We* tried hard to make this neg file one that provides good options for both T/Framework crowd and detailed/specific arguments for various Ks. Our agenda isn’t secret – we’d like to encourage substantive engagement with the thesis of the aff.
Learning to do this at camp is great, and may have equal or even greater utility than practicing a strategy like the Cap K you’re already more familiar with. If you’ve ever thought “what do I do vs. a non-USFG K aff?” our goal was to make that answer as easy as possible to answer.
There are a few distinct strategies you could combine and they all work vs the non-USFG version of the aff:
Terror DA + Case
Speaking for Others
K of Islam (this isn’t “Islam bad,” but rather it’s “Kundnani/Kumar (primary aff authors) treat all Ks of Islam as forms of islamophobia, that’s messed up. It’s also a net benefit to the Word PIC.)
Word PIC out of “Islamophobia”
Very good links to Foucault and Ks of anti-blackness – could be useful on the case even if you don’t read the off-case positions
There is some tension between potential strategies that you should think through as you prepare your strategy. For example, both the Word PIC and Speaking for Others Ks have “discourse first” components that might not work with your framework arguments. This doesn’t mean they both shouldn’t be in the 1nc, but it may be wiser to choose one of those options + case in the block than to go for both.
*Thank you to Emily Chen from GBN, Henry Ferolie from Walter Payton, Riley Franklin from Dulles, Emily Hall from Interlake, Emily Merz from La Costa Canyon, Tamara Morrison from University Prep, Mitchell Pickard from Barstow, Hadar Regev from Johns Creek, Ashton Smith from Maine East and Janai Williams from Groves for all of their hard work in producing this file. Future waves to come.
Most of this is straight forward but two big picture notes quickly –
-- It’s especially important to answer the case with K affs. Central to the 2ac response to everything else (T, DAs, other Ks, etc.) is the 1ac. So many teams just ignore it and it’s dangerous to grant the aff 100% of the aff and only attack it marginally on solvency (i.e. saying USFG action would solve better on the T version without answering whether the aff solves)
-- It’s not terribly difficult to assemble a case frontline vs. a K aff, esp one with a major author (this first wave leans heavily on Arun Kundnani, future waves will involve more Deepa Kumar, etc.)
If there’s a common author it’s not hard to go to your 2ac blocks and repurpose your K answers to deal with it.
That said, Kundnani is relatively new to the scene, so our approach was to research book reviews that challenged the thesis of his work. Em Chen went HAM here.
This stuff is some of the most irreplaceable stuff in the 1nc—make time for it. If you have to shorten your off case positions or, perhaps better, slice one, it’s worth it.
**note – the first card is also in the terror DA link under CT good**
Kundnani’s way off on root cause and the thesis of the aff is bankrupt – history proves
Rashi, 14—freelance journalist and writer for the Huffington Post (Tanjil, 3/16/14, "‘The Muslims are Coming!’, by Arun Kundnani", Financial Times, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/af5ef4c6-aa15-11e3-8bd6-00144feab7de.html)//twemchen
**edited for language
In truth, counterterrorism policies targeting Muslims are a legitimate responseto homegrown extremism, from the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby to the 366 (by one count) British citizens waging jihad in Syria. Furthermore, the victims of the 2005 London bombings bear witness to the reality of radicalism bred at home. At best, Kundnani’s argument is compelling in its dissection of governments’ disproportional responses. He estimates the FBI has one counterterrorism agent per 94 Muslims in the US, which approaches a Stasi-esque ratio of spies to citizens. He shows that authorities keep drawing spurious lists of suspected radicals; one in the UK included almost 300 children under 15. A commonplace at the core of Kundnani’s critique is that radicalism is mainly the byproduct of western foreign policy. “Religion had nothing to do with this,” according to Kundnani, citing a conspirator in the London bombings. This view is undermined by the existence of two generations of British Muslims predating the war on terror – men who fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in Bosnia in the 1990s. The diminution of religion’s role in stoking radicalism is as inaccurate as UK Labour politicians’ denial that wars in Iraq and Afghanistan acted even as recruiting sergeants. Kundnani scrutinises responses to terrorism better than outlining its causes.He probes the mutations of liberalism in the face of Islam, resulting in “war on terror liberals” for whom liberalism “became an ideology of total war”, from the UK Labour party’s interventionist foreign policy to Martin Amis’s innumerate paranoia about Muslim birth rates. Liberals hold up the Enlightenment, conservatives “campaign to defend Judeo-Christian identity” – both banners explicitly excluding Muslims; both groups inclined, Kundnani writes, to see “terrorists motivated by fanaticism inherent to Islam”. History offers correctives to these narratives, demonstrating varieties of Islam being as rooted in rationalism as the Enlightenment; the Enlightenment being as tied to terror as Islam(the word “terrorism” itself was first used during The Terror of the Enlightenment-inspired French revolution). The Muslims are Coming! lacks optimism but there is every reason to be- lieve “Muslim” might one day be suffixed to “Judeo-Christian” when describing the west’s culture and values. Note how one prominent French intellectual writes about Europe’s growing population of a certain religious minority: “All of them are born with raging fanaticism in their hearts.” The author of these unenlightened remarks? Voltaire. His subject? The Jews.
