Moral Judgment Matjaž Potrč

Principles in moral judgment

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Principles in moral judgment.

Principles/reasons seem not to be appropriate for moral judgment if there is unique phenomenology-intentionality identity. Moral particularism denies importance of moral principles/reasons. There is a presupposition though that moral principles/reasons, if they are effective, involve reasons/principles in a direct manner. The background chromatic illumination effectivity is possible in spite of this, so that one obtains principled particularism: each judgment is unique due to the phenomenology-intentionality identity, and this still allows background chromatic effectivity of reasons/principles. In fact, just involving judgment makes it possible to account for this mixture. So moral judgment in its full shape needs to be established in order to get sense of moral philosophy.

If intentionality-phenomenology identity theory is an entrance indeed how to come from mixed moral judgment proposals to the genuine judgment, this seems to promote a kind of moral particularism. Each judgment is unique, identical with just a specific appearance of phenomenology at this specific occasion. A question then arises whether there is any role here for reasons or principles in such an account. Our answer is that there is such a role indeed, so we would defend a kind of principled particularism, whose characteristics is that there is a role for reasons/principles in moral judgment indeed, but not as explicitly forthcoming in judgments, and rather being there in the cognitive intentional background of such judgments, chromatically illuminating the situation. This is how it seems to be the case with the constitution and nature of moral judgments indeed.

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