Professor Kessler Kitt Wolfenden



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Wolfenden


Final Paper

GOVT 421
Professor Kessler


Kitt Wolfenden
May 15 2010
Mill versus Mill versus Mill: A Study of the Contradictions Inherent in His Seminal Works

and the Paradox that Ultimately Condemns His Project to Failure

On Liberty and Utilitarianism were written by the same author, John Stuart Mill, within a four year period (1859-1863), yet the theories of these works differ widely. One, a liberalist text, espouses the harm principle, which limits society’s constriction of personal liberty; the other, entitled and grounded in the theory of Utilitarianism, argues that behavior is ethical if it brings greater utility (meaning happiness) to all of society. While Mill advocates relentlessly on behalf of both principles, these divergent texts cannot be reconciled with one another in a coherent manner. As Utilitarianism outlines the idealistic circumstances required to make its theory feasible, On Liberty details the weaknesses and limits of human nature, and from that more realistic framework we can see that personal liberty and societal utility are incompatible outside of utopian conditions that do not correspond to Mill’s description of reality. In addition to the contradictions inherent in these texts, a careful examination of these works shows that Mill’s true concern is not personal liberty or societal utility but instead advancement and progress. This goal can only be achieved if the superior few are given the freedom to cultivate their genius at the expense of happiness and liberty for the masses because, if given the opportunity, Mill believes that the majority would naturally attempt to impose conformity upon this elite minority. To achieve Mill’s true aim would therefore require not liberty or happiness for all but instead a paternalistic aristocracy in which the intellectual minority would dictate the structure of society for the rest. Such a system not only goes against both the theories of On Liberty and Utilitarianism but it is ultimately self-defeating, because in Mill’s own words, for the “strong man of genius” to compel others to become self-developed “is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself.”1

An assessment of the contradictions inherent in Mill’s work must begin with an examination of the theories that Mill sets out in On Liberty and Utilitarianism. These works differ widely in the principles they set forth, the values they champion and the assumptions they make of human character. On Liberty rests upon the assumptions that the mass is “a collective mediocrity” that, if not constrained, will infringe upon the liberty of its members by imposing “its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them.”2 In this work, Mill states that society can only legitimately exercise power over an individual to prevent harm to others, and he proclaims that "over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."3 He argues in favor of free speech, individuality and creativity, and rails against paternalism, conformity and tyranny of the majority. Mill speaks of an intrinsic value in individuality, even if an individual’s uniqueness adds nothing else to society – he says that “exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differently to the mass.”4 Mill clarifies that this has not always been the case, but that in the face of societal pressure to conform, any expression of individuality would positively benefit mankind. He says, “In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently, but better. In this age, the mere example of nonconformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service.”5

In Utilitarianism, by contrast, Mill espouses an ethical system by which actions are judged for their ability to promote utility, or happiness, for the greatest number of people possible. In this text, Mill states that utility is the chief goal above all else; he says that “pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends” (emphasis added).6 Because the utilitarian standard, Mill says, “is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether,” this ethical system “[can] only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character.”7 To sacrifice one’s own happiness to bring about an increase in the total happiness is thus the highest virtue under this theory8. Utilitarianism requires selflessness and cooperation and assumes the possibility of cultivating these characteristics in the majority of mankind.

Not only do the assumptions, values and goals in Utilitarianism and On Liberty differ greatly, but they come into conflict when one attempts to adhere to both principles. To follow one requires the other to be compromised. If Mill’s teachings expressed in Utilitarianism are followed most closely, for example, societal happiness comes at the expense of diversity and leads to personal suppression. Mill writes that the utilitarian standard requires individuals to put the happiness of all concerned above his own, and choose between them “as a disinterested and benevolent spectator.”9 In presenting this choice, not only does Mill draw a distinction between the two, recognizing that an individual’s happiness and societal utility are not one in the same, but he also implies that individuals would normally act out of self-interest unless taught or made to do otherwise.

