Plan Plan: The United States federal government should withdraw its military presence from the Republic of Korea.
Contention One: Intersectionality U.S. military presence in South Korea is the root cause of prostitution. Although it is illegal, the US military makes prostitution a thriving industry.
Dujisin 9, Zoltan, July 7 2009, “Prostitution Thrives with US Military Presence”, Inter Press Service News Agency, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=47556 Since 1945, U.S. troops have been stationed in the Korean peninsula, with their current strength estimated to be 28,500. The country plunged into civil war between 1950 and 1953 and since then, U.S. troops have remained there, claiming to act as a deterrent against North Korea, the country’s communist neighbour. Prostitution in the region is a direct result of their presence, local observers say. Russian and Chinese troops also had troops stationed on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of the civil conflict, but "have since left the area while U.S. troops are still here, in almost 100 military bases," Yu Young Nim, the head of a local non-governmental organisation which provides counseling, medical and legal care for sex workers, told IPS. Yu Young Nim’s office is located at the Camp Stanley Camptown, a few metres away from local Korean restaurants, home in the 1980s to U.S.-imported Kentucky Fried Chicken and Subway logos. Locals attest to the slow decay of a town. In front of one of these restaurants, sits a 36-year old former "mama-san", which in Korea denotes women supervising sex-work establishments. Like many other retired sex-workers, she looks older than her age, and has decided to open a restaurant. The "mama-san" prefers catering to U.S. soldiers instead of the more demanding Korean clientele. "G.I.s eat their food without complaints," she told IPS. "Koreans always expect to be served like kings." It was in camps such as these that a new dish called Pudaettsigae entered the Korean diet: Poor Koreans took ingredients such as sausage, beans, processed cheese from leftovers at the U.S. camp and mixed them with home-grown ingredients. After being a sex worker for much of her youth, during which she had a son with a U.S. soldier, like other "mama-sans" she opened her own club, where she employed other girls. She had to shut shop three years ago due to declining incomes. "If the base closes, I’ll try moving to the [United] States; it would be good for my son," she says. Her son lives in Korea and speaks the language well enough, but got his primary education in English. "I don’t think he could attend a Korean university, but the U.S. universities are too expensive for us." She could only wish his father was there to help. "I have some contact with the grandfather, but barely with the father. He doesn’t send my son gifts, not even a Christmas card. He has so much more money than me and doesn’t do anything for his son," she says. "My son [believes] he has no father." Several U.S. soldiers have married local prostitutes, in many cases impregnating them, only to later abandon them. "Even in those cases of couples living together, these women can be easily abandoned by their husbands or boyfriends, and are victims of physical, mental and financial abuse," says Young Nim. "The women mostly come from broken families, backgrounds of sexual abuse or domestic violence, and there is no protection from victims of these crimes," he says. "After entering the prostitution business they can’t get out." U.S. officials have made statements condemning prostitution but have done little to stop it. "They think this system should exist for the U.S. soldiers. Superficially they stand for a zero tolerance policy but practically they know what is going on and use this system," Young Nim told IPS. There has been a reduction in prostitution of Korean women, which "has more to do with the work of non-governmental organisations and the fact that Korea has developed economically," while "there is no contact with the U.S. authorities. They have a legal office and counseling centre but only for their own soldiers and relatives." After the negative publicity, the top military officials of the U.S. army have slowly became more outspoken in their condemnation of prostitution. U.S. soldiers were discouraged from frequenting traditional entertainment districts in central Seoul, although locals say that did little to stop them. A turning point was the violent murder of a prostitute in Dongducheon in 1992. The finger of suspicion pointed at U.S. troops, though action against them is difficult given they enjoy a special legal status since 1945. While prostitution is illegal in South Korea, camp towns are practically exempted from crackdowns, and US military anti-prostitution policies have forced these places to minimize their visibility.
The Korean prostitutes are symbolic of the colonization and occupation of the nation by US troops. The incidents of crime by US troops necessitates withdrawal of troops from the region.
