R&D isn’t t violates Energy production it’s pre-production


Low risk is no risk---and as a policymaker that threshold isn’t very high



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Low risk is no risk---and as a policymaker that threshold isn’t very high


Mueller 10 John Mueller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters” Issues Online in Science and Technology, Winter 2010 http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html

The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified.



At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored.

In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.




Even with unlimited funding and a perfect investment climate the plan will have no effect for decades – THEIR 1AC EVIDENCE


CN 12 The Challenge Network is an International Partnership of Expert Individuals, Most of Whom Have Occupied Senior Planning or Management Roles in Commerce and the Public Sector, "Nuclear Fusion: Penurious Promise", 2012, http://www.chforum.org/scenario2012/paper-1-4.shtml

Suppose that we had access to unlimited funds and that it was clear today how to spend them? The figure shows work done by Shell on the pace at which energy technologies penetrate the global market. Plainly, the economic potential and the regulatory environment will effect these, but the general trend is clear enough. Fusion, if available today, would take a considerable time to replace and extend existing electricity infrastructureWhat consequences would even the knowledge of its certain existence have on the world? It would, self-evidently, render investment in all but a few renewables obsolete. It would change our perception of primary energy from a limited to an unlimited resource, or one properly limited only by economic realities. It would considerably reduce the long run potential of the oil producing countries, and increase those of, in particular, poor importing nations. However, given the slow penetration that the figure shows, these would be impacts anticipated rather than felt in 2025. The forced retirement of conventional power stations by states as a climate management measure could well bring this forward, but still to the 2030s and beyond. The nature of the plant - turnkey modules or complex, delicate equipment that needed constant expert management - would greatly impact poor-world uptake, and hydrocarbons could become "poor man's energy" in such an environment.


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