Instrumentalism, Semi-Realism and Causality Comparing Dennett´s view of the function of folk psychology with the Theory-Theory

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In this essay I have outlined that Dennett´s theory hinges on the fact that intentional states cannot be causally active. I have then analyzed the causality-issue on two different levels: Firstly, Stich`s objection that we use intentional states as if they were causally active and secondly that it is likely that at least some intentional states like `knowings` or states we will ascribe to future (why future? Deep blue is present!) chess computers have a correspondence on the functional level and thus are causally efficacious. Therefore it seems that the theory-theory by granting FP to pick out ontologically real states, is not such a bad theory at all. On a weaker reading Dennett´s theory is though very enlightening as it explains why and how we ascribe intentional states to complex systems and how we might continue to use these after many of them have been eliminated by neuroscience.

Die logischen Schlüsse sind nicht nachvollziehbar ohne den entsprechenden “Background”. Aber bis zu einem gewissen Grad ist das nachvollziehbar.
(Seitenzahlen einfügen)

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