Our people preserve ancient and probably in former times world-wide religious teaching disseminated by ancient Indo-Europeans (Макеев 2007: 49).
During the last two decades the phenomenon of “Religious nationalism” has become a subject of academic debates. In many respects it is caused by an outstanding role which was (and is) played by religion and religious institutions in the dramatic political processes, having occurred in ex-Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as well as in Islamic and / or postcolonial world. Understanding nationalism as a phenomenon, secular in principle and, therefore, competing to religion and even destroying it, came into conflict with observable social reality. So, standard theories of forming nationalist movements and national states have demanded correction. On the other hand, the supposed close connection between the processes of modernization and secularization was revised. A number of scholars have paid attention to the fact, that such correlation is actual one only for several European cases (Stark 1985). Such criticism caused the revision of wide Eurocentric theories and the search of more flexible explanatory models to consider the specific character of local social contexts, starting with peculiarities of understanding the social nature of religion in various societies and during different historical periods and finishing with unpredictable and unexpected consequences of actions by secularization supporters, which often stimulate the revival of religious life.
In modern social studies the analysis of religious nationalism develops in several directions. A significant number of works is dedicated to relations and conflicts between a secular state and religious nationalism (Juergensmeyer 1993; van der Veer 1994; Asad 1999). Besides, connections of national identity and confessional affiliation are studied in some researches of modern European contexts, where adherence of practically faithless people to national churches (“belonging without believing”) is marked (Botvar 1996; Davie 2000). As a special research direction one can consider work on nationalism (racism) in some neo-paganism movements (Шнирельман 2004, часть III; Мороз 2005).There are some attempts to create a general conception of analyzing interaction of such concepts as ethnicity, nationalism and religion (Baumann 1999).
Generally speaking, the prospects of creating a unified model of interaction between religion and nationalism look improbable at the moment – the groups having developed or developing as nations have passed too different historical ways, and the imagined social reality where the members of the groups live is rather specific in almost each case. It fully concerns the question of forming relations between religion and nationalism or, to put it more precisely, consequences brought by the nation construction project for religious life of various nations and ethnic groups; attitude of religious institutions (existing or being created) to such projects; the segments of social reality, defining a trajectory of interaction between religion and nationalism (a religious institution and a national state).
Indeed, in most cases we may say that during the modernization epoch nationalism, acting as a secular ideology and pretending to be a quasi-religion, is forcing religion out of such important segments of social life as economy and politics. Religion finds itself in a kind of ghetto where it is expected performance to function as a keeper of tradition and spirituality, separated from economy and politics. But, as is well known, national projects during their realization essentially change public opinion and the image of social reality. So-called cultural nationalism1 makes active efforts to change tradition (national culture), along with language, into the absolute good in public opinion. When tradition starts to be taken as the main condition of preserving ethnic (national) specificity, the situation changes – a keeper of tradition becomes a socially significant figure. Like this nationalism creates preconditions for increasing the social importance of religion, that becomes one of the main symbols of an ethnic group (nation). In the circumstances, the nationalization of world religion often happens; in this way, for example, the image of Orthodoxy as the quintessence of Russian culture was formed, therefore, it is taken as traditional religion of Russians. However in a number of contexts “ethnic tradition” or, rather, its image in public opinion, is supervised not only by religious, but also secular institutions – first of all, by national humanities (ethnology, folklore studies). In that case, religious institutions try “to assimilate” the secular by origin knowledge of “spiritual culture of people (nation)”, resting upon its authority of the keeper of spirituality. Close connection between spirituality and religion that exists in perception of people may allow a church institution to privatize the wide area of national spiritual culture. But sometimes nationalists, not trusting religious institution by any reasons but at the same time being sure of religious nature of all the spiritual phenomena, can undertake their own attempts to recreate a folk (ethnic, national) religion on the basis of folkloristic, historical and ethnographic data.
