Appellant’s next argument is that the trial court erred in awarding Newmar restitution for the installation of the security system.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(J) provides for restitution of “[e]xpenses to install or increase residential security incurred related to a crime, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5, including, but not limited to, a home security device or system, or replacing or increasing the number of locks.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J).) In addition to arguing that the security system expense was necessarily a result of the Second not the First Burglary, appellant also asserts that the restitution for a security system should not have been granted because appellant’s crime was not a violent felony. Appellant’s arguments lack merit.
Under section 1202.4, an award is not limited to restitution for violent felonies. Where a defendant is convicted of a violent felony, the statute provides the trial court “shall” include in the victim restitution award expenses reasonably incurred by a victim in installing a security system. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(J).) But the statute does not preclude the court from awarding expenses for security systems in other cases as well. In fact, the statute provides a nonexclusive list of items of restitution. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3) [using phrase “including, but not limited to”].) “Because the statute uses the language ‘including, but not limited to’ these enumerated losses, a trial court may compensate a victim for any economic loss which is proved to be the direct result of the defendant’s criminal behavior, even if not specifically enumerated in the statute.” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1046.) Thus, where a victim incurs the economic loss of installing a security system as a direct result of defendant’s conduct, the trial court may include that amount in a victim restitution award regardless of whether the defendant was convicted of a violent felony.
Newmar testified that the security system was installed8 as a result of appellant’s commission of burglary. Newmar’s testimony is sufficient in this case to establish that the security system was installed as a result of the First Burglary. Therefore, the restitution award for the security system was not improper.