Here the acquiring firm acquires a stake in the target but cannot control it. However, a transaction of this kind can give rise to anticompetitive effects under certain conditions, not because the acquirer can control the target or change its incentives, but because it can control its own pricing behaviour having regard to the effect that will have on the target. Thus the authors posit a situation where a firm acquires a 20 % interest in a rival firm that it cannot control. If pre- transaction the acquirer raises its own prices by 10% that may prove unprofitable as the increase in profits may be offset by a greater loss of business to rivals. However, post transaction, if some of that lost business is diverted to a rival in which it has a partial financial interest, the lost business may be regained by the share of profit in the rival. In other words, under certain conditions, an acquiring firm may find that raising its own prices would be profitable if it acquires a passive financial interest in a rival and so it might be incentivised to do so post merger, despite the fact that it would not have found it profitable to do so without the transaction.
 In this sense then the acquisition may be said to be linked to an anticompetitive outcome that is transaction specific and would not have occurred but for the transaction.