Democratic states don’t go to war – public opinion, international commerce, and political ties
Chan 97 (Steve, Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise”, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (May, 1997), Blackwell Publishing , pp. 74-75, Jstor)
Kant pointed to three factors that could promote peace among republics. (These factors encompass several aspects of the structural and normative explanations that will be discussed below.) First, public opinion constitutes a powerful force against belligerence. As Kant (1957 :12-13) observed, "if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared. . . nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war." Second, a spirit of commerce contributes to peace. Being more developed economically and more active in foreign trade,democracies especially stand to benefit from international commerce andareself-deterred from fighting wars against one another because of the prospective losses that could result from disrupted trade. Dense networks of commercial ties lead to interaction that over time produces the norms of mutual responsiveness and reciprocal adjustment. Through internationalcommerce, Kant (1957 :28) believed, "a peaceful traffic among nations was established, and thus understanding, conventions, and peaceable relations were established among the most distant peoples." Third, the creation of a pacific union among democracies restrains war among them. Democracies' shared values and common institutions provide the political foundation for a league of peace in which, over time, norms of reciprocity and expectations concerning a preference for nonviolent procedures develop to regulate interaction. A more contemporary formulation (Deutsch et al. 1957) refers to this integrative process as the formation of a security community in which the idea of resorting to arms as a way of settling disputes becomes unthinkable. Kant (1983 :117) argued that a league of peace would "eventually include all nations and thus lead to perpetual peace ..." because once a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic (which by its nature must be inclined to seek perpetual peace), it will provide a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to guarantee a state of peace among nations that is in accord with the idea of the right of nations, and through several associations of this sort such a federation can extend further and further.
A2 DPT – Empirically Denied
Democracies go to war – Civil War and World War I prove. And small sample size means each exception matters.
Layne 94 (Christopher, Ph.D. in Political Science and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, International Security, The MIT Press, Vol. 19, No. 2, Autumn 1994, pp. 40-44, Jstor)
WARS BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES: BIG EXCEPTIONS IN A SMALL-N WORLD. The size of the N is an important question. If the effective universe of cases from which democratic peace theory can be tested is a small N, the importance of exceptions to the rule that democracies do not fight each other is heightened. Here, by their own admissions, democratic peace theorists are on thin ice. For example, referring specifically to the classification of the War of 1812 as one not involving two democracies, Bruce Russett acknowledges that this decision "may seem like a cheap and arbitrary escape" but asserts it is not.119 It is only intellectual suppleness-the continual tinkering with definitions and categories-that allows democratic peace theorists to deny that democratic states have fought each other.120 An important example of this is the War Between the States, which the democratic peace theorists generally rule out on the grounds that it was an internal conflict within a state rather an international conflict between sovereign states.121 Yet the events of 1861-65 seem especially relevant because the theory is based explicitly on the premise that the norms and culture that operate within democracies are externalized by them in their relations with other democratic states.122 Democratic peace theory itself makes relevant the issue of whether democratic norms and culture do, in fact, result in the peaceful resolution of disputes within democracies. The War Between the States cuts to the heart of the democratic peace theory's causal logic: if democratic norms and culture fail to prevent the outbreak of civil war within democracies, what reason is there to believe that they will prevent the outbreak of interstate wars between democracies? In the case of the Union and the Confederacy, the characteristics at the heart of democratic peace theory-the democratic ethos of respect for other democracies, a political culture that emphasizes the non-violent dispute resolution, the shared benefits of cooperation, the restraining effect of open debate and public opinion-failed conspicuously to assure a peaceful result. Indeed, if a democracy as tightly knit-politically, economically, culturally as the United States was in 1861 could split into two warring successor states, we should have little confidence that democracy will prevent great power conflicts in an anarchic, competitive, self-help realm like international politics. An even more important example is the issue of whether Wilhelmine Germany was a democracy. Even if World War I were the only example of democracies fighting each other, it would be so glaring an exception to democratic peace theory as to render it invalid. As