“The Defence of fair dealing in copyright is presently too restricted”
Abstract: The defences of fair dealing and public interest to infringement of copyright have been applied by the courts in a manner which is too restrictive to protect the right to Freedom of Expression in Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. In particular the courts rigid adherence to the ‘Laddie factors’ in its assessment of fairness in the key case of Ashdown v Telegraph Group does not pay sufficient regard to the requirements of Article 10. Article 10 requires consideration of further factors before dismissing the reproduction of a copyright work as unfair. Compliance with Article 10 would be achieved more effectively if the court paid more attention to the nature of the work itself before embarking on a rigid application of the Laddie factors. Where there is an issue of legitimate public concern raised by publication the courts should be hesitant in finding that publication would be unfair.
Introduction. Chapter III of The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) provides a variety of defences to a claim of copyright infringement. The focus of this essay is the defence of fair dealing in Section 30 of the Act and the public interest defence in S.171(3) and their compatibility with the Provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998.
The fair dealing provisions will provide a potential defence to copyright infringement where the defendant can show that his use of the copyright work was fair and that it was for the purpose of criticising or reviewing the work1, or for the purpose of reporting a current event2. There is thus a two stage test for a fair dealing defence to succeed, firstly the defendant must show that the use of the copyright work was for one of the stated purposes and, secondly, it must be shown that the use of the work was fair. There is no definition of what will constitute a ‘fair’ dealing in the Act but it is well established that this is a question of degree3.
Following the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) it now seems that the defences of fair dealing and public interest in the CDPA must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of human rights. Of particular relevance in this context is Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which protects freedom of expression and the right to receive information4.
There is clearly a potential for conflict between the right to freedom of expression and copyright protection, with the need to strike a balance between the right to freedom of expression and the copyright owners right to copyright protection. It is made clear in S.1(1) of the CDPA that copyright is a property right and, as will be seen, this has led the courts to take a restrictive approach to the defences of fair dealing and public interest. It is suggested that this restrictive approach has led to an undue restriction on freedom of expression, and that the courts failure to pay sufficient regard to freedom of expression, when considering defences to copyright infringement, has resulted in these sections of the CDPA being applied in a way that is incompatible with Article 10 of the ECHR.
Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd. The first time that the English courts fully addressed the issue of the impact of the HRA on copyright law was in the case of Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd5, which involved important issues of freedom of expression of the press and the right of the public to receive information of legitimate public interest. The copyright work at issue was the minute of a confidential meeting between Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democrats at the time, and the Prime Minister, concerning the possibility of forming a coalition cabinet and closer cooperation between the two political parties. When Ashdown (the claimant) resigned from his position as party leader in 1999 it became known that he was planning to publish diaries of his political career. Soon after, the defendant newspaper was given a copy of the minute without the claimant’s knowledge or approval, and later published an article containing several verbatim quotations from the minute.
The claimant brought proceedings for copyright infringement and the newspaper sought to rely on defences of fair dealing under S.30(1) and (2) CDPA and public interest under S.171(3) CDPA, along with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. The Court of Appeal found against the newspaper in each of these defences. However, the decision is highly unsatisfactory due to the restrictive approach the Court takes to the fair dealing and public interest defences, and, particularly, for the insufficient regard paid to the right to freedom of expression. There are a number of criticisms that can be made of this decision and this is best approached by looking at the Court’s approach to each of the defences in turn.
The effect on copyright of the Human Rights Act.
The first reference made to the right to freedom of expression was in the newspapers argument that, although the provisions of the CDPA in relation to fair dealing satisfy the requirements in Article 10(2) ECHR, of being ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘for the protection of rights of others’, the Act was incapable of satisfying the requirement of being ‘necessary in a democratic society’. At first instance this argument was rejected with Morritt V-C stating that,
“The provisions of the Act alone can and do satisfy the 3rd requirement of article 10(2) as well. The needs of a democratic society include the recognition and protection of private property… Such property includes copyright”6 This passage provides an early indication of the Court’s approach to the case and shows the unfortunate emphasis that is placed on the protection of private property values over the values of free expression. This led to a finding that the provisions of the CDPA as a whole were adequate to protect the right to freedom of expression, implying that the Human Rights Act is of little relevance to copyright cases. This finding is highly contentious in the sense that Article 10 clearly requires more than a legislative framework which can secure compatibility. This was acknowledged by the Court of Appeal, which stated that in the rare cases when freedom of expression and the protection offered by the CDPA come into conflict, it will be necessary for the court ‘to look closely at the facts of individual cases’7. This would clearly seem to be correct because the freedom of expression in Article 10 is concerned with protecting the rights of individuals to freedom of expression. Therefore, it seems that this must require the court to consider whether Article 10 is satisfied in relation to the facts of the individual case, rather than whether the legislation as a whole is capable of satisfying Article 10.