The 1AC’s approach to criticizing Western governments only re-creates the problem
Berger, 14—Associate Professor in International Security, PhD in Political Science (Lars, 3/27/14, "The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on Terror, by Arun Kundnani", Times Higher Education: World University Rankings, https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/books/the-muslims-are-coming-islamophobia-extremism-and-the-domestic-war-on-terror-by-arun-kundnani/2012227.article)//twemchen
One of the central themes in Arun Kundnani’s critique of what he describes as the domestic “war on terror” in the UK and the US is the apparent neglect of, or even taboo against, discussing the role played by the foreign policies of Western governments in bringing about the horrific acts of violence witnessed on the streets of London in July 2005 and May 2013. Kundnani, a US-based scholar of terrorism, is adamant that “what governments call extremism is to a large degree a product of their own wars”. However, there are a number of theoretical and methodological problems with his account. Kundnani is right to highlight methodological concerns about existing studies of Islamist radicalisation, many of which rely on a small number of cases and fail to include control groups of people who share radical ideologies but nevertheless choose not to engage in political violence. But this is not a new insight. Indeed, researchers across Europe have already published plenty of insightful critiques of the theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches of the radicalisation literature. Worse, Kundnani commits the same mistakes when he presents no theoretical justification for his choice of case studies, and fails to explain why the vast majority of Muslims who disagree with the Western foreign policies he sees as potential root causes have not become engaged in political violence. If we look at public opinion polls from across the Muslim world, including Muslim communities in the West, support for violence against Western civilians stands, on average, at between 5 and 10 per cent. But if Kundnani’s assertions are correct, this number should be much higher, given that in some Muslim countries, overwhelming majorities of up to 90 per cent criticise the policies of the US and the West. THERE IS A DANGER THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS CAN END UP TELLING MUSLIMS WHAT THE ‘CORRECT’ INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM IS In fact, it is not perceptions of US foreign policies with respect to Israel or Middle Eastern petroleum resources that shape approval of terrorist violence against US civilians, but the rejection of US culture and some of its most prominent manifestations, such as freedom of expression. This finding may go against the conventional wisdom that Kundnani seems to wish to repackage here as his own insights, but it is quite comprehensible in light of the groundbreaking analysis of anti-Americanisms by scholars Peter Katzenstein and Robert Keohane, in which they differentiate between a view that assesses US foreign policies on their own terms and a view that regards those same policies as reflecting the fundamentally evil nature of US society. When he criticises the Islamophobia peddled by right-wing US and UK media and politicians, Kundnani is more convincing, as is his argument that Western counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the US, should pay greater attention to the more widespread threat of right-wing violence. He is also right to highlight the inherently problematic nature of the attempts of various Western governments to meddle in the politics and discourses of Muslim communities in the name of fighting terrorism. It is important to not turn a blind eye towards radical discourses that can be used to justify political violence against civilians. But there is a danger that Western governments, in an attempt to address the cacophony of voices typical of the decentralised, pluralistic religious discourses in many (Sunni) Muslim communities around the world, can end up telling Muslims what the “correct” interpretation of Islam is. But once again, these are issues that have also already received considerable academic attention, with plenty of excellent analysis ranging from peer-reviewed publications to countless undergraduate essays. In short, Kundnani’s critique of hostility towards Muslims by some Western media and politicians and of Western governments’ interaction with their Muslim communities is convincing, although not wholly original. His highly ideological insistence on the link between Western foreign policies and Islamist terrorism is neither.