Thus, religion and nationalism have rather intricate relations. Nationalism, to accomplish its tasks, may adopt from religion some concepts, useful by virtue of their high emotional loading – “Chosen people”, “redemption and (national) resurrection”, images of martyrs and prophets, etc. (Hutchison, Lehmann 1994). But religious activists, for their turn, use actively nationalism’s conceptual arsenal. They find something among the religious images noticeably transformed by national ideology (the idea of national Messianism). But many things actively used by existing (or being created) “nationally focused” religious institution are invented by nationalist ideology itself – these are the images of common people as collective keeper of the higher wisdom, nation as the only absolute value, ethnic tradition as the most important information base use of which can guarantee survival to an ethnic group (nation). In the social landscape created by cultural nationalism where the concepts of tradition, people, spirituality and religions are closely connected, the activists of national (ethnic) religion can expect serious political dividends. For example, they can expand of their religious group’s borders to the size of a nation. The people to whom they point as their supporters do not always put obstacles in their way, though they have no direct connection to the activity of a religious institution, disposed to speak from their name. So, according to the sociological researches in Russia, 75 % of the questioned called themselves the Orthodox, but only 40 % – the believers (Kääririanen, Furman 2000). I.e. a plenty of non-believers have defined themselves as Orthodox, using the indication to a religion as an ethnic marker (Agadjanian 2001: 481).
Whether the national-religious project will be started and how effective it will be, depends on many factors concerning the area of ideas about social reality. I shall mark some of them:
1. The status of traditional national culture as national property. Here a lot depends on activity of the scholars who create the image of tradition collecting and publicly presenting data on national popular culture. Besides, significant influence upon increasing status of national culture is exerted by public campaigns intended to popularization of definite practices (customs, folklore genres, etc.).
2. The status of religion (a religious institution) as of a source and a controller of spirituality and public morals. In some social contexts these functions are perceived as a natural activity area of a religion.
3. The degree of correlation of a certain religion and an ethnic group. If in some society the degree is high, we could say that religious nationalism is a special way of thinking about social landscape, where an individual “receives” certain confessional affiliation together with his/her ethnicity. In the circumstances the religious identity becomes “natural” and practically obligatory, and an individual should mark specially that he is not “like everyone”, or accept the identity “on default”. In some cases mono-religiosity of an ethnic group is considered to be the “natural” situation; in case of poly-religiosity, the latter demands liquidation as an unnatural phenomenon or religious minorities are taken as potentially or actually dangerous marginal groups and converts into ethnic alien’s faith as traitors of his nation.
4. The degree of development of national eschatology, i.e. the ideas of that the nation (ethnic group) being under the threat of disappearance and / or enslavement. It should be mentioned that I am not inclined to distinguish imaginary and real threats. All of them influence a situation irrespective of experts’ opinion. The feeling of national humiliation, expectation of language shift (loss of ethnic language), obvious or latent ethnic conflict with unclear result and some other factors existing in the image of social reality, may stimulate the creation of national-religious projects.
Let us take a look at the current situation in Russian from this general perspective.
In the social consciousness of contemporary Russian society there are very tight relations between concept of religion and concept of nation (or ethnic group). Nationalistic style of thinking about religious issues determines logics of behavior and discourse not only for so-called radical Orthodox nationalists or different new pagans, who try to revitalize allegedly ancient, even primordial ethnic faith. One can come across such statements in very different, sometimes unexpected contexts. For example, leaders of main religious communities in Russia usually define amount of their followers just by so-called ethnic principle, when Orthodoxy is presented as the religion of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Chuvashes, Mordvins, Karelians, Komi, Ossetians, etc., Catholicism – as the religion of Poles and Lituanians, Lutheranism – as the religion of Germans, Finns and Estonians and so on. To account believers means in this situation just to take materials on ethnic identity of the last population census and equate ethnic groups with religious communities (Филатов, Лункин 2007: 35-37; Верховский 2003: 120).
The easy recognizable rhetoric of nationalism is a “natural” part of discursive habits of many religious authorities. When one listened, for instance, to the late Patriarch Alexis the Second, the head of Russian Orthodox Church, who was persistently stigmatized by “Russian patriots” as a traitor of the Russian people and faith, you could easily hear words about “unity of Russian nation”, “national originality of Russian Orthodoxy’ and even about “the extinction of Russian people”. Some of his statements are not far from an idea of “the international conspiracy against Russia”: “We must win in the war levied against Orthodox Russia; we must bring up a new generation of Orthodox Russians, who love Russia”, etc2.