The acceptance by the Court of Appeal that the Human Rights Act requires a consideration of compatibility on the basis of the facts of the individual case seemingly paved the way for a detailed consideration of the compatibility of the CDPA with Article 10. However, despite this, the court failed to pay any detailed regard to the human rights issues and embarked on a consideration of the defences of public interest and fair dealing, only considering the human rights impact at the end of the judgement, effectively as a mere after-thought.
The Public Interest Argument. The newspaper sought to argue that their reproduction of parts of the minute in their article was justified by the fact that there was a public interest in their publication. The problem with this argument is that S.171(3) CDPA8 provides no definition of what will be in the public interest. At first instance Morritt V-C held that the test was that adopted by Aldous LJ in Hyde Park v Yelland9, that the court’s jurisdiction to refuse to enforce copyright was ‘limited to cases where the enforcement of copyright would offend against the policy of the law’. Unsurprisingly, this narrow test led to the rejection of the public interest defence at first instance in Ashdown.
The Court of Appeal, however, felt that this test was too restrictive and preferred the reasoning of Mance LJ in Hyde Park. He stated that,
“The circumstances in which the public interest may override copyright are probably not capable of precise categorisation or definition”10 The court went on to say that, following the introduction of the Human Rights Act, there was a clear public interest in giving effect to the right of freedom of expression in those rare cases where this right trumps the rights conferred by the CDPA. It acknowledged that in such circumstances S.171(3) would permit the defence of public interest to be raised. Having acknowledged that the public interest can override copyright, and that the Human Rights Act will be a significant influence on when this will be the case, the court ultimately rejected the public interest defence. Without any real consideration of the public interest in freedom of expression
However, Ashdown was arguably a case where the right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive information, required publication of the copyright work. There is clearly a legitimate public interest in the contents of the minute since it relates to a matter of real political importance, namely the future composition of the cabinet. This suggests that the contents of the minute are clearly of importance to the public in the way that it could affect their opinions of the government which it trusts to run the country. In view of this, there is a strong argument that this is a situation where the right to freedom of expression trumps copyright and that the public interest justifies publication of the article, including the quotations taken from the minute of the meeting.
The fair dealing arguments. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that there was a potential defence of fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review under S.30(1) CDPA. It accepted the reasoning of the judge at first instance, that,
“What is required is that the copying shall take place as part of and for the purpose of criticising and reviewing the work. The work is the minute. But the articles are not criticising or reviewing the minute; they are criticising or reviewing the actions of the Prime Minister and Mr Ashdown. It was not necessary for that purpose to copy the minute at all.”11 I would argue this finding in the way that although it is fair to say that the real object of criticism or review in the newspaper articles is the conduct of the Prime Minister and Mr Ashdown, and not the minute itself, this should not automatically preclude a defence of fair dealing under S.30(1). It was held in Hubbard v Vosper that ‘a literary work consists, not only of the literary style, but also of the thoughts underlying it, as expressed in the words. Under the defence of fair dealing both can be criticised.’12 This appears to give rise to an argument that the defendants were entitled to use the minute as part of their criticism of the conduct of the Prime Minister and Mr Ashdown. If the minute is considered to be the literary work then an extension of the principle in Hubbard would suggest that the newspaper are justified in copying parts of the minute for the purpose of criticising the conduct of the claimant as this could be argued to be the thoughts underlying the work. If the purpose of the article is to criticise the conduct of the parties in holding secret meetings regarding political cooperation between them, then the content of the minute is clearly of significant importance in backing up the newspapers criticisms.
The Court of Appeal went on to find that the meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr Ashdown was a current event of interest to the public and that the defendants would therefore have a potential defence of fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events under S.30(2) CDPA, provided that the use of the copyright work was fair. This finding is clearly correct as the nature of this work, i.e. a meeting between two of the most important political figures in the country regarding cooperation between two major political parties, is a matter of real public concern, in that it could affect the way people vote if they know of conduct of the political parties of which they disapprove.