Sallie Yea, senior fellow at international development program at RMIT, 2008 “Sightings: Critical approaches to Korean geography” University of Hawai’I Press, p. 192-3
Such incidents have been used by numerous social movement groups in Korea as an argument for the withdrawal of US troops from the peninsula, which they see as contributing to the inability of North and South Korea to successfully reunify. As a consequence of two such incidents in 1992, in October of that year twenty civic and religious groups inaugurated a movement for eradication of crimes by US troops in Korea. The movement found that US soldiers commit an average of 2200 crimes in Korea each year, and that many of these crimes are sexually based offenses against women. Further, the movement highlighted the fact that less then 1 percent of crimes committed by US soldiers in Korea are tried in Korean courts. Since the movement was established the general public in Korea has become more attuned to these negative consequences of US military presence in Korea. As incidents continue to occur since the formation of the movement, they are now subject to popular protests and intense media coverage. The issue of prostitution in kijich’on is invoked by these groups in broader feminist-nationalist and ant-imperialist discourses of anti-Americanism in South Korea. Kim Hyun-sook, for example, discusses the way nationalist and feminist movements in South Korea have drawn on the issue of Korean women working in kijich’on clubs to push a particular nationalist-feminist agenda, thus often marginalizing the women’s ability to narrate their own stories and experiences. For Kim Jyun-sook, these women constitute an “allegory of the nation” in that they are viewed as symbolic of the ongoing colonization and occupation of the Korean nation by imperialist forces, embodied literally by the sexual violation of Korean women and violence against them by US troops. This powerful metaphor situates kijch’on prostitutes of Korean nationality within discourses of gender and Korean nationalism. We have several internal links—
1. Korean women are used as tools to maintain good relations between the U.S. and South Korea
Moon 97, Katharine H.S., Department of Political Science and Chair of Asian Studies @ Wellesley College, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations”, 1997, Columbia University Press
The selling and buying of sex by Koreans and Americans have been a staple of U.S.-Korean relations since the Korean War (1950-53) and the permanent stationing of U.S. troops in Korea since 1955. It would not be far-fetched to say that more American men have become familiar with camptown prostitution in Korea since the 1950s than with military strategy and Korea's GNP figures. Since the war, over one million Korean women have served as sex providers for the U.S. military. And millions of Koreans and Americans have shared a sense of special bonding, for they have together shed blood in battle and mixed blood through sex and Amerasian offspring. U.S. military-oriented prostitution in Korea is not simply a matter of women walking the streets and picking up U.S. soldiers for a few bucks. It is a system that is sponsored and regulated by two governments, Korean and American (through the U.S. military). The U.S. military and the Korean government have referred to such women as "bar girls," "hostesses," "special entertainers," "businesswomen," and "comfort women." Koreans have also called these women the highly derogatory names, yanggalbo (Western whore) and yanggongju (Western princess). As this study reveals, both governments have viewed such prostitution as a means to advance the "friendly relations" of both countries and to keep U.S. soldiers, "who fight so hard for the freedom of the South Korean people," happy. The lives of Korean women working as prostitutes in military camptowns have been inseparably tied to the activities and welfare of the U.S. military installations since the early 1950s. To varying degrees, USFK (U.S. Forces, Korea) and ROK authorities have controlled where, when, and how these "special entertainers" work and live. The first half of the 1970s witnessed the consolidation of such joint U.S.-ROK control.
2. The women are used to financially aid the South Korean economy
Katy Keheller, Staff Writer, 1/8/09 “South Korea, U.S. Military Accused Of Encouraging Prostitution” http://jezebel.com/5126343/south-korea-us-military-accused-of-encouraging-prostitution, IA The New York Times reports that while most of the women were not forced into prostitution, a group of sex-workers-turned-activists claim that the South Korean government was “one big pimp for the U.S. military.” They claim that the government “trained” prostitutes, giving them lesions in English language and etiquette, with the intention of using the sex trade to bring in much-needed foreign currency. According to scholars, the U.S. military worked with the South Korean government to regulate the health of the sex workers. However, they did not do so for the health of the women, but rather to ensure that American soldiers would not contract any STDs while visiting the conveniently-located camp towns. Some women claim that the American military police raided brothels, looking for women they suspected to be spreading disease. The Korean police would then step in, locking the accused women up in so-called “monkey houses" until they were deemed well enough to go back to work. Transcripts of parliamentary hearings support the former sex worker’s claims that the government explicitly encouraged the selling of sex in order to keep U.S. dollars flowing into South Korea. In one exchange from 1960, two lawmakers recommended that the government keep a number of prostitutes to meet the “natural needs” of U.S. soldiers. Lee Sung-woo, the deputy home minister, assured the speaker that the government had already made improvements in the “supply of prostitutes,” which he termed the “recreational system” for American troops. 3. Any marginalization of the harms of the Korean prostitutes sacrifices feminine integrity for national security
Katherine H.S. Moon, Chair of Asian Studies at Wellesley College, 1997Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations pg. p. 10-11, IA
The disregarding of kijich'on prostitutes as invisible and/or marginal has been apparent in academia and activism as well. Until very recently, social science scholarship on Korean women and society since the 1950s, has focused mainly on women as low-paid, underskilled labor in Korea's rush to export-led economic growth.'2 But only since the early 1990s has there been any significant academic scrutiny of kijich'on prostitution, which has been around longer than the bulk of women's modern factory work.
