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Litany of thumpers to the international order

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Litany of thumpers to the international order.

Murphy ‘20 [Chris; June 12; United States Senator for Connecticut and member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Foreign Affairs, “A New Civil Rights Movement Is a Foreign Policy Win,”; RP]
These days, of course, the world didn’t really need any new reasons to feel queasy about the United States. President Trump’s attacks on traditional allies, disinterest in human rights and democracy promotion, and generally boorish behavior have already put the country’s global reputation on a path of steady decline. Last year, the Pew Research Center reported that in many parts of the globe, approval of the United States was at an all-time low. The Trump administration’s bungled response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has left over 110,000 Americans dead, surely did not reverse this trend.

The liberal order is resilient.

Ikenberry 18 G. John Ikenberry, International Relations Professor at Princeton. [Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive, Roundtable: Rising Powers and the International Order, Ethics & Affairs, 32(1), p. 17–29]//BPS
Self-Reinforcing Characteristics of Liberal International Order The United States has dominated the post-war international order. It is an order built on asymmetries of power; it is hierarchical. But it is not an imperial system. It is a complex and multilayered political formation with liberal characteristics— openness and rules-based principles—that generate incentives and opportunities for other states to join and operate within it. Four characteristics reinforce and draw states into the order. First, it has integrative tendencies. Over the last century states with diverse characteristics have found pathways into its “ecosystem” of rules and institutions. Germany and Japan found roles and positions of authority in the post-war order; and after the cold war many more states—in Eastern Europe, Asia, and elsewhere—have joined its economic and security partnerships. It is the multilateral logic of the order that makes it relatively easy for states to join and rise up within the order. Second, the liberal order offers opportunities for leadership and shared authority. One state does not “rule” the system. The system is built around institutions, and this provides opportunities for shifting and expanding coalitions of states to share leadership. Formal institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, are led by boards of directors and weighted voting. Informal groups, such as the G-7 and G-20, are built on principles of collective governance. Third, the actual economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely shared. In colonial and informal imperial systems, the gains from trade and investment are disproportionately enjoyed by the lead state. In the existing order, the “profits of modernity” are distributed across the system. Indeed, China’s great economic ascent was only possible because the liberal international order rewarded its pursuit of openness and trade-oriented growth. For the same reason, states in all regions of the world have made systematic efforts to integrate into the system. Finally, the liberal international order accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development. In recent decades the Anglo-American model of neoliberalism has been particularly salient. But the post-war system also provides space for other capitalist models, such as those associated with European social democracy and East Asian developmental statism. The global capitalist system might generate some pressures for convergence, but it also provides space for the coexistence of alternative models and ideologies. These aspects of the liberal international order create incentives and opportunities for states to integrate into its core economic and political realms. The order allows states to share in its economic spoils. Its pluralistic character creates possibilities for states to “work the system”—to join in, negotiate, and maneuver in ways that advance their interests. This, in turn, creates an order with expanding constituencies that have a stake in its continuation. Compared to imperial and colonial orders of the past, the existing order is easy to join and hard to overturn.

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