This finding appeared to leave it open for the court to find that the defence of fair dealing under S.30(2) was made out, by analysing the fairness of the defendant’s use of the work with regard to the Human Rights Act. However, the court’s restrictive approach to the assessment of fairness led to an ultimate finding that the defendant’s publication of the quotes from the minute was not fair.
The Court’s Assessment of Fairness. The most important aspect of the decision in Ashdown was the court’s approach to the assessment of fairness. From a human rights point of view, this was also perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the decision. The court began by saying that,
“Section 30 will normally afford the court all the scope that it needs properly to reflect the public interest in freedom of expression and in particular, the freedom of the press. There will then be no need to give separate consideration to the availability of a public interest defence under section 171(3).”13 However, even if the provisions of S.30 are felt to be adequate to resolve the dispute, this does not relieve the court of its obligations to consider the public interest and also whether the right to freedom of expression has been unjustifiably restricted on the facts of the individual case. It is submitted that the public interest justification does require separate consideration, it is after all included in the CDPA as a separate defence which would suggest that the intention when the Act was drafted was that the defence should stand alone. I would also argue that in a case such as this, where there is clearly a public interest in learning of the contents of the minute, public interest requires consideration separately. This is especially the case now that the Human Rights Act requires what is in the public interest to be considered in light of the freedom of expression and the right to receive information protected by Article 10 ECHR. In a case such as this, concerning matters of legitimate public concern, there is a strong argument that the public interest in upholding the freedom of expression should outweigh the need to protect the property rights of the copyright holder. It also seems strange that the court adopted the wider view of public interest in favour of the restrictive view of Aldous LJ in Hyde Park v Yelland14, only to restrict its approach to the public interest by stating that it did not even require separate consideration.
With the court having held earlier in the judgement that compatibility with Art 10 requires a consideration of the facts of individual cases, it may have been expected that the court’s analysis of fairness would involve a consideration of the particular facts of the case in relation to freedom of expression. The Court also warned of the dangers of applying inflexible tests to the assessment of fairness and stated that ‘considerations of public interest are paramount’15 However, Lord Phillips MR then appears to contradict himself by doing exactly what he had warned against, namely applying inflexibly a test based on the ‘Laddie factors’ and failing to pay any real regard to considerations of public interest. The ‘Laddie factors’ can be summarised into three principles which are taken into consideration when assessing fairness. The first consideration is the extent to which the alleged fair dealing is in commercial competition with the copyright work, secondly, whether or not the work has previously been published and, thirdly, the amount and importance of the work that has been taken16.
Assessing Fairness: Commercial Competition. There are a number of criticisms that can be made of the court’s reasoning in relation to each of these three factors. To begin with, the court found that the defendant’s article was in commercial competition with the diaries that Ashdown was intending to publish in the future. The Court of Appeal agreed with Morritt V-C, at first instance, that there was evidence that ‘the publication in the Sunday Telegraph destroyed a part of the value of the memoirs which it had been Mr Ashdown’s intention to sell’. The court also stated that,
“We are in no doubt that the extensive quotations of Mr Ashdown’s own words added a flavour to the description of the events covered which made the article more attractive to read and will have been of significant commercial value in enabling the Sunday Telegraph to maintain, if not enhance, the loyalty of its readership”.17 These findings can both be criticised. Taking first the statement that the article destroyed a part of the value of Ashdown’s memoirs, this finding is suggesting that the use of several quotations from a 15 minute meeting in a newspaper article is in commercial competition with memoirs of Ashdown’s political career, spanning over many years. It is submitted that this surely cannot be the case. If anyone has such an interest in Ashdown’s political career that they would want to buy his memoirs, they are unlikely to change their mind because they have already read about this small section of his career. However significant this meeting may have been, it amounts to a minimal proportion of his career and, although the meeting and the contents of the article are clearly of great public interest, it seems unfair to suggest that extracts of a minute from a short meeting could possibly be in competition with memoirs spanning over a long political career.
As for the use of the quotes making the article more attractive to read and being of ‘significant commercial value’, it is submitted that this consideration receives far greater weight than is warranted on the facts. It should be remembered that the essential nature of a newspaper is that it is a profit-making organisation and that the newspaper has an important function of informing the public of events of legitimate public concern. In deciding that the article was in competition with the memoirs, the court does not consider the important public interest requirement of the need to give effect to the right to freedom of expression.