Mill suggests that this virtuous selflessness could be cultivated through government action. He says that “laws and social arrangements should place the happiness . . . the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible, in harmony with the interest of the whole,” and that education should establish an association in a citizen’s mind between his own happiness and that of society.10 However, this proposition stands in direct contrast to the glorification of diversity found in On Liberty. Not only does Mill say in this text that human beings are all incredibly different, but he also says that “it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings,” and that “it is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it, and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation.”11 In On Liberty, Mill not only states that we are different, but he argues that we should be different, and that we should embrace these differences without constraints.

Laws and social arrangements seeking to unite all individuals into a cohesive mass would contradict the importance of personal liberty and potentially lead to a tyranny of the majority, which Mill warns about in On Liberty. He says in that text, “There needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose . . . its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.”12 Mill attributes much importance to personal liberty in On Liberty, yet under utilitarianism the pursuit of societal happiness would seem to limit the freedom of its individual members.

If, on the other hand, On Liberty is adhered to more closely, and eccentricity is valued over societal harmony, then an individual’s liberty comes into conflict with and come at the expense of societal happiness. In On Liberty, Mill himself details how this could occur. He writes at great length of the disdain society has for individuality and creativity, and its tendency towards conformity and mediocrity. He says that “individual spontaneity is hardly recognized . . . as having any intrinsic worth” and that “the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind.”13 Mill gives little substantive explanation as to how such a society could foster individuality given its natural tendency to impose conformity upon its members; he does not “really examine the way in which custom – the social mores and morals – filters into our beings and unconsciously shapes our opinions and acts” despite his awareness that societal pressures led individuals to self-censorship.14 Yet Mill says that when such individuality does exist, it must be preserved without regard to society’s pleasure. He writes that human well-being necessitates individuality even if society doesn’t like it; he says that the harm principle “requires liberty of tastes and pursuits . . .without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong” (emphasis added).15

Mill does not explain how society can correct its own tendency to stamp out individualism, but he is clear that when such uniqueness does manifest itself, it must be preserved without regard to the inevitable displeasure it will cause the unenlightened majority. If the harm principle is followed, then, utility (defined by Mill as happiness or pleasure) must be compromised. Eccentricity and individuality might lead to societal advancement, but given the majority’s strong dislike of these qualities, they do not lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number in the society that Mill describes in On Liberty.

Mill never directly addresses the potential for conflict between the theories he espouses in Utilitarianism and On Liberty, but from a careful reading of his texts, we can imagine Mill’s argument against this seeming incompatibility between the two. Mill would potentially argue that the mediocre masses are unaware of the intrinsic value of liberty and will, in the long term, benefit from what now bothers them. In On Liberty Mill writes that cultivating individuality makes human life “rich, diversified, and animating” and the human race “infinitely better worth belonging to.”16 Mill might say that despite the majority’s aversion to difference, their tolerance of eccentricity will make them better people in the long run; they will eventually see their temporary displeasure give way to long-term improvement.

However, Mill’s theories are so divergent that they can only be reconciled under utopian conditions far from those that he ascribes to reality. For personal liberty to bring about societal happiness, individuals would have to be entirely cooperative and selfless, and for all of mankind to voluntarily put the interests of others ahead of their own, each person would have to renounce their disdain for difference and instead commit themselves to flourishing for all. Wendy Donner, a Canadian philosophy professor, writes, “In Mill’s conception of moral agents as self-developed, agents are appropriately socialized spontaneously to take account of the good and interests of others and to care about their well-being without being forced to do so.”17 According to Donner, this shows that Mill’s theory rests upon “an expectation of progress and improvement in human affairs, which will of necessity involve the recognition that earlier judgments were mistaken.”18 She says that “this places great weight upon the education and character of moral agents,” because “judgments of value are the evaluative basis of all human practical reasoning . . . but humans cannot fully make such judgments of value unless they have reached a certain threshold level of self-development.”19 It is important to note that utilitarianism rests on mankind’s advancement and therefore assumes universal capabilities to achieve such self-development. Donner writes, “Mill’s ideas and commitments require that all adult members of society have the opportunity and social resources effectively to gain the status of self-developed agent,” a perspective which is largely ignorant of the scarcity of such resources.20 Graeme Campbell Duncan, a government professor at Australia’s University of Queensland, says of this that “[Mill’s] general doctrine – the style, drift and substance of his liberalism – [is] above all relevant to the few [and takes] little account of the actual resources, economic and otherwise, of the bulk of mankind.”21 Duncan concludes that Mill “failed to see the large social changes which would be needed if [democracy] was to become a reality.”22