A pan of the reason for the dearth of academic interest in this subject is due to Korean social activists' own neglect of this issue. During my research stay in Korea from 1991 to 1992, I experienced many difficulties finding academics and activists who might be well-informed on camptown prostitution issues of the 1960s and '70s (the latter being the focal time of my research). One woman whom others had referred to as my "one sure bet" even admitted honestly that she and other long -time social activists had neglected the issue of camptown prostitution. She stated that she and others had focused their organizing attention and energy on organizing factory workers and protesting Japanese sex tourism in the 1970s (chapter 1), but that tackling the problem of camptown prostitution had never entered their minds. She confessed that she and her coworkers had never placed the kijich'on prostitutes in any framework of exploitation or oppression, that even most activists considered these women "too different" from themselves. "Too different" was a polite way of saying what many Korean activists and academics today, even those who advocate on behalf of the former Korean "comfort women" to the Japanese military in World War II, still believe-kijich'on prostitutes work in the bars and clubs because they voluntarily want to lead a life of prostitution, because they are lacking in moral character. This kind of academic and activist negligence of kijich'on prostitutes is a function of the Korean society's bias against these women-that they are an "untouchable" class, that they have already departed so far from the norms and values of mainstream society to deserve consideration of the political, economic, and cultural sources of their unenviable existence. Faye Moon, a cofounder of My Sister's Place, noted, "Students often become anti -American and shout 'Yankee go Home' when they demonstrate. However, most Korean students have never visited an 'American' military town in Korea. They are unaware of the oppression which takes place in these villages." Students began visiting and extending their solidarity to kijich'on prostitutes only as recently as 1990.' But there is a deeper underlying reason for these women's invisiblity even among progressive Korean activists and academics. For most of the post-civil war period, South Koreans have lived with military threat from the North and the presence of U.S. troops as givens that were not questioned, and the administrations of former generals-turned-presidents Pak ChónghOi (1961-1979). Chôn Tuhwan (1980-87), and Ro T'aeu (1987-1992) kept popular criticism of both domestic and foreign governmental policy at hay with authoritarian measures. Anticommunist and national security rhetoric was regularly employed to muster society's support for the government's economic and foreign policies as well as to stifle political dissent, protest, and inquiries into alternative interpretations of political issues such as the need for the U.S. troop presence and the terms of the U.S.-Korea alliance.Under the national security blanket, the work and lives of kijich'on prostitutes became integrally embedded in the work and lives of the U.S. soldiers, who provided protection deemed vital to the South Korean people's viability and prosperity. In a sense, to inquire into the plight of kijich'on prostitutes and to question their role in U.S. camptown life would have been to raise questions about the need for and the role of U.S. troops and bases in the two countries' bilateral relations. AND The drive to achieve complete security requires continuous exploitation of Korean women
Moon 1997 (Katharine H.S., Professor in the Department of Political Science at Wellesley College, “Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S./Korea Relations,” p. 18-9, )
I think there is yet another, unspoken, reason why these women have been forced out of Korean consciousness for nearly half a decade: Koreans have not wanted reminders of the war lurking around them and the insecurity that their newfound wealth and international power have been built on. That is, kijich'on women are living symbols of the destruction, poverty, bloodshed, and separation from family of Korea's civil war. They are living testaments of Korea's geographical and political division into North and South and of the South's military insecurity and consequent dependence on the United States. The sexual domination of tens of thousands of Korean women by "Yangk'i foreigners" is a social disgrace and a "necessary evil" that South Koreans believe they have had to endure to keep U.S. soldiers on Korean soil, a compromise in national pride, all for the goal of national security. Such humiliation is a price paid by the "little brother" in the alliance for protection by the "big brother."
South Korean prostitution denigrates women’s integrity as human beings because US military troops dehumanize women into sub-human commodities.
Jean Enriquez 99 Executive Director of Coalition Against Trafficking In Women-Asia Pacific, “Filipinas in Prostitution around U.S. Military Bases in Korea: A Recurring Nightmare”, Seoul, South Korea, November 1999
CATW asserts that trafficking in women is inseparable with the issue of prostitution. The gender-based nature of trafficking exposes itself as serving the purpose of ensuring the steady supply of women to areas where men demand sexual services. We deplore trafficking and prostitution as violations of women’s human rights.We cannot consider it work, because among others, it compels women to perform acts that denigrates their person — their integrity as human beings. The impact to women of sexual exploitation is hardly healed by time. Amerasian children, estimated at 30,000, were born to Filipinas prostituted around the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. They receive no assistance from either the U.S. or Philippine government. Economically, ‘working in the clubs’ meant irregular earnings and slavery, as many of them would be withheld of their salaries or are fined for any ‘misconduct’. The women were abused physically, psychologically and emotionally. Some were murdered. With the Visiting Forces Agreement recently signed between the Philippine and U.S. governments, 22 ports will be opened to foreign troops and more women will be abused in the remote rural areas of the country. In Korea, our women are once again subjected to the same brutality. The same experiences continue to haunt our women. In Korea, the Philippines and elsewhere, the women are viewed as commodities to be bought, and being Asians, they are certainly perceived as less than human. Trafficking and prostitution have reached crisis proportions in the Asian region, with the entry and maintenance of foreign military troops, and worsening globalization of economies. The R & R policy of U.S. military and its surrounding industry rely heavily on the buying and luring of women not only in Okinawa, Korea, and the Philippines, but more women from other countries including Russia, China and Thailand. Its twin menace, the unrestricted and globalized trade, rides on the continuing export of labor, as a convenient channel to traffic women for slave-like work or prostitution. Every month, 200-400 women and girls from Bangladesh are trafficked to Pakistan in the guise of labor migration. Yearly, 5,000 Nepalese women and girls are brought to India and Hong Kong on the same pretext. Currently, studies estimate that150,00 Filipinas are exploited in the entertainment industry of Japan. More and more women from E. Europe are transported to the West and to Asia for prostitution. It might surprise many that Africa is also becoming a destination for trafficking. In 1992, 8 Filipinas were tricked that they will work as waitresses in Germany but were instead brought to clubs in Nigeria. Trafficking and prostitution, thus, need to be understood as problems arising from contexts not only of poverty and unemployment, but also maintained and promoted by economic interests and political policies that thrive on the subordinated status of women in our societies. As significantly, there are long-held definitions of masculinity, reinforced by the military institution, that are satiated by trafficking in women. Military prostitution in Korea is sustained by racist depictions of Asian women—the legacy of US occupation exacerbates racism in both Asia and the United States
Moon 97 – Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, Department of Political Science and Edith Stix Wasserman Chair of Asian Studies (Katherine, “Sex among Allies” 1997, p. 33-35,)