Similar affirmation can be heard from common, non-radical Orthodox people. And it is very usual that these themes (conspiracy against Russia, secret war against Russia, a special predestination of Russian people and so on) appear in a conversation, when you talk with some “ordinary orthodox person” about such non-political things as children, food, even weather.
But Russian Orthodox believers are not the only social (or religious) group who represents religious questions in terms of ethnicity and nationalism. Evangelical missioners who work among indigenous peoples of the Russian north like to stress that their mission is not only Christianization of an indigenous people but also preservation of their ethnic culture. Many Muslim leaders eagerly talk about traditional ethnic Islam and even ethnic Muslims. So in contemporary Russia it is a usual way of thinking on social group and correspondently social identity when religion and ethnicity are represented through each other.
Under these circumstances for some ethnic nationalists universalistic Christianity (and in some contexts Islam) is the main threat for national and ethnic cultures, for very existence of ethnic variety. Some activists try to ethnicize the local variant of a world religion as far as possible; some create new ethnic religions (or, according to many of them, recreate old ones). The latter movement considers Christianity almost an absolute evil.
Here is an opinion of an Udmurt pagan priest from Middle Ural region: “The aggressive world religions led the mankind into a deadlock. Russian and other peoples rejected their own gods and adopted Christianity. That is why there is no future for them. Their spiritual betrayal and the long domination of Christianity resulted in deep corruption of the people’s soul. The progress of the mankind will make some peoples reject Christianity and will lead them to Paganism. If they still have the strength of mind to do it, they will be able to survive” (Филатов 2002: 147-148).
Supporters of ethnic religions proceed from an idea that every ethnic group has (or had or has to have) its peculiar religion, just as it has its language and culture (Шнирельман 2005: 8). For many ethnic activists it is very important to represent ethnic traditional beliefs rituals practices as a particular religion or even religious system, because “Only those people which created their own religious system are considered as a rule as civilized ones. That system is testimony of ethnic organism’s maturity; it is evidence of ethnic integration’s wholeness” (Салмин 2007: 5)3. From this point of view, Christianity is dangerous and harmful for ethnic groups because it is an international and even cosmopolitan religion by its nature. Sometimes it is considered as a forerunner and symbol of current processes of globalization (ethnonationalists’ worst nightmare). Christianity is brought by aliens and their voluntary or deceived allies. Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian nationalistic new pagans are inclined to accuse the Jews and construct an image of ill-intentioned invention of Christianity and secret spiritual invasion. Non-Russian activists of ethnic religions prefer talking about Russian undisguised cultural imperialism and Orthodox Christianity as one of its main tool.
One can continue listing particular accusations against Christianity (it suppresses human initiative by preaching the humility; it humbles human beings by the conception of the original sin, Christian priests are, of course, greedy etc.) Eventually none of those is new: they can be found in works of Nietzsche and Feuerbach or, for example, Soviet atheist ideologists. It is more interesting that in some sense such reasons seem to be superfluous. All of them result in a simple conclusion: we do not need any alien values, beliefs, practices and institutions, because we have got our own. And they are better because they are ours.
But my point is not to indicate a vicious circle or unoriginality of religious ethnonationalists’ arguments. I argue that activists of ethnic religion projects have more complicated relations with Christianity than a simple outright denial. First, they take their very concept of a proper religion from religious traditions they would like to reject, and use it in their creative activity. And second, by constructing a new religion, they deny not Christianity but rather modern western category of religion. Thus the creation of new ethnic religions appears as a complicated and dialectical process. To support what I say I will turn to two classical anthropological works.
First is an article by Clifford Geertz “‘Internal Conversion’ in Contemporary Bali” (1972). Here he describes and analyses some social transitions relating to changes in attitudes of different social groups of Indonesian Balinese society towards a local Hinduism. Those changes took place in 1950s and early 1960s. Geertz talks about three main aspects of that process – “the intensified religious questioning, the spread of religious literacy, and the attempt to reorganize religious institutions”. I think it is worth adding some specific traits of this process – attempts “to segregate religion from social life in general”, the systematization and interpretation of sacred texts (i.e. the creation of dogma and creed), the unification of ritual activity, and the organization of institutional control for local religious life (the local “Ministry of Religion”, qualifying examinations for priests, a religious school). To include those processes into a more general conceptual scheme Geertz uses Max Weber’s dichotomy “traditional religion vs. rational religion” and names the transformation he writes about “the rationalization of Balinese religion”.