It can be argued that even if the newspaper does gain a commercial advantage from the use of quotes from the minute, this should not lead to an automatic finding that the use of the quotes was unfair. It is clear from the wording of Article 10(1) ECHR18 that freedom of expression provides a right to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority. In this situation it would seem that the public interest in upholding the right to freedom of expression requires that the publication of the article be allowed, particularly in view of the fact that the contents of the article and the quotes in the minute are of real public concern. The fact that the defendants made a commercial gain from publication should not be conclusive of a finding of unfairness.
If the fact of a commercial gain were to be conclusive then the press would be greatly restricted in the way that they could report events. For example, if a newspaper was not allowed to gain a commercial advantage from their publication of articles containing extracts protected by copyright, then this would effectively prevent the press from using such extracts. Newspapers, by their nature are seeking to gain some form of commercial advantage from any articles they publish, because if they publish articles of interest to their readership then they will clearly be attempting to enhance the loyalty of their readers. This effective ban on the use of copyright works would represent a great restriction on the freedom of expression in the sense that, in the publication of articles such as this, it is necessary for the newspaper to include certain quotations in order to provide the story with credibility and to show that the newspaper is in a position to make an authoritative comment on the story. Without quotations to back up the story of the meeting between Ashdown and the Prime Minister, the article would lose much of its credibility and in such situations, newspapers may feel that a story which lacks authority is not worth publishing. This would represent a major blow to the freedom of the press.
A further criticism can be made from a human rights perspective of this aspect of the judgement and its failure to pay sufficient regard to freedom of expression. The emphasis placed upon the alleged financial loss of the claimant and the commercial gain made by the defendants, shows an underlying desire on the part of the court to reach a result which achieves fairness between the parties to the action. This can be criticised on the basis that Article 10 ECHR requires more than this. Freedom of expression includes a right of the public to receive information19 and, therefore, before concluding that the commercial competition of the two works at issue led to a finding of unfairness, the court should have considered this wider requirement of Article 10 and weighed the public interest in the right to receive information against the property rights of the copyright holder.
Assessing Fairness: Prior Publication. This was another unsatisfactory aspect of the courts judgement, with the court simply stating that the unpublished status of the minute favoured the claimant. However, in one commentary on the case, it is suggested that where there is a public interest in the subject matter of a copyright work, the public interest in the disclosure of that work is likely to be greater where the work is unpublished20. The court also places an emphasis on the fact that the minute was obtained in breach of confidence as a significant factor in suggesting unfairness. However the court fails to consider that in matters of legitimate public concern, the source of the information may be irrelevant if the public interest requires publication of the information. This point is even acknowledged within the ‘Laddie factors’ where it is said that ‘sometimes it is necessary for the purposes of legitimate public controversy to make use of leaked information’21. It is strange that the court should make such a rigid use of the ‘Laddie factors’, but ignores this significant qualification contained therein on the impact of prior publication on the fairness of the use of copyright work. This is an unfortunate omission on the part of the court because Ashdown can easily be argued to be a case where the public controversy involved makes it necessary to use leaked information. Consideration of this factor could have altered the court’s opinion on the fairness of the defendant’s use of the minute.
Assessing Fairness: The Amount and Importance of the Work Taken. In this regard, the court found that the extent of the use ‘weighed against the defence of fair dealing’on the grounds that ‘a substantial portion of the minute was copied’ and that ‘the most important passages in the minute were selected for publication’22. However, in reaching this conclusion, the court gave no reason as to why this was unfair in the circumstances. The court went on to ask,
“Can it be argued that the extensive reproduction of Mr Ashdown’s own words was necessary in order to satisfy the reader that the account given of this meeting with Mr Blair was authoritative? We do not believe that it can. The statement by the Sunday Telegraph that they had obtained the minute coupled with one or two short extracts from it would have sufficed”23 It is submitted that this passage is particularly controversial in terms of placing a restriction on the freedom of expression. The court can be seen to have taken it upon itself to dictate how the defendant newspaper should have approached its reporting of the meeting and its use of the confidential minute. The court has no jurisdiction to do so and, should it be otherwise, the freedom of the press would be greatly undermined. Newspapers would effectively be governed by the courts in how they report events of legitimate public concern. Support for this criticism can be found in the European case of Fressoz v France24. In this case, the European Court of Human Rights held that,
“Article 10 leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to ensure credibility”
This suggests that the newspaper should be free to decide how to use the copyright protected minute in its report of the meeting between Ashdown and the Prime Minister, and throws doubt on the apparent opinion of the Court of Appeal that it can dictate how the newspaper should have written the article in question.
