A2: China Balancing Chinese balancing fails – military and economic reform won’t affect the power gap
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false In sum, while rapid economic growth makes China an increasingly important actor in world politics, it still has a long way to go before it can contest American dominance in all key measures of power. This conclusion is confirmed by China’s behavior and the assessments of its leadership. None of China’s external alignments can be considered counterbalancing. The only other major power with which China has concluded formal partnerships is Russia. As we discuss in detail in chapter 3, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is propelled primarily by economics and regional security interests and is not well explained as a counterbalancing alignment. Neither Chinese nor Russian officials, nor experts on the two countries’ foreign policies, describe the partnership in such terms. Some scholars do describe China’s growing military expenditures as counterbalancing. But it is only possible to reach this conclusion if balancing is defined so expansively as to include any effort by any state to enhance its military capacity. There is no doubt that China is improving its military, and little doubt that it will continue to do so, at least until competing demands on the state budget determine otherwise. After all, the People’s Liberation Army starts from a primitive technological and organizational base. Any military leadership would want to upgrade that force. China’s military expenditures are a small fraction of the American commitment, and this ratio is not sensitive to the means of estimating it (see fig. 2.2). With a rapidly growing economy, China can afford to spend more on defense. The result of such expenditures over time may be new challenges for U.S. military operations in what Barry Posen calls the “contested zones” in or near China. The extent of these challenges depends on what the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and others do in response to China’s efforts. But the main point is that China’s current level of effort is nowhere near adequate to constitute counterbalancing – that is, to affect the United States’ overall military primacy and its command of the commons. With a smaller and much less advanced economy and a comparatively antiquated and inefficient military force, China cannot affect the overall military gap vis-à-vis the United States unless it is able to devote a substantially greater proportion of its comparatively smaller vote a substantially greater proportion of its comparatively smaller economic resources to defense than does the United States. Compared to China, the United States has and will long have a dramatic relative advantage in its ability to convert wealth to military power because of its massive investment over decades in the accumulation of the skills and infrastructure necessary to produce and use advanced weaponry. Yet China consistently devotes a smaller proportion of its GDP to defense than the United States does. Again, this conclusion is not sensitive to the measure used (see table 2.1). Given that China is not even working as hard as the United States at generating military power, we cannot describe its behavior as counterbalancing.
A2: China Balancing
China can’t balance – economic growth hampered by globalization
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false While China's economic growth is indeed assisted by its access to the global economy, the situation radically departs from the one Gilpin described. For one thing, the specific FDI mechanism he highlighted does not apply today. When Gilpin's book was written in 1975, U.S. “outward investment was four-and-a-half times greater than its inward investment." In recent years, in comparison, the U.S. FDI ratio has hovered right around "a perfect balance in terms of outward and inward" Of course, China is also aided by inward FDI, likely to a much greater extent than the United States. Yet, the same is true in reverse when we look at other aspects of economic globalization: the United States greatly benefits from globalization in a number of important ways that China either does not or only to a very limited extent. Significantly, many of these specific advantages the United States draws from economic globalization are to a large degree a function of its position in the system, both in terms of the size of its economy and also its status as the "incumbent" leader of the financial system. In particular, the United States profits to a great extent from having the dollar as the world's reserve currency and from its preferred status as a destination for international portfolio investment. With such a wide scope of available opportunities, the U.S. economy has also long attracted far more scientifically trained workers than any other state. By contrast, the renminbi is in no position to become a global reserve currency; just making it convertible will be a major challenge and is unlikely anytime soon." China is also not soon going to rival the United States in any way as a preferred destination for international portfolio investment or for newly mobile scientific and technological talent. Finally, it is also significant that U.S. MNCs have been at the forefront of establishing cooperative partnerships with foreign firms to enhance innovation and they also lead in the geographic dispersal of their production throughout the globe to reap various locational advantages. In contrast, in the years ahead China can at best benefit only slightly from home-based MNCs adopting novel globalization strategies given its current dearth of firms that are large and experienced enough to pursue this course." Globalization's contribution to China's rise in recent decades should also not be overstated. In contrast to the industrialized great-power challengers Gilpin discussed, China is a developing country whose extremely rapid growth in recent years owes much to factors having nothing to do with economic globalization. In particular, the speed of China's economic ascent since the late 1970s can also be traced to the fact that Chinese leaders put in place the key institutions-land reform, basic property rights-that most economists see as central to economic growth and that it started from an extremely low initial position thanks to decades of Mao-inspired policies that had long blocked the country's economic potential. In sum, China has been able to exploit "the advantages of backwardness" both through basic domestic reforms and through globalization. Finally, even if China benefits more from enhanced global economic interdependence than the United States, a power transition is simply not in the cards for many decades precisely because the United States now occupies such a dominant power position in the system. The challengers that Gilpin discussed were great powers with advanced economies at a comparable level of development to the hegemon. In those circumstances, aggregate GDP is a far better index of power than in a case where the rising state has a very large but comparatively poor population. As chapter 2 established, the power gap between the United States and China is currently immense, especially in military capabilities: no single factor, including globalization, can wipe it away anytime soon.