But why did the rationalisers of Balinese religion choose those certain ways for their activity? Geertz did not give us a clear answer to this question. He seems to think about this issue in terms of general laws of religious rationalization when he writes about some “social and intellectual processes which gave rise to the fundamental religious transformations of world history” and compares indirectly a case of Bali with ancient China and Greece. However, I think that we have no need to look for some general laws and remote parallels for understanding modern and post-modern religious transformations. Probably, Balinese know what they have to do to reform their religion because they have got a bright and obliging model of a proper religion not so far from them. I mean Islam.
Geertz notes: Balinese “as a people, intensely conscious and painfully proud of being a Hindu island in a Muslim sea, and their attitude toward Islam is that the duchess to the bug”. But Muslims are a powerful majority in Indonesia, and they control all state institutions including the state Ministry of religion. Balinese do not want to convert to Islam and they do not want that their religion is considered by the majority as a local and “wild” one. They try to make their religion respectable in their neighbours’ opinion (and in their own opinion). In this context the outer model determines their activity and Balinese have to accept majority’s rules of play and communicate with that majority to reach their aims.
Geertz provides an example of such communication: “The Muslims say, you have no book, how can you be a world religion? The Balinese reply, we have manuscripts and inscriptions dating before Mohammed. The Muslims say, you believe in many gods and worship stones; The Balinese say, god is One but has many names and the “stone” is the vehicle of God, not God himself”.
I would like to note that in these circumstances the Balinese have no opportunity to reply: “So what? There are many religions without any holy scripture and there are many polytheistic religions”. It would break the rules of dialog and destroy it. But the dialog is very significant for them. Through it arise Balinese holy Writ, dogmatics, theology, unified rituals and religious institutions. And such conversation does not necessarily take place at direct contacts: religious reformers can imagine this discussion, but they have to imagine it quite correctly.
It is important to note that here I mean not just relations of direct obtrusion and, correspondingly, forced adaptation of a certain religious model. For successful reformation of some religion that model has to be interiorized by reformation activists.
In the Bali case we face with a situation when a certain system of religious practices undergoes a substantial reorganisation (or rationalisation in Geertz’s terms) on the external pattern. And we can say for sure that some Balinese religion existed before the reforms because Balinese, not only Geertz, proceeded from a belief that some of their practices and ideas were religious. But sometimes we can see that an interaction between a big religion and a society where almost nobody can say that some of their practices are religious, results in creation of similar perception.
Here I will turn to my Northern Ossetian subject. The official name of that Northern Caucasian national republic is the Northern Ossetia – Alania and the last part of the name indicates the relation between contemporary Ossetians and their glorious militant ancestors Alans. The population of the republic is about 700 thousand people. 450 thousand of them are Ossetians. The Ossetian language is a Northern Iranian one and has no linguistic relatives in the region. Besides, the Northern Ossetia is special because it is the only national republic of the region that has no Muslim majority. Sometimes for outsiders Ossetians even looks like the only Orthodox native people of the Northern Caucuses but the situation is not so simple. There are many religion, traditions and movements in the republic including Ossetian religious traditionalists. To begin with I will try to describe briefly a context of public debate about Ossetian ethnic religion. Usually in this connection one speaks about creating neo-pagan religion, similar to the one that may be observed, for example, in some republics of the Volga region (Shnirelman 2002; Шнирельман 1998; cf. Филатов, Щипков 1996).
