Peter singer



Download 47.63 Kb.
Date03.05.2016
Size47.63 Kb.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality1

PETER SINGER
AS I WRITE THIS, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical care. The suffering and death that are occurring there now are not inevitable, not un­avoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Con­stant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions. The decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary deci­sions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situa­tion in any significant way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written to their parliamentary repre­sentatives demanding increased government assis­tance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fists, or done anything else directed toward providing the refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At the government level, no government has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive for more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative pur­poses, Britain’s share of the nonrecoverable development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde proj­ect is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,000. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as highly as it values the lives of the nine million refugees. Australia is another country which, on a per capita basis, is well up in the “aid to Bengal” table. Australia’s aid, however, amounts to less than one-twelfth of the cost of Sydney’s new opera house. The total amount given, from all sources, now stands at about £65,000,000. The estimated cost of keeping the refugees alive for one year is £464,000,000. Most of the refugees have now been in the camps for more than six months. The World Bank has said that India needs a minimum of £300,000,000 in assistance from other coun­tries before the end of the year. It seems obvious that assistance on this scale will not be forthcom­ing. India will be forced to choose between letting the refugees starve or diverting funds from her own development program, which will mean that more of her own people will starve in the future.2

These are the essential facts about the present situation in Bengal. So far as it concerns us here, there is nothing unique about this situation except its magnitude. The Bengal emergency is just the latest and most acute of a series of major emergen­cies in various parts of the world, arising both from natural and from man-made causes. There are also many parts of the world in which people die from malnutrition and lack of food independent of any special emergency. I take Bengal as my example only because it is the present concern, and because the size of the problem has ensured that it has been given adequate publicity. Neither individuals nor governments can claim to be unaware of what is happening there.

What are the moral implications of a situation like this? In what follows, I shall argue that the way people in relatively affluent countries react to a sit­uation like that in Bengal cannot be justified; in­deed, the whole way we look at moral issues—our moral conceptual scheme—needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come to he taken for granted in our society.

In arguing for this conclusion I will not, of course, claim to be morally neutral. I shall, how­ever, try to argue for the moral position that I take, so that anyone who accepts certain assump­tions, to be made explicit, will, I hope, accept my conclusion.


I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. I think most people will agree about this, although one may reach the same view by differ­ent routes. I shall not argue for this view. People can hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and per­haps from some of them it would not follow that death by starvation is in itself bad. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to refute such positions, and so for brevity I will henceforth take this assump­tion as accepted. Those who disagree need read no further.

My next point is this: if it is in our power to pre­vent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. By “with­out sacrificing anything of comparable moral im­portance” I mean without causing anything else comparably had to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This principle seems al­most as uncontroversial as the last one. It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and not to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably impor­tant. I could even, as far as the application of my argument to the Bengal emergency is concerned, qualify the point so as to make it: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from hap­pening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. An application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.

The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed. For the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away. Secondly, the prin­ciple makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do any­thing and cases in which I am just one among mil­lions in the same position.

I do not think I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take proximity and distance into ac­count. The tact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away. If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discrimi­nate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are far away from him). Admittedly, it is possible that we are in a better position to judge what needs to be done to help a person near to us than one far away, and perhaps also to pro­vide the assistance we judge to be necessary. If this were the case, it would be a reason for helping those near to us first. This may once have been a justification for being more concerned with the poor in one’s own town than with the famine vic­tims in India. Unfortunately for those who like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation. From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a “global village” has made an important, though still un­recognized, difference to our moral situation. Ex­pert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block. There would seem, therefore, to be no possible justification for dis­criminating on geographical grounds.

There may be a greater need to defend the sec­ond implication of my principle—that the fact that there are millions of other people in the same po­sition, in respect to the Bengali refugees, as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a situation in which I am the only person who can prevent something very bad from occur­ring. Again, of course, I admit that there is a psy­chological difference between the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, who have also done noth­ing. Yet this can make no real difference to our moral obligations.3 Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing. One has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation. It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils—poverty, overpopulation, pollu­tion—are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved.

