Imperialism Neg

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1. Plan doesn’t solve the impact of the advantages – imperialism is a pervasive problem of US dominance across the globe, the plan only removes bases from Japan, there’s no reason why Japan is the key point of US imperialism.
2. The U.S. mischaracterized as an empire—reciprocal economic partnerships and democratic agreements are the norm.

Ikenberry, 04. Professor of Geopolitics. G. John Ikenberry. “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.
Is the United States an empire? If so, Ferguson's liberal empire is a more persuasive portrait than is Johnson's military empire. But ultimately, the notion of empire is misleading -- and misses the distinctive aspects of the global political order that has developed around U.S. power. The United States has pursued imperial policies, especially toward weak countries in the periphery. But U.S. relations with Europe, Japan, China, and Russia cannot be described as imperial, even when "neo" or "liberal" modifies the term. The advanced democracies operate within a "security community" in which the use or threat of force is unthinkable. Their economies are deeply interwoven. Together, they form a political order built on bargains, diffuse reciprocity, and an array of intergovernmental institutions and ad hoc working relationships. This is not empire; it is a U.S.-led democratic political order that has no name or historical antecedent.To be sure, the neoconservatives in Washington have trumpeted their own imperial vision: an era of global rule organized around the bold unilateral exercise of military power, gradual disentanglement from the constraints of multilateralism, and an aggressive effort to spread freedom and democracy. But this vision is founded on illusions of U.S. power. It fails to appreciate the role of cooperation and rules in the exercise and preservation of such power. Its pursuit would strip the United States of its legitimacy as the preeminent global power and severely compromise the authority that flows from such legitimacy. Ultimately, the neoconservatives are silent on the full range of global challenges and opportunities that face the United States. And as Ferguson notes, the American public has no desire to run colonies or manage a global empire. Thus, there are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era. Ultimately, the empire debate misses the most important international development of recent years: the long peace among great powers, which some scholars argue marks the end of great-power war. Capitalism, democracy, and nuclear weapons all help explain this peace. But so too does the unique way in which the United States has gone about the business of building an international order. The United States' success stems from the creation and extension of international institutions that have limited and legitimated U.S. power.
3. Hegemony doesn’t equate to empire—other nations can choose to disengage from US security guarantees.

Ikenberry, 04. Professor of Geopolitics. G. John Ikenberry. “Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004.

Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb.

Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often reinforce fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security partner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading.

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4. There is no internal link to the impact – the 1AC Johnson evidence simply says that US bases cause environmental harm – this is not the functional equivalent of imperialism. Saying that it is trivializes the actual victims of colonialism and imperialism.
5. Global pluralism makes empire impossible—the US has influence but not the control described by the negative.

Zelikow, 03 “Transformation of National Security” Philip Zelikow. Professor of History and Public Affairs, University of Virginia. National Interest, Summer 2003, pg. 18-10 Lexis).
But these imperial metaphors, of whatever provenance, do not enrich our understanding; they impoverish it. They use a metaphor of how to rule others when the problem is how to persuade and lead them. Real imperial power is sovereign power. Sovereigns rule, and a ruler is not just the most powerful among diverse interest groups. Sovereignty means a direct monopoly control over the organization and use of armed might. It means direct control over the administration of justice and the definition thereof. It means control over what is bought and sold, the terms of trade and the permission to trade, to the limit of the ruler's desires and capacities. In the modern, pluralistic world of the 21st century, the United States does not have anything like such direct authority over other countries, nor does it seek it. Even its informal influence in the political economy of neighboring Mexico, for instance, is far more modest than, say, the influence the British could exert over Argentina a hundred years ago. The purveyors of imperial metaphors suffer from a lack of imagination, and more, from a lack of appreciation for the new conditions under which we now live. It is easier in many respects to communicate images in a cybernetic world, so that a very powerful United States does exert a range of influences that is quite striking. But this does not negate the proliferating pluralism of global society, nor does it suggest a will to imperial power in Washington. The proliferation of loose empire metaphors thus distorts into banal nonsense the only precise meaning of the term imperialism that we have. The United States is central in world politics today, not omnipotent. Nor is the U.S. Federal government organized in such a fashion that would allow it to wield durable imperial power around the world-it has trouble enough fashioning coherent policies within the fifty United States. Rather than exhibiting a confident will to power, we instinctively tend, as David Brooks has put it, to "enter every conflict with the might of a muscleman and the mentality of a wimp." We must speak of American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let us stop talking of American empire, for there is and there will be no such thing.

