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1 His main arguments are:
FP has made no significant progress within the last 2500 years.
FP has contributed hardly anything to phenomena like memory, mental illnesses, ...
There is very little hope that the concepts of FP can be embedded within the theories of other sciences.
2 Propositonal modularity means that mental states are functionally discrete, causally active and semantically interpretable.
3 The following arguments can also be used but to a lesser extent against eliminativism itself. This should be obvious as both semi-realism and eliminativism rely on intentional states being non-reducible.
4 Strong AI claims that it will be possible to build robots to which we can successfully ascribe `thoughts` and understanding.
5 Jerry Fodor is convinced that his representational theory brings about intentionality. Physicists like Roger Penrose in contrast are certain that a new theory of physics is necessary to explain semantically interpretable understanding.
6 Ansgar Beckermann has pointed out that Dennett has become increasingly cautious in how widely applicable his theory in fact is.