In Olongapo and Angeles in the Philippines, where the U.S. Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base were respectively located (until the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1992),"[t]here was virtually no industry except the 'entertainment' business, with approximately 55,000 registered and unregistered prostitutes and a total of registered 2,182 R&R establishments. 68By 1985 the U.S. military had become the second largest employer in the Philippines, hiring over 40,000 Filipinos. . . . The sum of their salaries amounted to almost $83 million a year." 69 Ideologies around race and nationality have also contributed to the social inequalities and conflicts, especially affecting prostitutes, in the U.S. camptown communities in Asia. Enloe writes that"[c]lass and race distinctions inform all social relations between the U.S. military and the host community." 70 The racism demonstrated by American soldiers toward Asians in Vietnam and Korea are well-documented. Lloyd Lewis notes that "soldiers in all branches of the armed services [in Vietnam] recount receiving the same indoctrination" that the "enemy is Oriental and inferior." 71 The racist terms for Vietnamese--"gook, slant, slope, dink . . . or a half a dozen local variations"—72 had all been employed previously by Americans [toward Japanese in World War II and Koreans and Chinese in the Korean War] to designate yellow-skinned peoples." 73 Max Hastings has noted in his history of the Korean War that the "Eighth Army was forced to issue a forceful order" in the summer of 1951 that soldiers cease" to take a perverse delight in frightening civilians" and attempting to "drive the Koreans off roads and into ditches." The order concluded with "We are not in this country as conquerors. We are here as friends." 74 Hastings also includes a comment by a Marine, Selwyn Handler: "Koreans were just a bunch of gooks. Who cared about the feelings of people like that? We were very smug Americans at that time." 75 Bruce Cumings recounts the racism among Americans, soldiers and diplomats alike, in the late 1960s:"Their racism led them to ask me, because I was living with Koreans and they rarely ventured out to 'the economy,' things like whether it was true that the Korean national dish, kimch'i, was fermented in urine." 76 Racist stereotypes of Asians within the American society have mixed with sexist stereotypes of Asian women to foster American participation in camptown prostitution in Asia. The main military newspaper, Stars and Stripes, encouraged soldiers to explore Korea's "nighttime action," especially the kisaeng party, the"ultimate experience": Picture having three or four of the loveliest creatures God ever created hovering around you, singing, dancing, feeding you, washing what they feed you down with rice wine or beer, all saying at once," You are the greatest." This is the Orient you heard about and came to find. 77 A U.S. Army chaplain I interviewed in April 1991 noted the following: What the soldiers have read and heard before ever arriving in a foreign country influence prostitution a lot. For example, stories about Korean or Thai women being beautiful, subservient-- they're tall tales, glamorized. . . . U.S. men would fall in lust with Korean women. They were property, things, slaves. . . . Racism, sexism--it's all there. The men don't see the women as human beings--they're disgusting, things to be thrown away. . . . They speak of the women in the diminutive. 78 On Okinawa, U.S. servicemen from the Kadena Air Base" can be seen in town (Naha) wearing offensive T- shirts" depicting" a woman with the letters LBSM," which means" little brown sex machine." 79 The "brown" refers to the Filipino and Thai women who constitute the majority of military prostitutes on Okinawa. 80 Aida Santos reveals that Olongapo sells a variation on the theme--a popular T-shirt" bearing the message 'Little Brown Fucking Machines Powered with Rice.'" 81 She emphasizes that in the Philippines,"[r]acism and sexism are now seen as a fulcrum in the issue of national sovereignty." 82The presence of U.S. military servicemenin Asiagenerates significant social transformationsthat affect both the host Asian society and the American society across the Pacific. Thanh-dam Truong has asserted that the U.S. military's use of Thailand as the major R&R base for U.S. soldiers fighting in Vietnam has spawned the now booming sex tourism industry all across the country, 83 winning Thailand the ignoble title, "Asia's brothel." Filipinos have charged that U.S. servicemen have brought AIDS and HIV into their country. Prostitutes in Olongapo, along with the umbrella feminist organization, GABRIELA, and health organizations, pushed the Philippine government to "obtain a guarantee that all U.S. service personnel coming into the Philippines be tested for HIV." 84 In 1988, the Philippines Immigration Commissioner required all U.S. servicemen entering the Philippines to present certificates verifying that they are AIDS-free. 85 In addition, sexual relations between American men and Asian prostitutes have created a living legacy of mixed-raced children who are rejected by both their mother's and father's societies. Maria Socorro"Cookie" Diokno, an active leader in the Philippines' anti-base movement, has referred to the children born of American servicemen and Asian women as "Amerasian 'souvenir' bab[ies]." 86 ABC's Prime Time (May 13, 1993) depicted Amerasian children in the Philippines who had been abandoned by their soldier-fathers and were living with their impoverished mothers, scavenging for food among heaps of rubble and waste. Enloe reports that"[o]f the approximately 30,000 children born each year of Filipino mothers and American fathers, some 10,000 [were] thought to become street children, many of them working as prostitutes servicing American pedophiles." 8 Enloe adds that a Filipino "insider" has noted that many others have been sold, with" Caucasian-looking children . . . allegedly sold for $50-200 (around P1,000-4,000), whereas the Negro-fathered ones fetch only $25-30 (around P500-600)." 88 Johnston's Mom in Songt'an, Korea, also tried to give up her sons to adoption, after earlier having given up a daughter. But in the end, she could not bear to do it and went back to prostitution in order to keep her boys. 89 In the film, Camp Arirang, one barwoman in Songt'an laments the need to give up her half African-American son one day; black Amerasian children are most shunned in Korean society, so most mothers try to send them to the United States for a chance at education and a future. She has already torn up all photographs of herself with her son because she knows she must let him go. In a voice cracking with emotion, she calmly says, "All I want him to know is that he was born in Korea, that his mother is Korean, and that she is dead. It will be easier for him that way." The withdrawal of U.S. naval bases from the Philippines in 1992 also left behind a legacy of approximately 50,000 Amerasian children in the Philippines, with an estimated 10,000 of them living in Olongapo, which had housed the U.S. Subic Naval Base. The law firm of Cotchett, Illston, and Pitre of Burlingame, California, filed a class action suit against the U.S. government on behalf of Amerasian children left behind in the Philippines in March 1993. 90 The plaintiffs would "ask the federal court to order the Navy to provide funds for the education and medical care of these children until they reach 18 years of age." 91 The prostitute- mothers of these children and several leading Philippine civic organizations, such as GABRIELA, as well as the Council of Churches, mobilized such legal action. Asian societies have borne the burden of the painful repercussions of militarized prostitution, but the American society has not gone untouched. Many of the prostitutes who end up divorced from their GI husbands (an estimated 80% of Korean-GI marriages end up in divorce) 92 go back into prostitution around military camp areas in the United States. 93 In the film The Women Outside, officials from the Mayor's Office of Midtown Enforcement in Manhattan state that some U.S. servicemen have been paid by flesh traffickers to marry women in Korea and bring them to the United States for work in massage parlors and brothels.
