Hegemony da ddi 2010 1 Hegemony Generic

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AT: Economic Primacy
Economic primacy is over.
1. The US overregulates markets.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, Foreign Affairs, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

For most of the last 30 years, the United States had the lowest corporate tax rates of the major industrialized countries. Today, it has the second highest. U.S. rates have not gone up; others have come down. Germany, for example, long a staunch believer in its high-taxation system, has cut its rates in response to moves by countries to its east, such as Austria and Slovakia. This kind of competition among industrialized countries is now widespread. It is not a race to the bottom -- Scandinavian countries have high taxes, good services, and strong growth -- but a quest for growth. U.S. regulations used to be more flexible and market-friendly than all others. That is no longer true. London's financial system was overhauled in 2001, with a single entity replacing a confusing mishmash of regulators, which is one reason that London's financial sector now beats out New York's on some measures. The entire British government works aggressively to make London a global hub. Regulators from Warsaw to Shanghai to Mumbai are moving every day to make their systems more attractive to investors and manufacturers. Washington, by contrast, spends its time and energy thinking of ways to tax New York, so that it can send its revenues to the rest of the country.

AT: Economic Primacy
2. Globalization.

Fareed Zakaria, Ph.D. from Harvard University, honorary degrees from Brown, the University of Miami, and Oberlin College, Trustee of Yale University, 2008, Foreign Affairs, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63394/fareed-zakaria/the-future-of-american-power?page=show cp

Being on top for so long has its downsides. The U.S. market has been so large that Americans have assumed that the rest of the world would take the trouble to understand it and them. They have not had to reciprocate by learning foreign languages, cultures, or markets. Now, that could leave the United States at a competitive disadvantage. Take the spread of English worldwide as a metaphor. Americans have delighted in this process because it makes it so much easier for them to travel and do business abroad. But it also gives the locals an understanding of and access to two markets and cultures. They can speak English but also Mandarin or Hindi or Portuguese. They can penetrate the U.S. market but also the internal Chinese, Indian, or Brazilian one. Americans, by contrast, have never developed the ability to move into other people's worlds.

The United States is used to being the leading economy and society. It has not noticed that most of the rest of the industrialized world -- and a good part of the nonindustrialized world as well -- has better cell-phone service than the United States. Computer connectivity is faster and cheaper across the rest of the industrialized world, from Canada to France to Japan, and the United States now stands 16th in the world in broadband penetration per capita. Americans are constantly told by their politicians that the only thing they have to learn from other countries' health-care systems is to be thankful for their own. Americans rarely look around and notice other options and alternatives, let alone adopt them.

Learning from the rest is no longer a matter of morality or politics. Increasingly, it is about competitiveness. Consider the automobile industry. For more than a century after 1894, most of the cars manufactured in North America were made in Michigan. Since 2004, Michigan has been replaced by Ontario, Canada. The reason is simple: health care. In the United States, car manufacturers have to pay $6,500 in medical and insurance costs for every worker. If they move a plant to Canada, which has a government-run health-care system, the cost to them is around $800 per worker. This is not necessarily an advertisement for the Canadian health-care system, but it does make clear that the costs of the U.S. health-care system have risen to a point where there is a significant competitive disadvantage to hiring American workers. Jobs are going not to low-wage countries but to places where well-trained and educated workers can be found: it is smart benefits, not low wages, that employers are looking for.

For decades, American workers, whether in car companies, steel plants, or banks, had one enormous advantage over all other workers: privileged access to American capital. They could use that access to buy technology and training that no one else had -- and thus produce products that no one else could, and at competitive prices. That special access is also gone. The world is swimming in capital, and suddenly American workers have to ask themselves, What can we do better than others? It is a dilemma not just for workers but for companies as well. When American companies went abroad, they used to bring with them capital and know-how. But when they go abroad now, they discover that the natives already have money and already know how.

Middle East Heg Unsustainable

U.S. Hegemony in the middle east is unsustainable

Chris Phillips, 6/1/10 “ US hegemony in Middle East is ending” http://www.america-russia.net/eng/geopolitics/245873652?user_session=9785d91c1f36347ca38f8415c1730cee

Yet Russia’s return to Syria, whether it be the sale of MiG-29s or building a naval dock on the Syrian coast, is not the action of a superpower challenging US hegemony as it was in 1945-89 but rather an assertive regional power taking advantage of the emerging power vacuum in the region. Instead of a new bi-polar cold war, regional powers such as Russia and Turkey are increasing their influence at the United States’ expense. The idea of a new cold war has gained currency in some quarters for the wrong reasons. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad himself told La Repubblica last week that «Russia is reasserting itself. And the cold war is just a natural reaction to the attempt by America to dominate the world». In the same interview he asserted that there was a new triple alliance between Syria, Turkey and Iran — part of a «northern alliance» that Damascus has been trying to construct against Israel and the US — with Russia now cast in the role as superpower benefactor.

