Heg Good – Laundry List Heg is key to solving free trade, global warming, terrorism, environmental degradation and disease
Greenberg 2006, Director Emeritus and Honorary Vice Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the Trilateral Commission.(Maurice, “On Leadership”, The National Interest, Winter 05/06)
I am concerned that these are not the issues being discussed by our political leadership and that the United States is abdicating its role as a global leader. There are a number of problems that require the United States to step forward and exercise leadership. In matters of world trade, the Doha Round has not been a booming success. Promises of aid for Africa have turned out to be little more than promises. We have transnational threats such as terrorism, environmental degradation and the spread of disease. We have an issue of global warming. I'm not a scientist, but I am concerned that the intensity and strength of natural disasters has grown. Ocean warming has occurred by several degrees of temperature, ice flows are melting in the poles--what is going to be the impact of that on the world's climate? There are a whole host of issues that are not simply matters of American national interest, but are global, planetary interests. And make no mistake, if the United States does not lead, who will? The future of the European Union is a question mark. The proposed constitution was not enthusiastically embraced by Europe's population. More and more Europeans are dissatisfied with the euro, which, I might add, seems less and less likely to replace the dollar as the leading currency for global trade and finance. American leadership is essential to put together the broad-based coalitions necessary to tackle these problems. Our national interest is served by continuing to build up our relations with other states, creating a network of mutual interdependence, rather than ignoring problems or isolating ourselves from the rest of the world.
Carla Norrlof ( Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” Cambridge University Press http://magbooks.org/post-9334/americas-global-advantage-us-hegemony-and-international-cooperation
As can be seen from table 6.1, there is a strong correlation between military successes and increased financial flows into the United States, providing support for the hypothesis that the United States has collected a security premium. A positive relationship is said to exist if financial flows increase/decrease the year following military success/ defeat. Military success (defeat) is indicated with a + (–) sign next to the year the operation was undertaken. Specifically, we see that in 77 percent of the COW cases, military successes are positively correlated with increased financial flows, and military defeats positively correlated with reduced financial flows. This figure is conservative and does not include the terrorist attacks on the United States, as explained above. Taking the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon into account increases the correspondence between military interventions and financial flows to 85 percent. If we expand the set of cases to include those assessed against reporting in The Economist on the war on Iraq, 82 percent of the cases either depict a positive relationship between military victory and the ability to attract capital or between military loss and the retreat of foreign capital. Again, if this figure takes the 9/11 attacks into account, the correspondence is 88 percent.
Hegemony Good – Prolif
Credibility decline of U.S. hegemony leads to international arms races and general instability.
Layne, Christopher. Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University. The Waning of U.S. Hegemony-Myth or Reality? A Review Essay. MIT Press, 2009.
Still, there are factors thatcould lead to a more fraught international environment, including: the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races (p. 97); competition for control of natural resources—especially energy—which could drive great power competitions (pp. 63–66)21; and fallout from the financial and economic crisis, which could cause the international economic system to become more mercantilist (pp. 93–94). Finally, in a multipolar world, established international institutions may not be able to deal with the challenges posed by economic and financial turmoil, energy scarcity, and global climate change. In such a world, a nonhegemonic United States will lack the capability to revitalize them.
Hegemony Good – Trade Heg is sustainable and key to free trade David Brooks 1/14/10 “ Realism and the US Hegemony” http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/5037238-realism-and-the-us-hegemony
The world system will suffer without a hegemon because international laws cannot be enforced, trade slows down and financial centers collapse.The United States has assumed the role of hegemon since the collapse of the Soviet Union, since then there has been unprecedented economic cooperation, growth and security. With rational policy makers and sound economic policy the United States will remain the hegemon for many more years.The U.S. has displayed the will and ability to be the world’s hegemon. China or the European Union are underdeveloped and lack national will to ascend to the role of hegemon. With a GDP of $13.62 trillion, the E.U. is ready to challenge the United States economically. Similarly, China has a GDP of $10 trillion, but most importantly maintains an annual growth rate around 9% (www.cia.gov). But, the U.S., with a GDP of $13.22 trillion and a growth rate around 3.4%, still is in the best position to lead the world for the next century. The international system has always been and will remain anarchic, violent and a place with few winners. If the United States is to maintain its position as world superpower it must maintain its economic power and independence.Opening foreign markets to U.S. companies and investors is the most efficient and expedient method for maintaining economic power. Companies that are well established and operate on a large scale will have a considerable advantage against smaller and lesser known companies. When Coca-Cola moves into a new market and is able to sell its new and well known product for cheaper or the same price as local competitors; Coca-Cola will assume control of that market.