Korean prostitution represents a unique intersection of colonial power, patriarchy, and class based discrimination
Pyong Gap Min. Professor of Sociology at Queens College, December '03. "Comfort Women": The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3594678.pdf, IA
The victimization of Korean comfort women has three major components: (1) their being forced into military sexual slavery, (2) their suffering inside military brothels, and (3) their half-century of agonizing experiences after their return home. More Korean women were mobilized for Japanese military sexual slavery than were women from other Asian countries, and Korean comfort women were treated more cruelly than were Japanese comfort women, mainly because of Japan's colonization of Korea. Thus, the colonization perspective used by Korean feminists is relevant to understanding the Korean experiences of sexual slavery. However, the state-supported patriarchal system in Japan was central to the establishment of Japanese military brothels while patriarchal customs in Korea have been mainly responsible for the Korean victims' lifelong suffering after their return home. Accordingly, the feminist perspective used by some Japanese feminist scholars is equally relevant to the Korean victims' experiences. In addition, as is the case with some other types of sexual assault, the Korean victims' lower-class back-ground played a less significant but still important role in their forced mobilization for the military sexual service. Using an intersectional analysis, this article intends to show that colonization, gender, and class were inseparably tied together to make the lives of Korean com-fort women extremely miserable, although each factor has greater effects on one component of their victimization than on the others. By emphasizing the intersec-tion of colonial power, gender hierarchy, and class, I argue that a one-sided empha-sis on colonization or gender hierarchy as the fundamental cause cannot fully explain the suffering of the Korean victims of sexual slavery.
Intersectionality is critical for the framing of violence against women—critiques of essentialism don’t solve
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Professor of Law at UCLA, 1991 “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and ViolenceAgainst Women of Color”pg. 1-2, IA
This article has presented intersectionality as a way of framing the various interactions of race and gender in the context of violence against women of color. I have used intersectionality as a way to articulate the interaction of racism and patriarchy generally. I have also used intersectionality to describe the location of women of color both within overlap-ping systems of subordination and at the margins of feminism and anti-racism. The effort to politicize violence against women will do little to address the experiences of nonwhite women until the ramifications of racial stratification among women are acknowledged. At the same time, the antiracist agenda will not be furthered by suppressing the reality of intra-racial violence against women of color. The effect of both these marginalizations is that women of color have no ready means to link their experiences with those of other women. This sense of isolation compounds efforts to politicize gender violence within communities of color, and permits the deadly silence surrounding these issues to continue. I want to suggest that intersectionality offers a way of mediating the tension between assertions of multiple identity and the ongoing necessity of group politics.It is helpful in this regard to distinguish intersectionality from the closely related perspective of anti-essentialism, from which women of color have critically engaged white feminism for the absence of women of color on the one hand, and for speaking for women of color on the other. One rendition of this anti-essentialist critique-that feminism essentializes the category "woman"--owes a great deal to the postmodernist idea that categories we consider natural or merely representational are actually socially constructed in a linguistic economy of difference.22 While the descriptive project of postmodernism of questioning the ways in which meaning is socially constructed is generally sound, this critique sometimes misreads the meaning of social construction and distorts its political relevance. Contention Two: Solvency Korean prostitutes can redefine their gender and race through policy—alternatives that suggest radical actions such as destroying categories won’t solve
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Professor of Law at UCLA, 1991 “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and ViolenceAgainst Women of Color”pg. 20-1, IA
But to say that a category such as race or gender is socially constructed is not to say that that category has no significance in our world. On the contrary, a large and continuing project for subordinated people-and indeed, one of the projects for which postmodern theories have been very helpful-is thinking about the way power has clustered around certain categories and is exercised against others. This project attempts to unveil the processes of subordination and the various ways those processes are experienced by people who are subordinated and people who are privileged. It is, then, a project that presumes that categories have meaning and consequences. This project's most pressing problem, in many if not most cases, is not the existence of the categories, but rather the particular values attached to them, and the way those values foster and create social hierarchies.
This is not to deny that the process of categorization is itself an exercise of power, but the story is much more complicated and nuanced than that. First, the process of categorizing--or, in identity terms, naming-is not unilateral. Subordinated people can and do participate, sometimes even subverting the naming process in empowering ways. One need only think about the historical subversion of the category "Black,," or the current transformation of "queer," to understand that categorization is not a one-way street. Clearly, there is unequal power, but there is nonetheless some degree of agency that people can and do exert in the politics of naming. And it is important to note that identity continues to be as site of resistance for members of different subordinated groups. We all can recognize the distinction between the claims "I am Black" and the claim "I am a person who happens to be Black." "I am Black" takes the socially imposed identity and empowers it as an anchor of subjectivity. "I am Black" becomes not simply a statement of resistance, but also a positive discourse of self-identification, intimately linked to. celebratory statements like the Black nationalist "Black is beautiful." "I am a person who happens to be Black," on the other hand, achieves self-identification by straining for a certain universality (in effect, "I am first a person")and for a concomitant dismissal of the imposed category ("Black") as contingent, circumstantial, non-determinant. There is truth in both characterizations, of course, but they function, quite differently depending on the political context. At this point in history, a strong case can be made that the most critical resistance strategy for dis-empowered groups is to occupy and defend a politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy it.
