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China is challenging U.S. hegemony in the pacific

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China is challenging U.S. hegemony in the pacific

Peter, Buxbaum “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific” 5/21/10 Online @ http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html ghs ls

China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it."
China’s been modernizing for years- U.S. deterrence is clearly necessary.

Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Matthew G. McKinzie, members of The Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. November 2006.

That modernization, the 2006 QDR explained, “has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios.” The “pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” China’s large-scale investments in offensive capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, more advanced submarines, and “strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systemsdirectly affect U.S. military force requirements and “place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.”2
China War Impact
U.S.-China nuclear slapfights result in millions of casualties- two scenarios.

Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, Matthew G. McKinzie, members of The Federation of American Scientists & The Natural Resources Defense Council. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. November 2006.

We conclude the report with a section that describes two nuclear strike scenarios (and several potential Chinese options) and calculates the casualties that both sides would suffer as a result. The simulations show with chilling clarity that while the nuclear capabilities of the two countries are quite different, the civilian casualties resulting from the use of just a small part of either country’s nuclear arsenal would be overwhelming. Whether the strategy is one of “countervalue” or “counterforce,” and whether the missiles are inaccurate or accurate, tens of millions of innocent people would die and more would suffer in a nuclear attack against either country. Our first scenario concludes that 1.5 million to 26 million causalities would result from a U.S. attack on Chinese ICBMs, depending upon the type and number of warheads used. Strike plans maintained by the Pentagon probably include options for significantly larger attacks. The declassified documents we examined reveal that nuclear war planning against China traditionally has involved much larger strikes against a broad range of facilities. Even so, the Pentagon has advocated – and the White House has authorized – additional nuclear planning against China. It is hard to see where deterrence ends and nuclear warfighting begins, but with U.S. planners pursuing “more discriminate capabilities for selected target types through lower yields, improved accuracy, and enhanced penetration,” the quest of the never sufficiently “credible deterrent” seems to be entering its next phase.26 Our second scenario concludes that 15 million to 40 million causalities would result from a Chinese attack on 20 populous U.S. cities. As if that is not enough, China is in the final phase of a nuclear facelift that the U.S. intelligence community has predicted will result in 75 to 100 warheads “primarily targeted” against the United States by 2015. Whether this projection will come true is not certain, but Chinese leaders apparently have decided that its antiquated long-range ballistic missile force is becoming vulnerable and a new generation of ICBMs is needed to ensure the credibility of China’s minimum deterrent. Our calculations show that the increase in warheads anticipated by the U.S. intelligence community could potentially hold as many as 75 major U.S. cities at risk and inflict more than 50 million casualties.

A2: China

Social Turmoil, Unemployment and impending leadership change prevent China from challenging U.S. hegemony

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry, Survival, 52: 4,

Despite its magnitude, Beijing’s stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in unemployment. The regime acknowledges that upwards of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even before the crisis hit, the number of so-called ‘mass incidents’ (such as riots or strikes) reported each year in China had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, Beijing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number of labour disputes brought before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was, ‘without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents’.12 In anticipation of an expected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot-control tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing’s troubles will mount. The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party’s leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent ‘might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage’ using ‘populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the party’s seemingly unified upper ranks’.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012.
China is peaceful and doesn’t seek to disrupt the international system
Hachigian, Nina and Peng, Yuan ( a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Director of the Institute for American Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing, ) 2010 “The US-China Expectations Gap: An Exchange”, Survival, 52: 4, 67-86
The international system is currently undergoing a fundamental change. The new international order requires that all the big powers cooperate with each other. The United States, as the only superpower, must assume an especially important role, and China as a rising power should also take its place. But peaceful coexistence is a precondition for peaceful cooperation. China does not intend to challenge US hegemony, nor to change the current international system. On the contrary, it aims to build a good relationship with America through gradual and constructive cooperation, as it achieves its peaceful rise.