Proximate causes outweigh—their epistemology is reductionist and relies on faulty comparisons
Alibhai-Brown, 14—Ugandan-born British journalist and author, research fellow at the Institute for Public Policy Research, founder member of British Muslims for Secular Democracy (Yasmin, 3/7/14, "The Muslims are Coming! by Arun Kundnani, book review: Nothing to fear but Islam itself", The Independent, www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/the-muslims-are-coming-by-arun-kundnani-book-review-nothing-to-fear-but-islam-itself-9174918.html)//twemchen
Arun Kundnani, now a professor at New York University, used to edit Race and Class, the quarterly house journal of the Institute of Race Relations (IRR). For over 40 years the IRR has archived black history, documented and protested against British racism, analysed politics, empire and globalisation. Many of us who became resolute egalitarians were awakened and inspired by the Institute's intellectual activist, A Sivanandan (Siva), now in his eighties. Kundnani, his young disciple, has taken up IRR causes with renewed vigour as they become ever more pressing and concomitantly deeply unpopular. In our times anti-racism ( aka "political correctness gone mad") has been expelled from public discourse and critics of capitalism are considered mad, bad or dangerous. In The End of Tolerance: Racism in the 21st Century (2007) Kundnani broke these sanctions. His template was stridently post-colonial, his politics boldly left wing. It was a well evidenced, powerful study; a classic. This one is equally well researched and written, but much less persuasive. The topic is vital; burning. Since 9/11, Muslims have had to pay over and over for crimes committed by fanatic Islamist militants. Our human rights have been snatched; we are watched, hundreds of thousands of our people tortured and murdered by western states or their Muslim stooges.In the "war on terror" anything goes. Kundnani exposes official duplicities and authorised illegal practices including intimidation, the use of agent provocateurs and extra-judicial killings. He tells the stories of the unheard and unseen. Shamuir Rahman, 19, for example, was recruited by the NYPD to push young Muslims into making inflammatory anti-American statements, part of the force's 'create and capture' strategy; Imam Luqman, suspected of advocating insurrections was not tried but shot dead by FBI agents in Detroit. This is the new wild west, cowboy justice. The UK incarcerates Muslims without any legal process. They, the unnamed, are in a black hole, and don't know if or when they will be charged or released. Facts and figures in the book scythe through presumptions and prejudices. I didn't know that murders in the last decade by the far right exceed those by Jihadis. Or that Republican congressman Peter King who summoned US Muslims to McCarthy-type hearings, was a keen and shouty fundraiser for the IRA in the 1980s. The author also scrutinises various anti-radicalisation government initiatives: some laughable, some Kafkaesque, others reminiscent of Maoist re-education programmes. With so many books written by liberals and Neocons on the "Muslim peril", it is a relief to have an intelligent counter-narrative: "One of the key arguments of this book is that to comprehend the causes of so-called jihadist terrorism, we need to pay as much attention to Western state violence and the identity politics that sustains it, as we do to Islamicist ideology. What governments call extremism is to a large degree a product of their own wars." However, although many of his arguments and details are incontrovertible, I can't go all the way with Kundnani's conclusions and rationales.Some claims aresimply ideological chants or fixations and careless connections are made. The book shifts blithely between Britain and the US. They may be deep allies, but they have different histories and values. From the age of exploration, the UK has had contact with Muslims, for better and worse. Americans, even now, are clueless about the Muslim nations, Islam and its adherents. Also problematic is Kundnani's post-colonial, anti-capitalist framework, which cannot fully explain the traumas of Muslims worldwide. (By the way, Prophet Mohammed worked for his merchant wife, a capitalist). Their aspirations and lives are shattered by "Islamaphobia", occidental domination, aggression and interventions and also corrupt Muslim politicians, low education and technological attainments, rejection of modernity and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states which systematically spread hardline, anti-female, Islamic Puritanism. Muslims are repressed by external and internal