Furthermore, even if all of mankind was educated and made to see the inherent value in tolerating difference and dissent, this extreme degree of synchronization among individuals’ interests is unrealistic given Mill’s theory of divergence among human nature. According to Mill, “human beings are not like sheep and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike.”23 For each and every member of human society’s interests to harmonize would require a significant degree of homogeneity among man that Mill himself has dismissed as a naïve and unrealistic concept. In addition to the impossibility of such unity, Mill also says that it would be harmful to mankind’s intellectual growth. In On Liberty, Mill states that such “unity of opinion . . . is not desirable.”24

To reconcile these two theories would require Mill to affirm that the masses will (eventually) be far happier if they are somehow induced into pursuing higher pleasures, contrary to their natural inclinations and preferences, but there is no way of proving that coercing the masses to follow those who have been distinguished as “superior” will eventually make them more happy. At the same time that Mill sets lofty goals for mankind’s advancement, On Liberty presents a pessimistic view that recognizes the limitations of individuals and the inability for mankind to change. In this work Mill says that the majority of mankind loathes individuality and has little capacity to change. He states that “the general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but also moderate in inclinations: they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual, and they consequently do not understand those who have, and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon.”25 Mill writes, “The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are . . . cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody,” and that “originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of.”26 The highest pursuit of these mediocre men, Mill says, is not to do anything exceptional themselves but instead to follow the initiative of the “highly gifted and instructed One or Few.”27 Mill also emphatically states that this state of affairs will not change – he says that “persons of genius, it is true, are, and are always likely to be, a small minority.”28 It is difficult to envision a diverse, democratic state in which all of mankind is happy if one also maintains that most people are entirely unable to appreciate the exercise of individuality and difference. Mill, therefore, cannot convincingly state that toleration of the eccentric minority will make the majority happy, even in the far-off future.

While Mill’s liberalism and utilitarianism conflict with one another, the theories espoused in On Liberty and Utilitarianism also clash with what seems to be Mill’s chief concern – not liberty or utility, but instead human development and societal progress. Many theorists have concluded that Mill abandons these goals for something greater; James A. Stegenga writes that “Mill's concept of liberty does not appear to be rooted in the principle of utility in any meaningful sense of this principle,” and that “it appears rather to be based on a consideration of the social benefits liberty would conduce combined with an implicit and at times explicit theory of natural rights.”29 Stegenga even goes so far as to state that “if strict adherence to the utility principle is the criterion for membership in the school of political philosophers known as the Utilitarians, then John Stuart Mill's name must be struck from the roster.”30

The question, then, is what exactly is this other, higher good is that Mill values more than liberty and happiness. Wendy Donner argues that Mill’s primary focus in his work was on “questions of good character and good lives.  His primary commitment, which ties in with the formative influence of classical Greek philosophy on his views, is to ways of life and character development.”31 Alan Ryan, a prominent Mill scholar, says that Mill’s aim is progress, or specifically the “improvement in the quality of the human beings composing the society.”32 We find support for this theory in the very first pages of On Liberty, where Mill includes this quote from Wilhelm Von Humboldt: “The grand, leading principle, toward which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity.”33 This highlights development, and not happiness as the primary goal. Mill’s writings in another one of his works, Considerations on Representative Government, lend further credence to this idea. In this text Mill writes that “the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves,” making no mention of happiness or pleasure.34 Mill again reinforces that his primary goal is the improvement of the people in a society when he says that a government’s goodness should be judged by “the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and individually.”35

