NATO is dead. Total collapse is impossible but hollowing is inevitable.
AP 2010 (Associated Press, Washington Times, US, Europe Rethink Role of Cold War Alliance http://www.hindustantimes.com/US-Europe-rethink-role-of-Cold-War-alliance/Article1-533976.aspx)
US relationswith Europe have deteriorated in recent years, in part due to opposition inside the alliance to the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. One of Obama's main foreign policy goals upon entering the White House was to repair ties with Europe while "resetting" relations with Russia, which regards NATO expansion as a threat to its influence in the former Soviet Union. There is no serious talk inside NATO of dismantling the alliance but, as analyst Stephen Flanagan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies put it in an interview, "Some are questioning what it's for." The original purpose was framed in purely defensive terms: to protect Western Europe from a potential land invasion by the USSR.Today there is no USSR, and no credible military threat to NATO as a whole. But the Russia-Georgia war served as a reminder to other former Soviet republics that are now NATO members, such as like the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, that their neighborhood remains dangerous. NATO's Western European members, including Germany, are more likely to view Russia as a major trading partner and a source of natural gas and oil. Central and eastern European members of the alliance view Russia more uneasily because of Moscow's history as an imperial power. The new members of the NATO club tend to see the alliance's nuclear arsenal as a counterbalance to Russia's military might. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the NATO secretary general, thinks the organization should work more closely with other military alliances far beyond Europe's borders, to include rising powers China and India. He says the Afghan war experience has shown the need for such global linkages. "But some fear NATO stretching itself too thin," he told a University of Chicago audience on April 8. "Others are afraid that NATO wants to rival the U.N. For these reasons among others, there is hesitation about NATO engaging more systematically with countries like India or China." NATO Alliance is in decline- cant overcome difficulties in Afghanistan and growing tensions between the allies
Stacey 09 (Dr. Jeffrey- Professor of the Political Science Department at Tulane University, “Explaining a Fraught Relationship: The United States, NATO, and the European Union”, IGIS Research Seminar Series at George Washington University, November 5, http://www.gwu.edu/~igis/assets/docs/Stacey_Paper.pdf)
The triangular relations between the US, EU, and NATO zre fraught. Formal US commitments to NATO are preventing constructive cooperation between the US and EU that appears to be in their mutual interest. While this scenario has begun to change on the ground, and the old hard lines of alliance commitments are beginning to soften in practice, the much vaunted and long standing Atlantic Alliance is certifiably unstable and may not be able to withstandthe centrifugal pressures currently arrayed against it. What explains this paradox? This paper seeks to identify the causes of a fairly suprising set of circumstances an outcome so thoroughly undesired by policymakers they are at present seeking means of transforming it. The NATO alliance has been significantly hampered by difficulties experienced in the Afghan theater, as relations between the US and European allies that grew severely strained under the Bush administration have hardly dissipated with the transition to the current administration.The unwillingness of European allies- who together comprise the core Member States of the EU- to make sufficient troop contributions to ISAF has rankled American leadership past and present. Eight years in the running, the War in Afghanistan continues to suffer from troop shortages in the field and perceived imbalances among the major contributing countries. Indeed, relations among NATO allies are not improving as the Obama Administration finds itself between Scylla and Charydbis in Afghanistan: without additional troop commitments from European allies, the US must choose between the incapacity of current forces to clear and hold outlying areas and the political pitfalls of larger body counts and fiscal deficits. Though NATO is on the record as an alliance in agreement to deploy a larger ISAF force by early 2010, only the UK is sending additional forces to the region. Germany, Netherlands, and Spain are in fact considering scaling back their current troop allotments, and the UK figure involves fewer than 500 additional pairs of boots on the ground. A marquee exhibit of NATO’s current state of instability is the alliance’s Comprehensive Approach. Stemming from the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO has formally committed itself to a widened array of foreign policy tools for stabilizing and reconstructing conflict affected states- ranging from the hard tools of kinetic warfare across the spectrum to the soft tools of long term development and everything in-between. The term “comprehensive connotes a horizontal concept that goes from soup to nuts, applying the complete foreign policy toolbox in an attempt to transform war zones into fully functioning states.
Good – Democratic Peace
Democracies don’t go to war . They only fight to win which checks aggression by and against them.
Bueno de Mequista et al 99 (Bruce, Senior Fellow – Hoover Institution, Stanford University; James D. Morrow, Senior Research Fellow – Hoover Institution, Stanford University; Randolph Siverson, Professor of Political Science – University of California; Alastair Smith, Assistant Professor of Political Science – Yale University; “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace”, The American Political Science Review, American Political Science Association, Vol. 93, No. 4, Dec. 1999, p. 804, Jstor)
In our simple model, leaders areassumed to be moti-vated by a desire to keep their job. They allocate resources toward the pursuit of public policies that benefit all citizens and toward private goods that benefit only their key supporters. When a member of the winning coalition defects from the incumbent lead-ership, the defector puts her access to private goods at risk. That risk is assumed to increase as the selectorate increases in size and to decrease as the winning coali-tion increases in size. The institutional arrangements of political systems influence the incentives of leaders to provide different kinds of policies. We examined the link between insti-tutions and policy choices in the context of interna-tional disputes. We demonstrated that democratic leaders, when faced with a war, are more inclined to shift extra resources into the war effort than are autocratic leaders. This follows because, as the winning coalition grows, the prospects of political survival in-creasingly hinge on successful policy performance.The extra effort made by democrats gives them a military advantage over autocrats in war. In addition, demo-cratic leaders only choose to fight when they are confident of military victory. Otherwise, they prefer to negotiate. Democrats make relatively unattractive targets be-cause domestic reselection pressures cause leaders to mobilize resources for the war effort. This makes it harder for other states to target them for aggression. In addition to trying harder than autocrats, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Defeat typi-cally leads to domestic replacement for democrats, so they only initiate war when they expect to win. These two factors lead to the interaction between polities that is often termed the democratic peace. Autocrats need a slight expected advantage over other autocratic ad-versaries to initiate conflict, but they need more over-whelming odds against democratic foes. This is because democrats compensate for any initial military disadvan-tage by devoting additional resources to the war effort. In order to initiate war, democrats need overwhelming odds of victory, but that does not mean they are passive. Because democrats use their resources for the war effort rather than reserve them to reward backers, they are generally able, given their selection criteria for fighting, to overwhelm autocracies, which results in short and relatively less costly wars. Yet, democracies find it hard to overwhelm other democracies because they also try hard. In general, democracies make unattractive targets, particularly for other democracies. Hence, democratic states rarely attack one another.