AND, any regulatory policies will fail
Human Rights Examiner, 2/8/10 U.S. military anti-prostitution/sex trafficking policy appears to be ineffective” http://www.examiner.com/x-24740-Norfolk-Human-Rights-Examiner~y2010m2d8-US-military-personals-creates-demand-for-sex-trafficking-in-South-Korea, IA
Thriving demand for prostitution and sex trafficking by the U.S. military service members questions the enforceability of the U.S. military anti-prostitution/sex trafficking policy. Though the policy has been implemented to deter sex trafficking and prostitution around the military base abroad, the news reports consistently say that they are still very much in existence. Though the policy caused many service members from revealing their identities when interviewed about their visits to prostitutes, it did not stop them from going back to prostitutes again for sex. The problem then lies on lack of awareness among the U.S. soldiers. Visit to brothels or prostitutes have been so widely accepted that the service members consider it almost as a rite. Further that the U.S. military, in fact, encouraged prostitution business around the military bases also contribute to their desensitization to prostitution.  While the penalty against human trafficking and prostitution must be doubled, the military should ensure to educate the service members on such misconducts as serious crimes.
AND, The impacts are systemic. Only withdrawing American military presence solves
Kirk and Okazawa-rey 1998-(writers for The Women and War Reader, “Making Connections Building an East Asia-U.S. Women’s Network against U.S. Militarism” New York University Press. http://www.gwynkirk.net/pdf/making_connections_paper.pdf
Participants shared the view that violence against women is an integral part of U.S. military attitudes, training, and culture. It is not random, but systemic, and cannot simply be attributed to “a few bad apples’ as the military authorities often try to do. We noted the many reports of rape, assault, and sexual harassment within the U.S. military that have come to light over the past few years. We also noted that U.S. military families experience higher rates of domestic violence compared to nonmilitary families. But the main emphasis of our discussion concerned crimes of violence committed by U.S. military personnel against civilians in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, especially violence against women, and the institutionalization of military prostitution. Crimes of Violence Women from all countries represented, including the United States, reported crimes of violence committed by U.S. military personnel against local women. Okinawan women emphasized violent attacks of women and girls by U.S. military personnel, especially the marines who are in Okinawa in large numbers. In May 1995, for example, a 24-year old Okinawan woman was beaten to death by a G.I. with a hammer in the doorway of her house. On their return from Beijing Conference in September1995, Okinawan women immediately organized around the rape of a twelve-year old girl, which had occurred while they were away. This revitalized opposition to the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and drew worldwide attention to violence against women on the part of U.S. military personnel. The National Coalition for the Eradication of Crimes by U.S. Troops in Korea, which comprises human rights activists, religious groups, feminists, and labor activists, was galvanized into action by a particularly brutal rape and murder of a bar woman, Yoon Kum E, in 1992. Korean participants commented that pimps and G.I.s try to intimidate the women against speaking out; women are also afraid of public humiliation. Drawing public attention to such crimes is embarrassing to the U.S. military. They are usually denied and covered up.
And, the systemic impacts of the affirmative far outweigh any manifestation of international conflict. Prioritizing the event of war over resistance to the systemic roots of the affirmative facilitates collective complacency and distracts attention from the broader effort to redress the harms of the status quo.
Cuomo, 1996. [Chris, J. War is not just an event: Reflections on the significance of everyday violence, Hypatia, Vol. 11, no. 4, pg. proquest]
Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifications for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war discuss war solely as an event--an occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typically marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, intentions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists---including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gendered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemonies--cannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions.In "Gender and 'Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an event-based conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.1Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems.Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns.I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.2 Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.Just-war theory is a prominent example of a philosophical approach that rests on the assumption that wars are isolated from everyday life and ethics. Such theory, as developed by St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Hugo Grotius, and as articulated in contemporary dialogues by many philosophers, including Michael Walzer (1977), Thomas Nagel (1974), and Sheldon Cohen (1989), take the primary question concerning the ethics of warfare to be about when to enter into military conflicts against other states. They therefore take as a given the notion that war is an isolated, definable event with clear boundaries. These boundaries are significant because they distinguish the circumstances in which standard moral rules and constraints, such as rules against murder and unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just-war theory assumes that war is a separate sphere of human activity having its own ethical constraints and criteria and in doing so it begs the question of whether or not war is a special kind of event, or part of a pervasive presence in nearly all contemporary life..Because the application of just-war principles is a matter of proper decisionmaking on the part of agents of the state, before wars occur, and before military strikes are made, they assume that military initiatives are distinct events. In fact, declarations of war are generally overdetermined escalations of preexisting conditions. Just-war criteria cannot help evaluate military and related institutions, including their peacetime practices and how these relate to wartime activities, so they cannot address the ways in which armed conflicts between and among states emerge from omnipresent, often violent, state militarism. The remarkable resemblances in some sectors between states of peace and states of war remain completely untouched by theories that are only able to discuss the ethics of starting and ending direct military conflicts between and among states.Applications of just-war criteria actually help create the illusion that the "problem of war" is being addressed when the only considerations are the ethics of declaring wars and of military violence within