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6. There’s no internal link to biopolitics or the Dillon card – the plan links to biopolitics more than the status quo. Their calculative logic evidence says that using the state itself is bad. The plan does not remove or solve that logic.
7. Criticizing benevolent action on the grounds of imperialism undermines liberation of oppressed people – imperialism is justified in some instances.

Shaw, 2 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era, 4-7-2002, AFM)
Conclusion: The abuses of anti-imperialism It is worth asking how the politics of anti-imperialism distorts Western leftists' responses to global struggles for justice. John Pilger, for example, consistently seeks to minimise the crimes of Milosevic in Kosovo, and to deny their genocidal character - purely because these crimes formed part of the rationale for Western intervention against Serbia. He never attempted to minimise the crimes of the pro-Western Suharto regime in the same way. The crimes of quasi-imperial regimes are similar in cases like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, but the West's attitudes towards them are undeniably uneven and inconsistent. To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy, rather than the demands for justice of the victims of oppression as such, distorts our responses to the victims and our commitment to justice. We need to support the victims regardless of whether Western governments take up their cause or not; we need to judge Western power not according to a general assumption of 'new imperialism' but according to its actual role in relation to the victims. The task for civil society in the West is not, therefore to oppose Western state policies as a matter of course, à la Cold War, but to mobilise solidarity with democratic oppositions and repressed peoples, against authoritarian, quasi-imperial states. It is to demand more effective global political, legal and military institutions that genuinely and consistently defend the interests of the most threatened groups. It is to grasp the contradictions among and within Western elites, conditionally allying themselves with internationalising elements in global institutions and Western governments, against nationalist and reactionary elements. The arrival in power of George Bush II makes this discrimination all the more urgent. In the long run, we need to develop a larger politics of global social democracy and an ethic of global responsibility that address the profound economic, political and cultural inequalities between Western and non-Western worlds. We will not move far in these directions, however, unless we grasp the life-and-death struggles between many oppressed peoples and the new local imperialisms, rather than subsuming all regional contradictions into the false synthesis of a new Western imperialism.

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8. Post-structuralist critiques of security are incapable of making material change in the world – they leave the victims of violence helpless and leave power where it is in the world
Booth 2005 (Ken, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales–Aberystwyth,

Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 270-71, footnote on 277)

Postmodern/poststructural engagement with the subject of security in international relations has been characterized by some of the general problems of the genre, notably obscurantism, relativism, and faux radicalism.26 What has particularly troubled critics of the postmodern sensibility has been the latter's underlying conception of politics.27 Terry Eagleton, for one, has praised the "rich body of work" by postmodern writers in some areas but at the same time has contested the genre's "cultural relativism and moral conventionalism, its scepticism, pragmatism and localism, its distaste for ideas of solidarity and disciplined organization, [and] its lack of any adequate theory of political agency."28 Eagleton made these comments as part of a general critique of the postmodern sensibility, but I would argue that specific writing on security in international relations from postmodern and poststructuralist perspectives has generally done nothing to ease such concerns. Eagleton's fundamental worry was how postmodernism would "shape up" to the test of fascism as a serious political challenge. Other writers, studying particular political contexts, such as postapartheid South Africa, have shown similar worries; they have questioned the lack of concrete or specific resources that such theories can add to the repertoire of reconstruction strategies.29 Richard A. Wilson, an anthropologist interested in human rights, has generalized exactly the same concern, namely, that the postmodernist rejection of metanarratives and universal solidarities does not deliver a helpful politics to people in trouble. As he puts it, "Rights without a metanarrative are like a car without seat-belts; on hitting the first moral bump with ontological implications, the passenger's safety is jeopardised."30 The struggle within South Africa to bring down the institutionalized racism of apartheid benefited greatly from the growing strength of universal human rights values (which delegitimized racism and legitimized equality) and their advocacy by groups in different countries and cultures showing their political solidarity in material and other ways. Anxiety about the politics of postmodernism and poststructuralism is provoked, in part, by the negative conceptualization of security projected by their exponents. The poststructuralist approach seems to assume that security cannot be common or positive-sum but must always be zero-sum, with somebody's security always being at the cost of the insecurity of others. At the same time, security itself is questioned as a desirable goal for societies because of the assumption of poststructuralist writers that the search for security is necessarily conservative and will result in negative consequences for somebody. They tend also to celebrate insecurity, which I regard as a middle-class affront to the truly insecure.31 Cut to footnote on page 277— 31. Examples of the approach are Dillon, The Politics of Security; and Der Derian, “The Value of Security,” in Lipschutz (ed.), On Security. In the shadow of such views, it is not surprising that the postmodern/poststructuralist genre is sometimes seen as having affinities with realism. Political realists and poststructuralists seem to share a fatalistic view that humans are doomed to insecurity; regard the search for emancipation as both futile and dangerous; believe in a notion of the human condition; and relativize norms. Both leave power where it is in the world: deconstruction and deterrence are equally static theories.