The view that numbers do make a difference can be made plausible if stated in this way: if every­one in circumstances like mine gave £5 to the Ben­gal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I any; therefore I have no obligation to give more than £5. Each premise in this argument is true, and the argument looks sound. It may convince us, unless we notice that it is based on a hypothetical premise, although the conclusion is not stated hy­pothetically. The argument would be sound if the conclusion were: if everyone in circumstances like mine were to give £5, I would have no obligation to give more than £5. If the conclusion were so stated, however, it would be obvious that the ar­gument has no bearing on a situation in which it is not the case that everyone else gives £5. This, of course, is the actual situation. It is more or less cer­tain that not everyone in circumstances like mine will give £5. So there will not be enough to pro­vide the needed food, shelter, and medical care. Therefore by giving more than £5 I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just £5.

It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substan­tial amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one’s dependents—per­haps even beyond this point to the point of mar­ginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one’s dependents as much suf­fering as one would prevent in Bengal. If everyone does this, however, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary. Thus, if everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not be as good as it would be if everyone did a lit­tle less than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they ought to do.

The paradox here arises only if we assume that the actions in question—sending money to the re­lief funds are performed more or less simultane­ously, and are also unexpected. For if it is to be expected that everyone is going to contribute something, then clearly each is not obliged to give as much as he would have been obliged to had others not been giving too. And if everyone is not acting more or less simultaneously, then those giv­ing later will know how much more is needed, and will have no obligation to give more than is neces­sary to reach this amount. To say this is not to deny the principle that people in the same circum­stances have the same obligations, but to point out that the fact that others have given, or may be ex­pected to give, is a relevant circumstance: those giving after it has become known that man\, others are giving and those giving before are not in the same circumstances. So the seemingly absurd con­sequence of the principle I have put forward can occur only if people are in error about the actual circumstances—that is, if they think they are giv­ing when others are not, but in fact they are giving when others are. The result of everyone doing what lie really ought to do cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do, although the result of everyone doing what lie reasonably believes he ought to do could be.

If my argument so far has been sound, neither our distance from a preventable evil nor the num­ber of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we are, lessens our obliga­tion to mitigate or prevent that evil. I shall there­fore take as established the principle I asserted earlier. As I have already said, I need to assert it only in its qualified form: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.

The outcome of this argument is that our tradi­tional moral categories are upset. The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. Giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund is regarded as an act of charity in our society. The bodies which collect money are known as “chari­ties.” These organizations see themselves in this way—if you send them a check, you will be thanked for your “generosity.” Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giv­ing. The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned. People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. (Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them.) This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look “well-dressed” we are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrific­ing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be prevent­ing another person from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians have called “supererogatory”—an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.

I am not maintaining that there are no acts which are charitable, or that there are no acts which it would be good to do but not wrong not to do. It may be possible to redraw the distinction be­tween duty and charity in some other place. All I am arguing here is that the present way of drawing the distinction, which makes it an act of charity for a man living at the level of affluence which most people in the “developed nations” enjoy to give money to save someone else from starvation, can­not be supported. It is beyond the scope of my ar­gument to consider whether the distinction should be redrawn or abolished altogether. There would be many other possible ways of drawing the dis­tinction—for instance, one might decide that it is good to make other people as happy as possible, but not wrong not to do so.

Despite the limited nature of the revision in our moral conceptual scheme which I am proposing, the revision would, given the extent of both afflu­ence and famine in the world today, have radical implications. These implications may lead to fur­ther objections, distinct from those I have already considered. I shall discuss two of these.

