Sharansky, Israel’s Minister for Jerusalem and Diaspora Affair, 2004,
(Nathan, The Case for Democracy, p. 88
Now we can see why nondemocratic regimes imperil the security of the world.They stay in power by controlling their populations. This control invariably requires an increasing amount of repression. To justify this repression and maintain internal stability, external enemies must be manufactured. The result is that while the mechanics of democracy make democracies inherently peaceful, the mechanics of tyranny make nondemocracies inherently beliligerent. Indeed, in order to avoid collapsing from within, fear societies must maintain a perpetual state of conflict. Nondemocratic societies have always been powder kegs ready to explode, but today the force of that explosion can be far more lethal than it was in the past. In an age of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, the dangers of ignoring the absence of democracy in any part of the world have increased dramatically. For a half century, the totalitarian regime in Pyongyang has threatened the security of South Korea. Once it developed long-range missiles, it threatened the security of neighboring Japan and endangered other countries with the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Now that Pyongyang has reportedly developed nuclear weapons— weapons that can be provided to international terrorist organizations—it endangers the security of the entire world. The threat posed by North Korea is not a function of the increase of the destructive capacity of its weapons. Rather, it is the enhanced capacity of its weapons coupled with the nature of its regime that is the source of the problem. Just as nuclear weapons in the hands of a democratizing Russia do not pose the same threat as they did in the hands of the Soviet Union, the weapons of a democratic North Korea would pose no greater danger to the world than if they would be in the hands of a democratic South Korea. In the hands of leaders whose power is dependent on people who see war as a last resort, weapons of mass destruction will be a weapon of last resort. But in the hands of leaders whose survival depends on maintaining a constant state of tension, the danger of these weapons being used directly, or via terrorist proxies, increases enormously. That is not to say that nondemocratic regimes will never sign peace agreements. From time to time, if it suits their interests, they will. But we must remember that for these regimes, the decision to wage war or make peace is not based upon its impact on the public welfare but on whether it strengthens the regime’s control. To democratic governments, whose power is ultimately dependent on the popular will, peace is always an interest. To nondemocratic regimes, peace and war are merely interchangeable methods of subjugation. One day staying in power will necessitate making peace. The next, it will necessitate waging war. That is why a genuine and lasting peace can only be made with democracies.
1AC – Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should limit the scope of its domestic surveillance under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to communications whose sender or recipient is a valid intelligence target and whose targets pose a tangible threat to national security.
1AC – Solvency
Our plan solves, limiting the purposes of 702 collection is critical to solve over collection.
Sinha, Fellow at Human Rights Watch, 2014
(G. Alex July 2014 “With Liberty to Monitor All How Large-Scale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy” Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/node/127364)
Narrow the purposes for which all foreign intelligence surveillance may be conducted and limit such surveillance to individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security or a comparable state interest.
o Among other steps, Congress should pass legislation amending Section 702 of FISA and related surveillance authorities to narrow the scope of what can be acquired as “foreign intelligence information,” which is now defined broadly to encompass, among other things, information related to “the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” It should be restricted to what is necessary and proportionate to protect legitimate aims identified in the ICCPR, such as national security. In practice, this should mean that the government may acquire information only from individuals, groups, or entities who pose a tangible threat to national security narrowly defined, or a comparable compelling state interest.
And, limiting the scope of the Section 702 authority is critical to solve overcollection of American communications.
Laperruque, Fellow on Privacy, Surveillance, and Security at Center for Democracy and Technology, 2014, (Jake, "Why Average Internet Users Should Demand Significant Section 702 Reform," Center For Democracy & Technology., 7-22-2014, https://cdt.org/blog/why-average-internet-users-should-demand-significant-section-702-reform/
Where Do We Go From Here?
There are sensible reforms that can significant limit the collateral damage to privacy caused by Section 702 without impeding national security.Limiting the purposes for which Section 702 can be conducted will narrow the degree to which communications are monitored between individuals not suspected of wrongdoing or connected to national security threats. Closing retention loopholes present in the Minimization Guidelines governing that surveillance will ensure that when Americans’ communications are incidentally collected, they are not kept absent national security needs. And closing the backdoor search loophole would ensure that when Americans’ communications are retained because they communicated with a target of Section 702 surveillance, they couldn’t be searched unless the standards for domestic surveillance of the American are met.