However the situation seems undoubted only without knowledge of the local religious and political context. The matter is that in Northern Ossetia there is no distinctness about what is Ossetian national (or ethnic) religion or what it should be. There is not any public consensus on existence of a specific Ossetian religion either. The nature of phenomena ascribed to the area of Ossetian spiritual culture is a point at issue and has clashing interpretations. The complexity of the situation and tension of discussions in many respects is determined by the uncommon religious history of the Ossetins. The fact of accepting Christianity by the ancestors of contemporary Ossetins not later than in the 10th century, and then “departure” of church structures from Ossetia after several centuries of presence (this event is often dated by the 15th century) defined the landscape of religious life of the people during the next centuries. The congregation having remained without pastors was left on its own. Expansion of Islam among a part of the Ossetins added some extra shades to the situation. Even the active propagation of Christianity by the Orthodox church “returned” in the 19th century has not changed the general picture: in the Ossetian religious life it is easy enough to find the elements corresponding with East-Christian (less often Islamic) culture and, most likely, going back to it and, on the other hand, practices and beliefs hardly traced to Christianity or Islam. In this situation the most widespread expression to define the nature of religious situation in the Ossetian society was (and still is) “mixture” – of Christianity, Islam, and paganism or Christianity (religion) and superstitions. However, not everyone in Ossetia wanted to determine the nature of the phenomena, discussed by scholars and national leaders, in terms of religion. For the majority the things which a researcher may recognize as a fact of a religious cult (for example, practice of pilgrimage to local sacred places), is just a tradition.
At the end of the last century such uncertainty has ceased to be convenient for a part of Ossetian elite, and attempts were made to apply religious terms to traditional practices. Then one began to speak first about Ossetian paganism, and then about pre-Christian (ancient Aryan) monotheism. For many national activists that conception of ethnic religion correlates directly with conception of a particular spiritual way of Ossetian people. Orthodox activists also joined the discussion and tried to represent Ossetian culture as the Orthodox one per se. At last, a significant part of the republic establishment as well as of common people consecutively avoid applying religious terminology to the things which some people take as demonstration of religiousness, preferring to speak about ethnic traditions, customs, etc.
So in the society under consideration there are some different interpretations of the ethnic cultural heritage and perspectives of using it for some national interests. Each of them determinates strategies of perception and representation of the ethnic spiritual tradition. It often causes open public debates.
But anyway, leaders and adapts of Ossetian ethnic religion project occupy a visible place in the social landscape of the republic. Some words should be said about three particular features of their mission.
1. They started their activity not from nothing. The concept of Ossetian ethnic religion was created by academicians a century ago and popularized since 1950s by Soviet atheists who furiously fought against Ossetian paganism. It was the Soviet antireligious activists who drove certain local practices (pilgrimage to the local sacred places, ritual feasts, etc.) in people’s minds from the field of ethnic tradition into the religious sphere (Штырков 2009). Now it gives to religious nationalists the right to talk about persecutions against their faith.
2. The leaders of the movement cannot just renounce Christianity as a religion of aliens – Russian and Georgians because many Ossetians consider Orthodox Christianity as a faith of their glorious ancestors – Alans. So the religious nationalists have to spend much time on explanations their anti-Christian position. Daurbek Makeev, maybe the brightest representative or even head of the movement, trying to be more persuasive uses, among others, anti-Semitic stereotypes to connect Judaism with Christianity: “There are no words about Honesty in Jewish religion, there is a description how to achieve self-interested goals. It is necessarily to say that the conception of making profits through corruption of other nations and their moral depravation is crucial for Judaism. It is the basic religion for Christians and Moslems” (Макеев 2007: 19). The other recognizable ideological image is related with conception of the Jewish conspiracy: “The degradation of Ossetian nation is not a consequence of progress and technological revolution/ It is a result of the successful work of Moses’ followers and their gone astray assistants [Christians]” (Макеев 2002: 56). It should be added that for Makeev and his associates Judaism is the main enemy and the certain ideal at the same time: “Moses understood perfectly that to betray someone’s god means to break off with her roots, to get universal debauchery, to loose traditional values and correspondently to weaken her ethnic identity and perish. He considered a betrayal to somebody’s God as the extreme crime – as a crime against the Nation” (Макеев 2007: 25).
3. In their polemics with Christianity they stress a vicious nature of the Church as a power institution. This moment makes their teaching attractive for some people, but at the same time does not permit speak openly about establishment of a new priesthood.
It is no surprise that rejecting the big religion Ossetian religious nationalists have to copy their main traits. They consider Nart epic songs as an Ossetian Holy Writ (Макеев 2007; Чочиев 2009). Through a very complicated exegesis of those texts they create their dogma and theological system. The main methods of that exegesis are audacious etymological construction and parallels between Ossetian linguistic, folklore and ritual data and those of Indo-Iranian (Aryan) ancient cultures. Besides old-new religion activists try to create a unified ritual system, every little element of witch has a theological motivation.