China Challenges

China's growing military poses a threat to U.S. hegemonic control in East Asia, as well as the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Bandow, Doug.(senior fellow at the Cato Institute) China’s Military rise means the end of U.S. Hegemony? May 5, 2009.

U.S. military spending continues to increase even though conventional threats against the United States are de minimis. China is the leading contender for Enemy Number 1. But if Beijing poses a threat, it is to U.S. domination of East Asia, not the country itself. Only the latter is worth fighting for. Commonly expressed is fear of growing Chinese military outlays. The Pentagon highlighted its concern with the latest annual report on the Chinese defense budget. Yet Beijing's armed forces remain dwarfed by America's military, which starts at a vastly higher base and spends several times as much. The Pentagon report states that the United States "encourages China to participate responsibly in the international system." True enough, but how does Washington define "responsibly"? One suspects it means accepting American military hegemony in East Asia — something with which Beijing isn't likely to agree. The Chinese military buildup so far has been significant but measured. "The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is pursuing comprehensive transformation from a mass army designed for protracted wars of attrition on its periphery against high-tech adversaries," explains the Pentagon. Moreover, China's "armed forces continue to develop and field disruptive military technologies, including those for anti-access/area-denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare, that are changing regional military balances and that have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region." Yet this concerted expansion little threatens U.S. security. Only the Chinese nuclear force is theoretically able to strike America today. Beijing possesses about 60 missiles, some of limited range.
China has the military capability to challenge US power
Dan Blumenthal is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, "Losing Asia?", 6/7/10, http://www.aei.org/article/102121

And then there is China, which has the greatest potential to undermine the Asia-Pacific peace. China has translated its economic resources into an impressive and growing military arsenal. Its Second Artillery ballistic and cruise missile forces pose a particular threat to U.S. and allied air supremacy in the "first island chain" (Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines). China's missiles could seriously damage and ground most U.S. air assets at our most important Pacific base--Kadena in Japan. The Second Artillery is refining a land-based anti-ship ballistic missile. China could soon have the capability both to establish local air supremacy and to hit any surface ship coming its way from the Western Pacific. China has a growing fleet of diesel and nuclear submarines. The diesel boats, which can stay longer undersea, carry arsenals sufficient to enforce a blockade of Taiwan and threaten surface ships in and around China's littorals. With a new base in Hainan Island, China's nuclear submarine force has easy access to the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. Given historic Sino-Indian mistrust and America's reliance on the Indian Ocean for its own energy trade, China's ability to cause mischief at critical Pacific and Indian Ocean chokepoints is a serious strategic development.

China Challenges
China to overtake U.S. economically.

Friedberg, 2010(Aaron, July 21st, professor of politics at Princeton University, Implications of a Financial Crisis for U.S. – China Rivalry, Survival, 52: 4,

31 — 54)

From a geopolitical perspective what matters most are relative rather than absolute gains; not how fast each economy is growing (or contracting), but how wide the differential is between their respective growth rates. Since the end of the Cold War the US economy has been expanding at an average of about 3% per year while China has enjoyed annual growth rates closer to 10%. It is this persistent seven-point gap that has caused many economists to predict that, by the middle of this century, at the latest, China will have overtaken the United States in terms of total output. If both countries return quickly to their pre-crisis growth trajectories the date of expected conver-gence will not change. If, on the other hand, one recovers more rapidly or more completely than the other, that moment could either be moved up, or pushed even further into the future. While there are some optimistic outliers, the emerging consensus among forecasters is that the United States will not bounce back immediately to its pre-crisis performance. Instead of averaging 3–3.5% per year (to say nothing of the 4% some had predicted at the turn of the century, before the dot.com bubble burst) growth is expected to remain at about 2–2.5% for much of this decade and perhaps beyond.3 As for China, after rising to a peak of 13% in 2007, its annual growth was cut almost in half (to around 7% on a year-onyear basis), during the initial stages of the global crisis.4 Thanks to a very aggressive response by the central authorities, growth climbed back to just under 9% in 2009. Some estimates show it hovering between 9 and 10% for at least the next few years, while others are even more bullish, at least in the near term.5 If China can return to something near its pre-crisis, double-digit growth rates while the United States continues to limp along at roughly 0.5–1% less than its earlier performance, the gap between the two countries will obviously close even more rapidly than it was before.