A2: China – Economics

Beijing’s response to financial crisis destroys economic capability

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry, Survival, 52: 4,


Whether or not China can sustain its initial recovery remains to be seen. At least in the near term, Beijing responded to the crisis by doubling down on a development model that was already approaching the limits of its utility. Rather than taking aggressive steps to boost consumer spending as a share of GDP, a course that both outside experts and many Chinese officials have identified as essential to sustaining long-term growth, the regime chose initially to pump even more money into infrastructure projects and to provide both direct and indirect support for a variety of export industries.6 While this approach may have been effective in preventing an even steeper shortterm drop in output, it threatens to create massive excess capacity, fuelling asset bubbles, weighing down banks with more non-performing loans and setting the stage for another slowdown that will be even deeper and more difficult to manage. As economist Stephen Roach points out, Beijing appears to have acted on the assumption that, as in previous recessions, foreign (and especially US) demand would soon recover, leading to a rise in exports and a resumption of rapid growth. If this turns out not to be the case, however, Roach concludes that China ‘runs the real risk of facing a more pronounced shortfall in economic growth’.7 In sum, short-term expedients may end up hastening the day of reckoning for China’s investment-heavy, export-led development strategy. While the regime has recently taken steps to encourage domestic demand, permitting workers wages to rise and the renminbi to appreciate, the changes to date have been small and tentative.8
Forward Deployment Link
Maintaining foreign deployments is key to US hegemony

Michael A. Allen, Department of Political Science Binghamton University (SUNY), "Deploying Military Bases Overseas: An Emprical Assessment", 6/6/10, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/3/6/9/p313697_index.html

The analysis within the Harkavy books suggest one initial hypothesis that would normally act as a control variable in other studies: distance. Given that the rival for the United States during the Cold War was on the other side of a globe encourages the United States to deploy bases that are far from its own territory and closer to the Soviet Union. This impetus is also bolstered by the traditional borders of the United States containing two oceans and having its two neighbors be strong and stable allies during the Cold War. As such, we would expect the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: The further away a country is from the United States, the higher the likelihood the United States will deploy a base in its territory. The proximity of a state to the United States is an attractive variable for defensive and offensive reasons. Defensively, it allows for the interception of forces prior to reaching the United States and force potential conflicts to remain distant. Offensively, it allows the United States to adequately project its military power into areas where conventional armies would normally require months to arrive. Having some semblance of a force already deployed within a distant region makes coercion in bargaining with other states more credible.
Maintaining deployments is key to US hegemony

Washington Times, 2/1/10 ("Koreas talk after exchanging gunfire", http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/01/koreas-talk-after-exchanging-gunfire/?page=1

In fact, preserving today's Pax Americana calls for extending at least these military institutional ties outside Europe in ways beyond the bilateral relationships of the past. In addition to conducting combined exercises with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and others in a one-on-one fashion, the United States needs to build a larger security architecture--something like NATO--in other regions and with other partners. This need not be so formal a structure as the Atlantic alliance, and especially not so sclerotic a system as NATO has proven itself to be in recent years, but it could provide the practical and training basis for the wide range of coalition operations that might be necessary in the coming decades. And there could be other ways to increase cooperation among the democratic stakeholders in the post-Iraq international order: defense industrial cooperation, intelligence sharing-indeed, all the traditional tools of past alliances, but applied to new circumstances. Make no mistake, whatever the advantages of power and principle that inhere in being the sole superpower and the "last, best hope of mankind," preserving the unipolar moment is a tall order. John Ikenberry is correct when he observed that "the secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks."[4] But the challenge now is to weave a new fabric of international order, one that emphasizes the political rights of individuals, not merely the rights of states.