9. Not all biopolitics bring about genocide—it trivializes Nazism to say that all enactments of the state of exception are equivalent.

Rabinow & Rose 03 (Paul, Professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley, Nikolas, Professor of Sociology @ the London School of Economics, “Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today,” December 10, 2003, pdf/RabinowandRose-BiopowerToday03.pdf, pg. 8-9)
Agamben takes seriously Adorno’s challenge “how is it possible to think after Auschwitz?” But for that very reason, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to apply Schmitt’s concept of the state of exception and Foucault’s analysis of biopower to every instance where living beings enter the scope of regulation, control and government. The power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this is not to say that this form of power commands backed up by the ultimate threat of death is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Unlike Agamben, we do not think that : the jurist the doctor, the scientist, the expert, the priest depend for their power over life upon an alliance with the State (1998: 122). Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyze every contemporary instance of thanato-politics from Rwanda to the epidemic of AIDS deaths across Africa. Surely the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make distinctions that can facilitate judgment and action.

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10. Viewing calculative thought as equivalent to domination ensures total political paralysis.

Bronner, 04 Stephen Eric Bronner, Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, 2004, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement, p. 3-5
Instrumental reason” was seen as merging with what Marx termed the “commodity form” underpinning capitalist social relations. Everything thereby became subject to the calculation of costs and benefits. Even art and aesthetic tastes would become defined by a “culture industry”—intent only upon maximizing profits by seeking the lowest common denominator for its products. Instrumental rationality was thus seen as stripping the supposed­ly “autonomous” individual, envisioned by the philosophes, of both the means and the will to resist manipulation by totalitarian movements. En­lightenment now received two connotations: its historical epoch was grounded in an anthropological understanding of civilization that, from the first, projected the opposite of progress. This gave the book its power: Horkheimer and Adorno offered not simply the critique of some prior his­torical moment in time, but of all human development. This made it possi­ble to identify enlightenment not with progress, as the philistine bourgeois might like to believe, but rather—unwittingly—with barbarism, Auschwitz, and what is still often called “the totally administered society.” Such is the picture painted by Dialectic of Enlightenment.. But it should not be forgotten that its authors were concerned with criticizing enlightenment generally, and the historical epoch known as the Enlightenment in particular, from the standpoint of enlightenment itself: thus the title of the work. Their masterpiece was actually “intended to prepare the way for a positive notion of enlightenment, which will release it from entanglement in blind domina­tion.”4 Later, in fact, Horkheimer and Adorno even talked about writing a se­quel that would have carried a title like “Rescuing the Enlightenment” (Ret­tung der Aufklarung).5 This reclamation project was never completed, and much time has been spent speculating about why it wasn’t. The reason, I be­lieve, is that the logic of their argument ultimately left them with little positive to say. Viewing instrumental rationality as equivalent with the rationality of domination, and this rationality with an increasingly seamless bureaucratic order, no room existed any longer for a concrete or effective political form of opposition: Horkheimer would thus ultimately embrace a quasi-religious “yearning for the totally other” while Adorno became interested in a form of aesthetic resistance grounded in “negative dialectics.” Their great work initiated a radical change in critical theory, but its metaphysical subjectivism sur­rendered any systematic concern with social movements and political insti­tutions. Neither of them ever genuinely appreciated the democratic inheritance of the Enlightenment and thus, not only did they render critique independent of its philosophical foundations,6 but also of any practical inter­est it might serve. Horkheimer and Adorno never really grasped that, in contrast to the sys­tem builder, the blinkered empiricist, or the fanatic, the philosophe always evidenced a “greater interest in the things of this world, a greater confidence in man and his works and his reason, the growing appetite of curiosity and the growing restlessness of the unsatisfied mind—all these things form less a doctrine than a spirit.”7 Just as Montesquieu believed it was the spirit of the laws, rather than any system of laws, that manifested the commitment to jus­tice, the spirit of Enlightenment projected the radical quality of that commit­ment and a critique of the historical limitations with which even its best thinkers are always tainted. Empiricists may deny the existence of a “spirit of the times.” Nevertheless, historical epochs can generate an ethos, an existen­tial stance toward reality, or what might even be termed a “project” uniting the diverse participants in a broader intellectual trend or movement. The Enlightenment evidenced such an ethos and a peculiar stance toward reality with respect toward its