One objection to the position I have taken might be simply that it is too drastic a revision of our moral scheme. People do not ordinarily judge in the way I have suggested they should. Most people reserve their moral condemnation for those who violate some moral norm, such as the norm against taking another person’s property. They do not condemn those who indulge in luxury instead of giving to famine relief. But given that I did not set out to present a morally neutral description of the way people make moral judgments, the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion. My conclusion follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, and unless that principle is rejected, or the arguments shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must stand, however strange it appears.

It might, nevertheless, be interesting to consider why our society, and most other societies, do judge differently from the way I have suggested they should. In a well-known article, J. O. Urmson sug­gests that the imperatives of duty, which tell us what we must do, as distinct from what it would be good to do but not wrong not to do, function so as to prohibit behavior that is intolerable if men are to live together in society.4 This may explain the origin and continued existence of the present divi­sion between acts of duty and acts of charity. Moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of society, and no doubt society needs people who will observe the rules that make social existence tolerable. From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent violations of norms against killing, steal­ing, and so on. It is quite inessential, however, to help people outside one’s own society.

If this is an explanation of our common distinc­tion between duty and supererogation, however, it is not a justification of it. The moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society. Previously, as I have already mentioned, this may hardly have been feasible, but it is quite feasible now. From the moral point of view, the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society.

It has been argued by some writers, among them Sidgwick and Urmson, that we need to have a basic moral code which is not too far beyond the capacities of the ordinary man, for otherwise there will be a general breakdown of compliance with the moral code. Crudely stated, this argument sug­gests that if we tell people that they ought to re­frain from murder and give everything they do not really need to famine relief, they will do neither, whereas if we tell them that they ought to refrain from murder and that it is good to give to famine relief but not wrong not to do so, they will at least refrain from murder. The issue here is: Where should we draw the line between conduct that is required and conduct that is good although not required, so as to get the best possible result: This would seem to be an empirical question, al­though a very difficult one. One objection to the Sidgwick-Urmson line of argument is that it takes insufficient account of the effect that moral stan­dards can have on the decisions we make. Given a society in which a wealthy man who gives five per­cent of his income to famine relief is regarded as most generous, it is not surprising that a proposal that we all ought to give away half our incomes will be thought to be absurdly unrealistic. In a society which held that no man should have more than enough while others have less than they need, such a proposal might seem narrow-minded. What it is possible for a man to do and what he is likely to do are both, I think, very greatly influenced by what people around him are doing and expecting him to do. In any case, the possibility that by spreading the idea that we ought to be doing very much more than we are to relieve famine we shall bring about a general breakdown of moral behavior seems remote. If the stakes are an end to wide­spread starvation, it is worth the risk. Finally, it should be emphasized that these considerations are relevant only to the issue of what we should re­quire from others, and not to what we ourselves ought to do.

The second objection to my attack on the pres­ent distinction between duty and charity is one which has from time to time been made against utilitarianism. It follows from some forms of utili­tarian theory that we all ought, morally, to be working full time to increase the balance of happi­ness over misery. The position I have taken here would not lead to this conclusion in all circum­stances, for if there were no bad occurrences that we could prevent without sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, my argument would have no application. Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, however, it does fol­low from my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters. Of course, mitigating circumstances can be adduced—for instance, that if we wear ourselves out through overwork, we shall be less effective than we would otherwise have been. Nevertheless, when all considerations of this sort have been taken into account, the conclusion remains: we ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of compara­ble moral importance. This conclusion is one which we may be reluctant to face. I cannot see, though, why it should be regarded as a criticism of the position for which I have argued, rather than a criticism of our ordinary standards of behavior. Since most people are self-interested to some de­gree, very few of us are likely to do everything that we ought to do. It would, however, hardly be hon­est to take this as evidence that it is not the case that we ought to do it.

It may still be thought that my conclusions are so wildly out of line with what everyone else thinks and has always thought that there must be some­thing wrong with the argument somewhere. In order to show that my conclusions, while certainly contrary to contemporary Western moral stan­dards, would not have seemed so extraordinary at other times and in other places, I would like to quote a passage from a writer not normally thought of as a way-out radical, Thomas Aquinas.