Perception of reduced U.S. forward deployment endangers U.S. security and encourages prolif

The New Deterrent Working Group (an informal team of defense and arms control experts with a combined total of decades of experience in the U.S. government, military service and nuclear weapons policy and programs. ) July 2009 “ U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century” http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/upload/wysiwyg/center%20publication%20pdfs/NDWG%20Getting%20It%20Right.pdf

The alternative – an accord that either appears to, or in fact does, leave the United States without an offensive and defensive strategic force posture sufficiently robust to deter attacks on us, our interests and those of our allies, and to discourage proliferation – will contribute to an international environment characterized by: more nuclear weapons in more hands (many of them unfriendly); greater instability; and a far less secure America.

Forward Deployment Link
Forward deployed troop presence is necessary for effective power projection and balance-of-power maintenance.

Calder 2007 [Kent E., Prof. East Asian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U, Embattled Garrisons: comparative base politics and American globalism, p. 217]
Contrasting sharply to the Fortress America option is the traditional pattern of American basing policy since the Korean War—what might be best called “Classic Pax Americana.” The basic elements of this strategy include: (1) creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent American political, military, and economic power, and on American values; (2) maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival powers in Europe and Asia; and (3) maintenance of economic interdependence as an American security interest. Forward deployment in Western Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East has been fundamental to this strategy, in order to check potential hegemonic rivals and to assure adequate energy supplies.

The logic of Classic Pax Americana was relatively simple. Interdependence among allies of the industrialized world was crucial to global prosperity and well being, including that of the United States; instability caused by Soviet threats and communist domestic inroads was the central threat to that interdependence; and extended deterrence was the means through which U.S. strategy should counter that threat. America’s post-World War II strategy, as Wolfram Hanrieder points out, thus involved dual containment—both of the Soviet Union and Germany/Japan. U.S. forward deployment in Germany, Japan, and their environs was central to this broad neutralization of both potential challenges to American power and of regional balance-of-power rivalries.

Concentrated forward deployment is necessary for troop flexibility and deterrence.

Calder 2007 [Kent E., Prof. East Asian Studies @ Johns Hopkins U, Embattled Garrisons: comparative base politics and American globalism, p. 218-219]

The incrementalist school presents four main strategic reasons for a continued offshore basing presence, beyond the controversies of the American Iraq presence. First, the need to maintain air superiority requires offshore bases. Even in a world where long-range U.S. bombers such as the B-2 can strike targets far distant from America’s homeland, as they did in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, aircraft with shorter ranges are needed to patrol the skies around them, as well as to refuel them. Those aircraft need foreign bases.

A second reason for foreign bases relates to the need for ground forces abroad. These forces would be crucial in the event that friendly countries might be attacked and defeated before U.S. forces could respond, making it necessary to evict an aggressor. They could also be necessary for various kinds of reconnaissance and/or counterterrorist activities. Ground units may well get lighter and more mobile over time, but they will inevitably continue to be large, heavy, and quite unwieldy to deploy. This reality will necessitate an offshore supply presence – either bases or prepositioned equipment—to allow such forces to respond to contingencies in a timely manner.

A third reason for at least some offshore bases—even if scaled down and isolated to minimize expense and conflict with local societies—is the need for safe ports and friendly harbors, it is argued. These could, for example, be important to assuring secure passage in the energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to consumers in the United States, Europe, and East Asia. The only way to move heavy ground forces and their equipment is, and prospectively will remain, by sea. If ports are required, it is much better to control them in advance. Thus the need is crucial for naval bases, or at least access agreements in potentially strategic areas.

A final rationale for a foreign base presence is strategic: the value of a “tripwire that links a nation’s formal security commitments tangibly to its intercontinental geostrategic capabilities, and thus enhances deterrence. In the case of the United States, this logic can be formidable: with by far the most substantial, diverse, and accurate military arsenal on earth, including nuclear weapons and state-of-the-art delivery systems, the United States is in a position to retaliate at any conceivable level to attacks where its forces are engaged. Deterrence is strongest when a potential aggressor realizes that U.S. forces would suffer casualties in any attack that it might attempt, so could credibly be expected to retaliate.
Forward Deployment Link
Forward deployment key to US hegemony – deterrence and cooperation.