transformation. Making sense of this, howev­er, is impossible without recognizing what became a general stylistic com­mitment to clarity, communicability, and what rhetoricians term “plain speech.” For their parts, however, Horkheimer and Adorno believed that re­sistance against the incursions of the culture industry justified the extreme­ly difficult, if not often opaque, writing style for which they would become famous—or, better, infamous. Their esoteric and academic style is a far cry from that of Enlightenment intellectuals who debated first principles in pub­lic, who introduced freelance writing, who employed satire and wit to demol­ish puffery and dogma, and who were preoccupied with reaching a general audience of educated readers: Lessing put the matter in the most radical form in what became a popular saying—”Write just as you speak and it will be beautiful”—while, in a letter written to D’Alembert in April of 1766, Voltaire noted that “Twenty folio volumes will never make a revolution: it’s the small, portable books at thirty sous that are dangerous. If the Gospel had cost 1,200 sesterces, the Christian religion would never have been established.”9 Appropriating the Enlightenment for modernity calls for reconnecting with the vernacular. This does not imply some endorsement of anti-intellectualism. Debates in highly specialized fields, especially those of the natural sciences, obviously demand expertise and insisting that intellectuals must “reach the masses” has always been a questionable strategy. The sub­ject under discussion should define the language in which it is discussed and the terms employed are valid insofar as they illuminate what cannot be said in a simpler way. Horkheimer and Adorno, however, saw the matter differ­ently. They feared being integrated by the culture industry, avoided political engagement, and turned freedom into the metaphysical-aesthetic preserve of the connoisseur. They became increasingly incapable of appreciating the egalitarian impulses generated by the Enlightenment and the ability of its advocates—Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and Rousseau—to argue clearly and with a political purpose.1’ Thus, whether or not their “critical” enterprise was “dialectically” in keeping with the impulses of the past, its assumptions prevented them from articulating anything positive for the present or the future.

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Criticizing Western “imperialism” obscures more insidious practices by regional powers

Shaw, 2 (Martin Shaw, professor of international relations at University of Sussex, Uses and Abuses of Anti-Imperialism in the Global Era, 4-7-2002, AFM)
It is fashionable in some circles, among which we must clearly include the organizers of this conference, to argue that the global era is seeing 'a new imperialism' - that can be blamed for the problem of 'failed states' (probably among many others). Different contributors to this strand of thought name this imperialism in different ways, but novelty is clearly a critical issue. The logic of using the term imperialism is actually to establish continuity between contemporary forms of Western world power and older forms first so named by Marxist and other theorists a century ago. The last thing that critics of a new imperialism wish to allow is that Western power has changed sufficiently to invalidate the very application of this critical concept. Nor have many considered the possibility that if the concept of imperialism has a relevance today, it applies to certain aggressive, authoritarian regimes of the non-Western world rather than to the contemporary West.  In this paper I fully accept that there is a concentration of much world power - economic, cultural, political and military - in the hands of Western elites. In my recent book, Theory of the Global State, I discuss the development of a 'global-Western state conglomerate' (Shaw 2000). I argue that 'global' ideas and institutions, whose significance characterizes the new political era that has opened with the end of the Cold War, depend largely - but not solely - on Western power. I hold no brief and intend no apology for official Western ideas and behaviour. And yet I propose that the idea of a new imperialism is a profoundly misleading, indeed ideological concept that obscures the realities of power and especially of empire in the twenty-first century. This notion is an obstacle to understanding the significance, extent and limits of contemporary Western power. It simultaneously serves to obscure many real causes of oppression, suffering and struggle for transformation against the quasi-imperial power of many regional states. I argue that in the global era, this separation has finally become critical. This is for two related reasons. On the one hand, Western power has moved into new territory, largely uncharted -- and I argue unchartable -- with the critical tools of anti-imperialism. On the other hand, the politics of empire remain all too real, in classic forms that recall both modern imperialism and earlier empires, in many non-Western states, and they are revived in many political struggles today. Thus the concept of a 'new imperialism' fails to deal with both key post-imperial features of Western power and the quasi-imperial character of many non-Western states. The concept overstates Western power and understates the dangers posed by other, more authoritarian and imperial centres of power. Politically it identifies the West as the principal enemy of the world's people, when for many of them there are far more real and dangerous enemies closer to home. I shall return to these political issues at the end of this paper.