the boundaries of declarations of war and peace. Though just-war considerations might theoretically help decision-makers avoid specific gross eruptions of military violence, the aspects of war which require the underlying presence of militarism and the direct effects of the omnipresence of militarism remain untouched. There may be important decisions to be made about when and how to fight war, but these must be considered in terms of the many other aspects of contemporary war and militarism that are significant to nonmilitary personnel, including women and nonhumans.FEMINIST APPROACHES TO WAR AND MILITARY VIOLENCEIn a recent Hypatia article, Lucinda Peach argues that just-war theory, which she takes to be more realistic and useful than pacifism, can be strengthened with feminist insights and analyses. Drawing primarily on the work of Sara Ruddick and Jean Bethke Elshtain, she reconstructs feminist responses to traditional just-war approaches, and illustrates how a more thorough application of feminist principles might lead to "a more careful and considered appraisal of when the use of armed force is morally justified" (Peach 1994, 167). Though she agrees with their criticisms of traditional just-war approaches, Peach finds Elshtain's and Ruddick's alternatives practically and theoretically lacking. Nonetheless, her faith in just-war theorizing is unwavering:The feminist criticisms discussed do not suggest a need to develop radically new or different criteria for assessing the morality or engagement in armed conflict from those offered by traditional just-war theory ... feminist criticisms and counterproposals suggest a number of specific proposals for modifying the practice more than the theory of the just-war approach to armed conflict. (Peach 1994, 164)Peach states that one of the problems with nonfeminist critiques of war is their failure to address the fact that "women remain largely absent from ethical and policy debates regarding when to go to war, how to fight a war, and whether resorting to war is morally justifiable" (Peach 1994, 152). But a just-war approach cannot successfully theorize women's roles in these events because formal, declared wars depend upon underlying militaristic assumptions and constructions of gender that make women's participation as leaders nearly impossible.The limitations of Peach's analysis make clear some aspects of the relationships between peacetime militarism and armed conflicts that cannot be addressed by even feminist just-war principles. Her five criticisms of just-war theory, discussed below, are intended to both echo and revise appraisals made by other feminists. But each fails to successfully address the complexity of feminist concerns.1) Peach finds just-war theory's reliance on realism, the notion that human nature makes war inevitable and unavoidable, to be problematic. She believes just-war theory should not be premised on realist assumptions, and that it should also avoid "unduly unrealistic appraisals" of human and female nature, as found in Ruddick's work.Peach rightly identifies the pessimism, sexism, essentialism, and universalism at work in just-war theorists' conceptions of human nature. Nonetheless, she fails to see that just-war theorists employ ossified concepts of both "human nature" and "war." Any interrogation of the relationships between war and "human nature," or more benignly, understandings and enactments of what it means to be diverse human agents in various contexts, will be terribly limited insofar as they consider wars to be isolated events. Questions concerning the relationships between war and "human nature" become far more complex if we reject a conception of war that focuses only on events, and abandon any pretense of arriving at universalist conceptions of human or female "nature."Feminist ethical questions about war are not reducible to wondering how to avoid large-scale military conflict despite human tendencies toward violence. Instead, the central questions concern the omnipresence of militarism, the possibilities of making its presence visible, and the potential for resistance to its physical and hegemonic force. Like "solutions" to the preponderance of violence perpetrated by men against women that fail to analyze and articulate relationships between everyday violence and institutionalized or invisible systems of patriarchal, racist, and economic oppression, analyses that characterize eruptions of military violence as isolated, persistent events, are practically and theoretically insufficient.2) Peach faults just-war theory for its failure to consider alternatives to war, stating that "the failure of most just-war theorists to seriously contemplate alternatives to war is ... radically deficient from the perspectives of pacifist feminist and others opposed to knee-jerk militaristic response to civil strife" (Peach 1994, 158). She argues that feminist just-war theorists, including Elshtain, should also pay more attention to pacifist arguments.When Peach discusses "alternatives to war," she is clearly referring to alternatives to entering into war, or to participating in "the escalation of conflicts." The avoidance of eruptions of military violence is certainly important, and Peach is correct that feminist insights about conflict resolution could present significant recommendations in this regard. However, feminist moral imagination cannot end there. In thinking of alternatives to war, we need to continue to imagine alternatives to militaristic economies, symbolic systems, values, and political institutions. The task of constructing such alternatives is far more daunting and comprehensive than creating alternatives to a specific event or kind of event.Pacifist writers as diverse as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Barbara Deming have emphasized the fact that pacifism entails a critique of pervasive, systematic human violence. Despite its reductionist tendencies, there is much to learn from the ways in which pacifists conceive of war as a presence, as well as the pacifist refusal to let go of the ideal of peace. Characterizing pacifism as motivated by the desire to avoid specific events disregards the extent to which pacifism aims to criticize the preconditions underlying events of war. 3) Following several influential moves in feminist philosophy, Peach rejects just-war theory's reliance on abstraction--of the realities, or "horrors," of war; of enemies as one-dimensional evil, killable Others; and of the ethical responses needed to address the morality of war, such as a privileging of justice and rights over love and caring. Following Elshtain, she believes that feminist just-war principles should be more particularized, contextualized, and individualized.But the abstraction of the particularities of war depends on an abstraction of war itself. The distance of such abstraction is created in part by willingness to think of war without considering the presence of war in "peaceful" times. Wars becomes conceptual entities--objects for consideration--rather than diverse, historically loaded exemplifications of the contexts in which they occur. In order to notice the particular and individual realities of war, attention must be given to the particular, individual, and contextualized causes and effects of pervasive militarism, as well as the patterns and connections among them.
