Economic growth collapses the environment and that hurts quality of life.
Riley 06 (Geoff, Head of Economics at Eton College, “Economic growth”, Sept, http://tutor2u.net/economics/revision-notes/as-macro-economic-growth.html)
There are some economic costs of a fast-growing economy. The two mainconcerns are firstly thatgrowthcan lead to a pick up in inflation and secondly, that growth can have damaging effects on our environment, with potentially long-lasting consequences for future generations. Inflation risk: If the economy grows too quickly there is the danger of inflation as demand races ahead of aggregate supply. Producer then take advantage of this by raising prices for consumers. Environmental concerns: Growth cannot be separated from its environmental impact. Fast growth of production and consumptioncan create negative externalities (for example, increased noise and lower air quality arising from air pollution and road congestion, increased consumption of de-merit goods, the rapid growth of household and industrial waste and the pollution that comes from increased output in the energy sector) These externalities reduce social welfare and can lead to market failure. Growth that leads to environmental damagecan have a negative effect on people’s quality of life and may also impede a country’s sustainable rate of growth. Examples include the destruction of rain forests, the over-exploitation of fish stocks and loss of natural habitat created through the construction of new roads, hotels, retail malls and industrial estates.
Growth bad – fuels war
Economic growth and war are dependent on each other.
Goldstein 03 (Joshua, Professor of International Relations, “War and Economic History”, http://www.joshuagoldstein.com/jgeconhi.htm)
Just as wars' costs and outcomes affect economic conditions and evolution, so too do economic conditions and evolution affectwar. Causality runs in both directions. For example, Dutch economic strengths in the early 17th century allowedrapidandcheap production of ships, including warships. The resulting naval military advantage in turn supported Dutch long-distance trade. The wealth derived from that trade, in turn, let the Netherlands pay and train aprofessional standing army, which successfully sheltered the Netherlands from the ruinous Thirty Years' War. This protection in turn let the Dutch expand their share of world trade at the expense of war-scarred rivals. Thus the evolution of warfare and of world economic history are intertwined. War is the proximal cause of the recurring inflationary spikes that demarcate 50-year "Kondratieff waves" in the world economy. Those waves themselves continue to be controversial. However, they may have some predictive value to the extent they clarify the historical relationships between war and military spending on the one hand, and inflation and economic growth on the other. The 1990s mainly followed a predicted long-wave phase of sustained low inflation, renewed growth, and reduced great-power military conflict. If this pattern were to continue, the coming decade would see continued strong growth but new upward pressures on military spending and conflict, eventually leading to a new bout of inflation in the great-power economies. Since scholars do not agree on the mechanism or even the existence of long economic waves, however, such projections are of more academic than practical interest. The relationship between military spending and economic growth has also generated controversy. Despite its pump-priming potential in specific circumstances, as during the 1930s, military spending generally acts to slow economic growth, since it diverts capital and labor from more productive investment (such as in roads, schools, or basic research). During the Cold War, high military spending contributed (among other causes) to the economic stagnation of the Soviet Union and the collapse of North Korea, whereas low military spending relative to GDP contributed to Japan's growth and innovation. During the 1990s, as real military spending worldwide fell by about one-third, the United States and others reaped a "peace dividend" in sustained expansion. However, effects of military spending are long-term, and sharp reductions do not bring quick relief, as Russia's experience since 1991 demonstrates. The global North-South divide - a stark feature of the world economy - is exacerbated by war. The dozens of wars currently in progress worldwide form an arc from the Andes through Africa to the Middle East and Caucasus, to South and Southeast Asia. In some of the world's poorest countries, such as Sudan and Afghanistan, endemic warfare impedes economic development and produces grinding poverty, which in turn intensifies conflicts and fuels warfare. The role of war in the world economy is complex, yet pervasive. The shadow of war lies across economic history, influencing its pace and direction, and war continues to both shape economic developments and respond to them.
High – 1NC
The economy’s growing—no double-dip recession. Yield curves and qualified forecasters agree.
Hulbert 7/15 (Mark Hulbert, editor of the Hulbert Financial Digest, 7/15/10, “It's Dippy to Fret About a Double-Dip Recession”, http://online.barrons.com/article/SB50001424052970203983104575367471896032724.html?mod=BOL_hpp_dc. LS)
The problem with this definition is just the opposite of the previous one: It is too restrictive. In fact, it almost certainly means that we will NOT have a double-dip recession this time around, since the current economic recovery is most likely already a year old. To be sure, it's impossible to know for sure how old the current recovery is, since the NBER has not officially ruled on when the recession that began in December 2007 formally came to an end. But most economists feel confident that it happened no later than July of last year. Furthermore, the U.S. economy is almost certainly still growing, even if at a slower pace than earlier this year and in 2009. And any recession that happens after this month will automatically not qualify. What, then, is all the "double-dip" debate about? James Stack, editor of InvesTech Research Market Analyst, suspects that the debate is less about the objective economic facts of the matter and, instead, a reflection of the widespread skepticismthat almost always greets nascent economic recoveries. "As market historians, we know the double-dip debate is a common occurrence in the first 12-18 months of economic recoveries," he wrote in the latest issue of his service. Regardless of what we call it, what are the odds that the economy will enter into another recession in the near future?Quite low, according to any of a number of econometric models with decent track records at predicting past recessions. Perhaps the one single indicator that is part of virtually all econometric forecasting models is the yield curve—the difference between the interest rates on longer-term and short-term Treasuries. Normally, those rates rise as maturities increase, but on occasion the relationship is just the opposite—a condition known as an inverted yield curve. Many economists consider a steeply inverted yield curve as a reliable indicator that a recession will occur in 12 months' time. What is the message of the yield curveright now? Because it is steeply upwardly sloping, it is at the opposite end of the spectrum from being inverted—and therefore giving very low odds of a recession. Consider one famous econometric model based on the slope of the yield curve that was introduced more than a decade ago by Arturo Estrella, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Frederic Mishkin, a Columbia University professor who was a member ofthe Federal Reserve's Board of Governors from 2006 to 2008. The New York Federal Reserve Bank's Website has a page devoted to the model, and it currently is reporting the odds of a recession in the next 12 months ata minuscule 0.12%. To be sure, with short-term Treasury yields close to zero because of the flight to quality away from Europe's sovereign debt crisis and the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, it would be virtually impossible for the yield curve to invert right now. But I wouldn't be too quick to dismiss the message of the yield curve, either: A similar message emerges from a separate yield curve based on corporate bond yields, and those yields are not directly affected by a flight to quality. The bottom line? A "double-dip recession" appears to be extremely unlikely, unless it is defined in such liberal terms as to make it unexceptional.