Rogue states are a self-fulfilling prophecy – states proliferate because they are afraid of the US.
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institut, 2007 –e, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 133)
Long before Saddam Hussein came down the pike, “regime change” has been a favored tool of American foreign policy. Here, however, U.S. grand strategy tends to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it causes states that might not otherwise have done so to become threats. That is, Wilsonianism causes the United States to be more, not less, insecure than it would be if its external ambitions were modest. When, by asserting the universal applicability of its own ideology, the United States challenges the legitimacy of other regimes – by labeling them as outposts of tyranny or members of an axis of evil – the effect is to increase those states’ sense of isolation and vulnerability. With good reason, such states fear that their survival could be at risk. Iran is a good example. Given that states – and regimes – are highly motivated to survive, it’s no surprise that others respond to American policy by adopting strategies that give them a chance to do so – like acquiring WMD capabilities and supporting terrorism. One thing is for sure: because of its Wilsonian foundations, the American Empire is a recipe for confrontation and antagonism with “others.” Hegemony Bad – China War
US primacy ensures conflict with China
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institut, 2007 –e, "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 75)
So what should the United States do about China? If the United States persists with its strategy of primacy, the odds of a Sino-American conflict are high. Current American strategy commits the United States to maintaining the geopolitical status quo in East Asia, a status quo that reflects American primacy. The United States' desire to preserve the status quo, however, clashes with the ambitions of a rising China.As a rising great power, China has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. Unless U.S. and Chinese interests can be accommodated, the potential for future tension—or worse—exists. Moreover, as I already have demonstrated, the very fact of American primacy is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—with China in the vanguard—in the form of counter-hegemonic balancing. Nevertheless, the United States cannot be completely indifferent to China's rise.
Straits Times, 2000 [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” Jun 25, LN]
THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore.If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upsetby the likes of Iraq.In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said thatshould that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else. Gen Ridgeway recalled that the biggest mistake the US made during the Korean War was to assess Chinese actions according to the American way of thinking. "Just when everyone believed that no sensible commander would march south of the Yalu, the Chinese troops suddenly appeared," he recalled. (The Yalu is the river which borders China and North Korea, and the crossing of the river marked China's entry into the war against the Americans). "I feel uneasy if now somebody were to tell me that they bet China would not do this or that," he said in a recent interview given to the Chinese press.
Ext. – China War Security guarantees ensure war with China
Ted, Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute
08 (Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America, Introduction Aug 15, CATO)
Such dubious security obligations are not confined to Eastern Europe. Indeed, the commitment that is potentially the most dangerous is Washington’s willingness to protect Taiwan’s de facto independence. That policy could easily lead to armed conflict with China. Under President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan has repeatedly engaged in actions to emphasize a national identity separate from China and to seek greater international recognition for its existence as an independent state—initiatives that Beijing considers extremely provocative. Yet even if the new government in Taipei proves to be more cautious than Chen’s administration, China is unlikely to tolerate indefinitely an upstart secessionist island barely 100 miles off its coast, especially when the overwhelming majority of mainlanders consider Taiwan to be Chinese territory. As China’s economic and military strength grows, Beijing’s leaders are almost certain to become more insistent about reunification. An armed clash between the mainland and Taiwan is all too likely at some point, and those analysts who assume that economic ties between those two entities—and between China and the United States—will be sufficient to prevent a crisis are being too optimistic. Washington’s willingness to defend Taiwan is a high-stakes gamble with a decidedly unfavorable risk-reward calculation.