Seemed relevant to hege and I figured there might be an aff that solves this. Obviously, an aff couldn’t directly invest in this but there is a bunch of stuff about how “Air-Sea Battle” is key to be able to blockade China.
Blockade K2 Deterrence
The Chinese naval modernization is outpacing US capabilities – the ability to enact a naval blockade is critical to effective deterrence
Mirski, 13 – junior fellow in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Sean, “The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 12 Feb 2013, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/12/stranglehold-context-conduct-and-consequences-of-american-naval-blockade-of-china/fowj)//eek
Since World War II, the United States has aimed to preserve military primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather than using this ascendancy for expansionist purposes, the United States sought to maintain regional stability through deterrence. For over five decades, its forces largely preserved command over the global commons in the pursuit of this mission. Even to this day, the United States remains the region’s most powerful military actor. But American military dominance is steadily eroding thanks to the breakneck pace of China’s military modernization, and, as a result, the military balance in the region is shifting. Since the mid-1990s, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been in the process of creating a formidable anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) complex in China’s near seas. As China continues to upgrade its A2/AD system, it presents a serious and sustained challenge to the United States’ operational access to the region. In wartime, some American forces may initially be prevented from operating in China’s near seas. Even in peacetime, China’s A2/AD complex arguably attenuates the United States’ ability to defend its interests and its allies from potential Chinese coercion, and with it, the American-organized system of deterrence and regional stability. The mounting challenge presented by China’s military modernization has led the United States to review existing military strategies and to conceptualize new ones. In the universe of possible strategies, the idea of a naval blockade deserves greater scrutiny. By prosecuting a naval blockade, the United States would leverage China’s intense dependence on foreign trade – particularly oil – to debilitate the Chinese state. A carefully-organized blockade could thus serve as a powerful instrument of American military power that contributes to overcoming the pressing challenge of China’s A2/AD system. A blockade could also provide the United States with several gradations of escalation control and be easily paired with alternate military strategies. Even if a blockade is never executed, its viability would still impact American and Chinese policies for deterrence reasons. The United States’ regional strategy is predicated on the belief that a favorable military balance deters attempts to change the status quo by force, thus reassuring allies and upholding strategic stability. The viability of a blockade influences this calculus, and can accordingly affect American and Chinese actions – both military and non-military – that are based on perceptions of it. If a naval blockade is a feasible strategy, it strengthens the American system of deterrence and dilutes any potential attempts by China to coerce the United States or its allies. Moreover, if a blockade’s viability can be clearly enunciated, it would also enhance crisis stability and dampen the prospects of escalation due to misunderstandings – on either side – about the regional balance of power. Yet despite the importance of understanding the viability of a blockade, the existing literature on the subject is remarkably sparse, circumscribed and inconclusive.4 While scholars of regional security affairs often reference their disparate beliefs about the possibility of a blockade, no consensus exists around either its strategic or operational viability. The few studies that have been undertaken are perspicacious and refreshingly creative, but they are limited in either their scope or detail. To date, no one has yet carried out a comprehensive public examination of a blockade’s prospects despite the striking implications of such a study for the Asia-Pacific military balance, regional deterrence and stability, and American military strategy. In part, a blockade strategy has been overlooked because economic warfare strategies seem inherently misguided given the close commer- cial ties between China and the United States. But if a serious conflict between the two nations erupted, then their immediate security interests would quickly override their trade interdependence and wreak enormous economic damage on both sides, regardless of whether a blockade were employed.