Hegemony da ddi 2010 1 Hegemony Generic
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- Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance
Hegemony DA DDI 2010 1 Hegemony Generic Hegemony Generic 1 1NC 2
1NC 3 1NC 4
Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance 6 Hegemony Sustainable 8 Hegemony Sustainable 9 Hegemony Sustainable – Economics 10 Heg Sustainable (Economic dominance) 11 Hegemony Sustainable – A2: Dollar Heg 12 AT: Growing International Markets 13 AT: Outsourcing 14 AT: Savings/Deficit 15 AT: Technical Education/Higher Education 16 AT: Primacy/Secondary Schools 17 AT: Britain Proves Unsustainability 18 A2: Britain Proves Unsustainability 20 AT: McDougall 21 A2: Collapse Now 22 China Challenges 23 That modernization, the 2006 QDR explained, “has accelerated since the mid-to-late 1990s in response to central leadership demands to develop military options against Taiwan scenarios.” The “pace and scope of China’s military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk.” China’s large-scale investments in offensive capabilities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, more advanced submarines, and “strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land and sea-based systems” directly affect U.S. military force requirements and “place a premium on forces capable of sustained operations at great distances into denied areas.”2 23 China War Impact 24 A2: China 25 A2: China – Economics 26 Forward Deployment Link 27 Forward Deployment Link 28 Forward Deployment Link 29 Forward Deployment Link 30 Link Booster 31 Credibility Link 32 Bases Link 34 Afghanistan Link 35 Afghanistan Link 36 Afghanistan Link 37 Afghanistan Link 38 Afghanistan Link 39 Afghanistan Link 40 Afghanistan Link 41 Afghanistan Link 42 Afghanistan Link 43 Afghanistan Link 44 Afghanistan Link 45 Afghanistan Links 46 Afghanistan Link 47 Afghanistan Link 48 Middle East Link 49 Iraq Link 50 Iraq Link 51 Iraq Link 52 Iraq Link 54 Iraq Link 55 Iraq Link 56 Iraq Link 57 Iraq Link 59 Iraq Link 60 Iraq Link 61 Iraq Link 63 Iraq Link 64 Iraq Link 65 Iraq Link 67 Iraq Link 68 Iraq Link 69 Kuwait Links 70 Kuwait Links 71 Asia Link 72 Asia Link 73 Asia Link 74 Asia Link 76 Asia Link 77 Asian Deterrence High 78 Japan Link 79 Japan Link 80 Japan Link 81 Japan Link 82 Japan Link 83 Japan Link 84 Japan Link – China 85 Japan Booster 86 Okinawa Link 87 Okinawa Link 88 Okinawa Link 90 Okinawa Link 91 South Korea Link 92 South Korea Link 94 South Korea Link 95 South Korea Link 96 South Korea Link – China 97 North Korea deterred now 98 North Korea deterred now 99 Turkey Link - TNWs 100 Turkey Link – TNWs 101 Turkey Link – TNWs 102 Turkey Link 103 Turkey Link 104 Turkey Link 105 Current Commitments Key 106 Perception Key 107 Hegemony Good – War 108 Hegemony Good – War 109 Hegemony Good – War 110 Hegemony Good – War 111 Hegemony Good – Power Vacuum 112 Hegemony Good – Global Crises 113 Heg Good – Laundry List 114 Heg Good – Economy 115 Hegemony Good – Prolif 116 Hegemony Good – Trade 117 Hegemony Good – Japan Rearm 118 Hegemony Good – Taiwan Invasion 119 A2: Offshore Balancing – Perception 120 A2: Offshore Balancing – Weakness 121 A2: Offshore Balancing 122 A2: Offshore Balancing 123 A2: Offshore Balancing 124 A2: Offshore Balancing 125 A2: Offshore Balancing 127 A2: Offshore Balancing 128 A2: Offshore Balancing 129 A2: Offshore Balancing 130 A2: Middle East balancing 131 A2: Asia Balancing 132 A2: China Balancing 133 A2: China Balancing 134 A2: EU Balancing 135 A2: Russia Balancing 136 Hegemony 2AC 137 Decline Inevitable 138 Decline Inevitable 139 Decline Inevitable 140 Decline Inevitable 141 Decline Inevitable 142 Decline inevitable 143 Decline inevitable: Deficits 144 Decline Inevitable: Dollar Heg 146 Decline Inevitable – Dollar Heg 147 Decline Inevitable: Navy 148 Decline Inevitable: Europe 150 No Primacy 151 No Primacy 152 No Primacy 153 No Primacy 154 AT: Ikenberry, Mastanduno, and Wohlforth 155 Middle East Heg Unsustainable 158 China Challenges 159 China Challenges 160 AT: Brooks and Wohlforth 161 Afghanistan Aff – Expensive 162 Afghanistan Aff 163 Afghanistan Aff 165 Afghanistan Aff 166 Iraq Aff 167 Iraq Aff 169 Iraq Aff 170 Iraq Aff 171 Iraq aff 173 Iraq Aff – Readiness 174 Iraq Aff 175 Iraq Aff - Overstretch 176 Iraq Aff – Soft Power 177 Turkey Aff 178 Turkey Aff 179 Turkey Aff 180 Japan Aff 181 Japan Aff 182 Japan Aff 183 Japan Aff 184 South Korea Aff 185 South Korea Aff 186 South Korea Aff – China 187 South Korea Aff – North Korea 188 Soft Power/Legitimacy Key 189 Soft Power/Legitimacy Key 190 Offshore Balancing Good – Laundry List 193 Offshore Balancing Good – Maintains Hegemony 195 Offshore Balancing Good – Challengers 196 Offshore Balancing Good – Counterbalancing 197 Offshore Balancing Good – Iran 199 Offshore Balancing Good – Iraq 200 Offshore Balancing Good – Afghanistan 202 Offshore Balancing Good – Middle East 204 Offshore Balancing Good – East Asia 205 Offshore Balancing Good – China 206 206 Offshore Balancing Good – Avoids anti- American resentment 207 A2: Israeli Strikes 208 Forward Deployment Bad – Laundry List 209 Forward Deployment Bad – Hegemony 210 Forward Deployment Bad: Prolif 211 Forward Deployment Bad – Russia 212 Russia Cooperation Solves Economy 213 Russian Engagement Key 214 A2: Russia Won’t Cooperate 215 Forward Deployment Bad – ME – AT: Oil 216 Hegemony Bad – Economy 218 Hegemony Bad – Economy 219 Hegemony Bad – War 220 Hegemony Bad – Terrorism 221 Hegemony Bad – Economy 222 Hegemony Bad – Economy 223 Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (1/2) 224 Hegemony Bad – Proliferation – (2/2) 225 Ext. Heg Causes Prolif 226 Hegemony Bad – China War 227 Ext. – China War 228 Ext. – China War 229 Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (1/2) 230 Hegemony Bad – Middle East and Iran War (2/2) 231 Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (1/2) 232 Hegemony Bad – Interventionism (2/2) 233 Ext. - Heg Causes Interventionism 234 A2 Hegemony K to Deomcracy 235