Hegemony Good – Japan Rearm
U.S. military presence is key to preventing Japan from going nuclear.
Brookes, Peter. Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies. Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might. November 24, 2008.
The presence of U.S. forces and the American nuclear deterrent has also kept Japan from exercising a nuclear option that many believe it might take, considering the rise of China, North Korea's nuclear breakout, its advanced scientific and technical capabilities, and indigenous nuclear power industry--a producer of a significant amount of fissile material from its reactors. Political and historical considerations aside, many believe that Japan could quickly join the once-exclusive nuclear weapons club if it chose to do so, resulting in unforetold challenges to regional security.
Hegemony Good – Taiwan Invasion
U.S. military presence is crucial to preventing Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Brookes, Peter. Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies. Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might. November 24, 2008.
We know that China is undergoing a major military buildup, especially involving its power projection forces--i.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay that military tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the mainland under force of arms. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO.
A2: Offshore Balancing – Perception Your turns are inevitable and balancing is impossible – other nations will always perceive the US as the hegemon.
Drezner 2009 [Daniel W., Professor of International Politics at Tufts and a senior editor at The National Interest, 7/15, “The False Hegemon,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21858]
The rest of the world certainly seems to treat America as the hegemonic power, for good or ill. According to the New York Times, Latin America is waiting for the United States to break the deadlock in Honduras. Vladimir Putin is incapable of giving a foreign-policy speech in which he does not blast American hegemony as the root of all of Russia’s ills. While Chinese officials talk tough about ending the dollar’s reign as the world’s reserve currency, its leaders also want America to solve the current economic crisis and to take the lead on global warming in the process. It’s not just foreign leaders who are obsessed with American hegemony. Last week, in an example of true hardship duty, I taught a short course in American foreign policy at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. The students in my class represented a true cross section of nationalities: Spaniards, Germans, Brits, Estonian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, Thai, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Turkish, Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and, yes, even Americans. I cannot claim that my students represent a scientific cross section of non-Americans (one of them complained that I did not rely on Marxism as a structural explanation for American foreign policy). Still, by and large the students were bright, well informed about world affairs and cautiously optimistic about President Obama. That said, a persistent trend among my students was their conviction that the U.S. government was the world’s puppeteer, consciously manipulating every single event in world politics. For example, many of them were convinced that George W. Bush ordered Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to precipitate last year’s war with Russia. The Ghanaian students wanted to know why Obama visited their country last week. The standard “promotion of good democratic governance” answer did not satisfy them. They were convinced that there had to be some deeper, potentially sinister motive to the whole enterprise. Don’t even ask what they thought about the reasons behind the war in Iraq. To be sure, the United States is a powerful actor; the government is trying to influence global events (and Americans are not immune to their own misperceptions). And good social scientists should always search for underlying causes and not take rhetoric at face value. Nevertheless, the belief in an all-powerful America hatching conspiracies left and right frequently did not jibe with the facts. For many of these students, even apparent policy mistakes were merely examples of American subterfuge. Ironically, at the moment when many Americans are questioning the future of U.S. hegemony, many non-Americans continue to believe that the U.S. government is diabolically manipulating events behind the scenes. Going forward, the persistence of anti-Americanism in the age of Obama might have nothing to do with the president, or his rhetoric or even U.S. government actions. It might, instead, have to do with the congealed habits of thought that place the United States at the epicenter of all global movings and shakings. The tragedy is that such an exaggerated perception of American power and purpose is occurring at precisely the moment when the United States will need to scale back its global ambitions. Indeed, the external perception of U.S. omnipresence will make the pursuit of a more modest U.S. foreign policy all the more difficult. The Obama administration has consciously adopted a more modest posture in the hopes of improving America’s standing abroad. If the rest of the world genuinely believes that the United States causes everything, however, then the attempt at modesty will inevitably fail.
A2: Offshore Balancing – Weakness Balancing dynamics don’t manifest unless the US becomes overtly threatening – standard balance-of-power explanations are structurally invalid.
Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 2009 [G. John, Prof. Politics and Int'l Affairs @ Princeton U, Michael, Prof. Gov't and Assoc. Dean Social Sciences @ Dartmouth College, and William C., Prof. Gov't @ Dartmouth College, "Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences," in World Politics, Vol 61, No 1, January, MUSE | VP]
The proposition that great concentrations of capabilities generate countervailing tendencies toward balance is among the oldest and best known in international relations.33 Applying this balancing proposition to a unipolar system is complex, however, for even as unipolarity increases the incentives for counterbalancing it also raises the costs. Walt [End Page 18] and Finnemore each analyze the interplay between these incentives. They agree on the basic proposition that the current unipolar order pushes secondary states away from traditional hard counterbalancing—formal military alliances and/or military buildups meant to create a global counterweight to the unipole—and toward other, often subtler strategies, such as soft balancing, hiding, binding, delegitimation, or norm entrapment. These analyses lead to the general expectation that a shift from a multipolar or bipolar to a unipolar structure would increase the relative salience of such subtler balancing/resistance strategies.
Walt argues that standard neorealist balance of power theory predicts the absence of counterbalancing under unipolarity. Yet he contends that the core causal mechanisms of balance-of-threat theory remain operative in a unipolar setting. Walt develops a modification of the theory that highlights the role of soft balancing and other subtler strategies of resistance as vehicles to overcome the particular challenges unipolarity presents to counterbalancing. He contends that balancing dynamics remain latent within a unipolar structure and can be brought forth if the unipole acts in a particularly threatening manner.
Finnemore develops a contrasting theoretical architecture for explaining secondary state behavior. For her, both the absence of balancing and the presence of other patterns of resistance can be explained only by reference to the social, as opposed to the material, structure of international politics. In particular, secondary state strategies that have the effect of reining in the unipole cannot be understood as the result of standard security-maximizing incentives. Rather, they are partially the outgrowth of the secondary states’ internalization of the norms and rules of the institutional order. If the unipole acts in accordance with those rules, the tendency of other states to resist or withhold cooperation will be muted. Finnemore establishes three social mechanisms that constrain the unipole: legitimation, institutionalization, and incentives for hypocrisy. Each of these entails a logic of resistance to actions by the unipole that violate certain socially defined boundaries.
A2: Offshore Balancing
Offshore balancing fails
Colin S. Gray ( Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England) January 2009 “ After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=902
The United States could try to effect a transition from its current on-shore Eurasian strategy of forward deployment, to an off-shore posture keyed to a policy role as "spoiler" of potential grand continental coalitions. As maritime-air-space balancer of large Eurasian menaces, the United States would both retain its political discretion over belligerency and favor its national strength in the higher technology features of its armed forces. The problem is that this off-shore role would not suffice to defend the national interest. The country would not be trusted, since it would eschew the firm commitments that require local presence. As much to the point, U.S. influence would be certain to diminish as a consequence of a process of withdrawal, no matter how impressive the reach of America's weapons through the several geographies of the great "commons." Almost by default, the United States should choose, perhaps simply accept, the role of hegemon-leader for a world order that serves both its own most vital interests as well as those of a clear majority of members of the world community, such as it is. Contrary to the sense of much of the contemporary debate, Americans have no prudent alternative other than to play the hegemonic role. But for the role to be sustainable, it has to rest upon the formal or tacit consent of other societies. Only with such consent will America be able to exercise a national security strategy geared successfully to the ordering duty.