Summary of the Court’s Assessment of Fairness
The consideration of these three factors led the court to find to find that the defence of fair dealing was not made out in Ashdown. This is a highly disappointing outcome in the sense that freedom of expression and the public interest surely requires publication when a matter of such public importance is at stake. Indeed, far from applying the fair dealing provisions in S.30 CDPA in a way that is compatible with the right to freedom of expression, the court in Ashdown can be seen to apply two new pre-conditions before the defence of fair dealing can exist.
These new conditions can be seen in paragraph  of the judgement where it is said that,
“The fair dealing defence under S.30 should lie where the public interest in learning of the very words written by the owner of the copyright is such that publication should not be inhibited by the chilling factor of having to pay damages or account for profits.”
Thus, it is suggested by the court that before a fair dealing defence can succeed there must be a public interest in publication, and that any monetary award made against the defendant would ‘chill’ his expression. These new pre-conditions impose a considerable restriction on the scope of the fair dealing defences and appear to be completely unwarranted by authority. In fact, it has been observed25 that the suggested requirement that there must be a public interest in publication would not have been satisfied by several previous cases where the defence of fair dealing has ultimately succeeded. For example, in BBC v British Sky Broadcasting26,the defence of fair dealing succeeded but it could hardly be said that the public interest demanded publication on a news programme of short highlights from a football match.
This example undermines the court’s assertion that a public interest in publication must exist before a fair dealing defence can succeed and raises the question of why the court sought to impose further restrictions on the defence of fair dealing. It is submitted that this is because of the view of the courts that private property values are predominant to values of free speech. However, this prevailing opinion of the courts surely requires reassessment now, in the light of the European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998.
Conclusions. An analysis of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ashdown v Telegraph Group27 leads to the conclusion that the provisions of the CDPA, in terms of the fair dealing and public interest defences, is not compatible with the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 ECHR. This is a disappointing result, inasmuch as this was the first time that the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression was argued fully before an English court. It was a good opportunity for the Court of Appeal to apply an interpretation of the fair dealing defences which was compatible with the right to freedom of expression. Unfortunately, from the human rights point of view at least, the court chose to uphold the property right of Mr Ashdown over the right of freedom of expression and the public right to receive this information, with a clear emphasis on achieving fairness between the parties rather than the wider consideration of the right of the public to receive information as provided by Article 10 ECHR. This result was largely due to the court’s inflexible application of the ‘Laddie factors’ test. If the court had adopted a more flexible approach and not attached such weight to its findings based on the ‘Laddie factors’ test, it is possible that a more favourable result could have been reached.
However, it is submitted that this incompatibility between the fair dealing defence and the right to freedom of expression is not down to any fault in the CDPA itself, but is due to the overly restrictive approach taken by the courts to the application of the defence. It is possible that a slightly different approach by the courts to the assessment of fairness for the purposes of S.30 could bring the defence of fair dealing into line with the Convention right to freedom of expression without any need for legislative reform of copyright law.
Two additional considerations are identified by Griffiths28 which should be taken into account in any assessment of fairness, and it is suggested that the application of these two factors could secure compliance with the right to freedom of expression. Firstly, he notes that the court failed to take account of the subject matter of the defendant’s article. This would appear to be a matter of common sense. It seems that the most relevant consideration in determining the fairness of an article would be the subject matter of that article itself. In this case, the subject matter of the article is clearly of real public importance and this should weigh in favour of the article’s fairness. The article contains revelations of conduct of two senior political figures in the country which is unarguably a matter of legitimate public interest. In view of this it seems difficult to believe that the court failed to take this hugely relevant consideration into account.
