle access and parking arrangements 42 Security awareness measures 43 Security controls 43 Control room security 44 Security enhancements at times of increased threat 44 Annex A - Bomb / Threat Report Form 46 Annex B - Marauding Active Shooter guidance 49 g.How you would communicate with staff, public, neighbouring premises, etc. 51 h.What key messages would you give to them in order to keep them safe? 51 i.Have the ability to secure key parts of the building to hinder free movement of the gunmen. 51 j.Does your location store NHS Medical Bags for use by paramedics to treat casualties of such an incident? Do your staff know the location of these bags? 51 k.Think about incorporating this into your emergency planning and briefings 51 l.Test your plan. 52 Annex C - Suspicious items - using the HOT protocol 53 m.external wiring; 53 n.visible batteries; 53 o.switches; 53 p.timers; 53 q.circuit boards; 53 r.wire passing from one package to another; 53 s.items secured by plastic adhesive tape; 53 t.annotations (e.g., ‘ON’, ‘ARMED’, ‘DET’, reference to the time delay); 53 u.specially modified wooden or plastic boxes; 54 v.unidentified powders or other putty-like substances; or 54 w.carefully wrapped in plastic bags. 54 Annex D - Quick reference security checklist 55 Annex E - General online resources 60 Annex F - Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) specific publications 62 Annex G - Vehicle search routine for entry to depots 63 Annex H - Glossary of terms 64 a.the police are called and: 66 x.police confirm the incident as an attempted or actual attack; or 66 y.any security related incident which attracts media interest, even if it would not be one requiring notification in line with 1 to 3 above; and 66 z.any discovery of firearms, ammunition, or other weapons; and 66 aa.any incidents of unauthorised access, or attempted unauthorised access, to non-public areas; and 66 ab.bomb threats; and 66 ac.any discovery of explosive devices, component parts of explosive devices, or articles having the appearance of such. 66 Foreword On 18 October 2010 the Government published its National Security Strategy which reiterated that the international terrorist threat to the UK is a tier one risk. This makes it part of a group of the highest priority risks for UK national security looking ahead, taking account of both likelihood and impact. Therefore work in protecting the travelling public will be essential for the foreseeable future. Terrorists continue to target railway services across the world. The Madrid commuter train attacks on 11th March 2004, London attacks on 7th July 2005 (three of which occurred on the Underground) and suicide attacks in Volgograd railway station on the 29th and 30th December caused death, injury and disruption. These are clearly very rare events, but potentially high impact, hence there is a need to plan, and to remain vigilant. Along with physical attacks, the transport network has also been disrupted by telephone threats, unattended items and hoax devices. The constantly changing nature of the risks and threats has necessitated a refresh of the original guidance published by the Department for Transport (DfT) in 2007. This 2014 document assembles the latest best practice security measures, and we hope that it helps your operations and staff to run a safe and secure network. This guidance covers the 7 light rail systems (Blackpool Tram, Croydon Tramlink, Manchester Metrolink, Midland Metro, Nottingham Express Transit, Sheffield Supertram and Tyne & Wear Metro) and can be used to help new networks ahead of commencing operations, for example the Edinburgh Tram. We encourage you to make full use of this guide. An effective protective security regime must take account of the prevailing threat and likelihood of a security incident, the vulnerability of potential targets and the potential consequences of an attack. Together these identify the risk to the operators and infrastructure and to those using them and working on them. The open nature of the environment around light rail stops and stations presents a greater challenge than some other transport modes where access can be more readily restricted to certain areas and screening and searching regimes are in place. Nonetheless, the opportunity exists to embed systems for effectively managing risk, and this guide shows you how to do that. Security measures will generally be a proportionate combination of "front line" physical and procedural security measures (e.g. screening, searching, physical barriers, patrolling) and "secondary" measures (e.g. background checks, security vetting and training), depending on the prevailing threat. A "multi-layered" approach to security is more robust, acknowledging that no single security measure is either fool-proof or capable of mitigating every type of threat. Security measures should therefore be commensurate to the risk, effective, holistic, practicable and sustainable. The aim is to deter would be perpetrators, detect prohibited articles and respond to any potential threats. Your security regime should also provide reassurance to passengers. Directory: government -> uploads -> system -> uploads -> attachment data -> file file -> 8 Section 1 : Sport file -> Notice of exercise of additional powers of seizure under Sections 50 or 51 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 file -> Home office circular 004/2014 Powers to search for and seize invalid travel documents in Schedule 8 to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 file -> Consultation on the Royal Parks and Other Open Spaces (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2012 file -> Crown copyright 2012 file -> This is the Report to Government by the Film Policy Review Panel The brief file -> Impact Assessment (IA) file -> Dcms/Wolfson Museums and Galleries Improvement Fund a public-Private Partnership (2002-2010) file -> Hms victory 1744: options for the management of the wreck site Share with your friends:
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