HANS BINNENDIJK - the Vice President for Research of the National Defense University and Theodore Roosevelt Chair in National Security Policy. Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Former National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control and Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Summer 1995. DTIC Online. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/case8.pdf.

The most critical military aspect of the engagement strategy is forward deployment. Post-Cold War reductions are nearly complete, and we now have about 285,000 personnel (or 17 percent of the active force) stationed overseas. That’s down from 510,000 (23 percent) just five years ago. But we are reminded by two articles in this issue that the debate over forward deployment continues. David Yost (in “The Future of U.S. Overseas Presence”) cites an opinion survey that shows about half of America’s elite favors maintaining current troop levels in Europe while the general public is far more isolationist. He points out that the Frank amendment of last year would have cut our force levels drastically if Europe declined to greatly increase host nation support payments. In commentary by James Lasswell (“Presence— Do We Stay or Do We Go?”)—a response to the new Air Force white paper, Global Presence, which appeared in JFQ, no. 7 (Spring 1995)—there is a strong case made for a continued naval presence overseas. This is a debate that, given the history of this century, cannot be allowed to drift. We need a national consensus in favor of continued overseas deployment. But to achieve that consensus we need a clearer understanding of the role of forward deployed forces in the post-Cold War era. During the Cold War the Armed Forces were deployed overseas as part of containment to deter attack by a known enemy. We relied heavily on rapid reinforcement to defend. Today we still maintain a presence in South Korea and the Persian Gulf for the same purpose. It is better to deter two major regional conflicts than to fight them. Such deployments are easy to justify. The complex strategic environment for this era, however, requires a better explanation of the overseas deployment of 285,000 Americans in uniform. It is this more complex case that must be made to the public. It rests on the concepts of reassurance, cooperation, and crisis response. Often even a token presence can serve like a cooling rod in a nuclear power plant. This is particularly true in Asia where a power balance among China, Japan, and the members of ASEAN has yet to be struck. Our roughly 100,000 military personnel stationed in East Asia stabilize the balance, reassure our friends, and prevent unnecessary regional military buildups. Most Asians recognize this more readily than Americans, which is why they wish us to stay and why Japan is willing to contribute a high level of host nation support. Reassurance also remains important in Europe where most want Germany to retain its non-nuclear status and defensive posture. In a world of multilateral diplomacy and combined military operations, close cooperation with foreign forces is indispensable. Habits learned in NATO facilitated the establishment of the coalition for Desert Shield/Desert Storm around which the Arab states gathered. This cooperation is not only critical for the success of combined forces on the battlefield, but it also yields diplomatic capital. Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group. Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace has demonstrated. And cooperation yields intelligence assets, such as early warning of terrorist threats against the Panama Canal. Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without which American influence would rapidly decline. Forward deployed forces are fundamental to America’s ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian concerns. In Desert Storm about 95 percent of the airlift came via Europe. A review of 27 operations mounted between March 1991 and October 1994 reveals that more than half were staged from Europe. Some, like Able Sentry, contribute to preventive diplomacy. Without forward staging areas, America would be severely constrained. Each service struggles with a portion of forward deployment. Many in the Army would prefer to bring home the two heavy divisions in Europe while only retaining a “reception center” infrastructure. There may be a case for replacing armor with more mobile light units. The Navy finds it increasingly difficult to retain a significant presence in the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf with a fleet two-thirds the size of a decade ago. As Marine Amphibious Units increasingly provide a mobile presence for crisis management, there do not seem to be enough to go around. Some within the Air Force advocate virtual as opposed to physical presence as a major contribution to our military capabilities. As we assess the significance of deterring regional conflicts, reassuring allies, cooperating in multilateral actions, and responding to crises, the case for forward deployment becomes clear. We are deployed overseas to promote U.S. national interests first and those of our allies second. This should not be a difficult notion to get across to the American people.

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