A careful examination of Mill’s theories thus reveals that his ultimate goal is not personal liberty or happiness for all people, but instead mankind’s betterment through the cultivation of genius among a few of its members. Mill attempts to assert that this goal is utilitarian because it will eventually lead to happiness; Evan Kreider proposes that Mill is a believer in “‘eudaimonism,’ the view that human happiness is primarily constituted by the development and exercise of our higher rational faculties.”36 However, Kreider also notes that Mill does not attempt to draw a correlation between this well-being and with hedonistic pleasure. Kreider writes, “It would certainly be possible – if Mill were a classical Benthamite hedonist – to argue that freedom of speech is necessary for the rational development of humanity, which in turn is merely instrumental for the maximization of hedonistic pleasures; however, he does not in fact make these explicit arguments.”37 Alan Ryan writes that in On Liberty, “Progress replaces utility as the key conception. In the essay On Liberty, Mill insists that he appeals only to utility; but he immediately moves away from any simple utilitarian defence of individual freedom by qualifying the claim: the utility in question is that which is founded on man’s permanent interests as a progressive being. But this, manifestly, is to make the principle of maximizing utility logically dependent on the principle of maximizing progress. So . . . the goal is no longer . . . maximum general utility; now it essentially involves notions of change and progress.”38 The curious absence of arguments linking progress and utility as well as the inability to foresee or guarantee this causal relationship reveals that for Mill, development itself is valued more highly than the happiness that may or may not be affected eventually from its achievement.

While Mill maintains in Utilitarianism that “happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end,”39 On Liberty points to many occasions where what is best for society does not make its people happiest. Mill says that the majority must respect nonconformists’ actions and refrain from constraining them “so long as what we do does not harm them, even though [our fellow-creatures] should think our conduct foolish, perverse or wrong.”40 Mill even says that suffering is sometimes necessary. He says, “Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.41” Skorupski says that “providing access to higher goods in the degree which ‘competent judges’ would call for” does not necessarily require “immiserating great numbers of people,” but that this may have been required in the past. He then says, “But to acknowledge this is simply to see what any teleological liberal must see anyway: that liberal politics rests on empirical circumstance and not self-evident natural rights.”

Mazlish notes that Mill in his concern for mankind’s improvement as a separate and more important good than happiness, Mill diverges from utilitarianism’s core. Mazlish says that the utilitarians that came before Mill “had wanted literally nothing but pleasure obtained by whatever means were the most effective . . . Bentham and Mill believed in education and legislation as the roads to happiness. But if a shorter way had been discovered, in the form of pills to swallow, techniques of subliminal suggestion, or other means of conditioning human beings in which our country has made such strides, then, being men of fanatical consistency, they might well have accepted this as a better, more effective and perhaps less costly alternative than the means that they had advocated. John Stuart Mill, as he made plain by both his life and by his writings, would have rejected with both hands any such solution. He would have condemned it as degrading the nature of man.”42 For Mill, happiness was never the final goal.

We see this concern for human development again and again in both On Liberty and Utilitarianism, In the former, Mill stresses the importance of making decisions on one’s own behalf, comparing those who do not actively take command of their own lives as using only the “ape-like” faculty of imitation.43 He asks of such a person, irrespective of his happiness, “What will be his comparative worth as a human being?”44 Then, when differentiating between higher and lower pleasures in Utilitarianism, Mill directly responds to the criticism that those who choose the former might be less happy than those who do not. He does not respond that these individuals are, in fact, any happier, but instead he says that they are better off. “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied,” Mill writes.45

A careful examination of Mill’s writings thus reveals that his ultimate goal is not personal liberty or happiness for all people; instead Mill seeks mankind’s betterment through the cultivation of genius among its most promising few. But in light of all that Mill has said regarding human nature and society, this advancement could only be achieved through a paternalistic form of government in which liberty is exercised primarily by the intellectual elite, who requires the majority to submit to their control.

Mill writes in On Liberty that “all [the strong man of genius] can claim is, freedom to point out the way,” but Graeme Duncan says that despite all Mill’s talk about the importance of persuasion instead of compulsion, he prescribes a system of government in which these elites rule over the masses and hold the majority of political power. Duncan writes, “The leaders of mankind were not merely to tell the truth and show the way, in the manner of Coleridge’s rational and cultured clerisy, but they were to be over-represented and, if possible, dominant in the institutions of government, through such devices as a limited franchise, plural voting, a second house, a legislative commission and the abolition of pledges.”46 He says that “because of the quality of the people, he prescribed a form of government in which, because of the loading of the electoral and parliamentary system, inequalities are given political expression, and the power of the ordinary citizen is curtailed sharply. The elevating statements about participation, autonomy, living one’s own life and so on, should not blind us to the fact that the actual political recommendations are bleaker and more limited, and fall short of urging what is normally understood by participation in ‘significant political decisions.’”47