A2: EU Balancing EU won’t balance – no military or unity
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false The only other economy big and rich enough to generate military capabilities on the American scale is that of the European Union, whose 27 member states have a combined GDP larger than that of the United States. To realize that potential, however, Brussels would have to wield Europe’s aggregate economic output with the same strategic purpose as the United States, a unitary state. A superpower’s military force could be purchased only at the price of a frontal assault on European nations’ core sovereignty. Balance-of-power theory assumes that states seek to preserve their security and autonomy, and, as Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon point out, “Fundamental to an understanding of the EU is an appreciation of the fact that such considerations are as present within it as they are in its dealings with the outside world.” Neither the authority nor the ability to act decisively in Europe’s name exists even in monetary matters, to say nothing of foreign and defense policy. Ultimate authority rests with the member states, all 27 of which must agree to any decision on defense and security policy. This requirement of unanimity “place profound limits on the potential for decisive EU security policies.” EU can’t balance – lacks military bite and unity
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false Some might argue that the European Union is an exception to the big-or-rich rule. It is true that if Brussels were to develop impressive military capabilities and wield its latent collective power like a state, the EU would clearly constitute another pole. But the creation of an autonomous and unified defense and defense-industrial capacity that could compete with that of the United States would be a gargantuan task. The EU is struggling to put together a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force that is de- signed for smaller operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and crisis management, but it still lacks military essentials such as capabilities in intelligence gathering, airlift, air-defense suppression, air-to-air refueling, sea transport, medical care, and combat search and rescue—and even when it has those capacities, perhaps by the end of this decade, it will still rely on NATO command and control and other assets. Whatever capability the EU eventually assembles, moreover, will matter only to the extent that it is under the control of a state-like decision-making body with the authority to act quickly and decisively in Europe’s name. Such authority, which does not yet exist even for international financial matters, could be purchased only at the price of a direct frontal assault on European nations’ core sovereignty. And all of this would have to occur as the EU expands to add ten or more new member states, a process that will complicate further deepening. Given these obstacles, Europe is unlikely to emerge as a dominant actor in the military realm for a very long time, if ever. A2: Russia Balancing Russia can’t balance – military and weapons are incompetent
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false The real core of Russia’s relationship with China, however, is no the diplomatic partnerships but extensive military coproduction arrangements and major arms sales. Yet Russia’s fundamental interest in these exports is not checking U.S. powerbut rather a desperate need to slow the decline of its military industrial complex. Between 1992 and 1998, Russia experienced what was probably the steepest peacetime decline in military power by any major state in history. Weapons procurement and spending declined dramatically after 1991, and by 2000 only 20 percent of Russia’s operational weapons stocks were modern, compared with 60-80 percent in NATO countries. Given the collapse of domestic orders (in 2001, only 10 percent of Russian defense firms received state orders), Russia’s defense sector possesses massive excess capacity. Against a backdrop of massive competing demands for new resources (dismal maintenance and training, dire personnel problems and overall inefficiency), increased defense outlays after 2001 did little to alter the fact that even a downsized Soviet-scale defense sector are too big for Russia. Arms sales are a lifeline for amilitary industry producing less than one-third of its 1992 output, and rapidly losing technological competitiveness. Even more immediately, exports aid a defense sector that supplies income and welfare services to hundreds to thousands of workers and their families, provides the economic lifeblood of dozens of cities, and enriches numerous managers and public officials. Military industry represents one of the few high-technology sectors in which Russians remain competitive, and they perceive strong overall commercial interest in promoting exports. The evidence concerning Russia’s major arms relationships overwhelmingly indicates that Moscow’s eagerness to sell weaponry to Beijing is only indirectly and marginally connected to the issue of U.S. hegemony.
Hegemony 2AC Heg decline inevitable but there’s no impact.
