Hegemony Generic 1
1NC 2
1NC 3
1NC 4
Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance 6
Hegemony Sustainable 8
Hegemony Sustainable 9
Hegemony Sustainable – Economics 10
Heg Sustainable (Economic dominance) 11
Hegemony Sustainable – A2: Dollar Heg 12
AT: Growing International Markets 13
AT: Outsourcing 14
AT: Savings/Deficit 15
AT: Technical Education/Higher Education 16
AT: Primacy/Secondary Schools 17
AT: Britain Proves Unsustainability 18
A2: Britain Proves Unsustainability 20
AT: McDougall 21
A2: Collapse Now 22
China Challenges 23
That modernization, the 2006 QDR explained, “has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios.” The “pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” China’s large-scale investments in offensive capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, more advanced submarines, and “strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systems” directly affect U.S. military force requirements and “place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.”2 23
China War Impact 24
A2: China 25
A2: China – Economics 26
Forward Deployment Link 27
Forward Deployment Link 28
Forward Deployment Link 29
Forward Deployment Link 30
Link Booster 31
Credibility Link 32
Bases Link 34
Afghanistan Link 35
Afghanistan Link 36
Afghanistan Link 37
Afghanistan Link 38
Afghanistan Link 39
Afghanistan Link 40
Afghanistan Link 41
Afghanistan Link 42
Afghanistan Link 43
Afghanistan Link 44
Afghanistan Link 45
Afghanistan Links 46
Afghanistan Link 47
Afghanistan Link 48
Middle East Link 49
Iraq Link 50
Iraq Link 51
Iraq Link 52
Iraq Link 54
Iraq Link 55
Iraq Link 56
Iraq Link 57
Iraq Link 59
Iraq Link 60
Iraq Link 61
Iraq Link 63
Iraq Link 64
Iraq Link 65
Iraq Link 67
Iraq Link 68
Iraq Link 69
Kuwait Links 70
Kuwait Links 71
Asia Link 72
Asia Link 73
Asia Link 74
Asia Link 76
Asia Link 77
Asian Deterrence High 78
Japan Link 79
Japan Link 80
Japan Link 81
Japan Link 82
Japan Link 83
Japan Link 84
Japan Link – China 85
Japan Booster 86
Okinawa Link 87
Okinawa Link 88
Okinawa Link 90
Okinawa Link 91
South Korea Link 92
South Korea Link 94
South Korea Link 95
South Korea Link 96
South Korea Link – China 97
North Korea deterred now 98
North Korea deterred now 99
Turkey Link - TNWs 100
Turkey Link – TNWs 101
Turkey Link – TNWs 102
Turkey Link 103
Turkey Link 104
Turkey Link 105
Current Commitments Key 106
Perception Key 107
Hegemony Good – War 108
Hegemony Good – War 109
Hegemony Good – War 110
Hegemony Good – War 111
Hegemony Good – Power Vacuum 112
Hegemony Good – Global Crises 113
Heg Good – Laundry List 114
Heg Good – Economy 115
Hegemony Good – Prolif 116
Hegemony Good – Trade 117
Hegemony Good – Japan Rearm 118
Hegemony Good – Taiwan Invasion 119
A2: Offshore Balancing – Perception 120
A2: Offshore Balancing – Weakness 121
A2: Offshore Balancing 122
A2: Offshore Balancing 123
A2: Offshore Balancing 124
A2: Offshore Balancing 125
A2: Offshore Balancing 127
A2: Offshore Balancing 128
A2: Offshore Balancing 129
A2: Offshore Balancing 130
A2: Middle East balancing 131
A2: Asia Balancing 132
A2: China Balancing 133
A2: China Balancing 134
A2: EU Balancing 135
A2: Russia Balancing 136
Hegemony 2AC 137
Decline Inevitable 138
Decline Inevitable 139
Decline Inevitable 140
Decline Inevitable 141
Decline Inevitable 142
Decline inevitable 143
Decline inevitable: Deficits 144
Decline Inevitable: Dollar Heg 146
Decline Inevitable – Dollar Heg 147
Decline Inevitable: Navy 148
Decline Inevitable: Europe 150
No Primacy 151
No Primacy 152
No Primacy 153
No Primacy 154
AT: Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 155
Middle East Heg Unsustainable 158
China Challenges 159
China Challenges 160
AT: Brooks and Wohlforth 161
Afghanistan Aff – Expensive 162
Afghanistan Aff 163
Afghanistan Aff 165
Afghanistan Aff 166
Iraq Aff 167
Iraq Aff 169
Iraq Aff 170
Iraq Aff 171
Iraq aff 173
Iraq Aff – Readiness 174
Iraq Aff 175
Iraq Aff - Overstretch 176
Iraq Aff – Soft Power 177
Turkey Aff 178
Turkey Aff 179
Turkey Aff 180
Japan Aff 181
Japan Aff 182
Japan Aff 183
Japan Aff 184
South Korea Aff 185
South Korea Aff 186
South Korea Aff – China 187
South Korea Aff – North Korea 188
Soft Power/Legitimacy Key 189
Soft Power/Legitimacy Key 190
Offshore Balancing Good – Laundry List 193
Offshore Balancing Good – Maintains Hegemony 195
Offshore Balancing Good – Challengers 196
Offshore Balancing Good – Counterbalancing 197
Offshore Balancing Good – Iran 199
Offshore Balancing Good – Iraq 200
Offshore Balancing Good – Afghanistan 202
Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East 204
Offshore Balancing Good – East Asia 205
Offshore Balancing Good – China 206
206
Offshore Balancing Good – Avoids anti- American resentment 207
A2: Israeli Strikes 208
Forward Deployment Bad – Laundry List 209
Forward Deployment Bad – Hegemony 210
Forward Deployment Bad: Prolif 211
Forward Deployment Bad – Russia 212
Russia Cooperation Solves Economy 213
Russian Engagement Key 214
A2: Russia Won’t Cooperate 215
Forward Deployment Bad – ME – AT: Oil 216
Hegemony Bad – Economy 218
Hegemony Bad – Economy 219
Hegemony Bad – War 220
Hegemony Bad – Terrorism 221
Hegemony Bad – Economy 222
Hegemony Bad – Economy 223
Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (1/2) 224
Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (2/2) 225
Ext. Heg Causes Prolif 226
Hegemony Bad – China War 227
Ext. – China War 228
Ext. – China War 229
Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (1/2) 230
Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (2/2) 231
Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (1/2) 232
Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (2/2) 233
Ext. - Heg Causes Interventionism 234
A2 Hegemony K to Deomcracy 235
It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners.
The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.
Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.
People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.
The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.
In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.
The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.