even Michael Doyle concedes, the question of whether Wilhelmine Germany was a democracy presents a "difficult case."1123 Indeed, it is such a difficult case that, in a footnote, Doyle creates a new category in which to classify Wilhelmine Germany- that of a bifurcated democracy: pre-1914 Germany was, he says, democratic with respect to domestic politics but not in the realm of foreign policy.124 Doyle does not consider Imperial Germany to have been a democracy for foreign policy purposes because the executive was not responsible to the Reichstag and, consequently, the foreign policy making process remained, he argues, autocratic. In fact, however, with respect to foreign policy, Wilhelmine Germany was as democratic as France and Britain. In all three countries, aristocratic or upper-middle-class birth and independent wealth were prerequisites for service in the diplomatic corps and the key political staffs of the foreign office.125 In all three countries, foreign policy was insulated from parliamentary control and criticism because of the prevailing view that external affairs were above politics. In democratic France, the Foreign Minister enjoyed virtual autonomy from the legislature, and even from other members of the cabinet.126 As Christopher Andrew notes, "On the rare occasions when a minister sought to raise a question of foreign policy during a cabinet meeting, he was accustomed to the remark: 'Don't let us concern ourselves with that, gentlemen, it is the business of the foreign minister and the President of the Republic.'''127 Treaties and similar arrangements were ratified by the president of the Republic (that is, by the cabinet) and the legislature played no role in the treaty making process (although the Senate did have the right to ask to be informed of treaty terms insofar as national security permitted).128 Notwithstanding the formal principle of ministerial responsibility, the French legislature possessed no mechanisms for effectively supervising or reviewing the government's conduct of foreign policy. 129 Even in democratic France, the executive enjoyed unfettered power in the realm of foreign policy. This concentration of foreign policy-making power in the executive had a profound effect on the chain of events leading to World War I. The terms of the Franco-Russian alliance and military convention-the "fateful alliance" that ensured that an Austro-Russian war in the Balkans could not remain localized-were kept secret from the French legislature, public, and press.130 In democratic Britain, too, as in France and Germany, crucial foreign policy decisions were taken without consulting Parliament. Notwithstanding the profound implications of the Anglo-French staff talks, which began in January 1906, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and Prime Minister H.H. Asquith did not inform the Cabinet of their existence.131 Grey and Asquith feared (and rightly so) that a Cabinet majority would oppose the staff talks and indeed the very idea of more intimate Anglo-French strategic relations. When questioned in Parliament in 1910, 1911, and 1913 about the Anglo- French military discussions, Grey and Asquith consistently gave false or evasive answers that kept hidden both the nature and the implications of the strategic agreements between London and Paris.132 Even when Grey and Asquith had to account to the Cabinet, after it learned in November 1911 of the existence of staff talks, they left their colleagues with the incorrect impression that London had undertaken no binding obligations to France.133 Notwithstanding Grey's and Asquith's constant reiteration (to the French, to Cabinet, and to Parliament) that London retained unimpaired freedom of maneuver, they had, in fact, undertaken a portentous commitment through a constitutionally doubtful process. In the Cabinet's debates about whether Britain should go to war in August 1914, Grey's argument that the Entente, and the concomitant military and naval agreements, had morally obligated Britain to support France proved decisive.134 It is apparent that before World War I, the most important and consequential grand strategic decisions made by both Paris (on the Russian alliance) and London (on the entente and military arrangements with France) were made without any legislative control or oversight, notwithstanding both countries' democratic credentials. Form should not be confused with substance. In the realm of foreign policy, France and Britain were no more and no less democratic than the Second Reich.135 The case of Wilhelmine Germany suggests that democratic great powers indeed have gone to war against one another (and could do so again in the future). Yet the prevailing view that the Second Reich was not a democracy has powerfully influenced the international relations-theory debate both on the broad question of how domestic political structure affects international outcomes and the specific issue of whether there is a "democratic peace." However, the received wisdom about pre-World War I Germany has been badly distorted by a combination of factors: the liberal bias of most Anglo- American accounts of German history between 1860-1914; the ideologically tinged nature of post-1960 German studies of the Wilhelmine era; and the residual effects of Allied propaganda in World War I, which demonized Germany.136 The question of whether Wilhelmine Germany should be classified as a democracy is an important one and it deserves to be studied afresh.