The US focuses on spreading democracy- their claims of empire are outdated.

Boot, 03 (“Neither new nor nefarious: the liberal empire strikes back” Max Boot, fellow of the Council of foreign relations, Current History, Vol. 102, Iss. 667; pg. 361 Nov. 2003. Pro Quest)
If the Europeans, with their long tradition of colonialism, have found the price of empire too high, what chance is there that Americans, whose country was born in a revolt against empire, will replace the colonial administrators of old?

Not much. The kind of imperial missions that the United States is likely to undertake today are very different. The Europeans fought to subjugate "natives"; Americans will fight to bring them democracy and the rule of law. (No one wants to put Iraq or Afghanistan permanently under the Stars and Stripes.) European rule was justified by racial prejudices; American interventions are justified by self-defense and human rights doctrines accepted (at least in principle) by all signatories to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. European expeditions were unilateral; American missions are usually blessed with international approval, whether from the United Nations, NATO, or simply an ad hoc coalition. Even the US intervention in Iraq this year, widely held to be "unilateral," enjoys far more international support (and hence legitimacy) than, say, the French role in Algeria in the 1950s.

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Only concrete action can prevent mass suffering
Ling ‘01

(LHM, Professor, The New School, New York, Post-Colonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia and the West)

Without concrete action for change, postmodernism's `dissident voices' have remained bracketed, disconnected, not really real. In maintaining `a criti­cal distance' or `position offshore' from which to `see the possibility of change' (Shapiro, 1992: 49), the postmodern critic brushed off too conveniently the immediate cries of those who know they are burning in the hells of exploitation, racism, sexism, starvation, civil war, and the like but who have few means or strategies to deal with them. What hope do they have of overthrowing the shackles of sovereignty without a program of action? After all, asked Mark Neufeld, `What is political without partisanship?' (Neufeld, 1994: 31). In not answering these questions, postmodernists recycled, despite their avowals to the contrary, the same sovereign outcome as (neo)realism: that is, discourse divorced from prac­tice, analysis from policy, deconstruction from reconstruction, particulars from universals, and critical theory from problem-solving. Dissident international relations could not accommodate an interactive, articulating, self-generative Other. Its exclusive focus on the Western Self en­sured, instead, (neo)realism's sovereignty by relegating the Other to a familiar, subordinate identity: that is, as a mute, passive reflection of the West or utopian projection of the West's dissatisfaction with itself. Critique became romanti­cized into a totalizing affair - especially for those who must bear the brunt of its repercussions. bell hooks asked, appropriately: `[s]hould we not be suspicious of postmodern critiques of the "subject" when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time?' (hooks, 1990: 28) Without this recognition, postmodernists ended up marginalizing, silencing, and exiling precisely those who are `the greatest vic­tims of the West's essentialist conceits (the excolonials and neocolonials, Blacks, women, and so forth)' (Krishna, 1993: 405). Worse yet, added Roger Spegele, dissidence as offshore observation has `freed us from the recognition that we have a moral obligation to do anything about it' (Spegele, 1992: 174).

Realism cannot be simply rejected – it is a permanent part of the thinking of foreign policy elites
Guzzini ‘98

(Stefano, Prof – Central European U, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, p. 22)

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we ­cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they should lose the capacity to understand the language of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary this understanding as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

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