Mill wrote in great detail of the evils of a tyrranny of the majority, but he does not seem to see or be bothered by the fact that his own recommendations would create a system in which a small minority would dominate all others. According to John Skorupski, “Mill was always a democrat.  But his criterion of democracy was the good of the people, not the will of the people.”48 For Mill, the theoretical liberty he would afford the masses is contingent upon the “quality” of such people, and is not an inalienable right.

Unsurprisingly, Mill continues to contradict himself – he vacillates between democratic and undemocratic principles, and his views smack of patronization and paternalism as he simultaneously criticises such ways of thinking. Duncan writes that “while Mill did limit democratic principles to accord with the skills and virtues of elites and the ignorance of ordinary men, there were powerful elements in his thought questioning elite dominance – anti-paternalism, the firm utilitarian assumption that each man is the best judgment of his own interests and the specific acceptance of political restrictions on the ruling minority. He made it clear to Bain, in discussing On Liberty, that ‘the notion of an intellectual aristocracy of lumieres while the rest of the world remains in darkness’ fulfilled none of his aspirations, which were ‘to make the many more accessible to all truth by making them more open-minded.’”49 Mill’s defenders claim that his theory is not entirely one of “democratic elitism” because the rulers are well-qualitifed and the ruled “are not passive, inert stuff, but are improving and developing, and their improvement is the main criterion of the success of the political system.”50 But although Mill believes that development for all is a worthy goal, he believes that the role for most of mankind is to defer to those who know better. In Mill’s mind, the submission of the ignorant to the educated “is a proper and voluntary deference, quite distinct from ‘mental slavery’ and from subservience to rulers as such, and compatible with wide popular liberty and individuality.”51 Mill believes that this would create “a fruitful and productive relationship, in conditions of intellectual freedom, between the morally and intellectually advanced members of the community, and the ordinary people. Everybody could not develop to the same degree, exercise the same powers and undertake the same responsibilities, but each should be encouraged and aided to develop to the pitch of which he was capable.”52

Mill believes that “most men [are] incapable of freeing themselves from the trammels of custom and tradition, of separating themselves from their personal and class interests, and of mastering the technical complexities of politics,” and so he believes that they cannot be trusted to make informed judgments of value. In the absence of their self-development, “[competent judges’] preferences provide the best indicators of value of different kinds of happiness.”53 *** explains this by ***** “the test is the preferences of agents who are in the best position to know.”54 But choosing these “competent judges” and allowing them to make decisions for others presents multiple problems. Firstly, this cohort of distinctly superior beings must be entirely devoid of the weaknesses that plague the majority of men. While most are “incapable of freeing themselves from the trammels of custom and tradition, [and] of separating themselves from their personal and class interests,” Mill brashly asserts that his group of superior persons is ”free from sinister – or mean and partial – interest.”55 He claims that these men are “learned, impartial, moderate, concerned with the good for the whole, and loving virtue for its own sake,” and that because they possess such wonderful characteristics they should be allowed to rule over their lesser peers.56

It is unclear how this group would manage to escape the mediocrity of mankind, but even if such a group existed, how could these chosen few come to a consensus amongst themselves and then make decisions as to what is best on the behalf of the rest? According to Mill, each individual of mankind is entirely different from all others, and “the same things which are helps to one person toward the cultivation of his higher nature are hindrances to another.”57 Mill repeatedly stresses the importance of self-autonomy in On Liberty, but the idea of competent and incompetent judges goes against this principle. The majority is given little say in deciding how they should be “developed” and instead are expected to voluntarily submit “to their own natural leaders in the path of progress.”58 In this way, “the traditional liberal view of each man as his own guide and authority thereby collapses on the ordinary man’s incapacity.”59