AT: Brooks and Wohlforth

Brooks and Wohlforth misinterpret data—trends show US economic and military dominance are ending.

Samuel A. Adamson, second-year MAIA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna Center and undergraduate degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford, 10, Bolgona Journal of International Affairs, “Supreme Effort: A Lesson in British Decline” cp

Pape argues that economic strength is at the heart of the United States’ global influence, noting that “[p]roductive capacity — defined by indicators such as wealth, technology and population size — is a prerequisite for building and modernizing military forces.”4 Therefore, in support of his declinist thesis, Pape presents a cogent set of data detailing the fall in the U.S. share of world product using three distinct measurements, reproduced below as table 1 and table 2.

His first choice of measurement (a comparison of each country’s output in current-year U.S. dollars, table 1) is that which is most frequently used by Pape’s opponents. Indeed, he makes explicit reference to its employment by Brooks and Wohlforth in their 2008 argument for America’s exploitation of its hegemonic position.5 However, whereas Brooks, Wohlforth and others tend to employ single year “snapshots” to paint an overly rosy view of U.S. unipolar dominance, Pape examines the trend over time and, deftly turning their own figures against them, confronts his critics head-on, concluding that the U.S. will see a 32 percent drop in its percentage of world product between 2000–2013. His justification for taking a long-term trend perspective is clear:

Single-year ‘snapshots’ of America’s relative power are of limited value for assessing the sustainability of its grand strategy over many years. For grand-strategic concerns —especially how well the United States can balance its resources and foreign-policy commitments— the trajectory of American power compared to other states is of seminal importance.6

As further evidence for the declinist trend identified in table 1, Pape also employs two further methods of calculating the U.S.’s percentage of world product: constant-dollar calculations and purchasing power parity, both of which are commonly used to determine GDP (table 2). Although the percentage drop predicted using these alternative methods is less than that of table 1, Pape remains resolute, remarking that “regardless of the metric, the trend is the same.”7 Indeed, both predict a significant decline of around 20 percent which Pape states “form[s] the lower bound of America’s decline.”8 His conclusion is unambiguous and frank: “Simply put, the United States is now a declining power.”9 He continues,

The United States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history.10
Afghanistan Aff – Expensive
The US spends billions to maintain presence in Afghanistan
Roxana Tiron, writer at The Hill, a congressional newspaper, "U.S. spending $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan according to CRS report", 10/14/09, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/63121-crs-calculates-cost-of-us-troop-presence-in-afghanistan?page=2#comments//avi

The U.S. spends about $3.6 billion a month in Afghanistan, according to data provided by the Congressional Research Service recently. The average cost per month is calculated at an average 51,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but that number likely will go higher with the 68,000 troops the Obama administration already is planning on having in that country, and could double if President Barack Obama backs a reported request from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander in Afghanistan, to send as many as 40,000 more troops to the country. The cost of sending one U.S. soldier in Afghanistan for one year is $1 million versus an estimated $12,000 for an Afghani soldier, according to Steve Daggett, a specialist with the Congressional Research Service. Those numbers fall within the calculations that the Obama administration has been using. The Obama administration is calculating $1 billion per 1,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan saves billions
Anita Dancs is an assistant professor of economics at Western New England College and a Foreign Policy In Focus analyst, "The Cost of the Global U.S. Military Presence", 7/3/09, www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/0907dancs.pdf//avi

This report summarizes changes in the global presence of the military, then estimates the current cost of maintaining troops, bases, and operations abroad. If the U.S. government scaled back these operations, billions of dollars could be saved each year. More than $100 billion could be saved immediately by ending the wars and occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan. More could be saved by closing bases and reducing military personnel. Current economic priorities coupled with a new landscape of security challenges, including nonconventional threats and international crime such as piracy, strengthen the case for decreasing the U.S. military’s global presence and increasing its emphasis on building mechanisms for international security cooperation.

