Childress the Third 12—associate professor of law at the Pepperdine University (Donald Earl, The Role of Ethics in International Law, Cambridge University Press, pp. 69-70)//FJ
Transnational collateral consequences can create powerful incentives for stales to commit to and comply with treaties - incentives that can sometimes lead states to act in ways that would otherwise be deeply perplexing. Such collateral consequences may motivate states to comply with their legal com- mitments to demonstrate to other states that they will keep their international agreements, even if the agreements turn out to be unfavorable for them- In short, such behavior demonstrates a willingness to follow international law because it is the law and thus creates an independent reason to act. Thus a state may comply with an agreement that it would rather ignore to demonstrate to other international actors that it is law abiding. However, the reach of this effect may sometimes be limited by the difficulty posed bythe task of monitor- ing compliance; if states believe that noncompliance will go undetected, they may have less incentive to comply.Moreover, if an international commitment is regularly ignored, states may question its status as law and hence may be less likelv to comply with it as a result.