brute forces, turning some to rage and murder. Kundnani disregards inconvenient truths, is dismissive of psychological and social reasons for radicalisation, itself a "myth" in his eyes. He is good on the socio-economic history of Muslims in Britain: why they came, the jobs they took up, unemployment, racism, resistance and deep disillusionment. But doesn't explain whyother minorities who have the same troubled history have not become brutal avengers. The murder of Stephen Lawrence is brought in for reasons that are not clear. So too, an attack in 2000 on two Asian brothers at a nightclub in Leeds. Two Leeds United footballers were accused, one convicted but not jailed. We know people of colour are subjected to racist attacks but can't be sure that religious hatred led to the assaults on the brothers. Is Kundnani saying Muslims face different or the same dangers as other black and Asian people in Britain? If Muslims face particular hatreds – which I believe many do – the author needed to focus on those and leave out the victimisation of non-Muslims or explain better than he does, how they fit into his analysis of "Islamaphobia" which means the fear and loathing of Muslims. In my view then, this is a gripping exposition of how the west has made a post-communist enemy and, in some ways, ignited Islamicist terrorism. But Muslims are not simply put upon. They have agency and some spread evil. To complete the story you will have to read the feminist Egyptian writer Nawal el-Saadawi or Samir Kassir, friend of Robert Fisk, the Lebanese author of Being Arab. Kassir was blown up not by Western assassins but by Arab brothers for being honest.
**note – next card is also part of the Islam K**
The radicalization thesis is false—it’s ignores the intricacies of the Muslim culture and fails to analyze extremism globally
Rashid, 14—a Research Associate in the Sociology Department at the University of Manchester, PhD in Sociology from the London School of Economics (Dr. Naaz, May 2014, "Book Review: The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror by Arun Kundnani", The London School of Economics and Political Science, blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2014/07/08/book-review-the-muslims-are-coming-islamophobia-extremism-and-the-domestic-war-on-terror-by-arun-kundnani/)//twemchen
The issue of terrorism continues to dominate the news whether in relation to the allegations of extremism in Birmingham schools or the long term repercussions of young British Muslims going to fight in Syria and Iraq. What links these two stories is the common sense understanding about how people come to commit acts of terrorist violence. In his new book, The Muslims are Coming, Arun Kundnani’s primary focus is the ‘radicalization thesis’ which underpins the moral panics underlying both phenomena. That is, the idea that people become radicalised through exposure to ‘extremist’ ideologies which can then lead them to engage in acts of terrorism. Through his rigorously researched analysis of preventive counterterrorism measures in the UK and US, Kundnani skilfully and articulately deconstructs the central tenets of these dominant discourses regarding radicalisation and extremism. Kundnani’s stated aims are to consider: firstly, how Islamic ideology has come to be regarded as the root cause of terrorism; and secondly, that acceptance of Muslims as citizens is predicated on them (us) distancing themselves from any particular set of ideological beliefs. He argues that “official and popular understandings of terrorism are more a matter of ideological projection and fantasy than of objective assessment.” (p. 17). He suggests that the events in both Boston and Woolwich fit the “current war on terror paradigm of young Muslim men becoming radicalised through their exposure to Islamist ideology”. This is despite the fact that in both instances, although not acting entirely alone, the perpetrators were amateurs with no connection to wider networks or terrorist cells. The transatlantic comparison allows Kundnani to showcase his detailed scholarship of policies, both in theory and in practice, weaving together the continuities and parallels between each country’s experiences. Common to both countries is the underlying belief in ‘the myth of radicalization’. As Kundnani writes, the term was little used prior to 2001, whereas by 2004 it “had acquired its new meaning of a psychological or theological process by which Muslims move toward extremist views”; so much so that by 2010 over 100 articles on the topic were being published in peer-reviewed academic journals each year (p 119). Despite this wealth of research, however, Kundnani argues