Military violence is neither natural nor inevitable—war is sustained by gendered systems of identity like military prostitution
Enloe 93 – Professor in the Department of International Development, Community, and Environment at Clark University, Ph.D in Political Science from UC Berkeley (Cynthia Enloe, “The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War” p. 245-248, )
Conquerors' mistresses, wartime rape victims, military prostitutes, cinematic soldier-heroes, pin-up models on patriotic calendars-these are only some of the indications, not only that nationalism is often constructed in militarized settings, but that militarization itself, like nationalist identity, isgendered. To put it more simply, no person, no community, and no national movement can be militarized without changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity infuse daily life. Much of our research in the 1960s and 1970s focused on civil wars some we labeled as revolutionary, and others portrayed as mere insurgencies. They seemed to offer opportunities to explore changing consciousness, national versus class versus ethnic loyalties, the processes of social mobilization and party building, state fragility, and state expansion. But as I recall, thinking about civil wars did not prompt us to think about or even conceptualize militarism. States had militaries; that's how you could tell they were states. And certain levels of alienated mobilization seemed naturally to take the form of armed insurgency. But as for militarism a distinctive set of beliefs and structures and militarization a particular societal process entrenching these beliefs and structures we looked to neither concept to generate questions, to make us stop in our intellectual tracks. So we made militarization of any society appear simpler than, in fact, it was. When I think back now to the 1960s, I wonder why I didn't pause, why I found it so easy to accept armed nationalist conflicts as, if not inevitable, at least not very surprising. At some level I did not see nationalist warfare as problematic. True, I did puzzle over state elites' use of their militaries and police forces to respond to ethnic or antiimperialist challenges. I did wonder how civilian nationalists came to their decisions to take up armed resistance and whether they would succeed in controlling the military forces they had created. And I did try to understand how relatively unpoliticized people caught in the crossfire would piece together their own strategies for coping with escalating conflict. All this hard questioning notwithstanding, I think I assumed that militarization of any nationalist conflict wasn't difficult to accomplish. It only required, I naively presumed, the state's deployment of military units and the insurgents' acquisition of weapons and recruits and policies to bring both sides into an encounter. In those days I didn't give much thought to what sorts ofmental transformations had to occur in order for national identities to become militarized. Now I am more and more convinced that the militarization of any nationalist movement occurs through the gendered workings of power. It is neither natural nor automatic. Militarization occurs because some people's fears are allowed to be heard, and to inform agendas, while other people's fears are trivialized or silenced. Slovak nationalism, reemerging today; Quebecois nationalism, now in its third decade of development; Lithuanian nationalism, successful in its achievement of statehoodnone have (as yet) been militarized. Within other nationalist movements, by contrast, there has been ambivalence and even explicit conflict over militarization. Thus, within contemporary Russian nationalism, U.S. black nationalism, Canadian Indian nationalism, South African black nationalism, German nationalism, and Serb, Croatian, and Bosnian nationalism, there have been debates over social changes that would legitimize particular militaristic tendencies. In each of these processes of national formation, the struggle today remains inconclusive. It is impossible to make sense of how nationalist ideologies and organizations emerge, grow, wither, or disappear altogether unless we chart these internal debates over militarization. Who supports militarizing strategies, and who offers alternatives? Do the supporters and their critics look different in their gender, region, generation, class, or political experience? Principal among militarizing transformations are changes in ideas about manliness manliness as it supports a state, and manliness as it informs a nation. If I had given more (or any!) thought to how the meaning assigned to being a man changed as a state deployed its forces in the name of "national security" or in the name of creating a new, more authentic nation, or as a nationalist movement mobilized its force, then I might have noticed that changes in ideas about masculinity do not occur without complementary transformations in ideas about what it means to be a woman. For instance, I might have paid attention to a state's policies regarding rape: were soldiers given instructions to avoid sexual assaults on women in the contested regions? Were reported assaults treated seriously by superior officers, or glossed over? I might have given more analytical weight to evidence that insurgent male leaders deliberately excluded or included women, that they tried to prevent sexual liaisons within their units, that they encouraged most women to serve the now-militarized cause in roles compatible with concepts of femininity preexisting in the community. And by paying attention I might have caught sight of the contradictions that thread their way through most instances of militarization. For militarization is a process that is not greased with natural inclinations and easy choices. It usually involves confusion and mixed messages. On the one hand, it requires the participation of women as well as men. On the other hand, it is a social construction that usually privileges masculinity. It is the first of these two conditions that makes many women who have become nationalists willing to support militarization: their participation as women becomes valuable, and they often gain new space in which to develop political skills. During the Intifada, Palestinian women began to run more of the West Bank community institutions as the Israeli military closed down older institutions as security risks, and as hundreds of Palestinian men were imprisoned. During the eight-month Iraqi military occupation, Kuwaiti women, having lost their Asian maids, likewise gained a new sense of their political value; actions such as obtaining food, carrying information, and caring for torture victims took on new, nationalist connotations. Similarly, Iraqi women who identify themselves as nationalists by virtue of participation in the ruling Baathist Party's Women's Federation today speak of the earlier Iran-Iraq war as a time when the state was compelled to take women's talents seriously, as it replaced conscripted men with women in hosts of official positions. Yet because it is a process riddled with gendered contradictions, the militarization of any nationalist movement is usually contested. It is often precisely where one can observe the formal and informal political struggles between women and men. In these debates over militarization, women and men are divided, not simply over priorities on the political agenda, but also over what constitutes this amorphous thing, "the nation."Peace movements that emerge within militarizing nationalist movements are typically treated as though they are hopeless and/or analytically trivial. The militarization of our own curiosity often takes the form of treating the most militarized tendencies such as the formation of mostly male militias as the most analytically