Now, according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, material goods are provided for the satisfaction of human needs. Therefore the division and appropriation of property, which proceeds from human law, must not hinder the satisfaction of man’s necessity from such goods. Equally, whatever a man has in super-abundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance. So Ambrosius says, and it is also to be found in the Decreturn Gratiani: “The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption and freedom of the penniless.”5
I now want to consider a number of points, more practical than philosophical, which are rele­vant to the application of the moral conclusion we have reached. These points challenge not the idea that we ought to be doing all we can to prevent starvation, but the idea that giving away a great deal of money is the best means to this end.

It is sometimes said that overseas aid should be a government responsibility, and that therefore one ought not to give to privately run charities. Giving privately, it is said, allows the government and the noncontributing members of society to es­cape their responsibilities.

This argument seems to assume that the more people there are who give to privately organized famine relief funds, the less likely it is that the gov­ernment will take over full responsibility for such aid. This assumption is unsupported, and does not strike me as at all plausible. The opposite view­that if no one gives voluntarily, a government will assume that its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would not wish to be forced into giving aid—seems more plausible. In any case, unless there were a definite probability that by refusing to give one would be helping to bring about mas­sive government assistance, people who do refuse to make voluntary contributions are refusing to prevent a certain amount of suffering without being able to point to any tangible beneficial con­sequence of their refusal. So the onus of showing how their refusal will bring about government ac­tion is on those who refuse to give.

I do not, of course, want to dispute the con­tention that governments of affluent nations should be giving many times the amount of genuine, no­strings-attached aid that they are giving now. I agree, too, that giving privately is not enough, and that we ought to be campaigning actively for entirely new standards for both public and private contributions to famine relief. Indeed, I would sym­pathize with someone who thought that cam­paigning was more important than giving oneself, although I doubt whether preaching what one does not practice would be very effective. Unfortunately, for many people the idea that “it’s the government’s responsibility” is a reason for not giving which does not appear to entail any political action either.

Another, more serious reason for not giving to famine relief funds is that until there is effective population control, relieving famine merely post­pones starvation. If we save the Bengal refugees now, others, perhaps the children of these re­fugees, will face starvation in a few years’ time. In support of this, one may cite the now well-known facts about the population explosion and the relatively limited scope for expanded production.

This point, like the previous one, is an argu­ment against relieving suffering that is happening now, because of a belief about what might happen in the future; it is unlike the previous point in that very good evidence can be adduced in support of this belief abut the future. I will not go into the evidence here. I accept that the earth cannot sup­port indefinitely a population rising at the present rate. This certainly poses a problem for anyone who thinks it important to prevent famine. Again, however, one could accept the argument without drawing the conclusion that it absolves one from any obligation to do anything to prevent famine. The conclusion that should be drawn is that the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is population control. It would then follow from the position reached earlier that one ought to be doing all one can to promote population control (unless one held that all forms of population con­trol were wrong in themselves, or would have sig­nificantly bad consequences). Since there are organizations working specifically for population control, one would then support them rather than more orthodox methods of preventing famine.

A third point raised by the conclusion reached earlier relates to the question of just how much we all ought to be giving away. One possibility, which has already been mentioned, is that we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility—­that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my depen­dents as I would relieve by my gift. This would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to very nearly the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee. It will be recalled that earlier I put for­ward both a strong and a moderate version of the principle of preventing bad occurrences. The strong version, which required us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, does seem to require reducing ourselves to the level of marginal utility. I should also say that the strong version seems to me to be the correct one. I proposed the more moderate version—that we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something morally significant—only in order to show that even on this surely undeniable principle a great change in our way of life is required. On the more moderate principle, it may not follow that we ought to reduce ourselves to the level of marginal utility, for one might hold that to reduce oneself and one’s family to this level is to cause something significantly bad to happen. Whether this is so I shall not discuss, since, as I have said, I can see no good reason for holding the moderate version of the principle rather than the strong version. Even if we accepted the principle only in its moderate form, however, it should be clear that we would have to give away enough to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as it is on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely. There are several reasons why this would be desir­able in itself. The value and necessity of economic growth are now being questioned not only by con­servationists, but by economists as well.6 There is no doubt, too, that the consumer society has had a distorting effect on the goals and purposes of its members. Yet looking at the matter purely from the point of view of overseas aid, there must be a limit to the extent to which we should deliberately slow down our economy; for it might be the case that if we gave away, say, forty percent of our Gross National Product, we would slow down the economy so much that in absolute terms we would be giving less than if we gave twenty-five per­cent of the much larger GNP that we would have if we limited our contribution to this smaller percentage.