that the underlying ideological assumptions mean that radicalization scholars systematically fail to address the reality of the political conflicts they claim to understand. Kundnani delineates the divergent histories of the UK and US’s respective Muslim populations in the context of very different, albeit occasionally intertwined, histories of (neo)imperialism, migration, and racial politics. He goes on to suggest, however, that 2005 represented a watershed year in which the 7/7 bombings in London brought the UK into close alignment with the US. As a result, the substantive historical, socio-political and demographic differences fell away and the UK and the US were united, not only in their ideologically inspired military encroachments, but also in their preventive counter terrorism measures against ‘home grown’ terrorism. This is perhaps where it could be argued that the book’s weakness lies. Kundnani’s scrupulous attention to detail that so enriches his critique of the common sense logic regarding the relationship between radicalization and terrorism is absent in this analysis. If, as he argues, the fundamental flaw with the radicalization thesis is its failure to take into account the wider socio- and geo-political context within which such political violence occurs, then equally, in order to assess the outcome of policies based on it, the localised differences between and within the US and UK surely warrant more nuanced analysis. At times he does address US-specific contexts such as the more overt tactics of create and capture used there, which almost amounts to the entrapment of potential terrorists. He also writes a coruscating indictment of Obama’s term in office in which the militaristic jingoism of George Bush has become dangerously banal, bureaucratic, and routine, such that the practice and function of the anti-Muslim racism which has been fostered has rendered invisible “the violence of the US empire” (p 14). On balance, however, the differences between the two countries are flattened out and the differential country-specific impacts of such initiatives remain somewhat unexplored.In the British context for example, the Prevent agenda cannot be assessed in isolation from the community cohesion agenda which preceded it and broader debates on multiculturalism and Britishness which foreground it. An underexplored side effect of the Prevent agenda in the UK is its impact on ‘inter community’ relations given the particularities of the postcolonial British experience. Sikhs have not, for example, been widely ‘misrecognised’ as Muslims in the UK as they have in the US (where the ‘Don’t Freak I’m a Sikh’ campaign emerged). Similarly, it is not clear whether Sikhs in the US have been drawn to far-right groups premised on an anti-Muslim platform as has occurred in the case of the BNP and the EDL in the UK. Given Kundnani’s previous work for the anti-racist left organisation the Institute of Race Relations (IRR) as well as his earlier publications, such as The End of Tolerance and Spooked! – his analysis of such differences would undoubtedly have been astute. Furthermore, the book does not situate the radicalisation debate in relation to the wider cultural pathologisation of Muslims in both countries as well as across the globe, for example, in relation to Muslim women, and the way in which these discourses are so heavily gendered.Nonetheless, given the virulent tenacity with which the violent extremism/radicalisation/counterterrorism discourse matrix permeates the public policy imaginary, in spite of little evidence to support the conceptual framework which underlies it, the book is a very timely intervention. Kundnani draws on a wide range of material to support his case, ranging from the work of Arendt to the analysis of populist representations of terrorism in TV series such as Homeland and South Park. There is also a wealth of research into and analysis of particular cases of counter terrorist activity and interventions which can challenge the established orthodoxies prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic (although these in depth examples might have benefitted from a more conventional bibliography and index). The Muslims are Coming should be required reading for officials and Ministers in the Home Office, Department of Communities & Local Government, the Department of Education, and the Department for Homeland Security, as well as for political commentators everywhere. However, for those engaged in critical studies of the racialised (and gendered) politics of the war on terror, fewer examples and more critical, country-specific analysis of the impact of such measures would have been welcome.