In relation to the subject matter of the defendant’s article Griffiths further suggests that when publication raises issues of legitimate public concern the courts should apply a strong presumption in favour of the defendant29. This would help to give effect to the Article 10 right in the way that in cases such as Ashdown where there is a legitimate public concern in publication, there would be a heavy burden of proof placed upon the copyright owner to show that use of his work is unfair. In issues of such public concern as the contents of the minute in Ashdown, it is submitted that this burden of proof could only be discharged where there was overwhelming evidence that the defendant’s use of the work was unfair, and that this unfairness outweighed the public interest in publication.
The second factor which Griffiths identifies as a relevant consideration which the Court of Appeal failed to address is the nature of the claimant’s work. He cites Kenrick v Lawrence30 as authority for the proposition that ‘Greater protection is granted to works invested with a higher degree of labour and skill and relatively simple works receive a thinner form of protection’. The minute in Ashdown would be a clear example of a work deserving only this ‘thinner’ form of protection. There was no great labour or skill expended in its creation, it was simply a record of a meeting which was later typed up by Mr. Ashdown’s secretary. In view of this, it could be argued on the facts of this case that the claimant’s copyright claim over the minute is likely to be outweighed by the strength of the defendant’s claim that publication was fair. There is a legitimate public interest here in publication and the weakness of the copyright claim of Mr. Ashdown cannot justify such an oppressive restriction on the right to freedom of expression enjoyed by the newspaper. Therefore, it seems likely that a consideration of the nature of the claimant’s work in this case would point towards a finding of fairness.31 Ashdown v Telegraph could be taken as demonstrating that the fair dealing defences are too restricted for the purpose of giving effect to the right of freedom of expression. However, it is suggested that this is simply down to the prevailing emphasis of the courts on protecting private property values over values of free speech. Unfortunately the court chose to follow a rigid application of the ‘Laddie factors’ in assessing fairness. It is submitted that this test, by itself, has been shown by Ashdown to be completely unsuited to cases which involve serious issues of public interest and freedom of expression. This is partly because these three factors consider only the conduct of the two parties to the case, there is no account of wider considerations such as the right of the public to receive information under Article 10(1) ECHR.
This is not to suggest that the ‘Laddie factors’ are irrelevant, it is simply argued that the ‘Laddie test’ on its own is inadequate to protect the right of freedom of expression, and should not be considered as conclusive in the assessment of fairness for the purposes of S.30. If the additional factors proposed by Griffiths and considered above are taken into account, then this could help relieve the tension between copyright protection and freedom of expression. These factors consider, on the basis of the individual case, whether the nature of the claimants work and the subject matter of the defendant’s article lead towards a finding of fairness or otherwise. This allows a consideration of public interest factors, and the suggested presumption in favour of the defendant in cases involving legitimate public concern means that any restriction on freedom of expression would require strong justification.
It is submitted that this approach to the assessment of fairness would result in a less restrictive approach to allowing use of copyright works to report matters of legitimate public concern. This would thereby bring the fair dealing provisions in S.30 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act into line with the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Christie A and Gare S, Statutes on Intellectual Property Law, 5th edition, 2001, Blackstones.
Davis J, Intellectual Property Law, 2001, Butterworths.
Burrell R, Reining in Copyright: Is Fair Use the Answer?, (2001) 4 Intellectual Property Quarterly 361.
Griffiths J, Copyright Law After Ashdown- Time to Deal Fairly With the Public, (2002) 3 Intellectual Property Quarterly 240.
Joseph L, Human Rights Versus Copyright: The Paddy Ashdown Case, (2002), 13(3) Entertainment Law Review 72.
Cases: Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd  EMLR 44 (High Court)
Ashdown v Telegraph Ltd  2 All ER 370 (Court of Appeal)
British Broadcasting Corporation v British Sky Broadcasting  Ch. 141
Fressoz & Roire v France (2001) 31 EHRR
Hubbard v Vosper  2 QB 84
Hyde Park Residence v Yelland  Ch 143
Kenrick v Lawrence (1890) 25 QBD 99
1 S.30(1) CDPA: Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.
2 S.30(2) CDPA: Fair dealing with a work (other than a photograph) for the purpose of reporting current events does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.
3 Hubbard v Vosper  2 QB 84
4Article 10 ECHR:
(1) Everybody has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
5  EMLR 44
6  2 All ER 370 at .
7 Lord Phillips MR at para 
8 S.171(3) CDPA: Nothing in this part affects any rule of law preventing or restricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public interest or otherwise.
9 Hyde Park Residence v Yelland  Ch 143, para