The crippling difficulty that plagues any attempt to achieve Mill’s goal of societal development in the society which Mill himself has described is that, in addition to violating the principles that Mill championed in On Liberty and Utilitarianism, the paternalistic government that would be required to compel the masses to cooperate would curtail the self-development of these people. Mill himself knew that “even a good despotism – an enlightened one . . . would not be an ideal government” because “it would leave the people mentally passive. If it attempted to educate the people, it would end by undermining itself, for ‘any education which aims at making human beings other than machines, in the long run makes them claim to have the control of their own actions.’”60 Unfortunately, Mill finds no other means of affecting the tolerance and intellectual culture that he deems so critical to mankind’s advancement. Mill believes that the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty,” yet he is far more concerned about the freedom of the intellectual and cultural elite than the right for the majority to make their own decisions.61 Mill recognizes that “the spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement.”62 There is no evident reason why Mill’s mediocre masses would tolerate the eccentricity that irks them so terribly, yet unless they choose to embrace individuality through their own will, they will never become self-developed themselves. Even after limiting the freedoms of the majority and even without proving for societal happiness, Mill’s efforts to achieve self-development of all of mankind cannot overcome the paradox inherent in the conditions Mill has detailed in his works.

Works Cited

Duncan, Graeme Campbell. Marx and Mill: two views of social conflict and social harmony.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Kreider, Samuel Evans. John Stuart Mill: Utility, Liberty and Eudaimonia. Diss. University of

Kansas, Philosophy, 2005. Dissertations & Theses: Full Text. February 2006. Pro Quest.

05 Mar. 2010

4&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

Mazlish, Bruce. James and John Stuart Mill: father and son in the nineteenth century.New

Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1988.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and Other Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Skorupski, John, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Mill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Smith, G. W. John Stuart Mill's social and political thought: critical assessments. London:

Routledge, 1998.

Stegenga, James A. "J. S. Mill's Concept of Liberty and the Principle of Utility." The Journal of

Value Inquiry 7 (1973): 281-89. Conclusion. SpringerLink. 10 Mar. 2010

springerlink.com/content/h63636n3n62w3127>.




1 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty and Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 74.

2 Mill 73, 9.

3 Mill 5, 14.

4 Mill 74.

5 Mill 74.

6 Mill 137.

7 Mill 142.

8 Mill 147.

9 Mill 148.

10 Mill 148.

11 Mill 70.

12 Mill 9.

13 Mill 63, 73.

14 Mazlish, Bruce, James and John Stuart Mill: father and son in the nineteenth century (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Books, 1988) 393.

15 Mill 17.

16 Mill 70.

17 Skorupski 290.

18 Skorupski 271.

19 Skorupski 272, 277.

20 Skorupski 278.

21 Duncan, Graeme Campbell, Marx and Mill: two views of social conflict and social harmony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 258.

22 Duncan 259.

23 Mill 75.

24 Mill 63.

25 Mill 77.

26 Mill 63, 72-73.

27 Mill 74.

28 Mill 72.

29 Stegenga, James A, "J. S. Mill's Concept of Liberty and the Principle of Utility,” The Journal ofValue Inquiry 7 (1973): 281-89 SpringerLink 10 Mar. 2010 springerlink.com/content/h63636n3n62w3127> Conclusion..



30 Stegenga Conclusion.

31 Skorupski 290.

32 Smith 152.

33 Mill On Liberty 4.

34 Mill On Liberty 266.

35 Mill 266-267.

36 Kreider, Samuel Evans, John Stuart Mill: Utility, Liberty and Eudaimonia (Diss. University of Kansas, Philosophy, 2005), Dissertations & Theses: Full Text, February 2006, Pro Quest 05 Mar. 2010 1.

37 Kreider 8.

38 Smith 152.

39 Skorupski 257.

40 Mill 17.

41 Mill 17.

42 Mazlish 391.

43 Mill 66.

44 Mill 66.

45 Mill, 140.

46 Duncan 259.

47 Smith 81.

48 Skorupski 25.

49 Duncan 259.

50 Smith 81.

51 Duncan 261

52 Duncan 259.

53 Mill 274.

54 Skorupski 273.

55 Duncan 260.

56 Duncan 260.

57 Mill 75.

58 Mill 388.

59 Duncan 260.

60 Mazlish 399.

61 Mill 78.

62 Mill 78.


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