A2: Offshore Balancing
Balancing fail – US strength and alliance difficulties prevent
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false
The main systemic obstacles to external balancing are coordination – a ubiquitous difficulty in international relations – and the collective action problem, which is even more formidable. Collective goods theory predicts that counterbalancing alliances will be hard to form and make effective.A balancing constraint against a prospective hegemon can be enjoyed by states that do not contribute to it; one state’s security benefit does not prevent others from benefiting as well. The result is a powerful incentive to free ride. States are tempted to stand aside and pass the balancing buck to others. Hence it is little wonder that John Mearsheimer’s review of two centuries’ experience leads him to conclude that “great powers seem clearly to prefer buck-passing to balancing.” The collective action problem feeds into the coordination challenges that beset any cooperative endeavor among states. Each prospective balancer is a self-interested actor seeking to minimize costs and risks and maximize the degree to which the alliance’s strategy complements the actor’s other preferences. Even when they agree on the need to balance, states tend to disagree on how burdens should be shared and what strategy should be followed. Allies tend to splinter over who gets to lead and set strategy. Except for those few alliances lucky enough to be able to balance a hegemon without a great deal of strategic coordination, effective alliances demand that members’ decisions on national security be shaped by their collective purpose. Leadership in an alliance of sovereign states with roughly equal capabilities is usually so contentious an issue that it is never really settled, which leads to strategic incoherence. The sheer size and comprehensiveness of the power gap favoring the United States, moreover, raises still higher the coordination and collective action barriers to external balancing. The greater and more comprehensive the hegemon’s lead, the larger and more strategically coherent the coalition needed to check it. As figure 2.1 illustrates, the power gaps that balancing efforts had to overcome in the past were much narrower, and yet the barriers loomed large. They are far more formidable now given the long road prospective balancers would have to travel to produce a credible check on American power. A comparison to history’s most successful power-aggregating alliance, NATO, is instructive. NATO’s ability to overcome the perennial obstacles to balancing in the Cold War hinged on two conditions: it confronted a one-dimensional superpower that was competitive mainly in conventional land power; and U.S. leadership within the coalition allowed Washington to overcome coordination problems and absorb the costs and risks of free riding by others. Those advantages do not apply to the would-be members of a counter-coalition against U.S. power today. There is no obvious leader of a hypothetical coalition, nor would that coalition posses the latent power advantage NATO enjoyed. Today’s unipolar system, in short, multiplies the problems that complicated the balancing efforts of the past. Organizing collective action to check a rising power is hard enough; fashioning a durable, coherent coalition against a well-established hegemon is a tougher order of business. All of the difficulties of overthrowing a ramified status quo now work for, rather than against, the hegemon. Several of the major powers are longtime allies of United States and derive substantial benefits from their position. Attempting to balance would put those benefits at risk, and Washington has ample opportunities to exploit the free-rider problem by playing divide and rule. A2: Offshore Balancing States won’t balance – geography and neighboring powers restrict them
Brooks &Wohlforth2008Stephen G. & William C. Associate Professors in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. World Out of Balance. International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fMWRJy1MznUC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=World+Out+of+Balance&ots=OoUSGjywNP&sig=rjiok0BKhyTk1Mh_1fqIMP4E09g#v=onepage&q&f=false A final impediment to balancing is the opportunity cost of using resources and bending strategy toward countering the system’s strongest state. Some fortunate balancers may find that their efforts to counter the hegemon complement their other foreign policy objectives. But most are not so lucky; the resources they use for balancing often cannot be used for other purposes. Many are less fortunate still, and find that balancing undermines other core interests. Here, we will discuss only opportunity costs for pursuing security interests, but this analysis can easily be extended to other core interests as well. A state’s willingness to pay for balancing is conditioned by the proportion of its security problems that would be addressed by checking systemic hegemony. The smaller this proportion is, the higher the opportunity cost – and thus the lower the probability – of balancing. More specifically, the more important are local securities issues compared to the benefit of checking the systemic hegemon. First is geography. The costs and challenges of moving military forces over long distances mean that countries generally pose greater threats to their neighbors than to states farther away. Neighbors are also more likely to have more potential clashes of interest with each other than with distant states. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass, where all the prospective balancers reside. When the putative hegemon and most of the potential balancers are close neighbors – as they were in the classic balancing episodes in modern European history – systemic and local imperatives more readily reinforce each other, meaning that balancing the hegemon is less likely to come at the expense of addressing local security challenges. In contrast, when the hegemon lies far offshore and the prospective balancers are close neighbors, as in the current system, local imperatives loom larger, and the counterbalancing strategy loses appeal. Second is the number of lesser states relative to great powers. The previous section showed that the current international system is characterized by an unprecedented hegemony with the great-power subsystem. Also important is the extraordinary proliferation of medium and minor powers. The dramatic increase in the number of states over the last half-century means that there are many more with at least some offensive military capability and occasionally significant defensive capability.Each great power has to think about more (and, in some cases, more capable) states than did their predecessors in most previous international systems. The result is again to increase the significance of local security issues and decrease the salience of systemic balance. A high relative salience of local security issues in today’s unipolar system raises the opportunity costs of systemic balancing. In many cases, the capabilities needed to check U.S. power are ill suited for local security challenges. As we shall discuss in more detail in chapter 3, when states face trade-offs between purchasing capabilities that might constrain the United States as opposed to those more useful for dealing with more immediate local problems, most opt for the latter most of the time. Even more important are the direct local security costs of systemic balancing. With great powers other than the United States clustered in and around Eurasia, efforts to produce systemic balance are likely to stoke local security dilemmas and generate compensating efforts by neighbors long before they materially reduce U.S preponderance. Moreover, such efforts may have the perverse effect of pushing neighboring powers closer to the United States.