1NC U.S. military primacy is high – an aggressive force posture makes it sustainable, and there are no challengers Brooks and Wohlforth 2008 [Stephen G. and William C., Profs. Gov’t @ Dartmouth, World out of Balance, p. 28-9] The United States spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make an effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting than the grit spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that give United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were me than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American.' And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has harvested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D.'5 These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest US forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” –that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, “Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. 1NC Withdrawal creates immediate regional power vacuums that embolden challengers. Poffenbarger and Schaefer 2009 [John G., Dept Social Sciences @ Wheeling Jesuit U, and Mark E., Dept History, Philosophy, Poli. Sci. and Religion @ Marietta College, "Searching for Acceptance: The United States and South America," for presentation at the 2009 International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, February 17, AllAcademic | VP] It is our contention that a strategy of hegemony is preferable to one of offshore balancing for several reasons. First, we believe that the depth and breadth of United States’ interests may not be best served by the use of regional proxies. The utilization of regional partners is certainly a possibility for an actor such as the United States, however off-shore balancing seems to call for an over reliance on such partners that could weaken United States power and interests. Second, the realities of the recent Bush administration’s policies may not allow for such a strategic adjustment to offshore balancing. That is not to say that the United States might not seek to reduce its exposure abroad in some areas, but a move to an off-shore balancing strategy at this time may send the wrong message to allies and potential rivals. Next, a move away from a strategy of hegemony would likely trigger a power vacuum in some areas. The European Union faces problems of unity, cohesion, willingness, and a lack of structure to deal with most of the situations currently faced by the United States. Russia, while seeing a resurgence of power in recent years, does not appear to currently have global ambitions, but more likely wishes to focus on its “near-abroad”. (This “near abroad” also seems to lie within United States’ security and economic purview.) China also appears to currently have limited global interests, as it seeks to finalize its development and gain global energy access, but it also may be searching for ways to alter its relative power in relation to the United States. Finally, it is our belief that such a dramatic change in strategy may actually trigger more balancing; as such a withdrawal may send a signal of vulnerability and a lack of willingness to latent balancers. We contend that the United States would be best served by maintaining its current position in the international system, and by simply taking steps to mitigate the motivations for balancing while seeking to attract bandwagoners. 1NC Sustained unipolar hegemony prevents multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict. Kagan 2007 [Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, “End of Dreams, Return of History”, Hoover Institution - Stanford U, in Policy Review, No 144, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10] Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path. Primacy Now – Comprehensive Dominance Directory: files files -> The United States and Post-Castro Cuba files -> Fighting Fit: Exploring Military Medicine (1850-1950) files -> Original: English files -> Socials 11: Provincial Exam Review Preparation Essay Component files -> 9. 5 Political Powers and Achievements Tom Burns- beacon High School files -> Indiana Academic Standards Resource Guide World History and Civilization Standards Approved March 2014 files -> On the Vanity of Earthly Greatness” “Ozymandious” Arthur Guiterman (1871-1943;1936) Author files -> Understanding Diversity What is Diversity? files -> Sscg: 16 Unit 7: Judicial Branch Share with your friends:
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