Marijuana Negative Solvency



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Marijuana Neg
the gutters, 2nc Lansing Rnd5, 1AC Practice 10-20, Speech 1ac Ag runoff 8-31 12AM, Speech 1AC CAFOs personal, send cards, 2nr , Con Side, Movements DA, Federalism DA, Court Packing DA, Death Penalty Negative, Death Penalty Affirmative, Aff AT Movements DA

AT– Banking Regs

Banking regs are irrelevant and haven’t deterred investments


Kristine Owram 20, writer for Bloomberg. “Pot Banking Legislation Won’t Have Much Impact: Cannabis Weekly.” 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-08/pot-banking-legislation-won-t-have-much-impact-cannabis-weekly
The DoJ and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCEN, have made it clear that banks and credit unions won’t be punished for working with the pot industry. “There hasn’t been a single financial institution that has been prosecuted or faced any kind of regulatory enforcement action just because they were banking marijuana,” said Vardaman, who’s now chief compliance officer and general counsel for cannabis compliance firm Simplifya.
Even though cannabis banking is mostly limited to credit unions and small banks at the moment, it’s enough to cover the industry, said Tyler Beuerlein, chief revenue officer for Hypur, a banking and payment solutions provider.
“This industry is already banked,” Beuerlein said in an interview. “I firmly believe there are less than 50 in the U.S. doing this to scale, but those 50 bank the overwhelming majority of licensed cannabis operators in the U.S.”

at: econ decline = war



COVID decreases likelihood of war


Walt 20---the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, May 13th, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)//EL
But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.
Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.
Posen adds that COVID-19 is also likely to reduce international trade in the short to medium term. Those who believe economic interdependence is a powerful barrier to war might be alarmed by this development, but he points out that trade issues have been a source of considerable friction in recent years—especially between the United States and China—and a degree of decoupling might reduce tensions somewhat and cause the odds of war to recede.
For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely?

COVID dampens reasons for even economically declining states to seek war


Walt 20---the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. (Stephen M., “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?”, Foreign Policy, May 13th, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/)//EL
One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose.
This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it would hammer the last nail in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after pose an imminent threat to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too.
Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure.
I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is hard to imagine any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment when debt levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct ways to stimulate the economy—infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do.
Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely.
Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible.


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