Afghanistan Aff
Excessive US presence in the region undermines power projection
Carl Robichaud is a program officer at The Century Foundation, "Overstaying Our Welcome in Afghanistan?", 5/26/05, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1013

A little over a year ago, attitudes towards American and the U.S. military were generally favorable. The most comprehensive survey, conducted by the Asia Foundation from February to March 2004, found that roughly two-thirds of Afghans were positive toward both the U.S. and U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan. However, the survey gave rise to concerns: a plurality of Afghans were unfavorable to the U.S. in both the Northwest (58 percent unfavorable vs. 30 percent favorable) and the South (46 percent unfavorable vs. 37 percent favorable). Attitudes toward the U.S. military were similar (59 percent unfavorable vs. 26 percent favorable in the Northwest, 42 percent unfavorable vs 39 percent favorable in the South.) (see pp. 9-10) Moreover, there is evidence that Afghans are chafing at the thought of a long-term American 'occupation.' As General Richard Meyers and President Karzai both argued last week, the violent protests on May 11 were less the result of a single incident (the Koran desecration) than of broader frustrations about America's role. Numerous complaints broadcast in the Afghan media—ranging from imperious behavior by U.S. security contractors, to abuses during raids, to claims that former U.S Ambassador to Afghanistan Khalilzad was the real head of state—suggest that the Afghan public is growing weary of Washington's hand. The presence of American troops, which were ramped up to ensure the success of the coming parliamentary elections, could have the opposite effect, spurring a political backlash that strengthens the position of unsavory factions. In addition, this troop presence may be fueling anti-Americanism in the region. Operation Enduring Freedom, originally viewed positively by much of the world, has been re-cast in the wake of America's invasion and occupation of Iraq, and is seen by much of the world as part of a U.S. grand strategy of hegemony. A March 2004 Pew poll found that by a wide margin people in the Muslim countries surveyed (Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, and Morocco) oppose America's war on terrorism. The 2005 Pew polling data indicate that respondents question the sincerity of America's motives in the war on terror—especially in Pakistan where only 6 percent felt U.S. efforts were sincere (vs. 58 percent insincere.) A majority of respondents in many nations worried that the U.S. military posed a threat to their country. The net result is suspicion of U.S. intentions and an erosion of America's position in the region. The U.S. can assuage some of these fears by working to internationalize the security presence in Afghanistan. The Pentagon long opposed the expansion of U.N.-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces, resulting in a small force of 5,000 limited to Kabul. The mandate of this force, which consists of NATO troops, was recently expanded to the provinces, and has played a role in securing elections and reconstruction. These international forces should be bolstered to guarantee stability until the Afghan army reaches sufficiency (and until its loyalty to the state, rather than to individual factions, is confirmed.) The international force should be increasingly constituted by Muslims, such as the Turkish troops that serve there with distinction today (to bring in more troops from mostly-Muslim states, ISAF will eventually need to involve non-NATO partners.) An expanded ISAF, authorized by the U.N., could eventually supplant the American forces. This force would have the benefit of being multi-national, multi-religious, and internationally accountable. It will be interesting to see how such a proposal is greeted by Washington, which has not pressed for increases in international troops in Afghanistan as energetically as it has in Iraq. A sizeable and indefinite base presence in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan allows the U.S. to project power toward China and Russia. Moreover, in the President's transformative vision for the greater Middle East, American troops help ensure a loyal, democratic, and thriving Afghanistan that can induce reform within Iran and Pakistan. Of course the question remains: does this presence serve as a stimulant for democratic and societal reform or as an irritant that can incite hostility and help recruit radicals? Another troubling implication of the over-militarized approach to America's regional goals is that military expenses have crowded out critical state-building investments. America efforts in Afghanistan follow the meringue model of nation-building, with a substantial military crust concealing a broad but airy layer of societal engagement. America sponsors numerous reconstruction initiatives, but many of them lack substance and funding. If budgets reveal priorities, the administration's 2005 supplemental request is illuminating: in a vast request for $82 billion, only $2 billion was set aside for non-military aid to Afghanistan. Military operations in Afghanistan, on the other hand, are estimated at $13 billion per year. It's sad to say that America's anemic levels of assistance are not unique among donors, which pledged last year to provide $8.2 billion in aid over three years, a far cry from the World Bank and Afghan government's estimate that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion over seven years. What is unique is the military presence that accompanies these aid gestures. The U.S. should work to share the military burden, and then re-invest the savings into measures critical to long-term success: confronting the drug problem, cracking down on smuggling, and expanding government capacity. Afghanistan remains abjectly poor and ranks among the worst-off in nearly every development indicator, including education, women's health, life expectancy, infant mortality, and infectious disease. Even with recent economic and educational progress Afghanistan could still fail.

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