Erik Jones, Staff Writer for Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, PhD of IR and Professor of European Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 7-21, 2010, “A Great Fall”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol 52. Issue 4
Arguments, like films, tend to be repeated in regular cycles. The argument about the decline of American power is no exception. By my count we are in at least the third iteration. The first came in the 1970s with writers like David Calleo and Robert Gilpin.1 The second came in the 1980swhen Mancur Olson and Paul Kennedy reignited the debate.2 We got to skip the 1990s and much of the 2000s. Now, however, American decline is back with a vengeance. In its current iteration, the declinist argument runs along the lines of the 1980s movie Scarface. In that movie, protagonist Tony Montana was a(racted to the United States because of its seductive culture: ‘I watch the guys like Humphrey Bogart, James Cagney. They, they teach me to talk. I like those guys. I always know one day I’m comin’ here, United States.’ Once inside the borders, it did not take Montana long to figure out the rules of the game. ‘In this country, you go(a make the money first. Then when you get the money, you get the power.’3 Unfortunately, Montana failed to appreciate the true well-springs of American prosperity. Instead, his image of the country was an exaggerated no-holds-barred sort of capitalism. Suffice it to say that the world of Scarface was unsustainable and so inevitably came crashing down around him. The film is a cautionary tale about what happens in a market without rules.It also suggests a question that most viewers in the early !"%$s would not have considered: what happens when other countries have the money? This is the questionStephen S. Cohen andJ. Bradford DeLong posein The End of Influence. Their answer begins by reiterating the lessons of Scarface. American power at the end of the Second World War was rooted to a large extent in the attractiveness of its culture and the wealth of its society. Other countries were willing to follow the United States because they wanted to be like the United States. Unfortunately, however, Americans themselves began to drift towards ever more extreme forms of free-market competition. This extreme neo-liberal view was at odds with the planning and industry that made America wealthy in the first place. As they embraced an increasingly unregulated market, the neo-liberals in America put their country on an unsustainable trajectory and became increasingly addicted to the combination of cheap manufactured goods and easy credit that other countries were willing to offer. The other countries got the money, and with it, the power. But this does not mean that the United States will go down in a hail of gunfire: ‘The United States will continue to be a world leader – perhaps even the leader. But it will no longer be the boss’
Decline Inevitable U.S. Hegemony is over.
Karaganov, Sergei, (head of Council of Foreign and Defense Policy) 'Russia's Choice', Survival, 52:1, 5 – 10 February 2010
Today, the Euro-Atlantic world seems far less victorious than it did in the 1990s. China and other Asian countries look like the true winners of the Cold War. It seems that China and Southeast Asia are destined to enjoy economic and political success for at least one more decade - much to the displeasure of their competitors and the ideological advocates of political liberalism. China's rise is based on the country's readiness to undertake economic and social experiments and the ability of its efficient authoritarian government to harness the benefitsof these experiments. Meanwhile, revolutionary changes in the international political and military spheres, coupled with the unprecedented openness of the information age, have denied the 'Old West' the ability to impose its political and economic rules on others by force, as it used to do in the past. Today, neither nuclear superiority nor even conventional superiority is as important as it once was. Against this backdrop, America's geopolitical position and claims to sole world leadership have sharply deteriorated, particularly in light of conflicts in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the economic crisis. It is clear that the United States will never completely regain its former status.
Decline Inevitable US hegemony is near dead-continuing to pursue it only puts the nail in the coffin
David P. Calleo, professor at Johns Hopkins University, 7/21/2010, Survival (American Decline revisited, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a924622589~db=all~jumptype=rss)
America’s less developed rivals-countries such as China, India, or Brazil-may have better prospects. They may continue to enjoy their substantial real growth vis-à-vis the United States and Europe indefinitely. China, in particular, may be able to continue channeling its once-frozen savings into its own domestic development. If so, China may emerge as one of the great winners of the new era. After two centuries of humiliation, China may regain some of its historical prosperity. Of course, no one can really say where the new century will take us. The trends of recent decades do, nevertheless, suggest a more plural world, with no single global hegemon. The future may well see a variety of great powers, probably with strong regional systems built around them. If so, the vision of a closely integrated world, led by the United States as a unipolar hegemon, seems a dangerously dysfunctional guide for American national policy. Indeed, the persistence of this uniopolar fantasy in a plural world system is probably the most reliable guarantee of morbid American decline. Since the Obama administration took office, it has grown increasingly fashionable to say this-not surprising, given a budget deficit approaching a trillion and a half dollars. But whether the president’s heightened concerns end up merely as adroit adjustments of rhetoric rather than resolute changes in the nation’s foreign and economic policy remains to be seen.
US overreach is already crushng the US both in the military and economy
David P. Calleo, professor at Johns Hopkins University, 7/21/2010, Survival (American Decline revisited, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a924622589~db=all~jumptype=rss)
The history of the past two decases suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America’s geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretention to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against ‘terrorism’. Praying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems poison the currency, an old pathology that firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline. It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United Sates found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today’s restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%. Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holding of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today’s instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshaled and deployed on very short notice. It is this excess of volatile money that arguably fuels the world’s great recurring bubbles. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings and dry up credit for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus end up as a threat to the world economy in general.