Realism better explains all situations where democracy could be the cause of peace.
Layne 94 (Christopher, Ph.D. in Political Science and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, International Security, The MIT Press, Vol. 19, No. 2, Autumn 1994, p. 38, Jstor)
Proponents have made sweeping theoretical claims for, and have drawn important policy conclusions from, democratic peace theory. These claims rest on a shaky foundation, however. The case studies presented above subject both democratic peace theory and realism to a robust test. It is striking that in each of these four cases realism, not democratic peace theory, provides the more compelling explanation of why war was avoided. Indeed, the democratic peace theory indicators appear not to have played any discernible role in the outcome of these crises. In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war (or, in the case of France in 1923, to use military force coercively) because it believed it had vital strategic or reputational interests at stake. In each of these crises, war was avoided only because one side elected to pull back from the brink. In each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the "live and let live" spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory's core, but because of realist factors. Adverse distributions of military capabilities explain why France did not fight over Fashoda, and why Germany resisted the French occupation of the Ruhr passively rather than forcibly. Concerns that others would take advantage of the fight (the "waterbirds dilemma") explain why Britain backed down in the Venezuela crisis, and the Union submitted to Britain's ultimatum in the Trent affair. When one actually looks beyond the result of these four crises ("democracies do not fight democracies") and attempts to understand why these crises turned out as they did, it becomes clear that democratic peace theory's causal logic has only minimal explanatory power.
A2 DPT – Statistics
The sample of POSSIBLE wars is small. Thus each instance of democratic war is significant.
Layne 94 (Christopher, Ph.D. in Political Science and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, International Security, The MIT Press, Vol. 19, No. 2, Autumn 1994, p. 39, Jstor)
Democratic peace theory purports to be validated by a large number ("N") of cases.A large N is achieved by aggregating the number of possible democratic dyads. Thus Switzerland and Sweden, or Austria and Israel, count as democratic dyads validating democratic peace theory. The result is the appearance of a large number of interactions with little or no conflict between democracies. Notwithstanding the theory's claim, however, the universe of supporting cases is small. There are three reasons why this is so. First, between 1815 and 1945 there were very few democracies (and the N would shrink further if only dyads involving democratic great powers are considered). Second, the possibility of anydyad (whether democratic, mixed, or non-democratic) becoming involved in a war is small, because wars are a relatively rare occurrence. States, even great powers, do not spend most of their time at war. 117 As David Spiro points out, if all nations are unlikely to fight wars, the claim that democracies do not fight each other loses much of its power. He states that if nations are rarely at war, and liberal dyads are a small proportion of all possible pairings of nation-states, then perhaps we should be surprised if democracies ever do go to war, but not at the absence of wars among democracies.118 Third, not all dyads are created equal. For the purposes of testing democratic peace theory, a dyad is significant only if it represents a case where there is a real possibility of two states going to war. To fight, states need both the opportunity (that is, the ability to actually project their power to reach an opponent) and a reason to do so. Only dyads meeting these preconditions are part of the appropriate universe of cases from which democratic peace theory can be tested.
Bad – Public Opinion
Public pressure increases democratic belligerence. Global democratization increases hyper-nationalism and conflict.
Chan 97 (Steve, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997), Blackwell Publishing , pp. 75-76, Jstor)
Extant research offers different degrees of support for Kant's three causal hypotheses, subjecting them to important qualifications. Russett (1990) has summarized the influence of public opinion in shaping the foreign policies of democracies. Although this influence cannot be denied, public opinion is usually quite "permissive" and often only reacts to policies (Hughes 1978). Its tendency to under- or overreact led Walter Lippman to remark that in their foreign affairs, democracies are likely "to be too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacific in peace and too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing or too transparent"(quoted in S0rensen 1993:96). This characterization is especially apt in describing democracies' relations with nondemocracies. Public opinion in democracies can be quite belligerent toward nondemocracies and even, at times, toward fellow democracies (see, for example, Ray 1995:193). Regarding other democracies, public opinion seems to exercise an effective restraint only against the outright application of open and massive military violence because established democracies have been known to undertake covert subversions and armed interventions against their peers (Forsythe 1992; Joyner 1992; Russett 1993a; Stedman 1993; Rosas 1994; Cohen 1995; Kegley and Hermann 1995a). The influence public opinion has on policymaking also varies considerably among the established democracies. It is quite dependent on each country's institutional arrangements, with some governments-like that in the United States-being rather open to its influence and other governments-like that in France-being insulated from its effect (Risse-Kappen 1991). In several recent democracies in Eastern Europe, public opinion has reflected racial demagoguery, ethnic mobilization, and hypernationalism. Similarly, religious fundamentalism has enjoyed significant mass support in the Middle East, where liberalism, populism, and electoral accountability do not necessarily coincide. In the context of two-level games (Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993), democratization can reduce the bargaining space for international negotiators faced with the problem of domestic ratification. Greater public influence may hinder rather than promote international agreements. One recent study (Kozhemiakin 1994) has found that its more assertive public impeded Ukraine's compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime whereas, unconstrained by popular sentiment, authoritarian Kazakhstan was able to be more responsive to this regime. Another case study (Lehman and McCoy 1992), focusing on Brazil's debt problems, concluded that under conditions of severe internal constraints, fragile democracies may be more prone to engage in diplomatic brinkmanship and risk the collapse of international negotiations than their authoritarian counterparts- who are probably both more willing and more able to impose internationally dictated concessions on their domestic constituents.