Appellant also argues that it was not proper for the trial court to award restitution related to attorney fees Newmar incurred. Appellant contends the award of restitution for the contingency fee was unreasonable as the trial court should have first determined what would be a reasonable fee under the Lodestar method for calculating attorney fees.
We agree with the Attorney General that the Loadstar Method is not the appropriate method to use in this case to determine fees. (See People v. Taylor (2001) 197 Cal.App.4th 757, 763). The Lodestar Method is a fee shifting mechanism applied in certain contexts such as civil litigation which confers a “‘significant benefit’” to the public, or to provide compensation for the enforcement of public rights under a private attorney general theory, or to bring about attorney fee shifting to discourage SLAPP suits. In contrast, victim restitution presents different interests—the “primary purpose of victim restitution is to fully reimburse the victim for his or her economic losses.” (Ibid.)
Even using appellant’s reasoning, the Lodestar Method would still not be appropriate to use here. The Lodestar Method as appellant himself points out is utilized when the statute does not provide otherwise. Here, the statute clearly provides for actual attorneys fees. Here, the actual attorney fee is known and therefore there would be no need to use the Lodestar method.
Appellant also argues that the fees for counsel’s attendance during the hearing were not “costs of collection.” As the Attorney General points out, there was testimony that Newmar hired counsel as a direct result of the First Burglary. Newmar’s attorney advised her and assisted her in locating documents to present to the Court. Accordingly, the trial court was within its purview to award fees to Newmar as these were actual costs for an attorney.