I mention this only as an indication of the sort of factor that one would have to take into account in working out an ideal. Since Western societies generally consider one percent of the GNP an ac­ceptable level for overseas aid, the matter is entirely academic. Nor does it affect the question of how much an individual should give in a society in which very few are giving substantial amounts.

It is sometimes said, though less often now than it used to be, that philosophers have no special role to play in public affairs, since most public issues depend primarily on an assessment of facts. On questions of fact, it is said, philosophers as such have no special expertise, and so it has been possi­ble to engage in philosophy without committing oneself to any position on major public issues. No doubt there are some issues of social policy and foreign policy about which it can truly be said that a really expert assessment of the facts is required before taking sides or acting, but the issue of famine is surely not one of these. The facts about the existence of suffering are beyond dispute. Nor, I think, is it disputed that we can do something about it, either through orthodox methods of famine relief or through population control or both. This is therefore an issue on Which philoso­phers are competent to take a position. The issue is one which faces everyone who has more money than he needs to support himself and his depen­dents, or who is in a position to take some sort of political action. These categories must include practically every teacher and student of philosophy in the universities of the Western world. If philos­ophy is to deal with matters that are relevant to both teachers and students, this is an issue that philosophers should discuss.

Discussion, though, is not enough. What is the point of relating philosophy to public (and per­sonal) affairs if we do not take our conclusions se­riously? In this instance, taking our conclusion seriously means acting upon it. The philosopher will not find it any easier than anyone else to alter his attitudes and way of life to the extent that, if I am right, is involved in doing everything that we ought to be doing. At the very least, though, one can make a start. The philosopher who does so will have to sacrifice some of the benefits of the con­sumer society, but he can find compensation in the satisfaction of a way of life in which theory and practice, if not yet in harmony, are at least coming together.



1 Peter Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243. Copyright© 1972 by Princeton University Press.

2 There was also a third possibility: that India would go to war to enable the refugees to return to their lands. Since I wrote this paper, India has taken this way out. The situation is no longer that described above, but this does not affect my argument, as the next paragraph indicates.

3 In view of the special sense philosophers often give to the term, I should say that I use "obligation" simply as the abstract noun derived from "ought," so that "I have an obligation to" means no more, and no less, than "I ought to." This usage is in accordance with the definition of "ought" given by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: "the general verb to ex­press duty or obligation." I do not think any issue of substance hangs on the way the term is used; sen­tences in which I use "obligation" could all be rewrit­ten, although somewhat clumsily, as sentences in which a clause containing "ought" replaces the term "obligation."

4 J. O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes," in Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Abraham I. Melden (Seattle and London, 1958), p. 214 (included in this anthol­ogy, pp. 541-548). For a related but significantly dif­ferent view see also Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London, 1907), pp. 220-221, 492-493.

5 Summa Theologica, II-II, Question 66, Article 7, in Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, ed. A. P.

d'Entreves, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1948), p. 171.



6 See, for instance, John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston, 1967); and E. J. Mis­hap, The Costs of Economic Growth (London, 1967).



Share with your friends:




The database is protected by copyright ©essaydocs.org 2020
send message

    Main page