But it is not worth to reduce that project to blind imitation of big religious traditions. There are some traits of this movement that make it, in my opinion, a bright and original phenomenon. The Ossetian religious nationalists do not create one more religion. They try to construct the system of faith that could go beyond restrictions of modern western conception of religion. And here it is my second theoretical foundation – Talal Asad’s discussion of the specificity of the western modern conception of religion as an academic and, I would like to add, cultural category ('The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category', (1993). And here I mean that the scantiness of modern western idea of the nature of religion is conceived not only by the new generation of anthropologists but also by some leaders of new religious movements.
The Ossetian religious nationalists disprove a conception of religion as something that saves human souls and takes persons to Haven that is as a teaching that places human ultimate values into other world. The religion of Ossetian traditionalists deals with this world and its main function is to protect the ethnic culture and save the nation from assimilation and disappearance. Christians’ and Muslims’ misdeeds are sins against God; in Ossetian ethnic religion they are sins against nation because they result in, for example, the demographic crisis and extinction of the nation. And the main sin would be is abandonment of the forefathers’ faith. “A person who abandoned of his people’s god and adopted the alien faith (ideology) from Moses’ followers bring damnation not only upon himself and his descendants but upon his whole people with all lands and possessions” (Макеев 2002: 57). As one can see Ossetian religious nationalists deny that religion is a question of individual choice. The Ossetian ancient religion is or must become the matter of the whole nation. “If the people forget about that [religious] tradition, it will loose its significance for God and be doomed to extinction (Макеев 2002: 47). The greatest sin is an apostasy from the national religion. Makeev likes to cite those historical examples when ossetians’ ancestors – Scythians and Alans – killed apostates and believes that those acts were reasonable and legal (Макеев 2002: 56, Макеев 2007: 25-26; see also Газданова 2007: 115-117).
The last but not least anti-modernist trait of this nationalist project I would like to mention is a disagreement to accept a restricted function of religion in the modern society, where it was forced to submit that modern religious systems are out of politics and have no actual working cosmology – they lost the battle against the western modern natural sciences and political thinking. Ossetian religious activists need a total religion, the religion that is not a part of social life or culture, but the whole life of the nation. And the whole Ossetian culture is religious by its nature. Their religion is politics and they contend that they are able to create such a system of faith where ethics, sociology and cosmology are closely interrelated. “We are talking about the three-levelled structure of universe that is psycho-emotional structure of the human being at the same time” (Макеев 2002: 2).
The ideology of Ossetian religious nationalism is not very new. A slogan “Nation is our religion” is well known. It is becoming more and more popular in contemporary Northern Ossetia. As it was said in one of comment to an article by an Ossetian religious nationalist (the title is very characteristic – “The truthful Words against Christians”): “Today a supporter of disappearing Ossetian culture can be forgiven for everything”.
In June 2009 the first community of traditional Ossetian religion was officially registered in a Ossetian town Mozdok. Daurbek Makeev is its head.
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1 That ideology proceeds from such a vision of nations when they are understood as based on mono-ethnic group with common language, past (first of all, origin), etc.
2 Обращение Святейшего Патриарха Московского и всея Руси Алексия к клиру, Приходским советам храмов Москвы, наместникам и настоятельницам ставропигиальных монастырей на Епархиальном собрании 2007 года http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/356093.html. The following citation was taken in a usual (non radical) diocesan newspaper: “The West hates Russia unreservedly because Russian land was and is the stronghold of Orthodox Faith… Now it is important [for the West] to annihilate the Russian man, who keeps the Orthodox world-view, Orthodox culture and Orthodox faith, who never permit the West to become the absolute ruler of the World” (Оплетин 2009).
3 The metaphors of “ethnic organism” and “integrity (wholeness)” are very important and characteristic in this context. The former permits to say about some “total amount of ethnic religious experience” and the latter – about perspectives of destruction of the ethnic culture because of loss of a single element in the religious system (Салмин 2007: 610-611).